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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION TO  
MARKET INFORMATION SHARING  
IN CHANNEL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Wal-Mart, Carrefour, Metro Group, Home Depot, H&M, Inditex/Zara, and Tesco. What do 
these retail heavyweights have in common? Is it their sheer enormous size and that each of 
these firms operate over more than 1,000 stores? Is it that they have impressively 
internationalized and entered different continents of the globe? Is it the fact that all of them 
have been miraculously unstoppable in multiplying their total sales in the last 10 years? 
Yes, each of these facts is true; but foremost these companies have become the legendary 
icons of the Retailing Revolution (cf. Bleustone et al., 1981; Kumar, 1997; Kahn and 
McAlister, 1997; Seth and Randall, 1999; Spector, 2005). Rather than the term 
“revolution” would suggest, this event was not a sudden shake-up but actually a widely-
observed uninterrupted trend for more than 30 years involving many aspects of the 
industry. The Retailing Revolution has turned the originally fragmented dormant and 
unsophisticated retail trade into a consolidated hyper-competitive and technology-savvy 
industry. By forging horizontal alliances, pursuing merges and acquisitions, many retailers 
have built up enough critical mass to create extremely efficient logistical systems and to 
develop their own excellence in marketing and branding capabilities. The quality of their 
consumer marketing capabilities was particularly demonstrated by creating strong store 
brand names, introducing competitive private label products and successful shopper-
loyalty cards programs, launching new innovative retail formats, and incorporating the 
opportunities provided by the Internet into their multi-channeling strategies.  
With their economies-of-scale and their investments in the latest ICT-technology (e.g., 
barcode-scanning, EDI-connections, point-of-sale (POS)-systems, shopper-loyalty cards), 
the more powerful retailers began to figure out innovative ways to make the most from 
their advantageous positions of being close to the consumer (Blattberg et al., 1994). 
Through collecting and analyzing their sales and customer loyalty data they can build a 
very valuable asset: real-time market information (Glazer, 1991; Bucklin and Gupta, 1999; 
Leenheer, et al. 2002). They subsequently started leveraging their size and information on 
shopping behavior to increase their bargaining power when dealing with their suppliers, 
the manufacturers (Corstjens and Corstjens, 1995; Wileman and Jary, 1997). Because, 
 2 
from the perspective of the Retailing Revolution, the suppliers/manufacturers were 
considered to be the “ruling establishment” against which these retailers stood up. 1  
In this dissertation we focus on retailers and their relationships with the formerly 
dominating players in the arena of the consumer marketplace: their suppliers. While the 
early periods in the Retailing Revolution had featured the retailers’ professionalization of 
internal processes (concentration, economies-of-scale, efficient logistic operations) and of 
front-office operations (i.e. interfaces with consumers), a new era has now dawned on the 
industry: the Back-End Revolution of Retailing (BusinessWeek, April 15, 2002). Thanks to 
the advances in information communication technology, new software with high speed 
connectivity, product coding standardization, and especially the rapid diffusion of web-
based tools to communicate with suppliers, totally new opportunities for retailers have 
emerged to rethink their supply chain relationship management (Lancioni, et al., 2000; 
Weber, 2001; Easton and Araujo, 2003; Brown, et al., 2005). Retailers can choose from a 
wide range of strategies lying on a continuum from competing head-on with suppliers, on 
one extreme, to collaborating side-by-side with suppliers, to the other extreme. Nowadays, 
innovative retailers are pioneering with strategies from either side of the “hard-soft” 
spectrum in restructuring their relationships with suppliers. With regard to head-on 
competition, retailers joined forces in designing e-marketplaces (Grewal et al., 2001; 
Skjøtt-Larsen et al., 2003; Eng, 2004). Two of such examples are Worldwide Retail 
Exchange (WWRE) and GlobalNetXchange (GNX) which can increase competition for 
commodity purchases (Hansen, et al., 2001); by, for instance, aggregating demand across 
multiple retailers to organize reversed auctions aiming for the best possible deal (Jap, 
2003; Smart and Harrison, 2003; Pinker et al. 2003). 
As the opposite and more “soft” alternative to squeezing suppliers for lower prices, 
retailers are also exploring strategies from the other side of the spectrum: collaborating 
with suppliers side-by-side (Buzzell and Ortmeyer, 1995; Mentzer et al., 2000; Corsten and 
Kumar, 2005). Suchlike retailer-supplier collaborations ought to make the channel fulfill 
consumer wishes together, better, faster, and at less costs. Engineering the channel to be 
more efficient and more market-responsive is not an easy task, because consumer demand 
is continuously changing and is getting ever more difficult to predict and still many 
                                                          
1 The many reports from practitioners about the power shift from manufacturer to retailer have been subject to a 
lot of academic debate. Several marketing scholars have tried to look for empirical evidence for this alleged shift 
in power (see Farris and Ailawadi, 1992, and Messinger and Narasimhan, 1995), but their longitudinal 
econometric models could not detect a negative effect of the growing retail concentration on the profitability of 
manufactures. Ailawadi (2001) gives explanations for why manufacturer profitability has not worsened relative to 
retailers: sales promotions are just as beneficial for manufacturers as for retailers and a competitive national brand 
assortment is still necessary for retailer profitability. For us, the important bottom-line here is that retailers have 
developed into good consumer marketing organizations like their counterparts, the suppliers/manufacturers 
(hereafter named: supplier). 
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channels structurally contain a lot of restrictions and suffer long time-lags to react to these 
consumer changes. With the help of new technologies like private virtual marketplaces / 
retail vendor portals, Wal-Mart’s RetailLink and Tesco’s TIE, retailers are more and more 
strategically using their collected real-time market information to cooperate with their 
suppliers (Information Week, May 21, 1999) in order to make the channel more demand-
driven. Illustrative in this respect is Wal-Mart’s announcement to stop selling its data to 
market-research companies (such as A.C. Nielsen and IRI) and to give emphasis to sharing 
its POS-data with channel partners (CBS.MarketWatch.com, May 12, 2001). The 
collaborations with suppliers in the channel are not only restricted to the retailing 
revolution icons, but also many other retailers have began to share market information with 
their suppliers. Across various retail industries, these retailer-supplier collaboration efforts 
are often labeled differently and decorated with acronyms like ECR, VMI, CRP, CPFR, 
QR, EDI, CM, RFID.2 Ultimately, the aim for all of them is very similar: “reinventing the 
traditional retail supply chain in order to create a successful demand chain” as “a 
consumer-driven change” (Blackwell, 1997; Blackwell and Blackwell, 1999), and the 
channel parties should be able to “offer the right products in the right place at the right 
time for the right price”. This four-edged objective is also considered to be the “Holy Grail 
of Retailing” (Fisher, et al., 2000), and is an idealized result supposedly attainable through 
an information-integrated channel (Abernathy et al., 1995) that quickly absorbs market 
information and moves it upstream in the channel to suppliers. 
If retailers decide to pursue channel collaborations with suppliers, they may as well 
benefit from their suppliers’ consumer and market information, because suppliers are 
traditionally the players in the channel having invested time and money in consumer and 
marketing informational resource, and in brand building (Corstjens and Corstjens, 1995). 
Suppliers have a strong reputation of being the experts on consumer habits and product 
preferences. Plus, through their dealings often more than one retailer, these players occupy 
in an excellent place in the chain to oversee market developments across retail channels. 
Even throughout these past years of upcoming retail power and increases in store brand 
penetration, brand manufacturers have maintained and increased their brand's equity by 
means of frequent and effective advertising and other equity-enhancing strategies. 
Consumers evidently are still willing to pay extra for manufacturer brands (Sethuraman, 
2000). Keeping their more advantageous position in the consumers’ minds, brand 
manufacturers embrace new communication technologies to stay in-sync with diverse 
                                                          
2 The acronyms stand for Efficient Consumer Response (ECR), Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI), Continuous 
Replenishment (CRP), Collaborative Planning Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR), Quick response (QR), 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), Category Management (CM), Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID); most 
of these concepts will be explained in detail further on in this thesis. 
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consumer target groups, like through virtual communities of consumption (e.g., Kozinets, 
2002; De Valck, 2005). Hence, brand manufacturers also possess market information 
which is valuable to their downstream trading partners and most of them have 
acknowledged the need to engage into ways to collaborate with retailers in a more 
intelligent way, rather than competing with their retailers head-on and having difficulties 
to keep their brands available for their consumers and to secure their market reach. 
Manufacturers are increasingly looking at ways to support the retailer in local marketing 
efforts (Van Dijk, 2004; Kotler, et al, 2002; micromarketing, Hoch, et al, 1995). 
To sum up, both retailers and suppliers possess valuable information resources about 
consumers and the marketplace. The idea of market information sharing is that retailer and 
manufacturer might learn from each other’s information and the channel relationship of the 
sharing parties may become more responsive to changes in market needs. Thanks to their 
mutually broader insights into the marketplace, channel partners are better capable of 
monitoring customers’ needs and behavior real time and they can evaluate the 
effectiveness of their marketing instruments, acquire market knowledge, improve the 
quality of marketing decisions, and ultimately transform the market channel relationship in 
to demand-driven chain, that is able to “deliver the right product in the right quantities at 
the right time”. 
Despite the promising benefits of constructing a more transparent information-
integrated channel and trying to find this “Holy Grail of Retailing”, it does not mean that 
retailers and suppliers automatically start to share their market information with each 
other. For instance, it is surprising to see that a recent study among 500 most 
technologically-innovative US firms shows that only 10% makes it an occasional or 
standard practice to share information with suppliers (InformationWeek, October 7, 2003). 
The hesitations from channel members may come from conflicting interests between them 
and perhaps associated with lack of trust, because both of them somehow compete for 
shares in the same end-consumer market (Corstjens and Corstjens, 1995), because the two 
parties need to increasingly compete for scare physical access to consumers (shelfspace), 
but also for limited brand loyalty of consumers (mindspace). A retailer may develop 
lucrative private labels that compete with the supplier’s brands, and a manufacturer may 
develop its own direct selling channels to consumers (forward vertical integration). To 
make things worse, often both parties may deal collaboratively with each other’s biggest 
rivals: a retailer also does business with competing suppliers and a manufacturer supplies 
other retailers.  So, all of this raises many questions requiring further investigation. This 
dissertation’s purpose is to understand three critical issues surrounding market information 
sharing in channel relationships. The first interesting issue is to learn more about the 
specific nature of market information sharing. What type of information is actually 
exchanged between channel parties? How frequently do channel members contact each 
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other to update on market developments? Is higher management involved in these 
contacts? Do companies formalize their market information sharing arrangements?  
In addition to knowing the actual nature of market information sharing, the second 
appealing issue to get more knowledge about is the specific circumstances in which 
channel members do share their market information. Especially, since market information 
sharing is yet portrayed as very promising and but not self-evident, it is important to 
discover factors stimulating or inhibiting channel members to share market information. 
Would it be a lack of trust between them? Perhaps their conflicting interests? What would 
be the factors stimulating a channel member to provide with access to their market 
information? Would it be the information processing capabilities of a channel member to 
cope with the abundance of received market information? Or would top management 
support to collaborate in the channel be critical to enhance information sharing?  
The third issue is to find out whether or not market information sharing channel 
members do outperform the channels without information sharing. Do information sharing 
channels learn better about the marketplace? Do they generate more joint profits? Do they 
create strategic revenues for the involved channel parties? Is their working relationship of a 
better quality? Or perhaps, are the information sharing channel relationships awash with 
data and fail to outperform non-information-sharing channels? 
Before discussing our main research questions further in paragraph 1.3, it is important 
to give a sketch of the landscape of market information sharing in channel relationships by 
giving terminology definitions, the concept of indirect channels, optimal channel 
performance, and exemplary cases of information sharing (paragraph 1.2). We then give 
the motivation for this study by addressing the scientific (paragraph 1.4) and managerial 
relevance (paragraph 1.5), and we end this chapter with an explanation of the structure of 
the thesis (paragraph 1.6).  
 
1.2 Market Information Sharing in Channels and its Windows of Opportunities 
Elementary is to introduce the terminology used in the thesis and to illustrate the context of 
the subject of this dissertation. First of all, we introduce the context of information sharing 
between a retailer and a supplier: the indirect marketing channel. Second, we will not only 
explain the collaborative channel philosophy behind market information sharing but also 
the list of symptoms revealing inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in the functioning of 
marketing channels. And third, we briefly describe different types of market information 
sharing arrangements in channels. 
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Figure 1.1 An Indirect Marketing Channel with 1 Supplier and 1 Retailer with the 
Thesis Topic Highlighted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2.1 The Indirect Marketing Channel 
A marketing channel is “a set of interdependent organizations involved in the process of 
making a product or a service available for use or consumption.” (Coughlan et al., 2001). 
The type of channels we center on in this thesis is the indirect marketing channel viz., a 
supplier selling his or her products to consumers via retailers. Figure 1.1 depicts an indirect 
marketing channel and shows the dynamism of different flows (cf. Coughlan, et al., 2001; 
Alderson, 1965; p.5; Bucklin, 1970) within the channel connecting supplier, retailer and 
consumers. The most visible part of this channel dynamism is the flow of goods going 
downstream (together with the flows of physical possession and ownership). The goods 
need to be requested and paid for; so, consumers request them and pay retailers and 
retailers order and pay suppliers; meaning that the flows of orders and money go upstream. 
The flows of information permeate all of the other flows in the channel and actually 
facilitate the movement of goods (Alderson, 1965; p.95) in the following way. In order to 
make the produced products wanted by the marketplace, the supplier investigates 
Information on 
consumer’s product 
preferences, attitudes, 
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product tests) 
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Flow of goods  
(physical possession, ownership) 
Flow of money 
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consumer needs by conducting market research (think of focus-groups, interviews, 
surveys). Likewise, the retailer examines consumers’ shopping and assortment preferences 
by studying the feedback obtained from the marketplace through another wide range of 
available market research means: scanner data, observed buying behavior, shopper focus 
group discussions, loyalty card data, etc. Based on the continuously obtained market 
information, each channel member formulates a product marketing communication plan or 
a retail marketing communication respectively, and subsequently makes attempts to 
influence consumer preferences, attitudes and behavior and to promote their products or 
stores. Consequently, both channel members receive feedback from the marketplace in the 
form of renewed market information. Accordingly, both parties verify this new 
information with their marketing plans and if appropriate an update follows; and the 
market information feedback loops start over.  
Owing to its position in the indirect marketing channel, every channel member 
possesses its own specific market information about the flow of goods (logistics), the 
shoppers’ and user’s preferences and their behavior (consumers), and about what happens 
in other indirect channel relationship through their dealings with each other’s competitors 
(competitors). Having unique information about the marketplace from different sources, 
there are three windows of information sharing opportunities illustrated by Figure 1.2. For 
example, the retailer has information about the logistics status-quo at the retail operations, 
while the supplier has insight into the inventory status at the production facilities. The 
retailer has a good view on consumer purchase behavior in its own outlets, while the 
supplier knows more about the product use in the whole marketplace. Furthermore, both 
channel members have access to different aspects of competitive intelligence: a retailer can 
compare the performance of the supplier to its competitors, whereas the supplier can 
benchmark the retailer’s performance against the other retail customers. The sources of 
market information held by one channel member are complements of the other and thus 
they can be marked as interesting windows of opportunities for information sharing. If 
channel members make use of these windows of opportunities and pool their information 
resources, they can assist each other in creating a completer picture on the actual 
marketplace.  
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Figure 1.2 Windows of Information Sharing Opportunities: Who knows and is able 
to share What? 
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To illustrate this idea better, consider a marketing channel selling a certain product in 
a local market. The supplier/manufacturer has good knowledge about the product’s 
technical specifications. And it may have learned from market research that consumers in 
different segments, those who buy for self-use and those who buy for gifts, will respond 
differently to these specifications and to marketing efforts. However, to make the demand 
forecast in the retail market, the supplier/manufacturer needs information regarding the 
distribution of local consumers across the two segments, but such local level of 
information is generally only accessible to the retailer. On the other hand, the retailer 
would not be able to predict the future product sale either, even though it is about the 
distribution of local consumers across the two segments, unless it acquires the information 
about the different response patterns of different consumer segments to the product.  
This thesis concentrates on the flow of information between the two channel members, 
irrespectively whether this flow is made routinely or in specialized ways. In particular we 
focus on the sharing of market information that helps to construct a more complete picture 
of the consumer marketplace. As such, our research will include the exchange of 
information in all three “windows” of information sharing opportunities: logistics, 
consumers, and competitors.  
 
1.2.2 Efficiency and Effectiveness in Demand-driven Marketing Channels 
The collaborative channel philosophy behind market information sharing in channels 
departs from the fundamental understanding that the total performance of an indirect 
channel is largely dependent of each other channel members’ functioning. In order to have 
its products sold, the supplier needs a well-performing retailer to ensure a timely 
availability to consumers. Likewise, the retailer needs a well-performing supplier to 
produce the right products needed by its consumers. But when do a retailer and a supplier 
have a joint channel relationship that optimally performs? The question is then when does 
a channel succeed in fulfilling consumer demand effectively and efficiently? Ideally, the 
channel performance should maximize the difference between the total of value delivered 
to their end-consumers and the total of supply chain costs (see Table 1.1). There are two 
complementary options to increase this difference. One step is the maximize the total 
consumer value is by expanding the reach of consumers and increasing the value delivered 
to them by ensuring the variety of products that come to the marketplace perfectly reflect 
what consumers want to buy, and delivers “right products in the right amounts at the right 
time for the right price”. The second step is to minimize the total costs made by the 
channel members to physically supply the products. In reality, channels seldom reach such 
a perfect point of maximizing channel performance, and the actual performance is less than 
optimal. The obvious next question to ask: how can channel members observe that their 
channel performance is less than optimal? The idea behind sharing of market information 
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is that by means of comparing and confronting each other’s propriety market information 
leads to more transparency in the channel assisting both channel partners to detect the 
discrepancies between ideal and actual channel performance (see McBeath, 2003; 
www.globalscorecard.net). By identifying these discrepancies between (more) ideal and 
actual performance, channel members are able to improve the quality of their decisions 
with regard to the two main functions of their joint marketing channel; i.e. optimal 
physical supply and optimal consumer value or market mediation (according to Fisher, 
1997). The physical supply function in the retailer-supplier relationship is readily apparent 
and includes producing the finished goods, and transporting all of them from one point in 
the marketing channel to the next; warehouse and retail stores. Less immediately visible 
but equally important is market mediation, whose purpose is to ensure that the variety of 
products reaching the marketplace matches with what consumer want to buy (see Table 
1.1).  
 
Table 1.1 Collaborative Channel Philosophy: Joint Challenges for Maximizing Total 
Channel Performance 
   
[Channel Performance] ≈ { [Market Reach × Consumer Valuei] - Σ [Supply Chain Costs] } 
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Cost-saving efficiency opportunities 
 
Demand-enhancing opportunities 
 Improvement in efficiency (by reduction 
of Physical Supply failures) 
Increase in effectiveness of marketing 
efforts (by elimination of Market Mediation 
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• Low success rate of new product 
launches 
• Obsolete retail inventories 
• Markdowns to clear inventory 
• Failure to offer large product variety 
• Product recalls 
 
Type Demand 
Forecast Error 
 
Inaccurate quantity of products 
 
Inadequate fit of products with consumer 
demand 
 
Adapted from: Marshall L. Fisher (1997); What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, in: Harvard 
Business Review, Vol. 78 (March-April, 1997), pp. 105-116 
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Improving the physical supply efficiency in the channel; the primary purpose of the 
physical supply function is to supply goods to retail customer’s demand efficiently at the 
lowest costs. These supply chain costs are the sum of cost of production, handling, 
transportation and inventory storage from the two channel members combined. There are 
five symptoms signaling room of improvement in the functioning of the physical supply in 
a channel relationship. First, inefficient transactions between two channel members make 
the supply chain to make unnecessary costs. Second, many errors in the flow of goods like 
ordering errors, handling errors, and/or delivery errors cause the supply chain costs to rise 
needlessly. Third, low customer service can lead to out-of-stock situations in retail outlets 
and subsequently to lost sales (opportunities) (ECR Europe/Ronald Berger Strategy 
Consultants, 2003; Corsten and Gruen, 2003; see also research on consumer reactions to 
stock-out situations, Campo et al., 2000; Sloot, et al, 2002). Fourth, relatively high 
inventory levels in the channel can be attributed to a lack of coordination and channel 
partners want to avoid the risk of having an out-of-stock situation. And finally, a fifth 
symptom but less directly visible symptom of physical supply inefficiency is the large 
variations in product flows in the whole supply chain. This is also referred to as the bull-
whip effect (Forrester, 1958, 1961). The demand order variabilities amplify in the 
marketing channel as they move up the channel, due to the supplier’s lack of information 
about consumer demand, delayed reactions by retailers, or forward buying practices by 
retailers (Lee et al., 1997). The primary cause for inefficiency in a channel is a forecast 
error in terms of predicting the wrong quantity for a certain period by at least one of the 
channel members. A successful business case in reducing their supply chain costs is US 
retailer Hannaford Brothers who managed to lower its inventory levels by 30% and reduce 
logistical lead-times from 2 weeks to 4 days by collaborating with their suppliers and 
giving them more market information (Schiano and Clark, 1995). 
Increasing the effectiveness of marketing efforts of the channel; mistakes in the market 
mediation function occur when the quality of goods supply does not match with the quality 
of consumer demand. Ideally, a well market-mediating channel maximizes the delivery of 
consumer value by producing the desired service outputs to the targeted and reached 
consumer segments (cf. Bucklin, 1966, 1970) and by offering the appropriate assortment 
of products the channel is associated with (Inman, et al., 2004); however, when service and 
assortment offerings mismatch with the variety and change in consumer demand, then the 
channel incurs costly mediation mistakes. These market mediation mistakes are recognized 
by different symptoms, such as mark-downs of obsolete retail inventories when supply 
exceeds demand. Other typical mismatches in market mediating are unwanted lot sizes 
(smaller-sized consumption bundle; a mismatch in bulk-breaking), too far-away retail 
outlets (lack of spatial convenience), too limited and unattractive assortments (e.g., De 
Vries-van Ketel, et al., 2004; failure to offer a large variety of products), not consumer-
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minded organized assortments (Morales, et al., 2005), too long waiting or delivery time, 
and/or delivery of inadequate service to consumers during and after their purchases. 
 In addition to that, the offering of unwanted service output or products by the channel 
to the target market is also an indication for a poorly market-mediating channel. Another 
evident symptom of ineffectiveness is a low success rate of newly introduced products; 
many new products fail because they do not satisfy existing consumer needs; and a lot of 
retailers regularly have to resort to markdowns to clear unwanted merchandise. In contrast 
to the forecasting error leading to inefficiency, the primary cause for ineffectiveness is a 
forecasting error in terms of inadequately predicting the desired quality. 
 
1.2.3 Types of Market Information Sharing Arrangements 
Through sharing their market information, the two channel members are better able to 
identify the opportunities for efficiency and effectiveness improvements, and to allocate 
their resources to resolve any symptoms of inefficiencies and ineffectiveness, as a result 
leading to consumer-driven innovation in the channel and creating a competitive advantage 
over other channel relationships. We define a market information sharing arrangement as 
an arrangement between two vertical channel parties to share market information with the 
intention to strengthen the performance of the channel for their mutual benefits. 
The management philosophy behind market information sharing strives for an 
idealized situation where the channel perfectly functions in delivering consumer value 
better, faster and at less costs. Apart from the theory on information sharing in channels, it 
is interesting to see how information sharing arrangements are put in practice. It is hardly 
possible to enumerate all existing types of information sharing arrangements between pairs 
of channel members, because every channel relationship develops its own configuration of 
information sharing rooted in the realities of competitive markets, past relationship 
episodes, and anticipated requirements for results. Table 1.2 presents therefore only a 
selection of exemplary cases in order to give an illustration of real-life market information 
sharing practices. In different industries, information sharing arrangements carry different 
names and labels. In the following we will discuss these examples of arrangements that 
have been developed in practice and compare them on their information sharing activities.  
The key word for information sharing in the fashion industry is Quick Response (QR). 
In the mid 1980’s, US retailers like Wal-Mart and Dillard set up QR-arrangements with 
their domestic apparel suppliers.  QR involves on-line electronic communication of sales 
data from retailers to merchandise vendors, with the vendors promptly supplying retailers 
with the merchandise needed to levels previously determined cooperatively by the retailer 
and the vendor (Fiorito, et al., 1995). In essence, retail buyers reserve production capacity 
 
13
T a
b l
e  
1 .
2  
Ex
a m
p l
e s
 o
f M
a r
k e
t I
n f
o r
m
a t
io
n  
S h
a r
in
g  
Ar
r a
n g
e m
e n
ts  
b e
tw
e e
n  
Re
ta
ile
r s
 a
n d
 S
u p
p l
ie
r s
: Q
R,
 C
RP
, V
M
I, 
C
PF
R,
 C
M
 
T
y p
e  
C
h a
n n
e l
 p
a r
tn
e r
s  
(r
e t
a i
le
r  
+
 s
u p
p l
ie
r )
  
[s
ta
r t
in
g  
y e
a r
] 
I n
d u
s t
r y
 
D
e s
c r
ip
tio
n  
c h
a n
n e
l c
o l
la
b o
r a
tio
n  
a n
d 
o b
je
c t
iv
e  
M
a r
k e
t i
n f
o r
m
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
e d
 
R
e p
o r
te
d  
P
e r
fo
r m
a n
c e
 
 
 
 
 
By
 R
et
ai
le
r 
By
 S
up
pl
ie
r 
 
Q
R
 
W
al
-M
ar
t +
 A
m
er
ic
an
 
T
ro
us
er
 +
 M
ill
ik
en
 [
19
85
] 1
 
Fa
sh
io
n 
Su
pp
lie
r 
A
m
er
ic
an
 T
ro
us
er
 r
ec
ei
ve
s 
PO
S 
sa
le
s 
da
ta
 a
nd
 o
rd
er
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fr
om
 r
et
ai
le
r 
W
al
-M
ar
t e
le
ct
ro
ni
ca
lly
, a
nd
 u
se
s 
th
is
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
to
 s
yn
ch
ro
ni
ze
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
an
d 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
w
ith
 te
xt
ile
 
m
ill
 M
ill
ik
en
. T
he
 r
et
ai
le
r 
st
ill
 p
re
pa
re
s 
in
di
vi
du
al
 o
rd
er
s,
 b
ut
 
th
e 
PO
S 
da
ta
 is
 u
se
d 
by
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
to
 im
pr
ov
e 
fo
re
ca
st
in
g 
an
d 
sc
he
du
lin
g.
  
PO
S 
sa
le
s 
da
ta
  
O
rd
er
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
D
el
iv
er
y 
 
(a
dv
an
ce
d 
sh
ip
pi
ng
 n
ot
ic
e)
 
• 
31
%
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 s
al
es
,  
• 
30
%
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
tu
rn
s 
• 
L
ea
d 
tim
e 
fr
om
 o
rd
er
 r
ec
ei
pt
 a
t t
ex
til
e 
pl
an
t 
to
 r
et
ai
le
r 
w
as
 r
ed
uc
ed
 1
8 
w
ee
ks
 to
 3
 w
ee
ks
. 
C
R
P 
25
 r
et
ai
le
rs
 +
 C
am
pb
el
l 
So
up
 [
19
92
] 2
 
Fo
od
 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
in
g 
re
ta
ile
rs
 s
en
d 
or
de
r 
vi
a 
E
D
I-
co
nn
ec
tio
ns
 to
 
C
am
pb
el
l S
ou
p.
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r’
s 
sy
st
em
 p
re
di
ct
s 
th
e 
co
ns
um
er
 
de
m
an
d 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 r
et
ai
le
r 
an
d 
sh
ip
s 
fo
re
ca
st
ed
 d
em
an
d 
ac
co
rd
in
gl
y.
 
A
gg
re
ga
te
d 
m
ov
em
en
t 
da
ta
 d
ai
ly
 
D
el
iv
er
y 
(a
dv
an
ce
d 
sh
ip
pi
ng
 n
ot
ic
e)
 
• 
A
bo
ve
 5
0%
 a
ve
ra
ge
 s
al
es
 g
ro
w
th
 w
ith
 C
R
P-
re
ta
ile
rs
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 n
on
-C
R
P 
re
ta
ile
rs
 
V
M
I 
H
an
na
fo
rd
 B
ro
th
er
s 
+
 1
6 
ve
nd
or
s 
[1
99
3]
 3
 
Fo
od
 
T
he
 s
up
er
m
ar
ke
t c
ha
in
, H
an
na
fo
rd
, p
ro
vi
de
s  
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 w
ith
 
m
ov
em
en
t d
at
a,
 a
nd
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 m
ak
e 
de
ci
si
on
s 
ab
ou
t 
qu
an
tit
ie
s 
to
 s
hi
p.
 T
hi
s 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t f
re
es
 r
et
ai
l b
uy
er
s 
fr
om
 
ro
ut
in
e 
re
or
de
ri
ng
 d
ec
is
io
ns
. 
M
ov
em
en
t d
at
a 
fr
om
 
D
C
 to
 s
to
re
s 
D
el
iv
er
y 
 
(a
dv
an
ce
d 
sh
ip
pi
ng
 n
ot
ic
e)
 
• 
R
ed
uc
ed
 r
et
ai
le
r 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
le
ve
ls
 b
y 
30
%
 
• 
Sa
vi
ng
 2
50
.0
00
 o
ve
rh
ea
d 
co
st
s 
• 
L
ea
d-
tim
e 
fr
om
 o
rd
er
 to
 w
ar
eh
ou
se
 d
el
iv
er
y 
re
du
ce
d 
fr
om
 2
 w
ee
ks
 to
 4
 d
ay
s.
 
V
M
I 
22
 n
at
io
na
l d
ep
ar
tm
en
t 
st
or
es
 / 
 3
 d
is
co
un
te
rs
 +
 V
F 
C
or
po
ra
tio
n 
[1
98
9]
4  
Fa
sh
io
n 
V
F 
C
or
po
ra
tio
n 
(m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
of
 je
an
s 
br
an
d 
na
m
es
 li
ke
 
W
ra
ng
le
r,
 L
ee
) 
cu
rr
en
tly
 h
an
dl
es
 4
0%
 o
f 
its
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
an
 a
ut
om
at
ic
 r
ep
le
ni
sh
m
en
t s
ch
em
e.
 V
F 
re
ce
iv
es
 P
O
S 
da
ta
 f
r o
m
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 r
et
ai
l s
to
re
s 
vi
a 
E
D
I.
 B
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
PO
S 
d a
ta
, V
F 
pr
ep
ar
es
 th
e 
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
re
pl
en
is
hm
en
t o
rd
er
s 
an
d 
se
nt
 th
em
 to
 
th
e 
re
ta
ile
r’
s 
st
or
es
, w
ith
in
 5
 d
ay
s.
 
PO
S 
 
St
or
e 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
st
at
us
 
D
el
iv
er
y 
(a
dv
an
ce
d 
sh
ip
pi
ng
 n
ot
ic
e)
 
• 
C
on
su
m
er
 s
al
es
 in
cr
ea
se
 f
ro
m
 +
5%
 to
 +
24
0%
 
• 
D
is
co
un
te
rs
 s
ho
w
 b
et
te
r 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 w
ith
 
V
F 
V
M
I 
pr
og
ra
m
 
C
PF
R
 
W
eg
m
an
s 
Fo
od
 M
ar
ke
ts
 +
 
N
ab
is
co
 [
19
98
]5
 
  
Fo
od
 
U
S 
Su
pe
rm
ar
ke
t c
ha
in
 W
eg
m
an
s 
an
d 
fo
od
 p
ro
du
ce
r 
N
ab
is
co
 
te
st
 th
e 
C
PF
R
 c
on
ce
pt
 a
nd
 r
el
at
ed
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
. T
he
y 
w
or
ke
d 
to
ge
th
er
 to
 m
an
ag
e 
th
e 
re
ta
ile
r’
s 
sa
le
s 
of
 th
e 
N
ab
is
co
-b
ra
nd
 
Pl
an
te
rs
 P
ea
nu
ts
.  
C
at
eg
or
y 
in
te
nt
io
ns
 
Sa
le
s 
Pr
om
ot
io
n 
pl
an
s 
D
em
an
d 
fo
re
ca
st
s 
 
M
ar
ke
tin
g 
pl
an
 
Sa
le
s 
Pr
om
ot
io
n 
pl
an
s 
D
em
an
d 
fo
re
ca
st
s 
• 
13
%
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 c
at
eg
or
y 
sa
le
s 
 
• 
53
%
 in
cr
ea
se
 B
ra
nd
 s
al
es
 (
+
53
%
) 
• 
R
ed
uc
tio
n 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
• 
L
es
s 
sp
oi
la
ge
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
on
tin
ue
d 
    
13
 
14  T a
b l
e  
1 .
2  
Co
n t
in
u e
d 
 
T
y p
e  
C
h a
n n
e l
 p
a r
tn
e r
s  
(r
et
ai
le
r 
+
 s
up
pl
ie
r)
  
[s
ta
rt
in
g 
ye
ar
] 
I n
d u
s t
r y
 
D
e s
c r
ip
tio
n  
c h
a n
n e
l c
o l
la
b o
r a
tio
n  
a n
d 
o b
je
c t
iv
e  
M
a r
k e
t i
n f
o r
m
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
e d
 
R
e p
o r
te
d  
P
e r
fo
r m
a n
c e
 
C
M
 
G
ia
nt
 +
 P
ro
ct
er
&
G
am
bl
e 
G
ia
nt
 +
 C
oc
a-
co
la
 [
19
94
]6
 
 
Fo
od
 
G
ia
nt
 a
nd
 tw
o 
br
an
d 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 te
st
 th
e 
C
at
eg
or
y 
M
an
ag
em
en
t p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
an
d 
bo
th
 s
up
pl
ie
rs
 b
ec
om
e 
C
at
eg
or
y 
C
ap
ta
in
s. 
PO
S 
da
ta
 o
f 
th
e 
to
ta
l 
pr
od
uc
t c
at
eg
or
y 
 
  
C
on
su
m
er
 
re
se
ar
ch
 
• 
16
%
 C
oc
a-
C
ol
a 
C
om
pa
ny
 u
ni
t s
al
es
  
• 
8%
 to
ta
l c
at
eg
or
y 
sa
le
s 
 
C
M
  
C
ar
re
fo
ur
 +
 C
ol
ga
te
 [
n.
a.
] 7
 
Fo
od
  
C
ar
re
fo
ur
 a
nd
 C
ol
ga
te
 p
ar
tn
er
 in
 th
e 
or
al
 c
ar
e 
ca
te
go
ry
. B
as
ed
 
on
 c
on
su
m
er
 s
tu
di
es
, C
ol
ga
te
 s
ug
ge
st
ed
 th
at
 C
ar
re
fo
u r
 
re
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
th
e 
di
sp
la
y 
in
 th
e 
or
al
 c
ar
e 
ca
te
go
ry
 s
o 
as
 to
 
m
er
ch
an
di
se
 to
ot
hb
ru
sh
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
ab
ov
e 
to
ot
hp
as
te
 p
ro
du
ct
s,
 a
s 
op
po
se
d 
to
 m
er
ch
an
di
si
ng
 th
em
 n
ex
t t
o 
ea
ch
 o
th
er
. 
 
T
ot
al
 C
at
eg
or
y 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
C
on
su
m
er
 
re
se
ar
ch
 
• 
6-
16
%
 s
al
es
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 th
e 
or
al
 c
ar
e 
ca
te
go
ry
 
C
M
 
R
ea
l,-
 (
M
et
ro
 A
G
) 
+ 
K
ra
ft
 
[2
00
0]
 8
 
Fo
od
 
G
er
m
an
 h
yp
er
m
ar
ke
t c
ha
in
 R
ea
l,-
 in
iti
at
ed
 a
 c
at
eg
or
y 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
rr
an
ge
m
en
t w
ith
 K
ra
ft
 f
or
 th
e 
ch
ee
se
 p
ro
du
ct
 
ca
te
go
ry
. 
T
ot
al
 C
at
eg
or
y 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
C
on
su
m
er
 
re
se
ar
ch
 
• 
25
%
 it
em
s 
re
du
ct
io
n 
 
• 
6%
 s
al
es
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 th
e 
ca
te
go
ry
 
C
M
 
T
oy
s 
‘R
 U
s 
+
 L
itt
le
 G
ol
de
n 
B
oo
ks
 (
R
an
do
m
H
ou
se
) 
[u
nk
no
w
n]
9  
B
oo
ks
 
Pu
bl
is
he
r 
of
 c
hi
ld
re
n’
s 
bo
ok
 L
itt
le
 G
ol
de
n 
B
oo
ks
 m
an
ag
es
 th
e 
bo
ok
 s
ec
tio
n 
fo
r 
ca
te
go
ry
 k
ill
er
 T
oy
’s
 ‘
R
 U
s 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
fr
om
 s
up
pl
ie
rs
 o
th
er
 th
an
 W
es
te
rn
 P
ub
lis
hi
ng
. 
PO
S 
da
ta
 o
f 
th
e 
to
ta
l 
pr
od
uc
t c
at
eg
or
y 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
 In
ve
nt
or
y 
st
at
us
 o
f 
co
m
pe
tin
g 
pu
bl
is
he
rs
  
D
el
iv
er
y 
O
rd
er
s 
to
 
co
m
pe
tit
or
s 
 M
ar
ke
tin
g 
pl
an
 
ca
te
go
ry
 f
or
 T
oy
s 
‘R
 U
s.
 
• 
E
xt
ra
 S
al
es
 f
or
 b
ot
h 
pa
rt
ie
s 
• 
In
cr
ea
se
d 
(m
an
ag
in
g)
 c
os
ts
 f
or
 L
itt
le
 G
ol
de
n 
B
oo
ks
 
So
ur
ce
s:
 1  
N
C
E
S 
C
on
fe
re
nc
e 
(2
00
2)
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
on
 J
ul
y 
25
, 2
00
2 ,
 W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
D
C
, U
SA
; 2
 C
la
rk
, T
.H
., 
J.
L
. M
cK
en
ne
y 
(1
99
4)
; C
am
pb
el
l S
ou
p 
C
om
pa
ny
: A
 L
ea
de
r 
in
 C
on
tin
uo
us
 R
ep
le
ni
sh
m
en
t I
nn
ov
a t
io
ns
, H
B
S 
ca
se
 9
-1
95
-1
24
; 3
 S
ch
ia
no
, W
.T
., 
T
.H
. C
la
rk
 (
19
95
);
 H
an
na
fo
rd
 B
ro
th
e r
s:
 L
ea
di
ng
 th
e 
G
ro
ce
ry
 C
ha
nn
el
 T
ra
ns
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 H
B
S 
ca
se
 9
-1
95
-1
27
; 4
 B
uz
ze
ll
 (
19
93
);
 V
an
if
y 
Fa
ir
 M
ill
s:
 M
ar
ke
t R
es
po
ns
e 
Sy
st
em
, H
B
S 
ca
se
 
9-
59
3-
11
1;
 5
 G
ro
ce
ry
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 o
f 
A
m
er
ic
a,
 K
J R
 C
on
su
lti
ng
 (
20
02
),
 C
PF
R
 B
as
el
in
e 
St
ud
y 
- 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
Pr
of
ile
, 4
2p
.; 
6  
N
A
C
S 
O
nl
in
e 
(2
00
3)
; S
to
ck
 T
ip
s:
 T
he
 G
ro
w
in
g 
T
re
n d
 o
f 
C
at
eg
or
y 
M
an
ag
em
en
t. 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
22
, 2
00
3 
7 G
re
en
w
oo
d,
 A
ni
ta
, a
nd
 S
eb
as
tia
n 
L
ev
y 
(2
00
4)
; B
ru
s h
in
g 
U
p 
th
e 
O
ra
l C
ar
e 
C
at
eg
or
y,
 E
C
R
 E
ur
op
e 
C
on
fe
re
nc
e 
B
ru
ss
el
s 
20
0 4
; 8
M
ar
zi
an
, R
ita
 a
nd
 M
ar
tin
 E
ck
ha
rd
t (
20
04
);
 5
 to
 D
ri
ve
: F
iv
e 
K
ey
 
Fa
ct
or
s 
to
 D
ev
el
op
 J
oi
nt
 B
us
in
es
s 
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
ly
, E
C
R
 E
ur
op
e 
C
on
fe
re
nc
e 
B
ru
ss
el
s 
20
04
;  
9 S
im
ch
i, 
et
 a
l.,
 (
20
03
);
 S
tr
at
e g
ic
 A
lli
an
ce
s,
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
 
 14
  15
at their vendors, but they wait to finalize the specification of their orders for the total 
product production time until closer to the time of delivery (Birtwistle, et al., 2003). By 
bringing smaller quantities of merchandise in the stores to identify the fast-movers (in 
color, style, size), the retail buyers first test the consumer preferences, and then they can 
later specify the rest of order based on the most-wanted products to complete the booked 
production time. The early QR-initiatives proved to be very successful: over 30% sales 
increase, inventory turns increase, sharp lead times reduction (NCES, 2002). 
Consequently, the popularity of QR rose and many apparel firms have adopted some form 
of QR (Birtwistle, et al., 2003 [in the UK]; Azuma, 2002 [in Japan]; Shin, 2002 [in Korea]; 
McMicheal et al., 1997; Perry et al., 1999; Perry and Sohal, 2000 [in Australia]) rose 
tremendously.  
The buzz-word for information sharing in the food industry is Efficient Consumer 
Response (ECR). In the footsteps of the fashion industry, the food industry started in the 
early 1990’s with ECR. ECR is a grocery supply chain management strategy aimed at 
eliminating inefficiencies, and excessive or non-value-added costs within the supply chain, 
thus delivering better value to grocery customers. It is designed “to re-engineer the grocery 
supply chain away from a push system in which manufacturers push products into stores, 
towards a pull-system in which products are pulled down the supply chain into the store by 
consumer demand information captured at the point of sale” (Kurt Salmon Associates, 
1993). ECR can be thought of as an umbrella name for a container full of improvement 
tools (management practices, enablers and integrators) to make the supply chain more 
effectively and efficiently demand-driven. Besides the improvement tools of “enablers and 
integrators” which technically facilitates product identification (product code standards, 
scanning technology), and communication standards (electronic/EDI messaging standards, 
data synchronization) and making paperless information sharing possible, the ECR 
philosophy distinguishes two categories of information sharing in channels: supply 
management and demand management. Supply management aims to streamline the logistic 
flows and make the channel relationship more efficient. Improvements can comprise the 
entire flow of goods: from the supply of raw material, packaging, producing, storing, 
transporting, storing at the retailer’s side, to putting it on the shelves and handling in the 
store. A type of information sharing arrangement belonging to supply management 
improvements is Continuous Replenishment Planning (CRP) (Vergin and Barr, 1999). 
Campbell Soup’s CRP-initiative (Clark and McKenney, 1994) pertains that their retailers 
share their aggregated inventory data (movement data) (at distribution center level) about 
the supplier’s own stock keeping units with a supplier. The manufacturer sends delivery 
notifications to the retailer as soon as orders are shipped. The main benefit for Campbell is 
that they are able to synchronize production based on the inventory-movement data. For 
the whole channel, CRP discourages forward buying by retailers; dampening demand 
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fluctuations in the chain and that results in savings for both parties on costly production 
overtime and unnecessary inventory holding-costs. On average, CRP lowers inventories by 
32% and reduces stock-outs by 55% (Vergin and Barr, 1999).  
A logical extension of the CRP-arrangement is to hand over authorization to the 
supplier to restock the retailer’s inventory. In such an information sharing arrangement 
Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) arrangement, the retail buyer is then freed from making 
routine reordering decisions and allows the supplier to assemble the order. In addition to 
the information about stock movement in the retail organizations, the retailer gives the 
supplier extra insight into logistic policy parameters (service-level targets, required stock-
levels). An example of a VMI-arrangement is US retailer H.E.Butt Grocery Company 
(Schiano and Clark, 1995), which authorized a number of their suppliers to manage the 
stock. The benefits of the VMI-arrangements to H.E.Butt’s are that warehouse inventory 
levels dropped, order lead-times shortened significantly, and out-of-stock levels 
minimized. Benefit to the suppliers was the ability to optimize their production planning 
and logistics operations and economize their truck-loads capacity.  
Next to supply management, ECR includes tools to understand demand management. 
In jointly managing consumer demand for products and services, the two channel partners 
assess in a collaborative process the effectiveness of their marketing actions toward their 
target consumers and shoppers, and then identify solutions creating value of these groups 
of consumers. Subsequently, given these strategies both channel parties optimize the store 
assortments, and launch relevant promotions and product introductions, which add value to 
the consumer. All of these cooperative retailer-supplier commercial activities aim to 
provide an optimal offering to consumers and thus are directed at improving the 
effectiveness of the marketing channel relationship. The two information sharing 
arrangements sprouting from demand management improvements are Collaborative 
Planning Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) and Category Management (CM). 
Especially sales promotional activities can disturb the orderly supply and production of the 
supplier; it is very difficult to anticipate the enormous demand spikes as a result of 
temporary consumer price reductions or other forms of sales promotions. CPFR aims to 
smoothen the supply during these extraordinary sales periods and to improve physical 
supply by a co-managed planning process and information sharing (Seifert, 2002; VICS 
and “A Guide to CPFR Implementation” from the ECR Europe). On top of the market 
information provided in a VMI-arrangement, channel parties give more clarity to each 
other on their sales promotional plans and share each other’s demand forecasts. An 
exemplary case for applying CPFR has been the pilot by regional US supermarket chain 
Wegmans and US manufacturer Nabisco, in which they tested the normative CPFR/VICS 
collaboration model for the Planters Peanuts brand. In a short time, the Wegmans-Nabisco 
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tandem achieved extra performance in terms of 13% extra category sales, 53% Nabisco-
brand sales, and a reduction in inventory.  
Category Management (CM) is an information sharing arrangement, where the retailer 
discloses comprehensive marketing information about the whole product category to the 
supplier. This information includes POS-data from the competitor’s brands in order to 
provide the full picture of the retailer’s market developments in the entire product 
category. The supplier in turn gives insight into his product category expertise to the 
retailer. By receiving total insight into the category performance at the retailer, the supplier 
gets entitled to compose the store assortment, pricing, and planning of sales promotions. 
One successful example in this case is the first industry-sponsored CM pilot project at US 
supermarket chain Giant in 1994. Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble were chosen to be the 
"category captain" for their respective category and to help select the products that would 
get shelf space in the Giant stores. In those two categories, Giant reclaimed market share 
that had been taken by their competitor Wal-Mart. Another CM example is German retailer 
Real,- (a Metro Group subsidiary) who initiated a category management arrangement with 
Kraft for the cheese product category. By sharing their market information, they optimized 
the store assortments. Still, by deleting 25% of the items from their assortments, channel 
parties increased the sales of the total category by 6%. 
The promise of ECR in the US grocery industry is to eliminate the total sum of 
inefficiencies in the marketing channels and supposedly amounting to savings of US$30 
billion (Kurt Salmon Associates, 1993).  This could be achieved by a 41% total-chain 
reduction of inventory by speeding up cycle time from originally 104 days to 61 days. 
Eventually, the full implementation of exemplary ECR-partnerships like Walmart-P&G 
could reduces the consumer prices by approximately 11%. Similar to the adoption of QR, 
ECR was received with great enthusiasm by many practitioners, partly due to the good 
results of early pilot projects. Yet in spite of its initial popularity and diffusion to other 
parts of the world (Harris, Swatman and Kurnia, 1999 [Australia]; Lohtia and Murakoshi, 
2000 [Japan]; Dupré and Gruen, 2004 [Germany], Arkadar and Frossard Ferreira, 2003 
[Brazil])3, ECR adoption has come to a stop (Kotzab, 1999; ECR Australia, 2002) and only 
few firms structurally embrace all parts of the ECR-philosophy (Gilmour, 2004). 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 National and ECR platforms to promote collaboration between retailers and manufacturers have mushroomed 
outside the US in the 1990s. It started in Italy (1993), followed by Canada (1994), Greece, Spain, Germany 
(1995), Australasia, Austria, Finland, HongKong, The Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, Sweden (1996), 
France, Philippines (1997), Poland, Denmark, Ireland, Singapore, South Africa  (1998), Belgium, Malaysia, 
South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan (1999), Czech Republic/Slovakia, Hungary, Portugal, Turkey (2000), Brazil, 
China (2001), and Iceland (2002). ECR Europe was founded in 1994. 
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Table 1.3 Types of Market Information Sharing Arrangements 
Label Market Information Shared  
 By retailer By supplier Prime Objective 
QR / EDI Order Delivery Efficiency through inventory turn 
increase, lead time reduction, transaction 
error reductions 
VMI / CRP Stock and movement  Delivery and lead times Efficiency through inventory reduction, 
lead time reduction 
CPFR Demand forecast and 
promotion calendar  
Demand forecast and 
promotion calendar 
Effectiveness through category sales 
increase, less spoilage 
CM Category performance 
and plans 
Consumer research Effectiveness through brand and category 
sales increase  
 
If we compare the market information sharing arrangements discussed above, it is obvious 
to see that the extent of market information shared varies a lot. Table 1.3 organizes the 
different information sharing arrangements along the dimension of information shared. In 
QR, the information shared is mainly confined to transaction data; whereas ECR/VMI 
practices add logistic information on stocks and movement data in the arrangement. 
Ultimately, in demand-side practices of ECR the channel members go a step further and 
share consumer insight. In this line, we therefore rank order these arrangements into four 
groups: 
 
1. Sharing of order and delivery information (e.g. QR and EDI); the prime objective of 
QR- or EDI-arrangements is to reduce supply chain costs by eliminating transaction 
errors. The retailer and the supplier electronically exchange order, purchase order 
confirmation, advance notice of shipment, and delivery information. This automated 
ordering process gives the supplier access to sales information (often aggregated at 
distribution-level) from the retailer and can be supported by idiosyncratic EDI-
connections, but increasingly happens through Internet protocols (so-called web-
EDI). In the fashion industry, these arrangements are labeled QR. Thanks to web-
based EDI the investments for channel members have dropped to adopt this type of 
arrangements. These practices are not only bound to retail industries like Fashion or 
Food.  
 
2. Sharing of logistical information (e.g., CRP and VMI); the main motivation of CRP 
or VMI arrangements is to improve logistic operations, to streamline operations and 
product flows, logistical information is exchanged between channel members. The 
retailer gives insight into sales information and stock policy and the supplier has the 
obligation to fulfill the orders within a certain limited time frame. The main benefits 
for both channel parties are that they are able to improve the quality of their 
replenishment and inventory allocation decisions and thereby lifting their warehouse 
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productivity and reduce transportation costs. Not only limited to the food industry, 
VMI is increasingly practiced in other retail industries (like VF corporation, see 
Table 1.2; and department stores, in: Buzzell and Ortmeyer, 1995). 
 
3. Sharing of Forecasts and Sales Promotional Activities (e.g., CPFR); the reason to 
the exchange of sales promotion activities plans and share demand forecasts is not 
only minimize the extra channel costs in these events, but also to optimize the sales 
during these extraordinary sales period. In managing such events, both channel 
members incur extra costs and still the success of remains highly uncertain. With 
these arrangements, the channel members first coordinate their sales promotion 
calendar and develop a contingency plan to act on. In the execution of the 
arrangement, retailers then pass on actual sales-performance information on 
supplier's brands and where both parties jointly plan sales promotions. The names 
for such arrangements vary: “collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment” 
(CPFR), “event management” (Tesco with its extranet TIE), “sales promotions 
management” (Sainsbury’s extranet SID). Examples of CPFR are not solely 
restricted to the food industry. In the fashion industry, WalMart and Sara Lee are 
experimenting together to optimize sales promotional activities. 
 
4. Sharing of Consumer and Competitive Intelligence (e.g, CM and CCRM); the 
objective of Category Management or Collaborative CRM is to maximize the 
consumer value of the channels offering and subsequently to maximize its sales 
potential. In the most far-reaching extent of information sharing arrangement where 
the retailer discloses comprehensive marketing information about the whole product 
category to the supplier. The shared information includes POS data from 
competitor’s brands, and in CCRM-arrangement the retailer shares customer-
loyalty-card data. The supplier in turn gives insight into his product category 
expertise to the retailer. By receiving total insight into the category performance at 
the retailer, the supplier gets entitled to compose the store assortment, pricing, and 
planning of sales promotions. According to a recent study by Cannondale 
Associates, Category Management is not just for grocery anymore, more retail 
channels is now embracing the practice (Cannondale, 2004). A case outside the food 
industry is category killer Toy’s R Us in cooperation with a publisher of children 
books, Little Golden Books. The supplier was charged with optimizing the planning 
of children’s book assortments at Toys’R Us stores and even managed the ordering 
of books from competing publishers.  
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1.3 Main Research Questions 
The Back-End Revolution in Retailing means that channel members are increasingly going 
to vary their information sharing arrangements. It is expected that they will implement 
these different arrangements more and more in a strategic way. That subsequently raises 
many interesting questions for all of the players involved.  Retailers need to explore new 
ways to restructure their supplier relationships. Suppliers are trying to find adequate 
answers to benefit from this new purchasing reality. Concerning the emergence of a 
multitude of various channel collaborations between retailers and suppliers, this 
dissertation specifically addresses the sharing of market information in channel 
relationships.  
In examining all of the four above mentioned types of market information sharing 
arrangements between channel members, it would be interesting to find answers to the 
following questions: what types of market information are actually being shared between 
retailers and suppliers? Do they refrain themselves to logistical information? Or do they 
exploit also other windows of information sharing opportunities? What market information 
is rarely shared, and what is shared more often? And how do the channel members 
exchange their market information? What is their contact frequency? Are higher level 
managers with marketing responsibility involved in the exchange? Do channel members 
formalize their information sharing? And do they share equally with all of their channel 
members? Hence, our first research question is:  
 
1. What is the actual nature of market information sharing of channel members? 
 
Despite the growing availability of new information technological advances to share 
information in the channel, and all of the wonderful promises of QR, ECR and consumer-
driven channel relationships, there is still no guarantee that retailers and suppliers will 
automatically begin to share their market information with each other. There remains a 
discrepancy between the generally held views among managers “that firms ought to share 
their information with channel partners” and the widespread observation that many firms 
still withhold market information from their channel partners (Information Week, October 
7, 2003). It is well known that many factors foster or inhibit channel members to hand over 
such a strategic asset as market information is, to each other. Is it a matter of a sufficient 
amount of trust in the channel relationship? Is information sharing subject to the 
dependence structure between the retailer and the supplier? What about the turbulence in 
consumer demand? And does the extent of inertia in the channel relationship play a role? It 
would be interesting to discover which antecedents are the most important factors for 
channel firms to share market information. Therefore, our second research question is:  
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2. What are the antecedents of market information sharing in channel relationships? 
 
After analyzing the antecedents that drive the sharing of market information in channel 
relationships, it would also be interesting to examine whether or not channel relationships 
that share more market information outperform the other relationships. Do market 
information sharing arrangements really contribute to the success of transforming the 
channel into a more consumer-driven demand chain? Do market information sharing 
channels learn better about the consumer marketplace? Does market information sharing 
pay of in terms of joint profits and the attainment of competitive channel advantages? We 
would like to know also whether sharing of market information materializes in 
improvement of the relationship quality. Is the information sharing party economically and 
socially more satisfied, and committed to the relationship? For that reason, our third 
research question is: 
  
3. What are the consequences of market information sharing in channel relationships? 
 
1.4 Scientific Relevance 
Empirical studies on the nature, antecedents and consequences of market information 
sharing in channels are very much opportune. The need for knowing more about these 
subjects has considerably risen in both groups: scientists and practitioners. As for the 
scientists, the relevance of this research is four-folded. This work aims (1) to be responsive 
to explicit calls from other scholars (i.c., customers for academic research), (2) to regard 
the channel relationship as its sphere of activity, (3) to integrate findings from different 
perspectives, and (4) to use a variety of methodologies to look at the matter. 
Responsive to calls. This dissertation is responsive because it answers to various calls 
for research from different marketing scholars. Ever since a description of a best-practice 
case in market information sharing in an industrial channel in Industrial Marketing 
Management in 1986 (Reddy and Marvin, 1986), no detailed empirical study on market 
information sharing in channel relationships had been conducted in the field of marketing. 
This is rather strange, for Reddy and Marvin (1986) concluded “the most crucial and 
sensitive element in developing [a channel] partnership: sharing and use of market 
information”. Yet, repeated calls for researching this specific topic came much later and 
from two different corners. The call from the first corner is in fact an extrapolation of the 
established idea that a source of competitive advantage increasingly lies in a firm’s ability 
to use market intelligence accurately (Menon and Varadarajan 1992; Moorman, Zaltman, 
and Deshpande 1992; Raju and Roy, 2000). So far, the use of information is promoted by a 
proper dissemination within the firm's boundaries (e.g., Maltz and Kohli, 1996). In the 
context of retailer-manufacturer interactions, it is appealing to investigate whether or not it 
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is possible to extend these established research findings to the dissemination of 
information across the boundaries of individual channel members: as is advocated by Day 
(1994), Dyer and Singh (1998), Frazier (1999) and Van Bruggen (2001). 
The call coming from the second corner stresses the importance of empirically study 
channel partnerships (Mentzer et al., 2000; Weber, 2001). A specific demand for 
examining the subject of information sharing within channel partnering in more detail was 
made by Frazier (1999, p. 229). He shared the observation that “the sharing of intelligence 
is virtually ignored” and urged that “research is needed in identifying factors that facilitate 
the sharing of intelligence between channel members, both upstream and downstream.” 
This dissertation does address the sharing of market intelligence, and makes a clear 
distinction between what information is shared and how it is shared. Concerning the 
“what” information is shared, we will develop a new measurement on the information 
shared content.  
Analysis at the level of the Channel Relationship. This dissertation regards the channel 
relationship as its unit-of-analysis. Like market information sharing, this research looks at 
the dynamics within a channel relationship, and considers this level as the appropriate unit-
of-analysis to investigate the information sharing phenomenon. Thus far, most studies 
empirically investigated the subject at the firm-level (Kulp, et al, 2004; Myers, et al, 2000). 
The disadvantage of such a level of analysis is that they then realistically disregard a firm’s 
variety in its information sharing activities within its portfolio of channel relationships. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to say whether the collected data in such a case refers to a 
“fuzzy/non-existent” average of the firm’s channel relationships, or perhaps to a specific 
salient relationship. Investigating market information sharing at a relationship-level is 
further justified since there are strong indications (including anecdotal evidence from 
managers; Chain Store Age, June 2003) that relationship characteristics like trust and 
dependence play an important role. We therefore intend to make a considerable 
contribution in the explanatory power by investigating the phenomenon at the relationship 
level.  
Integration of different perspectives. This dissertation integrates insights from 
different perspectives. As channel information sharing by definition means to incorporate 
observations from others; so does this research by blending in lessons from various 
research approaches.  In this thesis we compare three research perspectives: (a) the supply 
chain optimization approach (e.g., Lee, et al., 1997) and (b) the game-theoretic approach 
(e.g., Siedmann and Sundarararajan, 1997; Niraj and Narasimham, 2003), with (c) the 
behavioral empirical approach on marketing channel collaboration (e.g., Anderson and 
Narus, 1990). While the first two research perspectives simulate the potential benefits and 
outcome from channel information-sharing, the empirical perspective primarily 
concentrates on the actual state of information sharing in channels; notwithstanding the 
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fact that this perspective examines information sharing through four different 
conceptualizations: information sharing as power use (e.g., Boyle., et al., 1992),  as 
communicative behavior in the relationship (e.g., Mohr, et al., 1996), as a relational norm 
(Heide and John, 1992), or as motivational investment in the relationship (e.g., Gundlach, 
et al, 1995). This dissertation develops a research framework based on the insights from all 
three research approaches.  
Variety of research methods. Another way in which the dissertation integrates 
different perspectives is to employ a variety of research methods: a survey and an 
experiment. We contribute to exploring the same phenomenon by different means of 
collecting data. We collected data by means of a survey and by an experiment. The survey 
collected data from retail buyers from Dutch retail organizations. The laboratory 
experiment collected data from subjects in the role of a supplier dealing with a retail 
organization. In this last empirical study we primarily concentrate on the consequences. 
The survey collected data on all three research questions: nature, antecedents and 
consequences. 
 
1.5 Managerial Relevance 
In the early 1990’s, when pilot projects of ECR and QR reported very promising results 
and highlighted the importance of the information-integrated channel to find the “Holy 
Grail of Retailing”, it became clear that retailers and suppliers cannot maximize their 
channel performance without sharing information, because it “is the lifeblood of channel 
collaboration” (Martin, 1994). Now after 20 years’ of experimenting with information-
integrated channel collaborations, the advances in information communication 
technologies and the wide-spread adoption of web-based communication tools pushes 
retailers and suppliers into the new stage of the retailing revolution, the Back-End 
Revolution. In the coming years, information sharing in channel relationships is expected 
to become more sophisticated, and channel members will be going to employ their 
information sharing practices in a more strategic manner. Our research examines the nature 
of information sharing, and that will be helpful for both retailers and suppliers in the 
design of their future arrangements with each other. 
By scrutinizing the antecedents of information sharing practices, we give managers 
insight into the circumstances in which channel members are likely to share their 
information. Based on these findings, managers can make a situational analysis and will 
be able to asses whether or not their channel members are going to start an information 
sharing arrangement with their firm. However, if this analysis tells them, that 
circumstances are somewhat unfavorable, our insights may help them to influence the 
situations in such a way that their channel members start to share information with them. 
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With the systematic investigation of the consequences of information sharing, we aim 
to provide managers with a rich insight into “what works” in the information sharing 
arrangements. Our studies on the consequences should help managers to prioritize the 
different dimensions in information sharing arrangements. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation 
With the prime purpose of answering the three main research questions, the dissertation is 
set up around four chapters with empirical results: Chapter 5, 6, 7 and 8 respectively. The 
first three empirical chapters attempt to answer the questions about the nature, antecedents 
and consequences using data from a large survey. Chapter 8 examines the consequences of 
market information sharing by means of an experiment. The remaining chapters provide 
the reader with conceptual, theoretical, and methodological information about the research 
topic. We shall briefly introduce the content of the chapters to provide an overview of the 
dissertation’s structure. The structure of this dissertation also graphically presented in 
Figure 1.3.  
Chapter 2 gives an overview of different research perspectives taken by academics to 
investigate information-sharing in channel relationships. This systematic and extensive 
review includes over 120 studies and it does not only results into a list of relevant variables 
for studying the phenomenon, but also helps to get insight into the theories employed in 
explaining the intra-channel market information sharing phenomenon.  
Chapter 3 lays out our research framework about the nature, the antecedents and the 
consequences of market information in a channel relationship. We explain the theoretical 
fundaments for our hypotheses and explain how social penetration theory is applied in this 
channel context.  
Chapter 4 describes the data collection methodology of the survey that we used for the 
first three empirical chapters. Specially, we discuss the sample frame, key informant 
selection, and questionnaire development. Remember that Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are based 
on data by means of the survey. Chapter 8 is based on a laboratory experiment.  
Chapter 5 contains the analyses, and results of the first empirical part. Its objective is 
to address the first research question about the nature of market information sharing. In 
Chapter 6, we report the measurement validation, analyses, and results of the second 
empirical part and gives insights into the antecedents of market information sharing. 
Chapter 7 describes the analyses and results of the third empirical part that investigates the 
consequences of market information sharing.  
In contrast to the three previous empirical chapters with a primary retailer’s 
perspective, Chapter 8 takes on the supplier’s perspective and reports about methodology, 
analysis and results of the laboratory experiment. Like Chapter 7, it deals with the 
consequences of market information sharing.  
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Based on the findings from the four empirical parts, conclusions are drawn, 
implications for marketing channel practices are formulated, and ideas for future academic 
research are presented in Chapter 9.  
 
Figure 1.3  Structure of the Dissertation 
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CHAPTER TWO RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES ON  
INFORMATION SHARING  
IN CHANNEL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 we have described the phenomenon under investigation here. Not only did we 
lay out the management philosophy behind market information sharing with the promise 
for improvements in cost-saving efficiency and demand-enhancing effectiveness in 
channels, but also we gave real-life examples of such information sharing arrangement 
between retailers and suppliers. After that, we formulated our three main research 
questions related to the nature, antecedents and consequences of market information 
sharing. But before we develop our research framework to answer these questions, it is 
important to shed light on what academics already found out about the subjects closely 
related to ours here. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is two-fold. Our first objective 
is to sketch the landscape of the diverse academic perspectives taken to investigate the 
phenomenon of intrachannel market information sharing.  
Our second and derived objective of providing a systematic literature overview is to 
make a list of the variables playing an important role in information sharing in channel 
relationships. Both objectives assist us in elaborating our contribution to the literature and 
providing us with the crucial building blocks for our research framework, presented in 
Chapter 3.  
Research has been fragmented and multiple disciplines in management research have 
made their contributions to gain more insight into antecedents and consequences of 
information sharing.4 Figure 2.1 distinguishes three approaches to researching information 
sharing: supply chain optimization, game-theoretic, and empirical behavioral channel 
research. In the following discussion, we aim to explain for each approach how they 
contribute to the three issues relevant to our research questions. The first issue concerns 
the nature and conceptualization of information sharing; how does the research approach at 
                                                          
4 The strategic management literature also studies topics in interfirm relationships that are closely connected with 
information sharing. We do not include this stream of literature in the overview for the following two reasons. 
The first reason is that Strategic Management often investigates horizontal partnerships or international joint 
ventures; not necessarily vertical channel relationships. The second reason is that this literature primarily looks at 
receiving knowledge; absorbing knowledge (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Dyer and Singh, 1999) and not at 
the sharing information. 
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hand define information sharing and which aspects of does it capture? The second 
important issue relates to the antecedents in which information is shared. For each research 
stream, we want to detect which the conditional factors are shown to impact market 
information sharing. The third issue is about consequences of sharing information in 
channels. At the end of this Chapter, we summarize how the research streams in their 
typical way contribute to the three research questions we have.  
 
Figure 2.1 Overview Research Perspectives 
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In the following three paragraphs we clarify the difference among research perspectives in 
approaching the topic. The first research perspective presumes that sharing information 
from all different stages (or echelons) in a chain under the direction of one well-informed 
central planner brings about a better overall performance and higher profits for the whole 
chain than the sum of profits from non-information sharing individual channel firms at 
each chain stage together. We found 32 supply chain optimization studies belonging to this 
perspective. The main objective of this approach is to assess how much information 
sharing helps to increase the efficiency of the (whole) supply chain.  
The second research approach takes on a game-theoretic perspective. These studies 
view the supply chain as a composite of two or three independent firms with private 
market information. The eleven studies included in this overview attempt to understand 
which contract incentives exist to make channel firms reveal their private information and 
if they do, how. The main objective of this approach is to design the most attractive and 
efficient information sharing contract to be offered to the other channel member.  
Partly complementary to the previous two approaches is the third research perspective, 
the empirical behavioral approach. This research perspective does not necessarily assume 
information sharing in channels to be an alternative conduct evaluated by entirely 
economically rational firms. Instead, these 78 behavioral studies look at perceptions of 
actual information sharing behaviors by channel firms. Their objective is to provide 
possible explanations for the hesitations of organizations to pass on their market 
information to their channel partners. 
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows. Each of the three next 
paragraphs discusses one of the research approaches in more detail: supply chain literature 
(2.2), game theoretical models (2.3), and empirical behavioral research (2.4). The 
concluding paragraph 2.5 summarizes the similarities and differences among the research 
perspectives in order to list the relevant variables to be included in our research 
framework. 
 
2.2 Supply Chain Optimization Approach 
The first research approach, Supply Chain Optimization, looks at the phenomenon as a 
system-optimization problem in which one central channel planner with or without access 
to information from two or more stages (in this stream of literature, stages are often 
referred to as “echelons”) in the supply chain. The general point of departure is that if the 
central planner does not receive (all of) the stage-level information, then individual firms 
optimize their own stages and the chain may subsequently exhibit a sub-optimal system 
performance. Subsequently, the approach’s primary question to be addressed is to what 
extent information sharing leads to higher supply chain efficiency. The amount of 
efficiency improvement is calculated by the total reduction in the sum of the supply chain 
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costs, consisting of inventory holding costs, batch ordering costs, shortage penalties due to 
lost consumer sales opportunities or back-order costs, and, if appropriate, costs incurred by 
carrying obsolete or excess inventory.5 By having a measure for the efficiency 
improvement it is possible to estimate the (economic) value of information sharing in 
supply chains. Typical of these studies is to assess the value of information sharing as the 
relative cost difference between information sharing scenarios and the base case without 
any information sharing. A simple illustration of a supply chain optimization problem is as 
follows (this example is taken from Gavirneni et al., 1999). 
 
Consider one supplier in a supply chain with one retailer dealing with consumers (supply 
chain structure depicted as 1M : 1R) and having an infinite number of periods to sell his 
products via the retailer. The retailer faces varying consumer demands and replenishes 
inventory by following an (s,S) policy. Meaning that at the beginning of each period, the 
retailer reviews his inventory level (on-hand inventory minus consumer back-orders), and if 
it is below s, he/she places an order with the supplier to raise the inventory level to S. The 
supplier satisfies this order as much as possible. In the event the supplier does not have 
sufficient on-hand stock to satisfy the retailer order, a partial shipment is made to the retailer, 
and the retailer obtains the unfilled part of the order from an external source. There is no 
delivery lead-time with both sources of supply. Consumer demand arises at the retailer 
during the period, with complete backlogging. The focus of the analysis is the supplier, who 
after satisfying (partially or fully) a retailer order at the beginning of each period, decides 
how much to produce for the period. Production takes one period and is subject a capacity 
constraint. The supplier incurs linear inventory holding costs and linear penalty costs for 
retailer orders. The objective of the supplier (as well as the central planner of the model) is to 
determine a production strategy to minimize the supplier’s costs, under various scenarios of 
the supplier’s information about the downstream part of the supply chain. The base case is 
the scenario presuming that the supplier has no information about the retailer or consumer 
demand expect for the order the retailer has placed in the past. By calculating the difference 
between the supply chain costs (in the example, only the supplier’s costs), under the base 
case and alternative information sharing scenarios, the value of information sharing is 
obtained. 
 
The illustration depicted above is considered to be a simple one, because several of its 
assumptions make the optimization decision of the central planner less complicated. For 
instance in this example, there is no lead-time in delivery, and the retailer always has an 
                                                          
5 The types of supply chain costs included in these studies vary a little. Usually, these studies include inventory 
holding costs, shortage penalties for lost sales and back-order costs, batch-ordering costs (e.g., Gavirneni, et al., 
1999; Lee, et al., 2000). When the models are about a finite sales length context (Iyer and Bergen, 1997; Fisher 
and Raman, 1996) contain also costs incurred by obsolete or excess inventory. The majority of these studies 
assume one central planner (CP; see appendix II.1) whose aim is to optimize the total costs incurred by the each 
of the individual stages. Some of the studies only take the costs of one channel member into account; for instance, 
the supplier (Bourland et al., 1996; Gavirneni, et al., 1999) 
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alternative source to satisfy consumer demand if the supplier deliveries fall short. In the 
case that the supplier has no capacity restriction, the model would even be simpler. 
The focus in this approach lies thus on the overall supply chain performance and not 
just on the performance of one particular party in the whole channel (see Lee and 
Billington, 1992). To gain a systematic insight into the findings of the supply chain 
optimization approach, we collect the studies on information sharing from five high-
standing journals specialized in this approach and that have been used by an earlier review 
by Sahin and Robinson (2002): Management Science, Operations Research, Journal of 
Operations Management, European Journal of Operational Research, and Manufacturing 
and Service Operations Management. We update the Sahin’s and Robinson’s work by 
adding the most recent and relevant articles published in the last two years (2003 and 
2004). Appendix II.1 presents a table with a list of the 32 included studies and provides the 
following details for each study: its research objective, the specification of the supply 
chain structure for which the model is applied and the variables included in the model, and 
its key findings. The studies develop a mathematical multi-stage/echelon inventory control 
models (depending on the sales horizon, the models concern a periodic review problem or 
a newsboy problem). With the exception of some articles using case-studies (Lee, et al., 
1997; Taylor, 1999; Fransoo and Wouters, 2000), all of the listed studies take on an 
OR/operations management science approach modeling logistical management decisions, 
and use computer simulations to test and evaluate approximations of the models.  
In essence, it all begins with the periodic uncertainty and variability in consumer 
demand that creates the supply chain optimization problem. As made clear in Chapter 1, 
the marketing channels may improve their total performance to a large extent by 
diminishing the channel members’ errors in forecasting the quantity and quality of 
products desired by consumers. The forecasting errors in the quantity of the consumer 
demand cause supply chain inefficiency, while forecasting errors in quality lead to 
ineffectiveness in the channel (see Chapter 1, paragraph 1.2.2). The problem of uncertainty 
in consumer demand quantity is modeled by periodic inventory control models and 
assumes an infinite number of sales periods to come. The latter problem of uncertainty in 
consumer demand quality is often modeled as a newsboy problem (f.i., perishable or 
seasonal-sensitive consumer goods like style goods, or fashion).6 
                                                          
6 To illustrate the classic newsboy problem of a newspaper publisher, we give the following example:  a 
newspaper is concerned with controlling the number of papers to be distributed to newsstands. The cost of a paper 
varies (i.e., Sunday vs. daily), and the local consumer demand is a random variable, q, with probability function 
P(q) = probability that demand equals q. Unsold papers are returned, with no salvage value the next day, losing 
millions of dollars in the production cost. It is possible, however, for a newsstand to order more papers the same 
day. There are holding and shortage (penalty) costs. The problem is to determine a reorder policy so as to 
minimize total expected cost.      
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Figure 2.2 Illustration of the Bullwhip Effect: Demand Variability at Different Stages of 
the Supply Chain 
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order, amplify the distributor’s perception of consumer demand. Replication of this 
process at each stage of the supply chain amplifies the information distortion, causing all 
channel members upstream of the retailer to lose track of actual consumer demand pattern 
so that system-wide inventory control suffers.  
Laboratory experiments staging a supply chain environment (known as the classroom 
game The Beer Distribution Game) (Sterman, 1989) (later in the computerized version by 
Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi, 1998) partly explain the causes for the demand amplification 
by the misperceptions of time lags in the channel whereby game players do not adequately 
account for the delays between order placement and order delivery and therefore continued 
to over order or under order in the intervening periods. Furthermore, decision-makers do 
not have a clear idea of the optimal stock levels at each point in the chain and subsequently 
failed to plan for the required amount to stock in the pipeline when adjusting demand. 
Interestingly, these beer-game studies also reveal that decision-makers have a tendency to 
blame the widely fluctuating demand along the chain on external causes, for example 
fluctuating end-consumer demand, when in fact the end-consumer demand was held 
constant. So, while looking for external issues, the channel members do not search for 
solutions when the oscillations are actually caused by inappropriate decision-making 
internally within the chain. It is the local rationality whereby decision-makers try to 
optimize the goods flows of only their own stage in the chain. 
In trying to cope with the demand variability and uncertainty, a logical reaction of 
(uninformed) channel members is to hold more safety stock (Graves, 1996). Hence, we can 
argue that, the larger the consumer demand variability, the larger the bullwhip effect, the 
greater the potential value of information sharing to smoothen supply chain operations and 
improve supply chain efficiency by reducing the excess of held inventory. 
Whether it will ever be possible to entirely eliminate the bull-whip effect by 
information sharing, remains very doubtful. Chen, et al. (2000) demonstrate that even 
under the most ideal conditions when (1) all demand information is centralized, (2) every 
stage of the supply chain uses the same forecasting technique, and (3) every stage uses the 
same inventory policy, there will still be an increase in variability at every stage of the 
chain.  
Furthermore, the large difference in outcomes of the different supply chain 
optimization studies indicates that the reduction of supply chain costs by information 
sharing can considerably vary. Chen (1998) finds that supply chain costs are lowered up to 
9%, and on average by 1.8%. Aviv and Federgruen (1998) report benefits of 0%-5%. In 
contrast, Lee et al. (2000) find that information sharing can even lower supply chain costs 
by about 23% in their scenario with the highest consumer demand turbulence. However, 
Graves (1999) studies a similar model, with the exception that there is no outside inventory 
source, and concludes that information sharing provides no benefit to the supply chain. 
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Gavirneni et al. (1999) report that sharing the retailer’s information on consumer demand 
reduced the supplier’s costs by 1% - 35%. The impact on the total combined supply 
chain’s cost would be lower because information sharing has no impact on the retailer’s 
costs.  
Actually, this enormous disparity in outcomes of these studies using different model 
variables suggests that many other factors may influence the value of information sharing. 
Based on the studies in our review we will systematically enumerate the factors shown to 
influence the potential value (i.e. aggravating the bull-whip effect in the chain), the value 
of information sharing itself, and the relative value of information sharing (as compared 
with other measures to alignment the channel/supply chain). 
Factors influencing the potential value of information sharing. The potential value of 
information sharing concerns the estimation in supply chain cost reduction to be gained 
from sharing information in the channel. This potential is largely determined by the 
variability in consumer demand and the resulting bullwhip effect. Knowing that the 
consumer demand variability and the resulting bullwhip effect (Cachon, 1999) make 
channel members carry more inventory, it can be assumed that there is more potential of 
inventory and other supply chain costs to be reduced. Hence, it is important to first answer 
the question how to measure the bullwhip-effect size and second to identify the underlying 
causes of the bull-whip-effect. As for the quantification of the bull-whip effect, four 
studies concentrate on finding a good measurement method (Metters, 1997; Fransoo and 
Wouters, 2000; Taylor, 1999; Chen et al., 2000). Three studies address the identification of 
causes of the bullwhip effect (Lee, et al., 1997; Chen et al., 2000; Cachon, 1999).  
The potential gravity of the bullwhip effect in the channel increases when the supply 
chain optimization problem gets more complex. The complexity of the supply chain 
optimization depends on three main structural characteristics: (1) the scope of the supply 
chain to be optimized, (2) the length of the sales period, and (3) the inertia embedded in 
the chain. The primary complicating factor is the scope of the supply chain. The scope is 
defined by the number of stages and the number of players per stage. Both aspects make 
up the total number of decision-makers involved. The larger the number of decision-
makers involved, the higher the chances that the bullwhip effect worsens. Although, the 
vast majority of studies under scrutiny here restrict themselves to one manufacturer (1M) 
and one retailer (1R) (Bourland, et al., 1996; Gavirneni, et al., 1999; Lee, et al., 2000; Iyer 
and Bergen, 1997; Aviv, 2000) or to 1M : nR settings (Gilbert and Ballou, 1999; Fisher 
and Raman, 1996, Cahon and Fisher, 2000; Moinzadeh, 2002; Zhao, et al., 2002), it is 
found that the longer the chain (Chen, et al., 2000; Taylor, 1999; Fransoo and Wouters, 
2000), and the more players (Cachon, 1999), the larger the demand variance. 
Understandable is that the potential value of information sharing increases when the 
number of stages increases (Chen, 1998). 
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The second complicating factor in optimizing the supply chain is the sales period 
length. In case of an infinite long sales period, the periodic review inventory control 
models are used (Chen, et al., 2000; Bourland, et al., 1996; Gilbert and Ballou, 1999; 
Hariharan and Zipkin, 1995; Gavirneni, et al., 1999; Cachon, 1999; Lee, et al., 2000; Zhao, 
et al., 2002), because a certain level of consumer demand for these goods is assumed to 
last. That assumption cannot be made for modeling a situation with perishable, seasonal or 
style goods that are only sold in a limited number of periods; like in the fashion industry 
(with QR-channel arrangements, see Chapter 1, paragraph 1.2.3). In a time of changing 
consumer preferences, the sales periods may be short (Iyer and Bergen, 1997; Fisher and 
Raman, 1996), and the urgency to share timely demand information becomes greater. 
Because excess inventory at the end of the sales season is a major cost factor for these 
channels, supply chain optimization studies therefore use newsboy problems to model the 
optimization problem of the central planner (Fisher and Raman, 1996; Iyer and Bergen, 
1997; Milner and Kouvelis, 2002) The value of information shared is relatively higher 
when the consumer demand fluctuates even more in a short period (Milner and Kouvelis, 
2002). 
The third complicating factor in supply chain optimization through information 
sharing falls into the category of channel inertia. Limited production capacity and longer 
lead-times are both critical sources of inertia and make that the channel can only react to 
consumer demand changes with a certain delay. The more restrictions to production 
capacity (Metter, 1997), the more demand amplification occurs, because factory capacity 
limitations encourage over-ordering in times of shortages as in ration gaming (e.g., 
Metters, 1997, Lee et al., 1997). Yet, note that in over-capacitated chains, early demand 
information increases the value of information (to the supplier) (Gavirneni, et al, 1999). 
Furthermore, it is established that lead times of deliveries increase the uncertainty in the 
supply chain (Hariharan and Zipkin, 1995; Chen, 1998), and also enlarge the value of 
information because the potential to safe costs goes up (Moinzadeh, 2002). 
Factors influencing the value of information sharing. Not only the complicating 
factors surrounding information sharing, but also two characteristics of the shared 
information itself influence the value of information shared. Generally, three 
characteristics have been investigated by supply chain optimization studies: source of 
information, extent of information shared and the quality aspects, like timeliness, accuracy 
and predictive power. The source of information implies either it comes from upstream 
(supplier) or upstream (retailer). Only very limited attention is given to the sharing of 
information coming from the supplier, like cost or capacity information (Chen, 2003). An 
exception is the study by Chen and Yu (2005); their estimation of the value of supplier’s 
lead-time information shows that as sales volume grows, this upstream information 
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increasingly reduces the supply chain costs. All other studies deal with downstream 
information from the retailer.  
As for the second characteristic of information shared, the extent of the information 
shared may differ among the various studies. While most studies take a look at the sharing 
of full information and calculate the effect of passing on all information about consumer 
demand (observed at retail level) (Parlar and Whang, 1995; Anand and Mendelson, 1997; 
Chen, 1998; Gavirneni, et al., 1999; Chen, et al., 2000; Lee, et al., 2000; Milner and 
Kouvelis, 2002), the information shared is limited to the retailer’s/channel member’s 
ordering policy (Gavirneni, et al., 1999; Aviv, 2002), demand forecasts (Aviv, 2001; Aviv, 
2002), advance order commitments (Gilbert and Ballou, 1999), improved forecasts (Fisher 
and Raman, 1996), or retail promotion plans (Iyer and Ye, 2002) with their upstream 
channel partners. Overall, full information sharing is found to be more valuable than 
partial.  
Concerning the third characteristic of information shared, supply chain optimization 
studies look at quality aspects like timeliness, accuracy and predictive power. The 
timeliness of information shared is very valuable to the supplier for it reduces its inventory 
holding costs and reliability of the deliveries to retailer (Bourland, et al., 1996). Timely 
collaborative forecasting is also more effective. Less delay between the making of the 
forecast and the actual execution increase the benefits (Aviv, 2001). Both accuracy (free of 
errors) in information shared (Anand and Mendelson, 1997; Zhao et al., 2002) and 
predictive (explanatory) power (Aviv, 2002) also contribute positively to the value of 
information sharing. 
Factors influencing the relative value of information sharing. Information sharing is 
not the only one available instrument to make the channel more efficient by reducing 
supply chain costs. For instance, Cachon (1999) study shows that besides information 
sharing making the supply chain more flexible in terms of shortening retailer’s order 
intervals and lowering the minimal order batch is a viable alternative for reducing supply 
chain costs. It is therefore (managerially) interesting to look at the relative value of 
information sharing and to compare its value with other measures for supply chain 
alignment. In these comparative studies, information sharing can be regarded as 
complementary – the alternative measure increases the value of information shared – or as 
replacement – the alternative measure decreased the value of information. In a number of 
studies the information sharing is inextricably bound up with handing over the decision-
making to the other channel member (supplier), like the VMI-effectiveness studies (Waller 
et al., 1999: Aviv and Federgruen, 1998; Fry, et al., 2001; Aviv, 2002); in effect, in these 
cases the value of information shared depends very much on the coordination measures. 
Also other studies find information-sharing and coordination to go hand-in-hand and 
consider them of complementary value (Anand and Mendelson, 1997; Parlar and Weng, 
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1995). For instance, Watson and Zheng (2005) emphasize the importance of an appropriate 
incentive scheme for the player involved, because they find that the benefits of information 
sharing can really be materialized when the individual channel members are made 
accountable for the performance of the whole channel. Additionally, Milner and Kouvelis 
(2002) show that in long-lead time channels the value of information sharing only can 
increase when the supplier is both flexible in the timing of taking the order and producing 
the quantity.  
Substitutes for information sharing are shortening lead-times and cutting order batch 
sizes. The value of information sharing goes down when lead times are made shorter 
(Chen, 1998; Milner and Kouvelis, 2002). Smaller and smaller batch sizes decrease the 
value of information (Chen, 1998). Cachon and Fisher (2000) compare the value of sharing 
real-time demand information with two other information-technology-related sources of 
supply and improvement: reducing order cycle lead times through electronic transaction 
processing and reducing shipment batch sizes as a result of lower transaction processing 
costs.  
To summarize the discussion on the supply chain optimization approach, we have 
gained the following ideas on the nature, antecedents and consequences of information 
sharing. First, as for the nature of information sharing, the supply chain optimization 
approach concentrates on the calculation of the value of information sharing. Its value 
mainly lies in its potential to undo the negative bullwhip costs effects in the supply chain. 
Intrinsically, its value is linked with the extent to which information from the marketplace 
is shared in the supply chain. We make difference in partial versus full sharing of 
information. Some studies also look at quality aspects of information, such as timeliness, 
accuracy and explanatory power. These quality indicators for shared information in the 
channel appear to increase the value of the information. However, for now, it remains 
unclear whether or not these characteristics are uncorrelated. Later in this dissertation 
(Chapter 5), we will report from our own studies that the extent of information sharing has 
strong associations with the (perceived) quality. 
With regard to the antecedents of information sharing, this research perspective has 
studied the factors having an influence of the value of information sharing. Very prominent 
is the factor consumer demand turbulence, because variation in end-user demand is the 
start of the Bullwhip effect. Other circumstantial factors aggravating or dampening the 
bullwhip like channel inertia and the scope of the supply chain emerge as important 
variables to consider for explaining information sharing in channels. If a factor contributes 
to the value of information shared, then it can be considered to be an antecedent promoting 
information sharing in a channel (indicated by the “(+)”-sign). If the factor reduces the 
value of information shared, then the reverse is true and the factor then qualifies as a 
negative antecedent (indicated by the “(-)”-sign). With regard to the issue of the 
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consequences, it is clear that supply chain optimization studies primarily concentrate on 
the cost-saving efficiency improvement in the chain as a whole.  
 
Table 2.1 Important Variables from the Supply Chain Optimization approach 
Antecedents 
 
Market Information Shared Consequences 
 
Consumer demand turbulence (+) 
• consumer demand variability (+) 
• length of sales period (-) 
 
Channel inertia (+) 
• supplier capacity (-)  
• channel length (+) 
• order/delivery lead-time (+) 
 
Scope of the Supply Chain (+) 
• Number of stages in the chain (+) 
• Number of players per stage (+) 
 
 
Source 
• Upstream (supply lead-times) 
• Downstream (consumer 
demand data) 
 
Extent (downstream) 
• Partial (inventory policy 
parameters, stock information, 
demand forecasts) 
• Full (consumer demand data) 
 
Quality 
• timeliness 
• errors in information 
• explanatory power 
 
 
Supply Chain Performance (+) 
• Cost-saving efficiency 
improvement (ordering, 
backorder, inventory-holding, 
improved demand forecast 
accuracy) 
 
 
Note: (+) indicates that the variable increases the value of information sharing; (-) indicates that the variable 
decreases the value of information sharing. 
 
 
2.3 Game-theoretic Approach 
Another long-standing academic tradition in the modeling channel dynamics is game 
theory (Spengler, 1950; Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; Moorthy, 1987). When game theorists 
look at information sharing in channels, they regard it as a multi-agent decision problem, 
which means that there are multiple independent channel firms contending for a piece of 
the total channel profit (payoffs). In such a game-model, channel firms have to decide on 
making certain moves on which their payoff depends. For instance, they need to decide 
whether or not to accept or reject a contract to share their private information. Each 
channel member is supposed to behave rationally. Rationality in the language of game 
theorists implies that each channel member/player tries to maximize his/her payoff 
irrespective to what other players are doing. Moreover, looking solely for their own 
individual profits when making decisions, channel members do not care about the 
collective impact of the channel as a whole. Certain individual rational decisions may 
perhaps then result in lower total channel profits than optimal. When that happens and no 
optimal joint outcome is reached, the channel relationship is regarded as ill-coordinated. 
Game theorists aim to mend or prevent these channel coordination problems by 
formulating (prescribing) optimal arrangements for channel members. The channel 
coordination problem becomes bigger, when uncertainty about consumer demand grows. 
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For that reason, one type of such arrangements to reach channel coordination (and thus 
resulting in optimal total channel outcomes) in larger consumer demand uncertainty is to 
share market information between channel members. The prime question for game 
theorists is then: how should a supplier induce the retailer to reveal his true demand – what 
is referred to in the literature as the “demand revelation” problem (Myerson, 1979). An 
incentive scheme is only considered to be effective if it not only gives higher expected 
channel yields but also that the retailer is better off. This is called the Pareto optimality 
criterion to elicit the retailer to share his superior private information about the state of the 
nature (i.c., consumer demand) with the supplier. 
So far, it has been more common for game theorists to look at horizontal information 
sharing between competitors to inform each other about the state of nature (e.g, Vives, 
1984; Gal-Or, 1985; Shapiro, 1986; Gal-Or, 1986); here in this thesis, we look at vertical 
information sharing and to our knowledge, eleven studies have investigated this subject in 
a game-theoretic perspective.7 Appendix II.2 enumerates the studies and summarizes the 
different aspects: nature and number of players, sequence of the game with the 
specification of the strategic moves under consideration, the players’ payoff functions, the 
nature of information to be shared, and the key findings.  
The studies in our review all present dynamic games meaning that there are different 
sequential steps in the games to be taken (as opposed to one-shot games where players take 
simultaneously one step/action). Five studies are primarily price-setting games (a Bertrand 
type games; Chu and Messinger, 1997; Roy, 2000; Niraj and Narasimhan, 2003; Kurtuluş, 
2004). One of them is a quantity-setting game (a Cournot type game; Donohue, 2000; Li, 
2002; Gu and Chen, 2004). Others concern the offering of an arrangement by the supplier 
(Desiraju and Moorthy, 1997; Gal-Or, 1991), or the arrangement is achieved by agreement 
between the two channel parties (Siedmann and Sundarararajan, 1997). In order to give a 
clearer idea of how vertical information sharing can be modeled in a game-theoretic way, 
we give a simple illustration of such as game (this example is a simplification of the multi-
stage game of information sharing and price-setting developed by Niraj and Narasimhan, 
2002). 
 
                                                          
7 In the game-theoretical tradition of channels, there is another branch of studies looking at information 
asymmetry in manufacturer-retailer relationships. This group of studies does not particularly focus on the 
exchange of (demand) information itself, but on the signaling of a channel member to the other. A known 
example is from Chu (1992), where two games are presented; one is about how a manufacturer with private 
information can credibly signal to the retailer that consumer demand for new product will be high. We exclude 
these types of studies from our overview, because in these games none of the parties actually share market 
information; they merely send credible signals without giving insight. Other examples of demand signaling games 
are Desai and Srinivasan (1995), Desai (2000), and Cachon and Lariviere (2001). 
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Consider a marketing channel consisting of one manufacturer selling to consumers through one 
retailer. The retailer buys the product from the manufacturer at a wholesale price w and then 
sets the retail price P. The function of consumer market demand (Q) is assumed to be linear 
function with a constant price elasticity (β) and is given by: 
• Q = αL,H – β * P  (consumer demand function; αL/αH = low/high demand)  
• Πr = Q * P –w * Q  (profit function retailer) 
• Πm = Q * w (insert profit function manufacturer here) 
The consumer market demand is stochastic and the demand side uncertainty lies in the fact that 
the alpha can be either low (αL) or high (αH). In this game setup, the retailer has private 
information about the height of the alpha. The manufacturer has an interest in knowing more 
about the future consumer demand, because he wants to avoid setting a too high wholesale price 
in a low expected consumer market demand or setting a too low wholesale price in a high 
expected consumer market demand. Both situations can hurt the manufacturer’s profitability.  
In this game setting, manufacturer and retailer set their own wholesale price (w) and retail price 
(P); only after they have agreed on to share information or not. The sequence of the moves is 
therefore as follows: in the first stage the manufacturer decides whether to offer to form an 
information-sharing alliance. The next stage is the one in which the retailer decides to accept or 
reject the offer, if one is made. In the third stage, the manufacturer sets a wholesale price 
conditional on the market information available to him (either only his own predictions or the 
retailer’s demand forecast). The fourth and final stage is the retailer setting a retail price (P) 
conditional on own market information and the wholesale price set by the manufacturer.  
 
The solution of this game is found by using backward induction. A more detailed 
explanation on the calculation of the subgame equilibriums and the final outcomes goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis and we therefore refer to the publications of the game-
theoretic studies in this review.  
Contracts to Share Information. The manner in which information sharing is 
conceptualized in the game-theoretic approach is by way of the offering of a “contract” to 
be agreed upon by both channel members. We need to make a distinction between an 
explicit or an implicit information sharing contract. An explicit contract is that in one stage 
of a game (often in the beginning) the channel members have to make an explicit decision 
to share or not (as in the above-stated example; Siedmann and Sundarararajan, 1997; Li, 
2002; Niraj and Narasimhan, 2003; Gu and Chen, 2004; Kurtuluş, 2004). The contract to 
share information can also be an integral part of the contract offered. Examples of such 
implicit contracts regard information sharing as a built-in part of the franchise fee contract 
or retail price maintenance contract, (see Gal-Or, 1991), or the marketing arrangement with 
price and/or service requirements (Desiraju and Moorthy, 1997), or the two-period 
wholesale price arrangement (Donohue, 2000).  
Individual and Total Channel Pay-offs. The results of the games are evaluated on both 
the individual profits and the total channel profit. The outcome of a game is regarded 
optimal when channel coordination is achieved with total channel profit being maximized 
under the condition that none of individual channel member’s profits suffer. A second 
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effect and by-product of an information-sharing contract is that it may have consequences 
for the redistribution (share) of total of channel profits. The typical variables included in 
the players’ pay-off function to be optimized are the wholesale price, and retail price (due 
to the fact it is often a price-setting game). Another variable is the quantity to be bought 
and sold by the retailer. Unique in this respect is the model by Siedmann and Sundararaja 
(1997) that contains more intangible revenues to be gained by manufacturers if they enter 
into a category management arrangement (strategic sales and marketing revenues, 
competitive revenue, extra bargaining power), at the expense of paying a certain contract 
fee to the retailer.  
Differential impact from games settings.  Except for Siedmann and Sundararajam 
(1997), all the games in this review deal with a market situation where some consumer 
demand uncertainty is assumed to exist. As stated in the above mentioned illustration of a 
vertical information sharing game, uncertainty about consumer demand elevates the 
urgency for channel members to think of sharing information as a solution to reach an 
optimal outcome with a better channel coordination. Similarly, Gu and Chen (2004) find in 
their game-setting that higher levels of consumer demand uncertainty make it strategically 
more beneficial for a powerful retailer to share its information. But that does not imply that 
all studies find that information sharing helps to reach a better channel coordination under 
every condition. Each of these studies identifies circumstances under which information 
sharing is more helpful in achieving channel coordination. Just one critical note on the 
necessity of information sharing is placed by Chu and Messinger (1997). They 
demonstrate in their 2-player channel price-setting game that the acquisition of market 
information by only one single channel member delivers the greatest profitability for the 
whole channel, because the informed channel member’s should be able to fine-tune prices 
in response to demand conditions in order to maximize channel revenues. Moreover the 
channel as a whole can save out on the total costs of acquiring market information, because 
one channel members does not need to acquire any. For all the other games on information 
sharing, the conditions for the positive impact of information sharing on the total channel 
profit depend very much on the different game settings the authors investigate. We can 
cluster these circumstantial factors into four categories: contract characteristics, 
relationship characteristics, supplier competition, and retailer competition. 
As for the contract characteristics, several game-models with implicit information 
sharing contracts demonstrate that the manufacturers offering the contract have to be very 
strict and complete in setting the additional requirements to the other channel member: 
both price and service requirements (Desiraju and Moorthy, 1997), retail price 
maintenance (Gal-Or, 1991), and wholesale prices for both periods (Donohue, 2000), 
otherwise the information sharing does not lead to better channel profits. In explicit 
contracts, where channel members plainly agree on sharing in passing on information, the 
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positive impact on the total channel profit depends on the quality of the market information 
being shared. When the passed-on market information is more predictive and truth-telling 
probability (Niraj and Narasimhan, 2003; Gu and Chen, 2004) or the demand forecasts are 
more accurate (Roy, 2000; Donohue, 2000), the total channel profits go up.   
As for the relationship characteristics, it is important to note that different from the 
supply chain optimization literature, the competitive and conflicting interests between 
channel members play up in the game-theoretic perspective. The studies limiting the 
competitive arena to one manufacturer and one retailer (1 M : 1 R; a bilateral monopoly) 
often assume the manufacturers to be Stackelberg leaders (they make the first step in the 
game and determine the possible actions of the retailer) (Gal-Or, 1991; Desiraju and 
Moorthy, 1997; Donohue, 2000; Niraj and Narasimham, 2003). In the game setting from 
Gu and Chen (2004), the power between manufacturer and retailer is not taken as a given 
but the strength of retailer’s bargaining power emanates from the model. Subsequently, 
they find that the retailer’s bargaining power should not be too low or too high for the 
channel relationship to be coordinated by an information sharing arrangement.  
With regard to supplier competition, in games with more than one manufacturer 
(Siedmann and Sundararajan, 1997; Kurtuluş, 2004), the retailer appears to profit from the 
advantageous position to divide-and-rule. Moreover, Siedmann and Sundararaja (1997) 
assign the retailer to be the Stackelberg leader, thereby strengthening the power position of 
the retailer. Competition between suppliers leads to asymmetric information sharing, viz. 
only one manufacturer receives information from the retailer (Niraj and Narasimhan, 
2003). Furthermore, the game studies are not conclusive about which party turns out to be 
the winner of information-sharing and receives the highest share of the channel profits. 
The competition between suppliers appears to play a pivotal role in that respect. In 1M:1R 
games with the manufacturer as Stackelberg leader, the manufacturer will be the one most 
benefiting from information sharing. For instance, Donohue (2000) finds that the 
manufacturer may regain an extra share of the channel profits on the condition that he/she 
can arrange the retailer to give more predictive information about consumer demand.   
If competition among retailers is introduced, information sharing by the retailers is not 
self-evident. Li (2002) emphasizes that the information leakage effect coming as a result of 
information sharing with manufacturers, there are retailers that shy away from any 
information. However, when the manufacturer offers enough compensation by a lower 
wholesale price, the channel becomes coordinated by information sharing. 
Table 2.2 summaries the conclusions to be drawn from the game-theoretic perspective 
on information sharing in channel relationships. The foremost contribution of these studies 
is that they emphasize the dual conflicting interests within the channel relationship. They 
show that the power structure plays an important role in coordinating a channel trough 
information sharing. For instance, it is important to have channel leadership in order to 
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determine final outcomes of the game; it is either the manufacturers being the 
(Stackelberg-leader; setting wholesale prices or determining the channel arrangement) or 
the retailer (choosing the category advisor) that dictates the terms. Another important 
contribution of these studies is that they introduce competition at a very crucial element; 
competition at manufacturer-level or at retailer-level magnifies the conflicting interests in 
the channel relationship.  
 
Table 2.2 Important Variables from the Game-theoretic Approach 
Antecedents 
 
Market Information Shared Consequences 
 
Consumer demand turbulence (+) 
• Uncertainty 
 
Supplier Network 
• Number of suppliers (+) 
• Supplier Competition (+) 
• Retailer Competition (-) 
 
Relationship Characteristics 
• Governance structure (-/+) 
• Power structure (-/+) 
 
 
Content 
• Consumer demand 
• Competitive intelligence 
 
Quality 
• reliability (truth-telling) 
• complementarity 
 
• total channel profits (quantity 
and price levels, wholesale and 
retail) (+) 
• individual channel member profit 
 
Still, evidence from these game theoretical studies is inconclusive. The bottom line is that 
information sharing in channels is not always “good”. There are circumstances in which 
information sharing is not sensible to an individual channel member. Especially, when 
there are conflicting and competing interests at stake.  
The two research perspectives of the supply chain optimization and the game theoretic 
models have in common that they both simplify the problem at hand so that the basic 
underlying tradeoffs in market information sharing can be understood analytically. 
Unfortunately, this may compromise the (external) validity of their research results when 
applied in a real-world channel context. For instance, broadening the scope of the problem 
with the inclusion of more realistic factors like multiple products, and multi-stage supply 
chains with multiple players at each supply chain stage, it could provide additional insights 
not gleamed from simple models.  
 
2.4 Empirical Behavioral Approach 
In contrast, the third research perspective does not simplify the problem by introducing 
assumptions, but it in principle tests the hypotheses on information sharing practices in 
real-life. That means that without the predominantly normative stance on information 
sharing taken by the two previous research perspectives, the empirical studies in the 
marketing channels literature do not argue whether or not firms should share their market 
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information with their channel partners and they do not demonstrate the benefits to be 
gained from it (less demand variance amplification, lower inventories, etc.) either; they 
rather explain when and why firms share or refrain from sharing their market information 
in reality. Marketing channels are not only economic systems but also social systems 
(Reve and Stern, 1979; Stern and Reve, 1980) and less than optimal efficiencies and 
effectiveness in marketing channels may be due to dysfunctional political-economic 
dynamics and power play struggles within the channel relationships. 
Channel conflicts can be caused by many different sources (Lusch, 1976; Etgar, 
1979), but one major source is ineffective communications between channel members 
often leading to misunderstandings, incorrect strategies, and mutual feelings of frustration. 
Unfamiliarity with marketing concepts and ideas, desire for secrecy, lack of motivation for 
information sharing, and of standardized information processing procedures have been 
acknowledged to contribute to ineffective channel communications for a long time  
(Mattson, 1969). For example, late announcements about new products or advertising 
campaigns, mislaid or misunderstood messages, and the inability to provide effective 
information are causes of great concern to dealers. Manufacturers tend to complain about 
late orders or cancellations, incorrect specifications, and lack of feedback about market 
situations (Etgar, 1979). 
The objective of this paragraph is to provide a review of the extant marketing 
literature on the phenomenon of information sharing in marketing channels. Seventy-eight 
publications with studies on Information Sharing in Channels which appeared in the 
marketing literature were identified by means of a computer bibliographic search and 
issue-by-issue searches of mainly the eight major journals for marketing channels, 
Marketing Science, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of Retailing, International Journal of Research in 
Marketing, Industrial Marketing Management, and Journal of Business Research. The 
literature search covered the period of last three decades (1974 to 2005) starting with the 
Hunt and Nevin seminal work on the types of power uses in marketing channels. We need 
to be careful with confounding all of the empirical studies containing a label of 
information sharing, because “confusion still exists among the power, communication, and 
control constructs in both a conceptual and operational sense.” (Frazier, 1999; pp. 226-
240). Fundamental is the notion that the perspective depends on the relationship context in 
which the phenomenon is approached (cf. Boyle et al., 1992). For that reason, we start with 
classifying the empirical studies according to the way marketing scholars have 
conceptualized information sharing (based on the used operationalizations). Looking at 
Boyle, et al. (1992), Mohr and Nevin (1990, 1996), Heide and John (1992), and Gundlach, 
et al. (1995) we are able to discern four different conceptualizations of information-sharing 
in channel relationships: information sharing as (1) exercise of information power, (2) 
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communicative channel behavior, (3) relational norm, and (4) demonstration of 
relationship bonding. Table 2.3 displays the different typical operationalizations for each 
of the conceptualizations. 
 
Table 2.3 Typical Operationalizations for the Conceptualizations on Information 
Sharing in Channels 
 
As an Exercise of Information Power 
 
As Communicative Channel Behavior 
My primary supplier …. 
1. … focuses on general strategies (as opposed to specific 
tactics) as to how to make our business more profitable;  
2. … concentrates more on strategic, long-term issues, 
rather than specific courses of action our business should 
take; 
3. ... discusses the orientation our management personnel 
should take with regard to long-term planning, rather 
than daily activities; 
4. ... attempts to change our perspective by looking at how 
our business decision affects the "big picture". 
 
Responses are “always”, “usually”, “sometimes”, “rarely”,  
and “never” (5-point scale). 
1. [This supplier] lets our firm know as soon as possible of 
any unexpected problems with things such as…*  
2. We keep this supplier well informed about what is going 
on in this distributorship and with customers ** 
3. This distributorship and this supplier make it a point to 
keep each other well informed.** 
4. We hesitate to give this supplier too much information 
(reversed)** 
5. This supplier seeks our advice and counsel concerning 
their marketing efforts.** 
6. This supplier is willing to let us see their weaknesses as 
well as their strengths.** 
7. We are quite involved in the marketing and planning 
efforts of this supplier.** 
 
Responses range from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” 
(7-point scale). 
 
(from: Boyle, et al., 1992) (from: *Anderson and Narus, 1990; ** Anderson and Weitz, 
1992) 
 
As a Relational Norm 
 
As a Demonstration of Relationship Bonding 
1. In this relationship, it is expected that any information 
that might help the other party will be provided to them. 
2. Exchange of information in this relationship takes place 
frequently and informally, and not only according to a 
prespecified agreement. 
3. It is expected that the parties will provide proprietary 
information if it can help the other party. 
4. It is expected that we keep each other informed about 
events or changes that may affect the other party. 
 
Responses range from “completely inaccurate description” to 
“completely accurate description” (7-point scale). 
 
(from: Heide and John, 1992) 
 
Joint Action*** 
The extent to which [your firm]  undertakes the following 
activities with this supplier: 
1. Gathering market information 
2. Customer needs analysis 
3. Performance review 
4. Setting sales target or goals 
5. Sales promotion programs 
 
Responses range from “minimal” to “extensive” (7-point 
scale). 
 
 
Commitment Input**** 
1. Disclosed confidential information about industry/market 
conditions, competitors, and channel partners 
2. Provided proprietary information about firm decisions 
and strategies 
3. Agreed to make decisions that would benefit partners 
4. Promised resources and support (e.g., market research 
and help in decision making and financing) 
 
Responses range from “strongly disagree”to “strongly agree” 
(7-point scale). 
 
 (from: ***Kim, 1999; ****Gundlach et al., 1995) 
 
Per conceptualization we discuss the relationships found of information sharing with 
antecedents and consequences. Moreover we explain briefly the theoretical background 
used for reasoning why the exchange of market information between firms takes place and 
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what effects it has. Then, we compare the empirical findings from the four different 
conceptualizations with each other. 
 
2.4.1 Information Sharing as an Exercise of Information Power 
In search for explanations for inefficiencies and low effectiveness in marketing channel 
outcomes, marketing channel scholars have investigated a great deal on dysfunctional 
political-economic conflicts and power struggles within the channel relationships. Power is 
the channel member’s ability to control or influence the decision variables of the other 
channel member (El-Ansary and Stern, 1972; Stern and Reve, 1980). One of the power 
bases is having expertise and/or information (French and Raven, 1959), and hence, we 
argue that the use of expert or information power by a channel member is one of the 
conceptualizations of information sharing in behavioral channel research. It is 
subsequently important to note that we need to make a distinction between possession and 
use (i.c., sharing). The possession of market information is equal to having a certain power 
base, and that puts a channel member (source) into a position to control or influence the 
decision variables of the other channel member (target). Only the sharing of information 
can be characterized of exercising power; this tradition in the literature qualifies 
information exchange as exercising non-coercive power (Hunt and Nevin, 1974; Gaski and 
Nevin, 1985; Scheer and Stern, 1992; Keith et al., 1990); and considered to be an indirect 
influence strategy. While direct influence strategies are designed to change behaviors of 
the channel counter-part (target) by implying or requesting the specific action that the focal 
channel firm (source) wants the target to take (like requests, recommendations, promises, 
and appeals to legal obligations), indirect influence strategies are designed to change the 
other channel member’s beliefs and attitudes about the desirability of the intended 
behavior; so, no specific action is requested directly by the dominant channel member in 
possession of market information. The indirect influence from information exchange 
comes from the source’s discussions with the target on general business issues and 
operating procedures in order to alter the target’s attitude about desirable behaviors 
(Frazier and Summers, 1984; Boyle et al., 1992). 
Twenty-three empirical studies conceptualize information exchange as a non-coercive 
influence strategy. The commonly employed operationalization/measurement is on the 
perceived use of information-exchange to influence the channel counterpart's behavior (see 
also Table 2.3 for an overview of typical operationalizations). Although, “in general 
channel power research has been plagued by ambiguous and mixed findings” (Brown, et 
al., 1995b, p. 335), it is still possible to list the factors known to encourage the use of 
information sharing by a channel member. First of all, the foremost antecedent of channel 
members to make use of information exchange is their possession of the non-coercive 
power source (Gaski and Nevin, 1985: Rawwas et al., 1994), or the perception of power 
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attributed to them by the other channel member (e.g., Gaski and Nevin, 1985; Boyle and 
Dwyer, 1995; Brown, et al., 1995b;). 
Second, whether or not channel members with market information employ 
information exchange as an influence strategy is largely dependent on the dependence 
structure in the channel relationship. When channel members deal with more dependent 
parties, they tend to use more non-coercive influence strategies (Kieth, et al., 1990; Tikoo, 
2002). The use of non-coercive information exchange strategies are in particular used 
when the joint interdependence is greater and the common interests for both channel 
members grow (Frazier and Rodi, 1991; Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994; Kim, 2000). 
However, in more asymmetric interdependence structures (one channel member is more 
dependent on the other), the more powerful channel member prefers using a more coercive 
influence strategy over information exchange (Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994; Kim, 2000; 
Hu and Sheu; 2005).  
Besides the dependence structure, the relationship climate plays an important role in 
the use of information power. The presence of latent conflict reflects an underlying state of 
incompatibility between two channel members (Brown and Day, 1981), this amount of 
belief and attitude dissensus may hinder the use of information exchange by either of the 
channel members. Yet, as soon as the conflict manifests itself the use of non-coercive 
power will help to relax the situation in which channel members work more actively to 
resolve their differences (Frazier and Rodi, 1991). This is in line with the empirical finding 
that sharing norms on mutuality, solidarity and flexibility in the relationship (relationalism; 
Macniel, 1983) further enhances the information exchange (Boyle, et al., 1992).  
With regard to consequences of information sharing as an exercise of information 
power, the general finding is that the immediate (short-run) effectiveness of information 
exchange is considered to be lower than other types of power uses. It is widely assumed 
that the information sharing needs more time to have an effect; compared to other uses of 
power. It is argued that the immediate effectiveness of a base of power in altering the 
decisions of another is determined by its degree of selectivity and directedness. Expert-
based and information power are less selective and often undirected to specific behavior 
(cf. Etgar, 1978), and found to have a less strong direct effect on compliance than other 
uses of power (such as reward and coercion, Keith, et al., 1990; threats in more dependent 
channels, Payan and McFarland, 2005). 
The use of soft power like exchanging information diminishes the level of conflict in 
relationships (Gaski and Nevin, 1985; Brown, et al., 1995; Lee, 2001), and thereby 
stimulates the development of trust (Scheer and Stern, 1992) and commitment to the 
relationship (Scheer and Stern, 1992; Brown et al., 1995). It ultimately reinforces the 
perceived power position of the influencer (Hunt and Nevin, 1974); even though the power 
attributions are weaker compared to other power uses (e.g., Keith, et al., 1990; Scheer and 
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Stern, 1992; Brown, et al., 1995b), it is received by the other channel member with greater 
satisfaction (compared with more coercive types of influence strategies; e.g., Hunt and 
Nevin, 1974; Gaski and Nevin, 1985; Scheer and Stern, 1992; Brown, et al., 1995b).  
The question is then whether or not the non-coercive influence attempt of information 
sharing by one channel member is likely to be returned by the other. When a retailer starts 
to share his or her information more openly, will suppliers feel invited to share more of 
their information? And vice versa? Reciprocal action theory (cf. Gouldner, 1960; Kelley, 
1983) predicts that the actions taken by one party are in response to actions taken by the 
other party in an exchange relationship. There are studies in which this seems true; not 
only coercive influence attempts (Frazier and Summers, 1986; Frazier, et al., 1989; Kumar, 
et al., 1998) are returned, but also in non-coercive influence strategies (Frazier and Rodi, 
1991; Kim, 2000) because the frequent use of non-coercive strategies invites the other 
channel member to follow a similar pattern fostered by the supportive climate created in 
the exchange and related to concerns for equity (Dywer, et al., 1987). 
The reciprocity of the use of influence strategies is not always likely to occur (see 
Kale, 1989; Frazier, et al., 1989), because it is largely subject to the dependence structure 
between the channel members. Bilateral deterrence theory (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981; 
Lawler et al, 1988) gives an explanation for this contingency in reciprocating coercive 
actions. This theory contends that, a channel member’s desire to engage in conflict is a 
function of the party’s fear of retaliation and expectation of attack. As total dependence 
between channel members increases (all else being equal), retaliation poses an ever-greater 
threat to both channel parties. Because each fears retaliation and knows that the other 
harbors similar fears, the expectation of attack (and use of coercive influence strategy) is 
low. Consequently, as total interdependence increases, each becomes less likely to 
instigate conflict. The opposite holds true for increasing interdependence asymmetry. As 
the channel relationship becomes more asymmetric, the relatively powerful firm has less 
motivation to avoid conflict (and may use more coercive influence strategies), and the 
relatively dependent channel partner increasingly expects to be exploited and/or attacked 
regardless of its own behavior, so it is more likely to engage in a preemptive strike or 
rebellion against the more powerful firm’s domination (Lawler, et al., 1988; Kumar, et al., 
1995) 
Whether or not the same holds true for reciprocating non-coercive actions, like 
information sharing, may be explained by the “flipside” of bilateral deterrence theory, 
bilateral convergence (Kumar, et al., 1995): increased total dependence stimulates the 
reciprocating information-sharing, whereas increased dependence asymmetry does not. 
Kim (2000) finds confirmation that the principle of reciprocity holds for the increase in 
interdependence (when joint interests grow).  
 49
Interestingly, Gaski and Nevin (1985) point out that the possessor of market 
information (source) needs to be clear in the decision to share or not to share market 
information. The advantage of exercising non-coercive power is the prospect of increased 
satisfaction and decreased intra-channel conflict in dealing with other (target) party. 
However, drawback of unexercised non-coercive power will decrease satisfaction, and 
increase intra-channel conflict. This would imply that having a reservoir of market 
information obliges channel firms to share or else they would run the risk of causing 
unsatisfied channel partners and having a conflict with them. If the possessor of market 
information does not wish to share, then it would be wise not to expose their expertise and 
knowledge power to the other channel members.  
 
2.4.2 Information Sharing as Communicative Channel Behavior 
The power-conflict standpoint on marketing channels holds a more adversarial look at 
channel relationships and attempts to explain the dynamics by primarily looking at “how a 
channel member influences other channel members in the pursuit for its own self-interest”.  
Additional explanations for information sharing behavior in channel relationships can be 
obtained from a more cooperative view on channel dynamics; “a channel member actively 
work together with each other in order to reach common goals” (e.g., Dwyer, et al., 1987; 
Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Wilson, 1995). One particular type of such cooperative behaviors 
is the communicative behavior in channel relationships. The intensity with which channel 
members communicate with each other about plans, programs, expectations, goal-setting, 
and performance evaluation (cf. Anderson and Weitz, 1989) is often “defined as the formal 
as well as informal sharing of meaningful and timely information between firms” (cf. 
Anderson and Narus, 1990; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Channel communicative behaviors 
illustrate therefore the second way in which information sharing has been conceptualized 
in empirical behavioral channel research. Communication in the channel relationship is 
qualified as “the glue” (Mohr and Nevin, 1990) holding channel members together.  
In dissecting the components of “this glue”, 21 articles in our review reveal that 
approximately three ways for measuring channel communicative behavior exist. The 
simplest way gives a rather holistic score of communicative behavior in a channel 
relationship and concerns a general overall measurement looking at the “overall intensity 
(or openness) of communication (“the stickiness of the glue”). Anderson and Narus (1990) 
and Ross et al. (1997) measure the intensity of communication in the relationship; whereas 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) focus on reports about the other channel member’s 
communicative behavior. 
The second measurement of channel communicative behavior is more elaborated and 
highlights the different aspects of it. It builds on the mechanistic perspective of 
communication theory (Krone, Jablin, and Putnam, 1987; Mohr and Nevin, 1990), in 
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which communication is viewed as a transmission process through a channel. Important 
facets of the communication process include the message (content), the channel (mode), 
feedback (bidirectional communication) and communication effects. The more complex 
and composed measurements are used by Gassenheimer, et al., (1996; participative 
communication and feedback),  Schultz and Evans (2002; strategic content, 
informality, bi-directionality, frequency), Mohr and Spekman (1994; communication 
quality, information sharing, participation), Cannon and Homburg (2001; frequency, 
modality, amount of information sharing (by the other channel member). Also Mohr, et al 
(1996) emphasize the four different aspects of collaborative communication in channel 
relationships (frequency, bi-directionality, formality, and non-coercive content); but they 
combine all of the aspects into one measure of “collaborative communication”.  
The third approach of measuring channel communicative behavior concentrates on 
one particular facet: either the frequency of discussing business issues (Kim and Frazier, 
1997, the transparency in the relationship (Eggert and Helm, 2000), the outcome-based or 
behavior-based emphasis in the channel communication (Celly and Frazier, 1996). 
From the 22 empirical studies on channel communicative behavior, eight of them 
investigate in which circumstances channel members exhibit more communicative 
behavior. They discover the following antecedents to play a role (Anderson and Narus, 
1990; Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Mohr, et al., 1996; Brown, 1981; Li and Dant, 1997; 
Walter, et al., 2003, Reid, et al., 2002; Celly and Frazier, 1996). First, the governance 
structure is found to influence the intensity of communication and degree of interaction. 
Explicit contractual arrangements in channel relationships stimulate the amount and 
frequency of communication. (Brown, 1981) and stricter control and integration also go 
hand in hand with more collaborative channel communication (Mohr, et al., 1996). 
Second, if suppliers are more dependent of the downstream channel member, they are then 
more open in their communications (Anderson and Narus, 1990); this corresponds with the 
finding that higher stakes in the channel relationship also promotes channel 
communication (Anderson and Weitz, 1989). Third, the age of the relationship is found to 
have a (notable) negative relationship with the communicative behavior (Anderson and 
Weitz, 1989), suggesting that the parties have developed such a good understanding of 
each other that they can make their points more efficiently (i.e., with a lower level of 
communication). Fourth, trust and strong ties as major elements of relationship climate 
play a stimulating role in favor for channel communicative behavior (Anderson and Weitz, 
1989; Li and Dant, 1997). Fifth, the perceived competence of the channel counterpart 
enhances the communication (Anderson and Weitz, 1989) and this finding is in line with 
the fact that positive outcomes given comparison level also stimulate it (Anderson and 
Narus, 1990). Furthermore, the complexity in the purchase process requires channel 
members to communicate more intensely (Reid, et al., 2002). 
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The majority of the empirical studies emphasize the consequences of communicative 
behavior in channel relationships (16 studies). The prime set of consequences is the 
improvement in the relationship quality. More open communications in the relationship 
paves the way for dealing with conflicts in a more functional way (Anderson and Narus, 
1990; Morgan and Hunt, 1994), because it seems to promote conflict resolution. It can 
even prevent conflicts in channel relationships (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Kim and 
Frazier, 1997). Perhaps due to the lessened level of conflict, the increased channel 
communication has more opportunity to develop trust (Anderson and Weitz, 1989; 
Anderson and Narus, 1990; Morgan and Hunt, 1994), and gives the information-sharer to 
become more trustworthy in the eyes of the information-receiving channel member (Kim 
and Frazier, 1997; Schultz and Evans, 2002). The findings about the effects of channel 
communication on satisfaction are rather straightforward. All marketing channel studies on 
the relationship between communication and satisfaction report that communication raises 
the level of satisfaction with the other channel member (Anderson and Narus, 1990: Mohr, 
et al., 1996; Gassenheimer, et al., 1996; Schultz and Evans, 2002; Eggert and Helm, 2003). 
Relationships that are more informative on market developments are evaluated as of higher 
quality (Walter, et al., 2003). 
As an important second set of consequences, intensified communication in channel 
relationships also changes the behavioral intentions and leads either directly or indirectly 
to higher levels of commitment to the relationship with the other channel member 
(Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Kim and Frazier, 1996; Cannon and 
Homburg, 2001; Eggert and Helm, 2003). It also levels perceptions of asymmetry in 
commitment (Ross et al., 1997); and moreover, channel communication supports the 
perceptions of commitment to the relationship from the other channel member (Anderson 
and Weitz, 1992); and thereby corroborating the commitments. Communicating channel 
members search less for alternatives (Eggert and Helm, 2003),  
The third set of consequences relates to actual behavior: immediate consequence 
appears to be that channel members are more cooperative (Anderson and Narus, 1990; 
indirectly Morgan and Hunt, 1994), manage to coordinate their activities better (Mohr, et 
al., 1996), and spend more time dealing with each other (Anderson et al., 1987). 
Additionally, the increased channel communication does not only lower customer costs 
(Cannon and Homburg, 2001), but also may bring forth synergetic solutions (Schultz and 
Evans, 2002).  
A helpful theory explaining why channel members start to communicate more 
intensely with each other is social exchange theory (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). The key 
idea of social exchange theory is that channel members engage in and continue to the 
exchange with other channel member, because their benefits retrieved from the exchange 
are larger than the incurred costs. Channel members are satisfied with the relationship, 
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when the difference of benefits and costs are larger than their expectations (i.e., a certain 
comparison level), and they continue their relationship with the channel member if the 
expected pay-offs with alternative channel members are not bigger. This theory explains 
why trust can be considered an antecedent of more communication (exchange) with the 
channel member, as well as a consequence. Not trusting another channel member require 
costly efforts of monitoring and verifying; and when communication leads to more trust, 
these costs to maintain the relationship go down; subsequently reinforcing the interaction 
between trust and communication.  
Furthermore, this theory helps us to explain the conditional impact of channel 
communication on satisfaction found by Mohr et al. (1996): when high integration of 
manufacturer control in channel relationships exists, the effect of more collaborative 
communication (under which non-coercive content) on outcomes is weaker; compared 
with low integration and control. In higher controlled relationships, the expectations level 
of the dominant party (franchisor, parent company) concerning channel communicative 
behavior is higher, and due to this raised comparison level, it will be more difficult to 
increase satisfaction by collaborative communication. 
 
2.4.3 Information Sharing as Relational Norm 
If a channel relationship develops over time, parties not only grow trust, and in line with 
this, they develop expectations towards what they find to be appropriate and inappropriate 
behaviors in their conduct of doing business with each other (Dwyer, et al., 1987). These 
relational norms are defined as expectations about behavior that are at least partially shared 
by a group of decision makers (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Dwyer and Oh, 1988; Heide and 
John, 1992; Jap and Ganesan, 2000) and are based on the expectation of mutuality of 
interest, essentially prescribing stewardship behavior, and are designed to enhance the 
well-being of the relationship as a whole (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987). The specific 
domains reflecting these norms are ‘flexibility’, ‘solidarity’ and ‘information sharing’. Six 
of the ten empirical studies identify information exchange as a bilateral expectation that 
parties will proactively provide information useful to the partner.8 They follow Heide and 
John’s operationalization. Two other studies also belong to this conceptualization. Yet, 
they measure the norms about information sharing differently. In their taxonomy of buyer-
seller relationships, Cannon and Perreault (1999) regard open information exchange as a 
relationship connector; amongst others – operational linkages, legal bonds, cooperative 
norms, relationship-specific adaptations. A relationship connector is a dimension reflecting 
                                                          
8 Yilmiz et al. (2005) claim that they study relational norms; however, we need to note that their measurement of 
information sharing only includes statements of actual communicative behavior; none of items do explicitly refer 
to expected forms of behavior in the relationship. We therefore assign their study to the conceptualization a 
demonstration of relationship bonding. 
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the behavior and expectations in a particular buyer-seller relationship. Johnson and Sohi 
(2001) investigate the quality of information exchanged and whether or not is it sufficient 
in terms of accuracy, amount, usefulness, etc. Asking about sufficiency implies checking if 
the sharing of information lives up to some standard norm or expectation.  
Only five studies have studied the antecedents of information sharing as a relational 
norm (cf. Jap and Ganesan, 2000). This might be the case, because the creation of 
relational norms requires time (socialization process to promote that both channel 
members internalize each other’s goals) and methodologically, a longitudinal design would 
be needed to research it properly. Instead of measures of history (like age), it is found that 
the anticipated future is an important determinant for relational norms to be present; such 
as the prospect of a long-lasting business relationship (such as extendedness, Heide and 
Miner, 1992; long-term orientation, Lusch and Brown, 1996). Furthermore, the higher 
costs in develop exchange relationship in more turbulent environments (Pilling et al., 
1994) (e.g., asset specificity, frequency of transactions) are to stimulate the developments 
of relational norms most likely in order to safeguard the relationship-specific investments 
made. In addition to that the characteristics of the channel members also play a role in the 
development of norms to share information. Both a channel member’s strategic intent and 
its relational proclivity (Johnson and Sohi, 2001) stimulate the embeddedness of the 
interfirm ties (e.g., Johnson and Sohi, 2001) and consequently endorses the norms in the 
relationship. 
As it comes to the consequences of relational norms, the studies found that the 
following. Relational norms help to relieve channel members' perceived loss of control 
over the channel relationship when they have made specific investments into that 
relationship (Heide and John, 1992). Furthermore, norms enhance the quality of 
communication between parties in terms of frequency, bi-directionality, and formality 
(Mohr and Sohi, 1996). The increased formality limits the opportunities for channel parties 
to alter or omit information; thereby norms indirectly prevent the distortion or withholding 
of information shared. If a channel member violates an explicit contract or implicit rule, 
the existence of relational norms softens the severity of contract enforcement by the 
dominant channel member (Antia and Frazier, 2001). Similar to Heide and John (1992), 
Jap and Ganesan (2000) find that relational norms strengthen the perceptions of 
commitment from the other channel member. Especially in the building phase, the 
existence of relational norms relaxes the channel member’s concern of perceived 
asymmetrical commitment from the other party. 
Clearly, the effects from information sharing as a relational norm are different from 
information sharing as communicative channel behavior. There is an emphasis on the 
prevention of disappointment and gaining for lost control over the channel relationship.  
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The consequences of relational norms can be explained by the disconformation 
principle (Mohr, Fisher and Nevin, 1996; Kim, 2000); This principle suggests that an 
experience that disconforms an expectation leads to a significant change in response, 
whereas an experience that confirms the expectation brings an insignificant response 
change. Following Kahneman and Tversy (1979)’s discussion on decision-making under 
uncertainty, we note that framing can alter the reference point (viz., the baseline from 
potential gains and losses are assessed). If the sharing of market information is framed by 
one channel member as a channel partnership expectation, then actually sharing market 
information would in essence be complying with the norm, and the act of sharing 
information would only lead a relative small to no gain for the other channel member. 
However, if in such a frame of expectations, the channel member withholds information, it 
implies deviant behavior from the established norm and a relative heavy loss to the other 
channel member. All else being equal, more relationalism in the channel relationship is 
expected to result in a more information sharing between channel members, than in 
channel relationship without these norms. It seems that the information sharing has 
become a self-reinforcing circle more difficult to get out off: the cost of breaking-up the 
channel relationship and the reinforcing mechanisms imply growing costs for both channel 
members. 
Much research on relational norms has been conducted as a test to see whether these 
social norms would help to prevent deviant opportunistic behavior and thus could serve as 
a tool to safeguard the made relationship-specific investments. Often ideas from 
transaction-cost economics are borrowed (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Heide and John, 1992; 
Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Opportunism; Wathne and Heide, 2000) and compare the 
safeguarding effectiveness of these relational norms (relationalism; Macneil, 1980) to 
traditional transaction cost and agency theory relationship governance mechanisms – such 
as promoting bilateral relationship investments, and explicit contracting (Jap and Ganesan, 
2000; Brown et al., 2000).  
 
2.4.4 Information Sharing as Demonstration of Relationship Bonding 
The fourth way in which information sharing in channel relationships is conceptualized is 
that it has been regarded as a demonstration or pledge by a channel member to be willing 
to bond and invest in the relationship with the other party. This conceptualization may 
appear less homogenous of nature than the previous three, because the types of such 
demonstrations, promises or pledges can take many different forms and it is either 
measured as a commitment input (Gundlach, et al., 1995; Campbell, 1995; Achrol and 
Gundlach, 1999), as confidential information sharing (Doney and Cannon, 1997), as a sort 
of joint action (Heide and John, 1990; Kim 1999; Claro et al., 2003), as human-specific 
asset (Handfield and Bechteld, 2001), as relationship learning (Selnes and Sallis, 2003), as 
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an element of an higher-order construct of relational behavior (Lusch and Brown, 1996; 
Yilmiz et al., 2005), as an element of governance structure (Noordewier, et al., 1990), as 
coordination mechanism (Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1995), as vertical coordination 
(Buvik and John, 2000), or as pre-planning agreement of a category management 
arrangement (Gruen and Shah, 2000). Other conceptualizations of relationship bonding 
demonstrations are not restricted to one specific channel relationship, rather they 
conceptualize it at the firm-level as a type of channel policy program designed for every 
channel relationship of the firm: f.e, an automatic replenishment program for all its 
retailers (Myers, et al., 2000), key-account management for its customers (Homburg, et al., 
2002), information-integration mechanisms for all retail customers (Kulp et al., 2004).  
Twelve of the 23 empirical studies explore the antecedents of information sharing as a 
relationship bonding demonstration (Noordewier, et al., 1990; Heide and John, 1990; 
Campbell, 1995; Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1995; Lusch and Brown, 1996; Kim, 1999; 
Campbell, 1995; Claro, et al., 2003; Celly and Frazier, 1996; Corsten and Kumar, 2005; 
Joshi and Stump, 1999; Mavondo and Rodrigo, 2001; Selnes and Sallis, 2003, Subramani 
and Venkatraman, 2003; Yilmiz et al., 2005). First, when parties become more bilaterally 
dependent on each other, they engage in more relational behavior (Lusch and Brown, 
1996). In particular, if the downstream channel member’s cooperation is needed, the more 
dependent channel has the tendency to share information (Kim, 1999). Information sharing 
considered as a type of joint action is also enhanced when the channel member is locked-in 
by their relationship specific investments (Heide and John, 1990; Kim, 1999).  
Relationship bonding demonstrations of information sharing are more secured when 
there is more clarity about future developments. Different studies show that explicit 
contracting are better than implicit (Lusch and Brown, 1996), longer relationship 
continuity expectations (Heide and John, 1990, Lusch and Brown, 1996), and signals from 
the other channel member about his/her commitment (Kim, 1999) are all reassurances that 
encourages information sharing as a demonstration for relationship bonding. Another 
antecedent promoting information sharing as a relational bonding demonstration is a 
channel member’s strategy to differentiate their services from their competition. They are 
particularly more interested to demonstrate their bonding by sharing their market 
information with their (upstream) channel relationships (Kim, 1999). 
As for the consequences, information sharing as a commitment input leads to a 
reduction in opportunistic behavior in the relationship (Gundlach, et al., 1995; Achrol and 
Gundlach, 1999; Gruen and Shah, 2000) and also strengthens the beliefs in long-term 
commitment intentions (Gundlach, et al., 1995), and commitment to implement 
cooperative plans by the increased trust in cooperating together (specifically for category 
management; Gruen and Shah, 2000). 
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There is evidence that these investments accelerate socialization process in the 
relationship by the development of relational norms (Gundlach, et al., 1995), and channel 
members respect each other’s interests and become good at joint problem-solving 
(Campbell, 1995).  
A general finding is that these motivational investments and joint efforts do pay off in 
multiple ways. In the first place, they create barriers to imitate strategy by competitors 
(Campbell, 1995). Second, more profits are generated by higher category performance 
(Gruen and Shah, 2000), a more efficient replenishment system (Myers, et al., 2000), 
lower stock outs at customers (Kulp et al., 2004), and better effective key account 
management (Workman, et al., 2003). Third, the joint motivational investments result in a 
better performance in more uncertain environment (percentage on time deliveries and 
acceptable) (Noordewier, et al., 1990). Only one study did not find a positive effect of 
information sharing on wholesale-distributor performance (Lusch and Brown, 1996). 
The most often used theories in this conceptualization for explaining the relationships 
between antecedents and consequences are agency theory (e.g, Bergen et al., 1992) and 
transaction-cost economics. Regarding market information sharing as an agency-
theoretical problem would be to find ways to minimize the likelihood of selecting the 
wrong channel partner to invest in (adverse selection problem) and to give the right 
incentives to the channel partner to make the most from the partnership (moral hazard 
problem).  
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Table 2.4 List of Antecedents in Empirical Behavioral Approach  
Antecedent Information Power Exercise Communicative 
Behavior 
Relational norm Demonstration 
Relationship 
Bonding 
(#) 
Market Channel Environment      
Environmental uncertainty /decision-making 
uncertainty 
 CF(+) PCJ (+),BCZ (-) JoS(-),CHO, 
Ki-1(0),SeS (+) 
7 
Purchase complexity  RBP(∩) BCZ (+)  2 
      
Supplier Network      
Competition    Ki-1(0) 1 
Outcomes given comparison  AN(+)   2 
Availability of alternatives  WMHR(-) CP(-)  2 
Network intensity    CHO (+) 1 
      
Relationship Characteristics      
Age of relationship   AW-1(-), 
MFN(+) 
HM (0) CHO,LB (0) 5 
      
Governance/formalization/centralization BDRS, E(+),BD(0/+) B,MFN (+)  LB (+) 6 
Connectedness/cross-functional teams   JS (+) CK (+) 2 
TSI/ stakes/asset-specificity/customization  AW-1 (+) HM,PCJ,BCZ (+) CK,CHO,HB, 
HJ-1, JoS,Ki-1, 
SeS,SV,YSO (+) 
13 
      
Trust/relationalism/social bonding BDRS(+) AW-1,LD(+)  C,CHO,MR,SeS, 
YSO(+) 
8 
Conflict/latent conflict/manifest conflict FR (-),(+), BLM (-)    2 
Continuity expectations/extendedness   HM(+) HJ-1,LB,Ki-1, 
MR,SeS(+) 
6 
      
Total interdependence  FR,Ki-2,GC(+)   LB(+) 4 
Dependence asymmetry HS(+),GC(0/+),Ki-2(0) AN (0,+)  LB(0) 5 
Dependence of information-receiver T (0),KJC,BLM (+),KH(∩)  BCZ(+) Ki-1(+),YSO(+) 6 
Dependence of information-sharer  KH (+)  YSO(0) 2 
Replaceability of information-sharer  CF(+) HM(0)  2 
      
      
Characteristics Information-Sharing party      
Coercive power source K,RVB (-)    2 
Non-coercive power source BLM(0),BD,GN,RVB(+)    4 
Perceived competence/supplier 
familiarity/resource adequacy 
 AW-1,CF (+) BCZ (+)  3 
Strategic Intent/ fast innovation   JS (+) C (+) 2 
Relational proclivity/incentive systems   JS (+) CK (+) 2 
Cultural Similarity/Psychic distance  AW-1 (0) BCZ (0)  2 
      
Characteristics Information-Receiving party      
Experience T (0) CF (+)   2 
Added value (service differentiation)  CF (+)  Ki-1 (+) 2 
Relational restrictiveness  Br (+)    1 
Morale Br (+)    1 
Compliance Br (-)    1 
      
Number of different studies (# / Total) 
 
16 / 23 9 / 22 5 / 10 12 / 23  
 
Note: AF = Antia and Frazier (2001); AG = Achrol and Gundlach (1999); ALW = Anderson, Lodish, and Weitz (1987); AN = Anderson and Narus 
(1990); AW-1 = Anderson and Weitz (1989); AW-2 = Anderson and Weitz (1992); B = Brown (1981); BC = Bonner and Calantone (2005); BCZ = Bello, 
Chelariu and Zhang (2003); BD = Boyle and Dwyer (1995); BDRS = Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux, and Simpson (1990); BJ = Buvik and John (2000); BJK 
= Brown, Johnson, and Koenig (1995); BLM = Brown, Lusch, and Meuhling (1983); BLN = Brown, Lusch and Nicholson (1995); Br = Brill (1994); BV = 
Bensaou and Venkatraman (1995); C = Campbell (1995); CF = Celly and Frazier (1996); CH = Cannon and Homburg (2001); CHO = Claro, Hagelaar and 
Omta (2003); CK = Corsten and Kumar (2005); CP = Cannon and Perreault jr (1999); DC = Doney and Cannon (1997); E = Etgar (1978); EH = Eggert 
and Helm (2003); FR = Frazier and Rody (1991);  GAM = Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer (1995); GBB = Gassenheimer, Baucus and Baucus (1996); GC 
= Gundlach and Cadotte (1994); GD = Goodman and Dion (2001); GN = Gaski and Nevin (1985);  GS = Gruen and Shah (2000); HB = Handfield and 
Bechtel (2002); HJ-1 = Heide and John (1990); HJ-2 = Heide and John (1992); HM = Heide and Miner (1992); HMD = Hunt, Mentzer and Danes (1987); 
HN = Hunt and Nevin (1974); HS = Hu and Sheu (2005); HWJ = Homburg, Workman, and Jensen (2002); JA = Joshi and Arnold (1998); JG = Jap and 
Ganesan (2000); JS = Johnson and Sohi (2001); JoS = Joshi and Stump (1999); K = Kale (1986); KF = Kim and Frazier (1997); KH = Kim and Hsieh 
(2003); Ki-1 = Kim (1999); Ki-2 = Kim  (2000); KJC = Keith, Jackson, and Crosby (1990); KLO = Kulp, Lee and Ofek (2004); L = Lee (2001); LB = 
Lusch and Brown (1996); LD= Li and Dant (1997); Le = Leuthesser (1997); MDA = Myers, Daugherty and Autry (2000); MFN = Mohr, Fisher and Nevin 
(1996); MH = Morgan and Hunt (1994); MR = Mavondo and Rodrigo (2001); MSo = Mohr and Sohi (1995); NJN = Noordewier, John and Nevin (1990); 
PCJ = Pilling, Crosby, and Jackson (1994); RAW = Ross, Anderson, and Weitz (1997); RBP = Reid, Bolman Pullins and Plank (2002); RVB  = Rawwas, 
Vitell and Barnes (1997); SE = Schultz and Evans (2002); SeS = Selnes and Sallis (2003); SM = Simpson and Mayo (1997); SS = Scheer and Stern 
(1992); SV = Subramani and Venkatraman (2003); T = Tikoo (2002); WHJ = Workman, Homburg, and Jensen (2003); WMHR = Walter, Muller, Helfert, 
and Ritter (2003); YSO = Yilmiz, Sezen, and Ozdemir (2005) 
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2.4.5 Conclusion of the Empirical Behavioral Approach  
To sum up our systematic review of the empirical behavioral studies, Tables 2.4 and 2.5 
extensively list the discovered empirical relationships between the four different 
information sharing conceptualizations and the antecedents and consequences respectively. 
As for the antecedents, we regroup the identified variables into five main categories: 
market channel environment, supplier network, relationship characteristics, and 
characteristics of the information-sharing party and the information-receiving party. Given 
the multitude of different variables within each of these main categories, we put several 
closely related variables together. For example, in the category of relationship 
characteristics, variables concerning the governance structure are combined with aspects of 
formalization and centralization. The variable trust is merged together into one category 
with other positive relationship sentiments, like relationalism and social bonding. As it 
turns out, across the four conceptualizations the most frequently researched set of 
antecedents having an influence on information sharing is the relationship characteristics 
(33 different studies). Of which, the different aspects of the dependence structure in the 
channel relationship (15 studies) are the most often investigated antecedent. The variable 
relationship-specific investments (13 studies) is after that one the most frequently 
researched. Followers are trust (8 studies), formalization (6 studies), continuity 
expectations (6 studies) and relationship age (5 studies). Between conceptualizations, there 
is a slight difference in emphasis. The information power exercise accentuates the internal 
matters (relationship and information sharing party characteristics), whereas the other three 
conceptualizations also have an eye for other external factors like supplier network and 
market channel environment. 
Regarding the consequences, we classify the different types of consequences 
according to a chain of reactions that information sharing in channel relationships may 
cause. Starting with changes in the perceptions of the information-receiving party towards 
the information-sharing counterpart; it has been consistently shown that it reinforces the 
image of information-sharing party’s power base of the information sharing party (4 
studies) in the eyes of the information receiving party. The corroboration of the powerful 
image of an information-sharing party does not necessarily go at the expense of perceived 
control and sense of autonomy by the influenced information-receiving party (3 studies 
with mixed findings). The mostly studied type of consequences is the changes in 
perceptions towards the relationship quality (23 studies); thanks to information sharing the 
channel relationship is evaluated in more positive terms: especially more trusted (8 studies) 
and with more satisfaction (15 studies) and with less conflict (7 studies).  
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Table 2.5 List of Consequences in Empirical Behavioral Approach  
Consequences Information power 
exercise 
Communicative 
behavior 
Relational norm Demonstration 
Relationship  
Bonding 
(#) 
     
Perception Changes     
     
… toward  Information-Sharing Party      
power position of influencer HN,GN,BJK,RVB 
(+) 
   4 
control by receiver/autonomy KJC (-), SS (+)  HJ-2 (+)  3 
      
...in Relationship Quality      
Latent conflict FR (-/0)    1 
(Manifest) conflict FR (+) GN,BJK,L(-) AN (0/-), KF (-) JG (-)  7 
Functionality of conflict RVB (+) AN (0/+), MH (+)   3 
Attitude to conflict resolution FR (+)    1 
Relationship quality/harmony HS (+) Le, WMHR (+)   3 
Trust SS, SM (+) AW, AN, MH, KF, 
SE (+) 
 DC (0) 8 
Satisfaction  RVB(0), 
GN,HN,KJC, SS, 
BJK, SM,L(+) 
AN,MFN,GBB,EH(
+) 
JG, MSo (+) CHO(0) 15 
      
Behavior Changes      
      
… in Intended Behavior      
Commitment SS, SM (+) GD(0), AW-
2,MH,MFN,KF,CH, 
EH  (+) 
 GAM,MR(+) 11 
Perceived continuity of relationship  AW-1 (0)   1 
Instrumental commitment BLN (+)  JG (+)  2 
Normative commitment  BLN (+)    1 
Propensity to leave  MH (-)   1 
Search for alternatives  EH (-)   1 
Perceived asymmetry of commitment  RAW (-)   1 
Exclusivity/attention  LD,BC (+)   2 
      
… in Actual Behavior      
Use of non-coercive power by receiver K, Ki-2 (+)    2 
Compliance/acquiescence HMD, SS(+), 
PM,KJC(0) 
MH (+) JA (+)  6 
Interfirm agreement/cooperation/ 
coordination/solidarity/ time spent with 
channel member /share of business 
FS,HS (+) AW-2,ALW, 
AN,MH,MFN(+) 
MSo (+)  8 
      
      
Performance Changes      
      
Sales/growth in sales/profitability    CHO,CK,KLO (+) 3 
Synergic solutions/joint problem solving  SE (+)  C (+) 2 
Customer costs/transaction costs/out-of-
stock 
 CH (+)  KLO,MDA(-), BV (-
/+) 
4 
Performance/receiver’s role performance BD,BLN,GN (+) LD, SE (+) JG, BCZ (+) GS,HJ,MDA,NJN, 
KLO,SeS(+),LB (0) 
14 
Barriers to imitate strategy by 
competitors 
   C (+) 1 
      
Miscellaneous      
Decision-making uncertainty  MH (-)   1 
Severity of contract enforcement   AF (-)  1 
Customer value  EH (+)   1 
Relational norms    GAM (+) 1 
Opportunism by other channel member 
/withholding information 
  MSo (-) GAM,AG,GS (-) 4 
Perceived equity    CK (-) 1 
Capability development    CK (+) 1 
     
Number of different studies (#) 
 
14 / 23 15 / 22 6 / 10 15 / 23 
Note: abbreviations are explained in Table 2.4 
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After the changes in perceptions, the next link in the chain concerns the changes in 
intended or reported behavior of the information-receiving channel member. The firm 
becomes more committed to the relationship, intends to stay in the relationship and gives 
up searching for alternatives (16 studies). With respect to actual behaviors, information 
sharing leads to compliance, acquiescence, agreement, cooperation and the reciprocation of 
non-coercive power use (13 studies). Reciprocation of information sharing practices is has 
been investigated by two studies. 
As a final step in the chain of reactions, 21 studies research the changes in 
performance by information sharing. Information sharing leads to more sales, growth in 
sales, profitability, more efficiency, less costs, synergetic solutions, and a contribution to 
the other’s (role) performance. 
 
2.5 Conclusions of Comparing the Three Research Perspectives 
The objective of this chapter was two-folded. In the first place we have explored what has 
already been found out about information sharing in channels by three different disciplines 
in management research. We have shown how each of these approaches makes their 
unique and specific contribution to our understanding of information sharing in channels. 
Whereas the supply chain optimization studies calculate the potential value in supply chain 
cost reduction to be gained from sharing information, and the game-theoretic models 
figure out under which conditions information sharing contracts can assist to maximize the 
total channel profits and reach channel coordination, the empirical behavioral research 
perspective look at the actual information sharing behavior in channels. Based on the 
description and systematic review of the three main research perspectives, we are now able 
to take the next step and make a list of all relevant variables shown to play an important 
role in information sharing. Table 2.6 briefly summarizes the previous discussion and in 
addition to showing an overlap between the three approaches, it also displays the extent to 
which they are complementary to each other.  
First, inherently due to the way in which information sharing has been conceptualized 
by a research perspective, different aspects of the nature of information sharing are 
emphasized. Both supply chain optimization and game-theoretic modeling specifically 
look at the extent of shared information; and thereby they specifically look at the content 
of information which is disclosed in the channel relationship. The empirical behavioral 
perspective emphasizes much more the manner in which information is shared: frequency 
and formality.  
Second, the antecedents studied by the three perspectives differ largely. All three 
perspectives investigate the influence of market channel environment characteristics. The 
only antecedent, that the three approaches have in common, is consumer demand or 
environmental uncertainty in the channel. Yet, the three approaches are not unanimous on 
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whether uncertainty leads to information sharing. While the supply chain optimization and 
game-theoretic models view information sharing (under certain circumstances) as a tool to 
better channel performance, the behavioral studies are divided among themselves: some 
show evidence for a positive association between uncertainty and information-sharing, 
while others demonstrate a negative one. Additionally, the supply chain optimization 
studies highlight the impact from the supplier network; whereas the empirical behavioral 
studies accentuate the relationship characteristics. The game-theoretical models are more 
and more including variables from both categories, supplier network and relationship 
characteristics. The reason why the supply chain optimization studies do not incorporate 
relationship characteristics is, because in principle it departs from the idea that all of the 
involved channel members have only one communality and that is the reduction of the 
negative effects of demand amplifications in the supply chain. They hardly assume that 
any conflicting interests exist in the channel relationship, as is assumed by the game 
theoretic models. The contracts are means to bridge these conflicting interests in order to 
achieve channel coordination. 
Concerning channel member characteristics, due to their standpoint is to view all firms 
as identical economic rational actors, the two first approaches largely close the eyes to the 
influence of the channel member’s characteristics. 
Third, the consequences of information sharing examined in the three research 
perspective range from more objective performance measures to more subjective 
statements about perceptions, relationship quality and performance. Supply chain 
optimization studies and game-theoretic models look at the objective measurements as 
total channel profit, whereas the empirical behavioral studies investigate the impact of 
information sharing by means of subjective measurements. Supply chain optimization 
calculates the extent to which information sharing results in the adsorption of negative 
bullwhip effects.  
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Table 2.6 Key insights from the three research perspectives 
  
Research Perspective 
 
  
Supply Chain Optimization 
 
 
Game-theoretic 
 
Empirical Behavioral  
Objective Maximizing channel efficiency 
by sharing information to 
optimize inventory 
replenishment and allocation 
decisions. 
 
Designing efficient contracts for 
giving an incentive to share 
private information in order to 
achieve channel coordination 
Explaining the factors playing a 
role in the creation and 
maintenance of relationship 
quality, satisfaction, 
commitment, and performance 
Nature of 
Information 
sharing 
Accent is on the downstream 
demand information (from 
retailer to supplier) and the 
extent to which information is 
shared varies: from advance 
demand information, retailer’s 
inventory position, to centralized 
consumer demand information. 
The offered contracts in the 
games either implicitly or 
explicitly agree on sharing 
information on consumer 
demand. Some contracts vary in 
extent and range from demand 
forecasts to the inclusion of 
competitive intelligence and cost 
information. 
Measurements for actual 
information sharing behavior 
differ in starting point. Four 
broad categories of 
conceptualizations – information 
power exercise, communicative 
behavior, relational norm, and 
demonstration of relational 
bonding – can be distinguished. 
 
 Mainly the content of (demand 
or inventory) information is the 
focus of research. Implicitly, 
these studies include the 
frequency (one update every 
replenishment period) of 
information sharing. 
 
The information sharing 
contracts include specifications 
on the content of information 
shared. Some cases include 
specifications on the exclusivity 
of the arrangements. 
Rather than on the content of 
information shared, the focus is 
on the style of information 
sharing in terms of frequency, 
formality, bi-directionality, tone-
of-voice, are under investigation. 
    
Antecedents Conditions influencing the value 
of information sharing primarily 
lie in the domains of market 
channel environment and 
supplier network. 
Conditions influencing the value 
of an information sharing 
contract for both channel 
members. 
Factors influencing the 
likelihood in which channel 
firms use information power, 
engage in communicative 
behavior, establish relational 
norms, or demonstrate their 
willingness to bond. 
 
    
 Market Channel Environment Market Channel Environment Market Channel Environment 
 Consumer demand variance and 
channel inertia are important 
antecedents. The larger the 
consumer demand variance, the 
more supply chain inefficiencies 
to be resolved by information 
sharing. Inertia in the channel 
also increases these 
inefficiencies. 
 
The consumer demand 
uncertainty gives the retailer 
more information about demand. 
An information sharing contract 
can eliminate this information 
asymmetry and coordinate the 
channel.  
Uncertainty in the environment 
(not restrained to consumer 
demand) can either be a stimulus 
or inhibitor to share information. 
Also the purchase complexity is 
found to be another antecedent 
influencing information sharing 
behavior; the direction of the 
influence can however differ. 
    
Continued 
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Table 2.6 Continued 
  
Research Perspective 
 
  
Supply Chain Optimization 
 
 
Game-theoretic 
 
Empirical Behavioral  
Antecedents Supplier Network Supplier Network Supplier Network 
(continued) The scope of the supplier 
network (in terms of the number 
of stages and the number of 
players per stage) increases the 
(total) value for the whole chain. 
The number of suppliers and 
competition intensity among 
suppliers increase the likelihood 
for information contracts. Partly 
because the retailer is more in a 
position to benefit more from the 
arrangement.   
n.a. 
  Retail competition negatively 
affects the retailer’s position to 
extract more benefits from the 
contract and this will reduce the 
chance for such a contract.  
 
    
 Relationship Characteristics Relationship Characteristics Relationship Characteristics 
 n.a. Not only are the mutual benefits 
to share information highlighted 
here, but also the conflicting 
interests in the relationship. In 
negotiating an information 
sharing contract the channel 
structure (Stackelberg 
leadership) and bargaining power 
appear to be important 
antecedents for the outcome. 
Relationship characteristics are 
the prime focus here. Factors like 
relationship age, trust, 
relationship-specific investments, 
contract formalization, 
dependence structure, appear to 
be important antecedents. 
    
 Channel Member Characteristics Channel Member Characteristics Channel Member Characteristics 
 All are economically rational 
actors. Other channel member 
characteristics are not taken into 
account. 
All are economically rational 
actors. Other channel member 
characteristics are not taken into 
account. 
Characteristics of the channel 
member are shown to play a role 
in their tendency to share 
information. Their power base, 
perceived competence, relational 
proclivity, service differentiation 
strategy. 
    
Consequences The principle outcome of 
information sharing is the 
equivalent of the value of 
information sharing. Studies 
calculate to what extent 
information sharing reduces the 
demand variance in the chain and 
ultimately how it saves costs in 
the total supply chain. 
By definition, if an information 
sharing contract is signed, then 
the total channel profits are 
higher (“The channel is 
coordinated”). The division of 
the surplus may depend on 
bargaining power/channel 
structure (Stackelberg 
leadership). 
Similar to the wide variety in 
conceptualizations of 
information sharing, the types of 
consequences under investigation 
differ a lot. The majority of the 
studies look at the added value of 
information sharing for 
satisfaction, relationship quality, 
commitment, perceptions about 
the channel member’s 
performance.  
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CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Transforming a channel relationship to be more market responsive through market 
information sharing is not that obvious, because the collaboration between a retailer and a 
manufacturer also implies dealing with conflicting interests in their relationship at the 
same time. These extremes of cooperation and competition really surfaced in the 
approaches to research information sharing in Chapter 2. On the one hand, there are the 
supply chain optimization studies accentuating the mutual collaboration benefits in sharing 
information between channel members, to dampen the costly bull-whip effect, to 
orchestrate inventory management decisions, and to improve supply chain efficiency. 
While on the other hand, the game-theoretic models also incorporate the conflicting 
competitive interests between channel members and presume that they do not just give up 
their information advantage without an adequate compensation in return. The empirical 
behavior perspective is not dominated by any of these two assumptions and investigates 
actual information sharing behaviors of firms. The purpose of this chapter is to develop the 
research framework that integrates the insights from all three research perspectives, which 
is guided by our three main research questions about the nature, antecedents, and 
consequences of market information in channel relationships as formulated in Chapter 1. 
One of the ways we combine the insights from these research perspectives is in how 
we conceptualize market information sharing. As noted earlier, several empirical 
behavioral studies emphasize the style in which information was exchanged in channel 
relationships (i.c., the sharing mode). Seldom has the content of information sharing been 
a part of their measurements. Interestingly, the content of market information that is shared 
in the channel relationship is the main subject of the two other research streams. 
Furthermore, there are specific calls for research on the “sharing of intelligence between 
channel members” (Frazier, 1999). Our approach follows the empirical behavioral 
tradition, and attempts to answer these calls for further research by making an explicit 
distinction between shared content and sharing mode, and by researching what actually 
takes place in relationships; rather than asking what could be the potential of sharing 
information. However, we want to build a bridge between the three different research 
streams by developing a research framework that includes all key variables from these 
research perspectives (see Table 2.6). Figure 3.1 shows this framework constituted by 
three main blocks, which ordering is based on the logic of the structure–conduct–
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performance approach (Bain, 1956) in which, thinking about the process of transforming 
the relationship into a more consumer demand-driven channel, market information sharing 
is viewed as the “conduct,” whereas the antecedent variables are viewed more as 
“structure”, finally leading to “performance”. The three Parts correspond with the main 
research questions posed in Chapter 1. The block in the middle is concerned with the Part 
I: the nature of the market information sharing arrangement. A conceptual discussion of 
the market information sharing characteristics is presented in paragraph 3.2 of this 
Chapter, and in Chapter 5 we will present the empirical results. 
Part II of this dissertation is represented in the block on the left-hand side. It deals 
with the array of antecedents. In paragraph 3.3 we formulate our hypotheses on the 
relationships between antecedents and the characteristics of market information sharing 
arrangements. 
Part III is reflecting in the right-hand side of the framework stating the list of 
consequences of market information sharing: joint market learning, channel relationship 
performance, and channel relationship quality respectively.  
 
3.2 Information-Sharing Arrangements and Key Constructs  
In Chapter 1 we have described the several types of information-sharing arrangements 
currently practiced by channel managers: EDI, QR, VMI, CPFR, CM. At a more abstract 
level, we now discuss and define the four focal constructs of information sharing 
arrangement in channels: (1) the shared market information content, (2) the sharing mode, 
and (3 and 4) the benefits and costs for channel members to share their market information 
with each other. In the following paragraph, we will elaborate these four constructs to 
develop the research framework incorporating the relationships among them and their 
antecedents. The antecedents will be defined as we develop the hypotheses. 
 
3.2.1 Market Information Sharing Arrangements 
As previously explained in Chapter 1, we define information sharing in marketing 
channels as “an arrangement between two channel members to share market information 
with the intention to strengthen the performance of the channel for their mutual benefits”. 
Such an information sharing arrangement can vary in what information is exchanged and 
how the information is being shared. We therefore distinguish two important dimensions of 
information sharing arrangements: shared content and sharing mode. Concerning the 
shared content of information, we will show in the next paragraph that it may comprise of 
different information categories and it can be ranked into degrees (in line with ideas from 
Seidmann and Sundararajan, 1997; Lee and Whang, 1998). The sharing mode is the 
second dimension of information sharing and refers to the way in which market 
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information is exchanged between channel parties. Paragraph 3.2.3 will explain the features 
of this dimension.  
 
3.2.2 Shared Content of Market Information 
Both previous chapters have demonstrated that a lot of heterogeneity in the shared 
information can exist in channel relationships. Especially, Chapter 1 with a brief overview of 
the different information sharing arrangements – Quick-Response, Continuous 
Replenishment Planning, Vendor Management Inventory, Collaborative Forecasting 
Planning and Replenishment, and Category Management – indicates that the arrangements 
really vary a lot in what information is exchanged. However, the measurement of what 
market information is shared does not receive much attention. As laid out in paragraph 2.4.2 
of the preceding Chapter, many empirical behavioral studies on channel relationships have 
communication measurements that are either very complex stacking up many different 
aspects or are confined to a channel member’s general willingness to inform the other party 
about “unexpected changes”, “plans”, “if relevant”; like intensity (Anderson and Narus, 
1990; Ross et al., 1997) or transparency (Eggert and Helm, 2003). Exceptions are three 
examples coming close to a measurement of shared content of market information. First, 
Boyle et al. (1992) regard information sharing as use of non-coercive power. They define it 
as “[…] suppl[y] [of] information with no specific action requested or otherwise indicated” 
and subsequently measure it by items such as “My […] supplier concentrates more on 
strategic, long-term issues, rather than specific courses of action our business should take” 
and makes it equal to a rather informal business talk. Their emphasis on the fact that the 
influence is without any obligations and contains a certain non-committal attitude makes it 
more a measurement of a friendly tone of voice.  
The second attempt is by Mohr, et al. (1996) with their measurement of collaborative 
communication.  Retailer-supplier communication is considered to be collaborative when it 
is frequent, formal, bidirectional, and non-coercive. The first two are clearly aspects of the 
sharing mode. The other two are more related to the content. Bidirectionality is measured as 
the amount of feedback (about their product, market conditions, etc.) the channel members 
give to each other.  The measurement of non-coercive content is similar to that from Boyle 
et al. (1992) and only concerns communications without any obligations. Moreover, Mohr et 
al. combine all of these four items in order to arrive at one overall measure of collaborative 
communication compiling different aspects of an information arrangement. 
Another attempt to measure shared content is by Kulp, et al. (2004) and is much more 
specific. They ask firms to report on their participation in information sharing initiatives like 
store inventory and/or POS information and VMI systems. Furthermore, their survey 
included an index about the sharing of information about consumers; built up from question 
about the sharing of consumer research (e.g., on price sensitivities, or segmentation) and 
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information about demand for new products and services. However, a major downside of 
Kulp et al.’s measurement is that respondents (CEO’s from CFG manufacturing companies) 
were asked to report on their dealings with retail partners in general. Their unit-of-analysis is 
thus the “firm”, and not the “channel relationship”, consequently they actually ignore any 
variance in information sharing practices within a firm’s portfolio of relationships. 
If we want to develop a research framework that well integrates insights from supply 
optimization studies and game-theoretical modeling, than a measurement on the shared 
content on a relationship level is required. Measuring shared content is not an easy task to 
think lightly of: “[r]esearchers experience great difficulty defining and measuring 
communication” (Gassenheimer, et al, 1996 referring to Roberts and O’Reilly, 1974). 
Following the supply chain optimization studies and game-theoretic models distinguishing 
differences in “extent” of information sharing (from “partial” to “full”), it should be a 
measurement that relates to the degree in which channel members give each other insight 
into their possessions of confidential market information. We connect the notion of sharing 
confidentialities to the level of intimacy between two persons. Borrowing from social 
penetration theory on inter-personal relationships, a theory explaining interpersonal intimacy 
and overt behavior in social interaction (Altman and Taylor, 1973; Taylor and Altman, 1975; 
Shaw and Costanzo, 1982; Weitz and Bradford, 1999), we draw parallels between 
individuals and channel organizations disclosing private information to each other. In social 
penetration theory, the personality of an individual consists of the individual’s ideas, 
feelings, beliefs, and emotions about self, other people, and the world. These items of 
personality are organized into substantive areas, such as religion, politics, and family. There 
are three dimensions of personality within the structure: breadth category, breadth 
frequency, and depth. Breadth category refers to the number of major topical areas within 
the personality structure. Breadth frequency refers to the amount of interaction within each 
area. The major topical areas of personality can be ranked along a central-peripheral or depth 
dimension. The personality is then often postulated as an onion-skinned body. As a 
relationship between two individuals develops, both individuals begin to reveal more 
information about more private and inner areas. This process of self-revelation can be 
imagined as penetrating more central, unique and vulnerable layers of the onion structure. 
Importing this theoretical idea into the context at hand here, channel relationships, it is 
then logical to draw the parallels between an individual’s personality and a channel 
member’s market position. A channel member’s market position also consists of different 
areas, like sales, customers, competition, margins, cost structure, profitability (see also 
Clark, Croson, and Schiano, 2001). These areas can be ordered according to confidentiality. 
The channel member’s disclosure about its own position and performance in the marketplace 
can be represented as the “peeling-off of different onion-layers” (see Figure 3.2): in the 
beginning, a channel member begins with revealing less confidential and more visible 
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information about its position in the marketplace. Later as time passes on and the 
relationship grows, other content from more confidential layers are being shared with the 
other channel member. 
Based on this theoretical idea, it is important to distinguish for each of the possible 
information domains to be shared between channel members, to determine to which 
hierarchy of layers it belongs. Later in Chapter 5 (paragraph 5.2), we will go deeper into 
detail on how we measure shared content 
Figure 3.2 depicts a bowl with different “onion-layers” representing the information a 
channel member holds about its own market position. The market information that is shared 
corresponds with a layer and subsequently expresses the degrees of shared content in a 
channel relationship; ranging from low to high degrees of shared content. The lowest degree 
is the zero-level, at which no information is shared in channel relationships. These zero-
degrees of shared content are not shown in the picture here.  
The first degree of shared content in channel relationships takes shape when retailer 
and/or supplier share some basic almost superficial information. The retailer recounts the 
past sales performance of the supplier’s products and how effective its sales promotions are. 
The supplier only talks about promotional communication for the coming period.  
One layer deeper than the superficial exchange of information is the second degree: 
both retailer and supplier give each other insight into logistical problems and needs. The 
retailer tells about his out-of-stock problems with the supplier’s products, it explains its 
stock policy and discloses its logistical cost targets. The supplier is then more open about the 
delivery schedule, the number of product available for the marketplace, and its stock policy 
and logistical costs targets. 
The third degree of shared content for retailers and suppliers is when they disclose 
information about their category information and consumer market intelligence respectively. 
The retailers unfold then details about the profitability of the product category as a whole, 
the sales and sales targets, out-of-stock problems. When suppliers share their information to 
the third degree, they are open about their consumer market intelligence. 
The fourth degree is sharing market information from the ultimate deepest layer; in such 
cases, retailers make their competitive and consumer intelligence known to the suppliers. As 
for suppliers, they would explain to their channel partners more about their business process 
intelligence; sales performance at other competing stores, its effectiveness of promotional 
activities with other retailers. We therefore pose the following proposition: 
 
P1: The different categories of market information content shared between channel 
members constitute a hierarchy. 
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Figure  3.2 Categories and Degrees of Shared Market Information Content 
 Shared Content by Retailer 
with Supplier (degree) 
 
Shared Content by Supplier with 
Retailer (degree) 
 
 Sales information (1st) 
Sales information of 
supplier’s own products, 
realized consumer prices for 
supplier’s own products, 
effectiveness of supplier’s in-
store sales promotions, sales 
target for the supplier’s 
products, etc. 
Promotional communi. (1st) 
Consumer promotional activity 
schedule, introductions of new 
products for the coming period, 
advertising campaign for the 
coming period, instore-
promotion plans. 
 Logistic information (2nd) 
Out-of-stock problems of the 
supplier’s products, the 
retailer’s stock policy, stock-
levels at the retailer’s 
location, logistical costs 
targets, sales promotion 
calendar for the coming 
period. 
 
Logistic information (2nd) 
Delivery schedule of the 
products, out-of-stock problems 
in general, the total amount of 
products available for the 
marketplace in the coming 
period, the supplier’s stock 
policy, logistical costs targets. 
 Category strategy info (3rd) 
Strategy for the category in 
the retail operation, 
profitability of the category, 
range of margins, changes in 
brandmix of the assortment, 
total category sales, sales 
target for the category, out-of-
stock problems within the 
category. 
 
Consumer market intell.(3rd) 
Consumer profiles using the 
supplier’s products, the results 
from consumer research 
(product test, consumer 
evaluations), geographic spread 
of the sales of the supplier’s 
products, sales targets for the 
marketplace, the effectiveness of 
promotional activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Competitive & customer 
intell. (4th) 
Sales performance of supplier 
benchmarked against direct 
competitors, consumer 
profiles buying the supplier’s 
products, consumer profiles 
buying within the product 
category, geographical spread 
of sales of supplier’s 
products, planned instore-
sales promotions of direct 
competitors for the coming 
period, profitability of direct 
competitor’s products, 
consumer profiles buying 
competitor’s products, sales 
targets for competitors. 
Business process intell. (4th) 
Sales performance of retailer 
outlets benchmarked against 
competing retailers, the 
expansion strategy (which 
retailers to acquire as customer), 
effectiveness of instore-sales 
promotions at other retailers, 
sales performance out of the 
trading area of the retailer, sales 
performance within the trading 
area of the retailer,  
 
 
 
Based on: Altman and Taylor (1973), Weitz and Bradford (1999), Seidmann and Sundararajan (1997), Lee and Whang (1998) 
Note: the full details on measurement scale for Shared Market Information Content can be found in paragraph 5.2 
 
 
 
 
Superficial (conversation) 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Increasing disclosure 
 
(needs, strategy) 
High  
disclosure 
(core position) 
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3.2.3 Sharing Mode 
The second dimension of an information-sharing arrangement concerns the sharing mode in 
which the market information is exchanged. Mainly the empirical behavioral approach with 
the conceptualization “information sharing as communicative behavior” (see paragraph 
2.4.2), pays a special attention to this dimension of the information sharing arrangement. 
Here, we focus on a constellation of four sharing mode aspects that have been identified as 
collaborative (cf. Mohr and Nevin, 1990; Mohr, Fisher and Nevin, 1996): contact frequency, 
contact frequency with high(er) management, formality and exclusivity. Contact frequency 
has received some attention in the marketing literature (cf. Anderson and Weitz 1989) and is 
defined as the number of contact events between a sender (the sharing firm) and a receiver 
(the channel partner) during a given period of time (cf. Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980). The 
higher the contact frequency, the greater the collaborative nature of the sharing mode. 
Contact Frequency Higher Management describes the contact frequency with higher 
management (marketing management and/or top management) of the retailer and/or the 
supplier. Collaborative exchanges between channel members may be featured by multi-level 
contacts (Day, 2000) and as such with a greater multiplicity of information channels within 
the channel relationship (Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1995). On top of the usual buying-sales 
contacts, the organizations have contacts at a more strategic level. The advantage of 
arrangements with high contact frequency from higher management is that it indicates 
“commitment from the top” that subsequently gives an incentive to align the interests of 
individual organizations (supplier and retailer) in order to make a success of the information-
sharing arrangement. The higher the contact frequency of higher management, the greater 
the collaborative nature of the sharing mode. 
Formalization (formal versus informal modality) of communication refers to the extent 
to which contacts between channel members are routinized, planned, or structured, as 
opposed to unplanned, fleeting, or ad hoc in nature (Mohr and Sohi, 1996). Maltz and Kohli 
(1996) refer to formality as the ratio of formal sharing events to the total number of 
information-sharing events during a given time period. As the information sharing is more 
formalized, we regard the sharing mode to be more collaborative. 
Exclusivity as the fourth aspect of the information-sharing process, refers to the number 
of parties receiving market intelligence from the retailer. The given exclusivity of the 
information-sharing process by the retailer signals a strong pledge of commitment to the 
supplier (cf. Anderson and Weitz, 1992). Sharing information is like sharing a valuable 
asset; if the sharing takes place at a more exclusive basis, then we regard the sharing mode 
to be more collaborative (with respect to the channel partner). 
We characterize the sharing mode to occur in a more collaborative fashion, the 
exchange of information takes place more frequently, with higher management, is more 
formalized, and on a more exclusive basis.  
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Figure 3.3 The Tentative Relationship between Degrees of Shared Content and 
Collaborative Style in the Sharing Mode  
  
 Degree of Shared Content 
by Retailer 
 
 
 
Low High 
 (e.g., sales 
information) 
(e.g. logistical 
information) 
 
(e.g., category 
strategy 
information) 
(e.g., customer 
intelligence) 
Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
    
  
EDI/CRP = Electronic Data Interchange/Continuous Replenishment 
VMI = Vendor Managed Inventory 
CPFR = Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment 
CM = Category Management 
  
 
Although both sharing mode and sharing mode are separate dimensions of information 
sharing arrangements, it is likely that both are related to each other. A channel member who 
interacts frequently with the other party is likely to develop a deeper understanding of the 
latter's market information needs (cf. Fisher 1978), and subsequently it will be more likely to 
be able to provide the information needed by the receiver and to present the information in a 
manner that is readily understandable by the channel partner. Many behavioral empirical 
studies demonstrate that information-sharing related aspects are interrelated; for instance, 
key-account management practices featuring more intensive activity on information are 
known to be more formalized and have multiple inter-firm contacts (Homburg et al., 2002). 
Mohr, Fisher and Nevin (1996) find a direct relationship between the sharing of non-
coercive content with contact frequency and formality; and they even go as far as to 
conceptually combine the different aspects of two dimensions of sharing mode and shared 
content by merging them into one single measurement of collaborative communication. An 
 
EDI/CRP 
Collaborative Style  
in Sharing Mode 
VMI 
CPFR 
 
CM 
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observation in the field of channel collaborations is that retailers engage in EDI and VMI 
arrangements with many more suppliers compared to the number of suppliers included in 
more arrangements with higher degrees of shared content, such as CPFR and Category 
Management. Figure 3.3 shows the tentative relationship between the collaborative style in 
sharing mode and the degrees of shared content. 
When a channel relationship is more and more characterized by a collaborative style 
of sharing information, higher degrees of content are being shared. We therefore pose the 
following proposition: 
 
P2: A collaborative style in the sharing mode is positively related to the degree of shared 
content, but both dimensions are distinct aspects of the information sharing 
arrangement. 
 
 
3.2.4 Benefits of Sharing Market Information with Channel members 
Sharing different degrees of market information with other channel members at a different 
frequency, with varying contact-levels of higher management, in a formalized way, and/or 
more exclusively is expected to bring about different types of benefits to the sharing channel 
member (Van Bruggen, 2001). Table 3.1 lists the different types of benefits varying from 
more efficiency, more effectiveness, improved working relationship, to increased influence 
capacity.   
The first two types of benefits from sharing information are more direct of nature. When 
channel member share their information, the channel partners can use the information in 
order to increase the quality of their decisions in the channel. The decision quality is raised 
thanks to combining information sources from both parties, resulting not only into a richer 
and more complete picture of the marketplace but also in a reduction of some of the 
uncertainty for each of the individual decision-maker/channel member. Furthermore also it 
removes equivocality in the exchange of information; thereby enhancing the quality of 
coordinating the decision-making in the channel relationship. As a result of improved 
individual channel member’s decision-making and the coordination thereof, the channel 
relationship is expected to function better in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness. 
Cost-saving efficiency gain. Inefficient channel relationships suffer from costly failures 
in the physical supply with high transaction costs, errors in ordering, handling and delivery, 
an excess of pipeline inventory. Information sharing is expected to reduce supply chain costs 
by lowering the need for inventory (Gavirneni, et al, 1999), by diminishing shortage and 
back-order costs, and shortening lead times (Lee et al., 2000). Attributed to an improved 
inter-firm coordination and a better sales forecast (in quantity), the channel members are 
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able to harmonize their ordering, handling, distributing products and managing of 
promotional activities. In so doing, information sharing increases the efficiency in channel 
operations and improves the physical supply (see the Supply Chain Optimization approach; 
Lee, et al, 1997). The benefits of efficiency gain can be realized on a relatively short-term 
basis.  
 
Table 3.1      A Channel Member’s Benefits and Costs of Sharing Market Information with 
other Channel Party 
 
Benefits 
 
 
Costs 
• Cost-saving efficiency gain (more efficient 
physical supply)  
o Efficient coordination between firms 
o Lower inventory holding costs 
o Lower shortage and back order costs  
o Shorter lead times 
 
• Demand-enhancing effectiveness gain (improved 
market mediation) 
o Improvement of the delivery of 
customer value 
o Faster response to changes in consumer 
demand 
o More able to “drive” consumer demand 
 
• Improvement in relationship quality 
 
• Increase in influence capability 
 
• Relationship-specific investments 
o More time, money and effort spent in 
channel member relationship 
o Becoming more dependent on the other 
channel member 
 
• Loss of expert power 
o Deterioration of negotiation position 
 
• Vulnerability to opportunistic behavior by channel 
member 
o Not using any shared market 
information 
o Misuse of shared market information 
o Leakage of shared market information 
 
• Deleterious network effects 
 
Source: Van Bruggen (2001); Forrester Research, “Benefits of and Barriers to CPFR online” (2001) 
 
 
Demand-enhancing effectiveness gain. Ineffective channel relationships make mistakes in 
the matching supply with consumer demand. Typical symptoms of such failures to maximize 
consumer value are obsolete inventory, markdowns to clear inventory, low success rate of 
new product launches. The second benefit from information sharing is that the channel 
relationship becomes more capable of meeting consumer needs and adapting to changes in 
consumer needs more rapidly. As a firm’s relationships have been recognized as an 
important source of competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1999; Day, 2000), they can be 
an instrument to respond more rapidly to arising market opportunities. Information sharing 
enables to mobilize channel members to become more adaptive to changing consumer 
demand; resulting in improved market offer quality (Emshwiller, 1991), and successful new 
product development (Magnet, 1994). The third and fourth types of benefits from 
information sharing are less direct and serve to be no more than facilitation for reaching 
more effective and efficient channel relationships.  
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Improvement in relationship quality. The atmosphere of the working relationship 
between channel members can be thought of as hybrid culture that develops between the 
channel firms and reflects the elements of both firm's cultures, but is different from either 
firm's culture (Wilson, 1995). Perhaps, a third and more indirect benefit of sharing market 
information is that it stimulates the development in the channel relationship itself. Research 
shows that when both channel parties become more market-oriented, their relational 
atmosphere improves (Siguaw, et al, 1998; Baker et al., 1999). Information sharing partners 
are expected to become more satisfied about the performance, and about the way their 
dealings take place. Ultimately, each others’ willingness to invest in the further development 
of their relationship increases.  
Increase in influence capability. A firm’s capability to influence is its ability and 
willingness to reward good behavior of the other channel member, or to inflict negative 
consequences on that channel member (punitive capacity; Kumar, et al., 1998). The 
possession of market information can contribute to the influence capability in two following 
ways. In the first place and especially in the beginning of a channel relationship, sharing 
market information can be perceived as a token of rewarding the other channel partner (cf. 
Scheer and Stern, 1992; as a use of information power; see paragraph 2.4.1) or as a 
demonstration of relationship bonding (see paragraph 2.4.4). In the second place and in 
particular at a later stage in the relationship, as the other channel member has grown 
dependent of receiving this market information and has subsequently designed its business 
processes accordingly, a possible withdrawal or stop of sharing information any longer may 
be detrimental to the receiver’s performance. With this idea in mind, the fourth (indirect) 
benefit of market information sharing is the increase in the influence capability of the 
sharing company and may turn into a powerful two-edged sword in directing the channel.  
 
3.2.5 Costs of Information-Sharing with the Channel Members  
Despite the benefits that information sharing in channel relationships can bring, there are 
also costs associated with it (Van Bruggen, 2001). An information sharing channel member 
may run the risk of incurring four types of costs: higher relationship-specific investments, 
loss of expert power, increased vulnerability to opportunistic behavior, and possible 
deleterious channel network effects (see Table 3.1). 
Relationship-specific investments and increased dependency. A more intensive 
information-sharing implies that the sharing firm dedicates more resources (e.g, time, 
money, training, information technology, specific adjustments) to the relationship with the 
supplier. These out-of-pocket costs are relationship-specific investments because these 
resource commitments cannot be recovered if the channel relationship terminates. As the 
information-sharing relationship continues, hesitancy within the sharing parties develops; 
meaning that the costs to switch to another channel partner rises. Information-sharing parties 
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become increasingly dependent on each other, and strategically less flexible to change 
information sharing partnership.  
Loss of expert power. The second type of cost in sharing market information is the loss 
in expert power, because disclosing proprietary information means giving up the expert 
position and the opportunity to profit from a position of (market) information asymmetry, in 
which a channel member would negotiate for better trade deals. An inherent risk with 
information sharing is that, for instance, the retailer losses its look-out for negotiating a 
lower purchase price (Coughlan, Anderson, Stern, and El-Ansary, 2001). Channel members 
sharing information should also be aware of longer-term learning risks; the other channel 
member may be just enter into a information sharing arrangement in order to outlearn the 
information possessor (Mohr and Sengupta, 2002). To minimize the undesirable transfer of 
information, the sharing firm should careful in its selection of whom to share with, and how 
to share (sharing mode).  
Vulnerability to opportunistic behavior. The third type of cost is becoming more 
dependent of another channel member by sharing information. The increased dependence 
makes the sharing channel member more vulnerable to many forms of opportunism by the 
other (receiving) party: not only to active, but also to passive opportunism (e.g., Wathne and 
Heide, 2000). Active forms of opportunism would be defined in general terms as “self-
interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1975; p. 6). In this context, guile would stand for 
“lying, cheating, calculated efforts to mislead, distort, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse”. Less 
deliberate but potentially harmful behavior by the channel partner are passive forms of 
opportunism, like withholding information, or not using the received information. The 
information sharing is then in vain, because the other party does not use the market 
information to improve channel relationship operations with the sharing firm. It seems like a 
classical principal agent theoretical problem of adverse selection. Yet, it remains difficult to 
monitor and detect the (right) use of information by the receiving party. Even supposing the 
sharing firm exerts itself to carefully select a channel partner, it cannot be certain whether 
the channel partner makes the most from the more intensive market information-sharing. 
The two other forms of opportunism are active and at least equally detrimental to the 
sharing firm. The first is misuse; the shared information can be used against the sharer and 
misused by the other party for other purposes (Hart and Saunders, 1997). The receiving 
party may use the information for their own benefit rather than for improving the 
functioning of the channel relationship. For instance, a supplier may use the information to 
develop own direct channels, and a retailer to develop a private label program (activities of 
vertical integration). The second type of active opportunism is leakage. The shared 
information can be leaked to direct competitors of the sharing firm. For example, brand 
manufacturer Gilette told a large retailer the date on which it planned to begin selling its new 
Good-News disposable razor. The distributor promptly called competitor BIC and told it 
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about the impending product launch. BIC put together a crash team and was able to start 
selling its new razor shortly after Gilette did (Kotler, et al., 2005; p. 342).  
Sharing firms may take different measures in designing a formal (legal) contract on the 
use of its information, herewith attempting to minimize the opportunity that channel partner 
misuses or leaks the (often confidential) strategic information (moral hazard problem; active 
form of opportunism) to competitors. However, a known example in category management 
partnerships literature is that the retailer is never sure that the supplier makes an objective 
category plan (Gruen and Shah, 2001). Furthermore, leakage may occur without the 
presence of bad intentions; although the actual transmission of information is itself 
confidential, direct competitors may be able to infer information from if certain actions of 
the sharing channel partners are observable (Li, 2002). “they are concerned that such 
information could end up being shared with competitors” (Hoban, 1993; quoted in: Sahin 
and Robinson, 2002). 
Deleterious network effects. The fourth type of costs is that the sharing of information 
with one channel member can frustrate the relationships with a third and/or other channel 
members not involved in the information sharing arrangement. These deleterious network 
effects corrupt other business relationships (Ritter, 2000). 
 
3.3 Hypotheses on the Antecedents of Information-Sharing in Channel Relationships  
Referring to Figure 3.1 we focus on the left-hand part of the research model: Part II is on the 
antecedents of information sharing. The research perspectives in Chapter 2 engender the idea 
that an information sharing strategy is not appropriate for all conditions. In the systematic 
review of the three research approaches, we manage to earmark important and relevant 
antecedents that possibly influence channel members to pursue an information sharing 
strategy or not. These possible antecedents are grouped in five building blocks: market 
channel environment, supplier network, relationship, supplier, and retailer characteristics (as 
shown in Figure 3.1 and in Table 3.2). In understanding how much these factors stimulate or 
inhibit information sharing in channel relationships, it is important to realize that the sharing 
of higher and higher degrees of market information in channel relationships (social 
penetration; interorganizational penetration) does not occur in a haphazard way, but is 
presumed to be influenced by the nature of the benefits and costs in the channel relationship. 
Sharing information in channel relationships is supported by positive reinforcements 
and by immediately obtained and forecasted benefits. The downside is also assumed to be 
true, that the sharing of market information can be stopped and reduced by negative 
reinforcements and by expected costs. Theories explaining these mechanisms of developing 
more closer channel relationships and overt channel behavior are Social Exchange theory 
(Thibaut and Kelley 1959; Kelley and Thibaut, 1978) and Social Penetration theory (Altman 
and Taylor, 1973); these theories argue that a channel member starts to share more (i.c., in 
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higher degrees and with a more collaborative style) information in a relationship with 
another channel member when the expected benefits of sharing information exceed the 
expected costs. 
 
Table 3.2  Expected Relationships between Antecedents, Shared Content by Channel 
Members, and Collaborative Style in the Sharing Mode 
  
Hypotheses 
 
 Retailer’s Benefits and Costs 
from 
Sharing Market Information 
with Supplier 
 
(B = Benefits; C= Costs) 
 Supplier’s Benefits and 
Costs from 
Sharing Market Information 
with Retailer 
 
(B = Benefits; C= Costs) 
 Collaborative 
Style in Sharing 
Mode 
 
 
 
Independent Variables Br Cr  
Hypothesis 
( Br - Cr )  Bs Cs 
Hypothesis 
( Bs – Cs )  
Hypothesis 
 
          
Market Channel Environment          
1: Consumer Demand Turbulence + + ∩  +  +  * 
2: Consumer Demand Growth +  +  +  +  + 
3: Purchase Complexity + + ?  + + ?  + 
4: Channel Inertia  -  -  -  -  - 
          
Supplier Network          
5: Network Horizon  + -  - + -  - 
6: Network Concentration  - +   + -  * 
7: Supplier Competition Intensity  + -  +  +  * 
8: Retailer Competition Intensity  +  +    -  * 
9: Information Sharing Norms + - +  + - +  + 
10: Negative Connectedness   + -  +  +  * 
11: Positive Connectedness  - +  -  -  * 
          
Relationship Characteristics          
12: Age of Relationship + - +  + - +  + 
13: Trust  - +   - +  * 
14: Relationship-specific Investment  - +  -  -  * 
15: Contract Formalization  - +   - +  + 
16: Total interdependence + - +   - +  + 
17: Dependence asymmetry - + -  - + -  - 
          
Supplier Characteristics          
18a: Market Sensing Capabilities  + -  +  +  * 
18b: Market Relating Capabilities +  +  +  +  + 
19: Goal Congruency  - +  + - +  + 
20a: Top Management Support Supplier + - +  +  +  + 
20b: Incentive Structure Supplier + - +  +  +  + 
          
Retailer Characteristics          
21a: Market Sensing Capabilities +  +   + -  * 
21b: Market Relating Capabilities +  +  +  +  + 
22: Predisposition to ally with suppliers  + - +   - +  + 
23a: Top Management Support Retailer +  +  + - +  + 
23b: Incentive Structure Retailer +  +  + - +  + 
          
Covariates          
Industry          
Food (Food = 1; other industries = 0)   +    +  * 
Supplier Type           
Brand manufacturer (brand manufacturer = 
1; private label = 0) 
  +    +  + 
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For example, a retailer signs a category management agreement with a certain supplier only 
if the expected benefits from this type information sharing arrangement with the supplier are 
higher than the expected costs. The expectations of the retailer are based on the 
accumulation of past experiences as well as on the whole set of beliefs about the future 
dealings and exchange of information with that supplier. It is important to note that this total 
of expected benefits and costs are not only being directed at the other channel member, but it 
also appears to be directed toward the process of information-sharing itself (e.g., Gruen and 
Shah; 2000) and the circumstances in which is being shared. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
both shared content and sharing mode are a function of the expected benefits and costs of 
information sharing with the other channel member (see Table 3.2), but that the extent to 
which these benefits and costs play a role depends on the antecedents. 
Table 3.2 lists the expected direction of the effect from the antecedent on shared 
content. The expected direction is a result of the difference between the sum of expected 
benefits and the sum of expected costs. We do not develop the specific hypothesis for each 
sharing mode aspect, because it would hardly be feasible. For the sake of efficiency, we 
constructed one overall hypothesis for the collaborative nature of the sharing mode. Later in 
the data analysis in Chapter 6 we do take a specific look at each of the sharing mode aspects. 
The degree of shared content market information and sharing mode are hypothesized to 
affect the channel relationship performance. The second part of the research model is on the 
consequences and will be dealt with in paragraph 3.5. Per domain of antecedents we will 
discuss the direction of the hypotheses.  
 
3.3.1 Market Channel Environment 
The first set of variables influencing market information sharing concerns four aspects of the 
market channel environment: consumer demand turbulence, consumer demand growth, 
product complexity and channel inertia.  
Consumer Demand Turbulence is here defined as the extent to which the rate of change 
in the consumer demand is rapid and unpredictable (cf. Achrol and Stern, 1988). The 
influence of consumer demand turbulence on the benefits and costs of information sharing is 
rather difficult to hypothesize in a straightforward way; as it happens, the research 
perspectives presented in Chapter 2 show a large variety in influences of consumer demand 
uncertainty on information-sharing.  
With regard to the expected benefits of information sharing, it is primarily the supply 
chain optimization approach suggesting that the following chain-of-events takes place: when 
the consumer demand becomes more turbulent (such as consumer demand fluctuations, 
many (product) innovations, high price sensitivity), the bull-whip effect augments and 
consequently channel parties absorb growing demand fluctuations by increasing their 
inventories. Higher inventory levels in the supply chain heighten the need for coordination 
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in the channel, and thus information-sharing would be a valuable strategy in lowering supply 
chain costs (Graves, 1996; Lee, et al., 1997; Cachon, 1999; Chen et al., 2000; Lee, et al., 
2000). Sharing higher degrees of shared content like demand forecasts can potentially absorb 
demand fluctuations and subsequently reduce the supply chain costs (Aviv, 2001). 
Additionally in terms of effectiveness of the channel, game-theorists would predict that in 
situations of uncertain consumer demand, contracts to share information leads to higher 
channel profits (e.g., Gal-Or, 1991; Niraj and Narasimhan, 2003). Also marketing channel 
scholars in the empirical behavioral tradition agree that environmental uncertainty in terms 
of consumer diversity and dynamism impacts the decision-making uncertainty faced by the 
channel firms (Achrol and Stern, 1988) and causes transaction costs to rise (Pilling et al., 
1994), information sharing then can help to reduce that perceived uncertainty and to better 
anticipate potential exchange problems. Mentzer et al. (2000) also argue that stronger 
channel relationships offer higher levels of interfirm coordination, greater stability and 
flexibility. Other empirical studies give additional evidence supporting the idea that 
information sharing and more coordination harnesses channel members against sudden 
external changes. A closer coordination in the channel relationship whereby information 
sharing is regarded as normal conduct mitigates perceptions of environmental uncertainty 
(Paswan, et al. 1998); perhaps because a more information-based coordination also more 
meaningful to both of them in situations with uncertain consumer demand (Celly and 
Frazier, 1996) and motivates channel firms to engage in relationship learning (i.c. 
information sharing) either to gain control over these externalities or to buffer the 
consequences (Selnes and Sallis, 2003). 
Aside from the general agreement among research perspectives on the idea that 
information sharing delivers extra benefits to channel members in situations of uncertain 
consumer demand, there is debate on whether or not the costs of the information sharing in 
these situations are higher. The increased costs might explain us why not all firms absorb 
turbulence by information sharing. Studies in the behavioral empirical tradition find that it is 
sometimes strategically more sensible for firms to avoid stronger ties with other firms in 
times of environmental turbulence (Joshi and Campbell, 2003; Joshi and Stump, 1999). 
Consumer turbulence and uncertainty in general may give rise to opportunism, because 
either party can take advantage of the changing situation (Heide and John, 1990), “can yield 
a level of task ambiguity that greatly diminishes the willingness and ability of the parties to 
share information” (Bello, et al., 2003: p 6) and for that reason “parties want to remain 
flexible in uncertain environments” (Dywer and Oh, 1987) and refrain from joint actions 
then (Joshi and Stump , 1999). For these reasons, we believe that in more turbulent 
consumer demand situations, the costs of information sharing in terms of becoming more 
dependent and the opportunistic behavior are higher.  
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We do think that the extra costs of information sharing are mostly borne by the retailers 
and not by the suppliers. In times of turbulence, suppliers seek sales guarantees and are 
increasingly willing to invest in their buyer relationships, while retailers try to refrain from 
further investments into their supplier relationships in order to maintain their independence 
and flexibility (Jap, 1999). As a result, we hypothesize different expected relationships 
between the antecedent consumer demand turbulence and the degrees of shared content by 
retailers (downstream) and suppliers (upstream). As for the retailers, we expect that when 
consumer demand turbulence keeps on increasing, the efficiency gains are gradually offset 
by a growing wish to stay less dependent on the supplier. In more turbulence environments, 
the desire to have the possibility to switch suppliers becomes bigger; it means that the 
perceived costs of information sharing for the retailer go up: information sharing may then 
imply an intertwinement of its operations with one supplier leading to more difficulty to 
switch suppliers. When considered in tandem with the positive effects of efficiency gain, this 
argument suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship between consumer demand turbulence 
and shared content by the retailer (Hypothesis H1a-r).  
As for the suppliers, the efficiency gain benefits are expected to grow monotonically 
when consumer demand turbulence increases. Possibly, the sharing of information by the 
supplier in response to consumer demand turbulence may bring forth an extra improvement 
in relationship with its retailer. Hence, we expect consumer demand turbulence to stimulate 
the shared content by suppliers (Hypothesis H1a-s).   
Regarding the sharing mode, we expect in line with the shared content that the supplier 
will share its information in a more collaborative style (higher contact frequency, contact 
frequency of higher management, more exclusivity, and formalization); whereas the retailer 
is more reserved in the sharing mode style (less contact frequency, little contact with higher 
management, less exclusivity, and less formalization). 
 
H1a-r:  The relationship of consumer demand turbulence with retailer’s degree of shared 
content has an inverse U-shape. 
H1a-s:  As consumer demand turbulence increases, suppliers share higher degrees of 
market information with retailers. 
H1a-rs:  As consumer demand turbulence increases, retailers (suppliers) share information 
in a less (more) collaborative style. 
 
 
Consumer Demand Growth. A growing consumer demand situation makes it reasonable to 
believe that more new market opportunities are to be learnt from by both channel members. 
Main question for both retailer and supplier is “are we currently addressing all of the 
emerging consumer wishes?”. Primary benefit from sharing information is then to seek, 
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monitor and maintain the effectiveness of their market channel. Since established sources of 
information (from syndicated suppliers) are not available in such growing market segments, 
both parties need to share first-hand information in their effort to monitor the growing 
demand. Our hypothesis is that in growing consumer demand situations, the effectiveness 
gain is relatively higher than in stable consumer demand (low growth). For that reason, we 
expect that both retailer and supplier are likely to share higher degrees of market information 
content (H1b-r and H1b-s) when the consumer demand is growing. The sharing of information 
serves as inputs for the learning about new market opportunities (e.g., Sinkula, Baker and 
Noordewier, 1997; Selnes and Sallis, 2003), and is expected to take place in more 
collaborative sharing modes (higher contact frequency, with higher management, more 
exclusively, and more formalized). 
 
H1b-r:  As consumer demand growth increases, retailers share higher degrees of market 
information with suppliers.  
H1b-s:  As consumer demand growth increases, suppliers share higher degrees of market 
information with retailers.  
H1b-rs:  As consumer demand growth increases, channel members share their market 
information in a more collaborative style (higher contact frequency, contact with 
higher management, more exclusivity, and more formalization).  
 
 
Perceived Product Complexity. When the purchase situation is more complex, the channel 
members experience a more technical and complicated buying/selling situation. Information 
sharing in high product complex buying situations may provide extra benefits as well as 
incur extra costs. In the first place, more product complexity means that both channel 
members wish to have more market information to retrieve extra securities. The need for 
securities springs from the higher risk of failure to meet consumer demand (in quality; 
effectiveness gain); channel members prefer to minimize the maximum regret of missing out 
on a market opportunity; and thus the benefit from information sharing is “effectiveness 
gain”. The suppliers will intensify communication with channel members downstream to 
give these guarantees  (Bello, Chelariu, and Zhang, 2003). The extra costs of information 
sharing in more product complex buying situations is that channel members need to spend 
much time on elementary technical matters of the business dealing like, specifying the 
product and delivery conditions. As the total amount of time is limited, the relative cost of 
spending time and effort to exchange information about the market increases. Higher 
benefits as well as higher costs of information sharing in more buying situations with more 
complexity; that means that both effects counter each other and we therefore hypothesize a 
zero net effect. 
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Concerning the sharing mode, we hypothesize, though, that the parties seek to eliminate 
possible misunderstandings and have a elaborative form of sharing mode with higher contact 
frequency, more contact with higher management, in a more exclusive manner, and more 
formalized. 
 
H1c-r:  Complexity in the purchase situation does not have an influence on the degrees of 
shared content by retailers with suppliers. 
H1c-s:  Complexity in the purchase situation does not have an influence on the degrees of 
shared content by suppliers with retailers. 
H1c-rs:  As complexity in the purchase situation increases, channel members share their 
market information in a more collaborative style.  
 
 
Channel Inertia. When it takes a long time (and a lot of effort) for a channel to react to 
consumer demand changes, the channel is regarded as inert. Supply Chain optimization 
studies demonstrate that channels with longer lead times experience greater costly bullwhip 
fluctuations; meaning that the potential for efficiency gain by sharing market information 
increases. However, this approach only advocates that information sharing would be an 
appropriate strategy to reduce these augmented demand variations and make the supply 
chain more efficient (Hariharan and Zipkin, 1995; Chen, 1998). However, the structural 
time-lag in the channel minimizes the timeliness of information so much that it losses its 
effectiveness in the channel. Without being effective, it is very difficult to optimize the 
supply chain and become more efficient. We hypothesize that notwithstanding the possible 
efficiency gains from sharing information in inert channels, the effect of channel inertia on 
lower effectiveness is greater. That is why, we think of the channel inertia as a critical 
structural hurdle for channel members to share, because the barriers are too large to make 
the sharing of information pay off in the short or medium term. We hypothesize a negative 
relationship between the content of market information shared and channel inertia. In 
accordance with the expected shared content in the relationship, we expect that the channel 
inertia remains a barrier to share collaboratively.  
 
H1d-r:  As channel inertia increases, retailers share lower degrees of market information 
with suppliers.  
H1d-s: As channel inertia increases, suppliers share lower degrees of market information 
with retailers. 
H1d-rs:  As channel inertia increases, channel members share their market information in a 
less collaborative style.  
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3.3.2 Supplier Network 
The second set of antecedents playing a role in the sharing of market information in channel 
relationships is the supplier network. The channel relationship cannot be seen in isolation 
but as being embedded in a network of other supplier relationships (cf. Ritter, et al., 2004; 
Achrol and Kotler, 1999). The supplier network is defined as the portfolio of supplier 
relationships of the retailer; it is constituted by structural dimensions, competition intensity, 
information sharing norms, and connectedness. The structural dimensions of the supplier 
network are network horizon (magnitude) and network concentration (comparable to 
network density). 
Supplier Network Horizon. The supplier network horizon denotes primarily how 
extended the retailer’s view of the network is (Anderson, Hakansson, and Johansson, 1994) 
and is here defined as the set of supplier relationships (within the product category), with 
which the retailer regularly deals. Sharing information in a large supplier network (with 
many other suppliers) is for both channel members less attractive than in a smaller supplier 
networks (with a few other suppliers), because of costs of information sharing are higher and 
the prospected benefits are lower. The retailers’ costs to share information are relatively 
higher in a larger network than in a smaller network, because retailers would prefer more not 
to become (too) dependent from one (information sharing) supplier with so many other 
alternative suppliers being present. 
Both the suppliers’ expected costs to share information are higher and their benefits are 
lower in larger supplier networks. A larger supplier network spreads the retailer buyer’s 
attention over a large group of smaller trading partners and the fragmented retailer’s 
attention subsequently reduces the likelihood that information sharing pays off in any 
substantial efficiency and effectiveness gains for the supplier. Besides that, the fragmented 
retailer’s attention increases the costs of information sharing due to the risen probability that 
the retailer is not going to use the received information from the supplier (a form of passive 
opportunism).  
In large fragmented supplier network horizons, the preferred way to do business is at 
arm’s length and information sharing is more or less discouraged. Both retailer and supplier 
will share information in a less collaborative style (less contact frequency, little contact 
frequent of higher management, less exclusively, and less formalized). 
 
H2a-r: As the supplier network expands, retailers share lower degrees of market 
information with suppliers. 
H2a-s: As the supplier network expands, suppliers share lower degrees of market 
information with retailers. 
H2a-rs:  As the supplier network expands, channel members share their market information 
in a less collaborative style. 
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Supplier Network Concentration. The concentration in the supplier network is the degree to 
which the buying budget (within a product category) is concentrated at a small number of 
suppliers. Assuming that the amount a retailer buys from a supplier is strongly correlated 
with the strength of the retailer-supplier relationship, we can draw a parallel with Burt’s 
(1992) network density reflecting the average strength of the relationships in the network 
and it mainly influences the channel members’ costs to share information. 
The retailers’ costs to share information are relatively smaller in a more concentrated 
supplier network. Information sharing in such circumstances would simply be relatively 
lower relationship-specific investments because a higher supplier concentration allows the 
retailer to focus its dedication to a smaller number of important suppliers.  
On the other hand, the suppliers’ information sharing costs are relatively higher, 
because a higher concentration implies for them that the retailer has strong ties with their 
direct competitors. In such a case, leaking confidential market information becomes much of 
a danger to that supplier. Perhaps the chances of leaking do not increase, but the possible 
detrimental effect of it does substantially.  
These opposite costs effects for channel members are also expected to be reflected in 
the sharing mode in which market information is passed on. The retailer pursues a more 
collaborative style of sharing, while the supplier condenses the opportunity to share market 
information by sharing in a more distant way (less contact frequency, less contact with 
higher management, less exclusivity, and less formalized). 
 
H2b-r: As the supplier network concentration increases, retailers share higher degrees of 
market information with suppliers. 
H2b-s: As the supplier network concentration increases, suppliers share lower degrees of 
market information with retailers. 
H2b-rs:  As the supplier network concentration increases, retailers (suppliers) share their 
market information in a more (less) collaborative style. 
 
Supplier Competition Intensity. The intensity of competition among suppliers themselves is 
an important characteristic for the supplier network. A number of benefits and costs of 
information sharing are influenced by the supplier competition intensity.  
The retailers’ benefits from the sharing information with a supplier that faces more 
intense competition are expected to be higher, because the supplier will be (extrinsically) 
motivated to make the most from the received retailer information. Moreover, the costs of 
information sharing for retailers with competing suppliers are relatively lower, due to the 
smaller likelihood that they misuse information (cf. Kauffman and Mohtadi, 2004). 
However, we expect one prime cost factor to be overriding:  under conditions of high 
competition among suppliers, retailers can deal many competing suppliers to satisfy their 
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needs for market information and occupy a good negotiation position which they prefer to 
keep (Walter et al., 2003). Giving up this negotiation position and losing an expert power is 
much higher in this case, because it would be relatively better for them to play the divide-
and-rule game in order to come up with the best deal when suppliers are doing their best to 
compete for the retailer’s preference. So in such competitive circumstances, there is no 
immediate need for the retailer to start sharing more content. It might be that only limited 
degrees of retailer information sharing occurs, but revealing more about their market 
position to a supplier is expected to be too costly. Hypothesis H2c-r therefore assumes a 
negative relationship. 
Even though the effectiveness of some information sharing arrangements (like CRP, 
Myers et al., 2000) have been found to lower in more market competitive environments, we 
think that the suppliers expect different costs and benefits from information sharing when 
they are facing more supplier competition, because the need to make market information 
useful is greater. In competitive markets where market information is more valuable (Raju 
and Roy, 2000), suppliers make the sacrifice of passing on their information to retailers in 
order to achieve a good working relationship. Competition is thought to work as a catalyst 
(Mouzas and Araujo, 2000). That is why, we hypothesize, that suppliers will use market 
information in these situations as a competitive weapon with the objective to win the 
retailers’ preference (Anderson and Narus, 1990); the supplier’s expected benefit of an 
improved relationship with the retailer is greater than the cost of losing the valuable expert 
position. H2c-s assumes a positive relationship. As a result, competition intensity among 
suppliers is likely to have different effects on the shared content of market information in a 
channel relationship. Like the supplier network concentration, competition intensity is 
presumed to have divergent effects on the sharing mode. The retailer prefers to lead 
competition among supplier do its work and prefers arm-length style sharing modes; while 
suppliers aim for sharing information collaboratively. 
 
H2c-r: As competition among suppliers in the network increases, retailers share lower 
degrees of market information with suppliers. 
H2c-s: As competition among suppliers in the network increases, suppliers share higher 
degrees of market information with retailers. 
H2c-rs:  As competition among suppliers in the network increases, retailers (suppliers) share 
their market information in a less (more) collaborative style. 
 
Retailer Competition Intensity. Articles in the popular business press stress the importance 
for retailers to collaborate with suppliers to head their direct competitors (see also Mentzer 
et al., 2000; Mouzas and Araujo, 2000). Collaboration vertically with suppliers may deliver 
a competitive cost advantage and thus information sharing would make channel relationships 
 88
more efficient for the retailer. In this case, the supplier finds himself in a very attractive 
situation in which he treasures his negotiation position. The supplier is therefore expected to 
react differently than retailers, shop for better deals with severely competing retailer, and 
keep information to himself. Correspondingly, the channel members are expected to share 
their information in a unilateral collaborative fashion. 
 
H2d-r: As competition among retailers intensifies, retailers share higher degrees of market 
information with suppliers.  
H2d-s: As competition among retailers intensifies, suppliers share lower degrees of market 
information with retailers.   
H2d-rs: As competition among retailers intensifies, retailers (suppliers) share their market 
information in a more (less) collaborative style (higher contact frequency, contact 
with higher management, formalization, exclusivity). 
 
Information Sharing Norms in the Supplier Network. More intense business networks 
surrounding the focal retailer-supplier relationships increases the motivation to engage in 
more collaborative arrangements with each other (Claro et al., 2003). That means that in a 
strong network the two channel partners together with other industry actors have developed 
a high level of consensus and shared values. Such a generally agreed positive attitude in the 
network towards channel collaborations in general, and information sharing in particular, 
positively influences the channel member’s perception ratio between benefits and costs. It 
puts more weight on the information sharing benefits and it downplays cost of information 
sharing. In effect, it raises the level of comparison for the channel relationship to maintain 
(cf. Anderson and Narus, 1990). For both channel members, we hypothesize that in supplier 
networks with highly developed information sharing norms, a firm sharing less information 
violates not only the expectations in one channel relationship, but it neglect of this code to 
share information leads to deleterious effects in the whole network. For instance, being 
uncooperative (i.c., sharing no information) could reduce the channel member’s goodwill 
(Antia and Frazier, 2001). In fact, in order to avoid both decay in the relationship and 
deleterious network effects, retailer and supplier will share information with each other. 
Besides the economical motive resulting from the trade-off between benefits and costs, in a 
network with information sharing norms, channel members may also have legitimacy 
motives to share information (see Grewal, et al., 2001) and have the wish either to portray 
themselves as advanced or to mimic a successful benchmark firm in the network. 
As for the sharing mode, networks with established norms are expected to have 
developed a habit to share in a more collaborative way: both channel members seek regular 
contact, involve higher management, engage in exclusivity contracts, and formalize their 
information sharing. 
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H2e-r:  As the supplier network has stronger information sharing norms, retailers share 
higher degrees of market information with supplier. 
H2e-s:  As the supplier network has stronger information sharing norms, suppliers share 
higher degrees of market information with retailers. 
H2e-rs:  As the supplier network has stronger information sharing norms, channel members 
share market information in a more collaborative style. 
 
Negative and Positive Connectedness. Whereas network characteristics like horizon, 
supplier and retailer competition and information-sharing norms are concerned with an 
overall form of interconnectedness among all channel relationships, there is also network 
centrality. Network centrality refers to the strength of an individual channel firm’s position 
in the network. One measure of network centrality is the degree of connectedness (cf. Antia 
and Frazier, 2001). Connectedness can defined as the degree to which the exchange in one 
relationship is contingent on the other (Cook and Emerson, 1978). We distinguish two types 
of connectedness: negative and positive connectedness.  
As for retailer-supplier relationships in negative connected network, making such 
strategically important decisions to information sharing with a channel member, the firm 
realizes that teaming-up with one partner may deteriorate other channel relationships. The 
costs of information sharing in such circumstances are higher due to the increased costs of 
deleterious network effects. Our hypothesis (H2f-r) therefore is: if the retailer-supplier 
relationship is negatively connected with other supplier relationships in the network, then the 
retailer is hampered to share information since the retailer does not want to damage the other 
supplier relationships. Interestingly, in such a situation, the supplier is expected to do the 
opposite and is more motivated to share higher degrees with the retailer, because closer ties 
with the retailer is going to weaken the retailer’s ties with its direct competitor. Hypotheses 
H2f-s is positive because the comparative advantage to be gained becomes bigger. The way in 
which information is shared is assumed to be unilaterally collaborative (for the supplier); the 
retailer with negatively connected supplier relationships is going to have less frequent 
contact, less involvement of higher management, less exclusivity, and less formalized. 
 
H2f-r:  As the retailer-supplier relationship becomes more negatively connected to other 
supplier relationships, retailers share lower degrees of market information with 
suppliers. 
H2f-s:  As the retailer-supplier relationship becomes more negatively connected to other 
supplier relationships, suppliers share higher degrees of market information with 
retailers. 
 90
H2f-rs:  As the retailer-supplier relationship becomes more negatively connected to other 
supplier relationships, the retailer (supplier) shares market information in a less 
(more) collaborative style. 
 
In positively connected retailer-supplier relationships in the network, collaboration in one 
relationship leads to better performances in others. In such a case, the retailer perceives 
relatively lower costs in sharing with the supplier due to lower (or perhaps even negative) 
deleterious network costs. Collaboration with one supplier can make the retailer an 
interesting and knowledgeable channel partner for another supplier. The retailer is expected 
to share higher degrees of content with the supplier. We expect the supplier to hold back, for 
there is no extra competitive incentive for him to share higher degrees of content in 
positively connected supplier networks (H2f-s). He would then indirectly sponsor his 
competitor. Similar to the previous hypothesis, the sharing mode is assumed to be 
unilaterally collaborative; the retailer share in a more collaborative fashion, while the 
supplier keeps away from sharing more collaboratively. 
 
H2f-r:  As the retailer-supplier relationship becomes more positively connected to other 
supplier relationships, retailers share higher degrees of market information with 
suppliers. 
H2f-s:  As the retailer-supplier relationship becomes more positively connected to other 
supplier relationships, suppliers share lower degrees of market information with 
retailers. 
H2e-rs:  As the retailer-supplier relationship becomes more positively connected to other 
supplier relationships, retailers (suppliers) share market information in a more (less) 
collaborative style. 
 
3.3.3 Relationship Characteristics 
The third set of antecedents relevant to explaining when channel members overtly and 
collaboratively share market information with each other concerns the characteristics of the 
relationship. To characterize the relationship, we look at the age, the level of trust in the 
supplier, the relationship-specific investments made by the retailer, contract formalization, 
and the dependence structure.  
Relationship Age. Previous behavioral empirical studies did not show an unequivocal 
influence of relationship age on information sharing in channel relationships; the age of the 
relationship may have a positive (Mohr, et al, 1996) as well as a negative effect (Anderson 
and Weitz, 1992) on the information sharing behavior by channel members. Two other 
studies do not find any effect (Heide and Miner, 1992; Lusch and Brown, 1996). We expect 
the age of the relationship to have effect on both the costs and the benefits of information 
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sharing. First, the age reduces the costs of opportunism, because older relationships have 
survived different and maybe difficult episodes. Second, relationship age affects the 
expected benefits of market information sharing. As the relationship matures, channel 
members are more accustomed to each other, and efficiency and effectiveness gains are 
easier to attain. The older the relationship, the higher degrees of market information channel 
members share (H3a-r and H3a-s). Similarly, we expect that as the relationship has come of 
age, the sharing takes place in a more collaborative fashion. 
 
H3a-r: As relationship age increases, retailers share higher degrees of market information 
with suppliers.  
H3a-s: As relationship age increases, suppliers share higher degrees of market information 
with retailers.  
H3a-rs: As relationship age increases, channel members share market information in a more 
collaborative style.  
 
Trust in Supplier. Trust in the supplier is the perceived ability and willingness of the supplier 
to behave in ways that consider the interests of the retailer. Trust is a vital element in a 
business relationship (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Geyskens, et al., 1998) works as a facilitator 
of effective cooperative behavior in business relationships (e.g., Dywer, et al., 1987). 
Insufficient trust deters retailers from sharing critical information with their suppliers 
(Kinsey and Ashman, 2000). Relationships characterized by trust expose more 
communication (Anderson and Weitz, 1992), higher investments into the relationship 
(Campbell, 1995), and more relationship learning (Selnes and Sallis, 2003), encourage the 
transfer of proprietary information (Helper and Levine, 1992; Mohr and Sengupta, 2002). 
Not only the empirical evidence but also the abundance of citations in the trade press stating 
the critical importance of trust in ECR-projects (e.g., ECR CPFR Guide to Implementation, 
2001) make use hypothesize that trust in the supplier has a positive effect on information 
sharing in channel relationships. For the most part, the perceived costs of information 
sharing are relatively lower in trusted relationships. There is a lower chance on opportunistic 
behavior, because trusted channel members are expected to abstain from misuse and leakage 
of the received market information (H3b-r and H3b-s). The sharing mode will also be 
characterized by a higher contact frequency, involvement of higher management, and 
exclusivity. Except for formalization, trust can serve as a safeguard against opportunistic 
behavior and lessens the need for formalization of the information sharing arrangement. 
 
H3b-r: As trust in the supplier increases, retailers share higher degrees of market 
information with suppliers.  
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H3b-s: As trust in the supplier increases, the higher degrees of market information are 
shared by the supplier.  
H3b-rs: As trust in the supplier increases, channel members share their market information 
in a collaborative style (with an exception for formalization).  
 
Relationship-Specific Investments in the supplier relationship. The third relationship 
characteristic assuming to affect the market information sharing in channel relationships is 
the amount of investments made by the retailer to specifically cater the supplier relationship.  
As for the retailer, the costs of information sharing are relatively after having made 
specific investments in the supplier relationship. The reason is that they have already 
become more dependent on the supplier, hence they face lesser costs of getting locked-in. 
Moreover, retailers may fear losing the specific investment into supplier relationship and by 
continuing the sharing of information with the supplier, losing this investment can be 
prevented (H3c-r is positive).  
As for the supplier, information sharing from their part is expected deliver relatively 
less when the retailer made already substantial relationship-specific investments; 
information sharing is less needed to gain more efficiency and effectiveness, because the 
retailer’s investments can be considered a hostage to the supplier. Having such a hostage 
does not really stimulate the supplier to put extra effort in the relationship with the retailer 
and therefore we expect suppliers not to share more market information (H3c-s is negative). 
We thus theorize the relationship-specific investments in the supplier relationship 
having both a positive and a negative effect on the sharing of market information in the 
channel relationship (H3c-r and H3c-s), for the retailer and the supplier, respectively. The 
sharing mode is expected to be unilaterally collaborative; meaning that one party is sharing 
with a higher contact frequency, more involvement of higher management, more exclusivity, 
and more formalization, while the other shares information in a more distant style. 
 
H3c-r: As the retailer’s specific investment into the supplier relationship increases, 
retailers share higher degrees of market information with suppliers.  
H3c-s: As the retailer’s specific investment into the supplier relationship increases, 
suppliers share lower degrees of market information with retailers.  
H3c-rs: As retailer’s specific investment into the supplier relationship increases, retailers 
(suppliers) share their market information in more (less) collaborative style.  
 
Contract Formalization. Contract formalization refers to the degree in which the channel 
relationship is governed by explicit contracts. There is mixed empirical evidence about the 
association between contract formalization and the closeness or strength of the relationship. 
One study claims that the effect of formalization on the closeness is negligent (Lusch and 
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Brown, 1996), while another study shows that information exchange is embedded in legal 
bonds (Cannon and Perreault jr, 1999). We think that contract formalization lower the costs 
of sharing information in the channel relationship. It serves as a safeguard against the costs 
of opportunistic behavior by either channel party and it thereby stimulates market 
information sharing. The hypotheses for both retailer’s and supplier’s shared content are that 
a well-formalized contract encourages channel members to share more market information 
(H3d-r and H3d-r are positive). In a similar vein, we think that contract formalization provides 
a layer for information sharing in a more collaborative way. 
 
H3d-r: As contractual formalization of the relationship increases, retailers share higher 
degrees of market information with suppliers.  
H3d-s: As contractual formalization of the relationship increases, suppliers share higher 
degrees of market information with retailers.  
H3d-rs: As contractual formalization of the relationship increases, the channel members 
share their market information in a more collaborative style.  
 
Total Interdependence. Another important relationship characteristic in channels is the 
degree to which the members are dependent on each other. A channel firm’s dependence on 
the other is traditionally defined as the firm’s need to maintain the relationship with the other 
to achieve its goals (Frazier, 1983). A good indication for the channel party’s dependence on 
the other is whether or not the other can be easily replaced by another without harming sales 
and profits (cf. Heide and John, 1988; Kumar, et al., 1995). The interdependence structure of 
a channel relationship is made up from two dimensions: the magnitude (total) and the 
asymmetry in the dependencies of the two parties on each other (Gundlach and Cadotte, 
1994; Kumar et al., 1995). Recent research has found that higher total interdependence 
between channel parties enhances the prospering of their relationship (Kumar, et 1995, Van 
Bruggen et al., 2005). In relationships with a greater total interdependence, parties have a 
larger amount of common interest to improve the functioning of the channel, and are both 
more motivated to prevent conflicts or other dysfunctional affairs keep them from actual 
performing. 
As for information sharing in a higher total interdependent channel, the relative costs 
and benefits for both channel members are respectively lower and higher than less 
interdependent relationships. Costs are lower because both retailer and supplier avoid the 
chance of instigating a conflict with each other and will not misuse and leak the received 
market information. Also the fear of losing a precious negotiation position is less. 
Furthermore, the benefits are expected to be higher. In higher interdependent relationship, 
both channel members are to reap more fruits from information sharing, because due to their 
interdependency they are much more motivated to work for more efficiency and 
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effectiveness in the channel relationship. Even a soft influence strategy as information 
sharing is found to be more effective in relationships with higher dependency (Keith, et al. 
1999). 
 
H3e-r: As total interdependence in the relationship increases, retailers share higher degrees 
of market information with suppliers.  
H3e-s: As total interdependence in the relationship increases, suppliers share higher 
degrees of market information with retailers.  
H3e-rs: As total interdependence in the relationship increases, the channel members share 
their market information in a more collaborative style.  
 
Dependence Asymmetry. The second dimension of the interdependence structure in the 
channel relationship concerns the dependence asymmetry. The difference between the 
channel member’s dependence on its partner and the partner’s dependence on the channel 
member is also referred to as the channel member’s relative dependence (Anderson and 
Narus, 1990). Whereas total interdependence enhances the channel performance, the 
asymmetry in dependence is however suspected to create a more instable situation for its 
functioning. In theory, when channel relationships become more asymmetric, the relatively 
less dependent (more dominant) firm has increasingly less motivation to avoid conflict, 
because retaliation becomes less likely and less damaging. But because the relatively more 
dependent (dominated) firm expects to be exploited regardless of its behavior, is it more 
likely to engage in a “pre-emptive strike” or rebellion against the more powerful firm. With 
this mechanism in mind, we anticipate that in asymmetric channel relationships, both 
channel members would regard the relative information sharing benefits to be lower. 
Expectations surrounding rebellious behavior by the other channel member are likely to end 
up in information sharing opportunism: not working with the received information. The 
dominated channel firm may dedicate resources to developing other alternative channel 
relationships in order to lessen its relative dependence on the focal relationship. The 
dominating channel firm also prefers to puts its effort to (more) important channel 
relationships. The sharing mode in dependence asymmetric relationships will reflect these 
low degrees of shared content and is expected to be less collaborative than more symmetric 
dependent relationships.  
 
H3f(g)-r: As the relative retailer (supplier) dependence in the channel relationship increases, 
retailers share lower degrees of market information with suppliers.  
H3f(g)-s: As the relative retailer (supplier) dependence in the channel relationship increases, 
suppliers share lower degrees of market information with retailers.  
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H3f(g)-rs: As the relative retailer (supplier) dependence in the channel relationship increases, 
channel members share their market information in a less collaborative style.  
 
3.3.4 Supplier Characteristics 
The fourth set of antecedents refers to the characteristics of the supplier. Unlike the 
assumption of the supply chain optimization studies and game-theoretic models presented in 
Chapter 2, supplier firms are not identical economic rational actors. There is a lot of 
heterogeneity in the characteristics of suppliers. The Resource-Based View (RBV) of the 
firm (Barney, 1992) posits that individual firm should strive to improve their performance 
through amassing and utilizing strategic assets and capabilities. Strategic resources are those 
that are valuable, rare, and difficult-to-imitate. An intangible asset like market information is 
also regarded as a source for competitive advantage and it is reasonable to expect that it 
affects the market information sharing process in the pursuit for more competitive, efficient 
and effective channel relationships (Zahay and Handfield, 2004). The qualities of a supplier 
affecting the expected benefits and costs from information sharing can be grouped in two 
classes: (1) the supplier’s capabilities and (2) supplier’s willingness. The two capabilities 
taken into account here are market-sensing and market-relating. The three willingness 
indicators are goal congruency, top management support, and incentive structure. 
The supplier’s capability in market information sharing is reflected an excellent 
reputation of good informational skills and expertise. Often such capable suppliers have a 
greater absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) and are able to “recognize the value 
of new, external information, assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends” (e.g., Malzer 
and Kohli, 1996). Knowing that absorptive capacity is its ability to understand new external 
knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 128), 
we follow Day (2000,2002) and make a distinction between market sensing and market-
relating capabilities. 
Supplier’s Market-Sensing Capabilities. Market sensing means being good at open-
minded inquiry rather than looking for information to confirm pre-existing beliefs about the 
market. The supplier’s market-sensing capabilities affect the retailer’s expectation about the 
benefits and costs from information sharing. The retailer’s costs of information sharing with 
the skilled market-sensing suppliers are perceived to be relatively higher. Market 
information from the retailer may be compared with other sources and this may hurt the 
retailer’s negotiation position. Furthermore, the retailer’s expected benefits from sharing are 
also be relatively low. Well market-sensing suppliers can (better) collect market information 
themselves; retailers are in a lesser good position to make a valuable contribution and 
basically listen to what these suppliers have to tell them about the market developments: 
lower chance of increase in influence capability. As a result of higher expected costs and 
lower benefits, we hypothesize that the relationship is negative.  
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The benefits from sharing information for market-sensing suppliers are relatively 
higher. Disclosing market information by them may have a substantial positive impact on 
the quality of the working relationship. Because the possession of a non-coercive power base 
assume some sort of responsibility for cultivating it. Not using it and withholding it may 
even harm the relationship with the retailer (cf. Gaski and Nevin, 1985).  
Since channel members have conflicting costs and benefits from information sharing 
when suppliers are good at market-sensing, the sharing mode is unilaterally collaborative in 
style; the supplier demonstrates its good intentions to share higher degrees by having more 
frequent contact and with higher management involvement, more exclusivity, and more 
formalization. The retailer exposes a less collaborative sharing mode. 
 
H4a-r: As the quality of the supplier’s market-sensing capabilities increases, retailers share 
lower degrees of market information with suppliers.  
H4a-s: As the quality of the supplier’s market-sensing capabilities increases, suppliers 
share higher degrees of market information with retailers.   
H4a-rs: As the quality of the supplier’s market-sensing capabilities increases, the sharing 
mode is characterized as unilaterally more collaborative from the supplier’s side 
(higher contact frequency, contact with higher management, formalization, 
exclusivity), less collaborative from the retailer-side.  
 
Supplier’s Market-Relating Capabilities. The other type of a supplier’s capabilities that is 
important to sharing market information in channels, is knowing-how-to successfully 
translate the (received and collected) market information into effective marketing efforts. 
These market-relating capabilities surface in being skilled and knowledgeable in building 
loyal consumer relationships based on a good understanding of their needs.  
If a supplier knows well how to apply the retailer’s market information to repair the 
malfunctionalities in the channel relationship, the retailer is going to benefit more from 
information sharing with. We think that a retailer will adapt the sharing of its information to 
the supplier’s market-relating capabilities. If a retailers shares higher and higher degrees of 
market information with a mediocre market-relating supplier, than beyond a certain point, 
we expect that an information-(sharing)-overload is reached for this supplier and the 
information sharing becomes counterproductive (cf. Meier 1963; O'Reilly 1978). 
Information overload occurs when new (market) information is transmitted to the supplier at 
a rate that exceeds the supplier’s capacity to process it (Huber 1982; Stohl and Redding 
1987). As a result, the retailer will adjust its shared information to the degree that can be 
processed by the supplier. The expected benefits of efficiency and effectiveness from market 
information sharing are greater when a supplier has better good market-relating 
competences, because the supplier is able to make good use of the received retailer’s 
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information. The hypothesis could also be positive if we would frame it theoretically as an 
agency problem; the retailer prefers to share information with a supplier that can represents 
the retailer’s interests at best and can make good use of its information (a minimization of 
the adverse-selection problem). 
The supplier’s expected benefits from building up a better working relationship by 
giving the latest market information to a retailer go up when the supplier has good market-
relating capabilities. Having good market-relating capabilities coincides with the view that a 
good channel-bonding strategy (Day, 1994) is instrumental for the supplier’s own market 
position; in particular due to the increased influence capacity is aims to achieve. 
 
H4b-r: As the quality of the supplier’s market-relating capabilities increases, retailers share 
higher degrees of market information with suppliers.  
H4b-s: As the quality of the supplier’s market-relating capabilities increases, suppliers 
share higher degrees of market information with retailers.   
H4b-rs: As the quality of the supplier’s market-relating capabilities increases, channel 
members share their market information in a more collaborative style (higher 
contact frequency, contact with higher management, formalization, exclusivity).  
 
Supplier’s Goal Congruency. Not only on the supplier’s capabilities in sharing market 
information, but also the willingness to engage in an information sharing arrangement with a 
retailer influences the expected benefits and costs for of the channel members. One of the 
indicators for the supplier’s willingness is its goal compatibility with the retailer. These 
compatibilities in terms of reputations and ambitions (goals) play an important role (Smith 
and Barclay, 1997).  
The retailer’s costs to disclose information to the supplier are relatively lower, when the 
supplier pursues goals that are not conflicting with the retailer’s; suchlike suppliers are 
expected to work on behalf of the retailer and would not opportunistically misuse or leak 
retailer’s information.  
The supplier’s expected benefits are relatively higher when it has high goal congruency 
with the retailers, because the supplier is more willing to strive for more efficiency and 
effectiveness in the channel relationship. The costs are also expected to be lower; the 
supplier does not suspect the retailer to harm the supplier’s interests.  
 
H4c-r: As supplier’s goals are more congruent with the retailer, retailers share higher 
degrees of market information with suppliers.  
H4c-s: As supplier’s goals are more congruent with the retailer, suppliers share higher 
degrees of market information with retailers.   
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H4c-rs: As supplier’s goals are more congruent with the retailer, the channel members share 
their market information in a more collaborative style (higher contact frequency, 
contact with higher management, formalization, exclusivity).  
 
Supplier’s Top Management Support. In order to become a success, collaborations between 
channel firms need to be supported by top management. Managerial commitment is “a 
critical component” (Myer et al., 2000). The internal backup from the top or “upper 
organization echelons champion the initiative” (Mouzas and Araujo, 2000) and the vision 
from the top are important partnering antecedents (Mentzer, 1999; Day, 1995). Similar to the 
supplier’s goal congruency, top management support signals to supplier’s commitment to 
ally with the retailer. 
The retailer’s expected benefits from information sharing with a supplier having top 
management support is relatively higher than with a supplier without top management 
support. The yield in higher efficiency and effectiveness gains is much more of a strategic 
priority. Additionally the retailer’s expected costs are lower, because the top management 
also serves as a guarantee against opportunistic behavior. 
With the endorsement from their top management, the supplier will be surer of 
revealing higher degrees of market information to the retailer. The signal given by top 
management support also makes expected benefits from information sharing with the retailer 
to rise. 
 
H4d-r: As support of supplier’s top management increases, retailers share higher degrees 
of market information with suppliers.  
H4d-s: As support of supplier’s top management increases, suppliers share higher degrees 
of market information with retailers.   
H4d-rs: As support of supplier’s top management increases, the channel members share 
market information in a more collaborative style (higher contact frequency, contact 
with higher management, formalization, exclusivity).  
 
Supplier’s Incentive Structure. In addition to top management support, the supplier 
organization can have an incentive structure as an instrument to stimulate information 
sharing (Corsten and Kumar, 2005) and to promote the working as a team in the whole 
channel (Whatson and Zeng, 2005). The lack of such an incentive scheme may inflame the 
internal conflict between brand management and sales management within the supplier’s 
organization and that does – in the end – not serve the successful implementation of 
information sharing programs (Gruen and Shah, 2000).  
The incentive structure rewarding cooperation with the retailer is thus expected to result 
in higher degrees of information sharing with the retailer, because it offers a good signal for 
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the supplier’s willingness to utilize the shared information well. We further hypothesize that 
the incentive structure of the supplier also promotes the sharing of information of the 
supplier itself, materializing the signal for cooperation. 
 
H4e-r: As the supplier’s incentive structure more and more supports collaboration with 
retailers, retailers share higher degrees of market information with suppliers.  
H4e-s: As the supplier’s incentive structure more and more supports collaboration with 
retailers, supplier share higher degrees of market information with retailers.   
H4e-rs: As the supplier’s incentive structure more and more supports collaboration with 
retailers, the channel members share their market information in a more 
collaborative style (higher contact frequency, contact with higher management, 
formalization, exclusivity).  
 
 
3.3.5 Retailer Characteristics 
Similar to the set of supplier characteristics, we also consider the characteristics of the 
counterpart to have an important influence on the information sharing practices. The 
qualities that retailer brings to the table of the channel relationship concern the final set of 
variables consisting: its market-sensing capabilities, market-relating capabilities, 
predisposition to ally with suppliers, top management support, and incentive structure.  
Retailer’s Market-Sensing Capabilities. Similar to the hypotheses about the supplier’s 
market-sensing capabilities, we would argue that the retailer’s capabilities to collect market 
information are expected to stimulate the sharing by retailers (H5a-r), while it is to bring a 
halt to the sharing of suppliers (H5a-s), because the supplier’s information sharing benefits-
costs ratios is relatively unfavorable due to higher chances for misuse and lower relative 
added value of shared information. Subsequently, the sharing mode is only unilaterally 
collaborative:  the retailer shares in a collaborative fashion, while the supplier exercises 
restraint in the way his information is being shared. 
 
H5a-r: As the quality of the retailer’s market-sensing capabilities increases, retailers share 
higher degrees of market information with suppliers.  
H5a-s: As the quality of the retailer’s market-sensing capabilities increases, suppliers share 
lower degrees of market information with retailers.   
H5a-rs: As the quality of the retailer’s market-sensing capabilities increases, the sharing 
mode is characterized as unilaterally more collaborative from the retailer’s side 
(higher contact frequency, contact with higher management, formalization, 
exclusivity), less collaborative from the supplier-side. 
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Retailer’s Market-Relating Capabilities. Similar to hypotheses made about the supplier’s 
market-relating capabilities, we expect the retailer capabilities to make good use of market 
information (market-relating) to affect the sharing from both sides positively (H5b-r and H5b-
s), similar to the supplier’s market-relating competences. Retailers with good market-relating 
capabilities is more likely to use information sharing as an instrument to build up links with 
channel members; the benefits from information sharing as a relationship-building tool is 
perceived to be greater by market-relating retailers. Suppliers are also likely to share more 
degrees of market information with a market-relating retailer, because it knows that the 
retailer is able to deal effectively with the received market information. 
 
H5b-r: As the quality of the retailer’s market-relating capabilities increases, retailers share 
higher degrees of market information with suppliers.  
H5b-s: As the quality of the retailer’s market-relating capabilities increases, suppliers share 
higher degrees of market information with retailers. 
H5b-rs: As the quality of the retailer’s market-relating capabilities increases, the channel 
members share their market information in a more collaborative style (higher 
contact frequency, contact with higher management, formalization, exclusivity).  
 
Retailer’s Disposition to Ally with Suppliers. The retailer’s disposition to ally with suppliers 
is another and related characteristic. Earlier studies have called this retailer trait relational 
proclivity (Johnson and Sohi, 2001), partner orientation (Mentzer, er.al., 2000) or belief in 
manufacturer collaboration (Joshi and Campbell, 2003). This disposition relates to the 
strength of the general tendency held by a firm to seek out, engage in, and make close 
partner-style supplier collaborations as opposed to conducting interfirm buying-selling 
interaction at arm’s length (cf. Johnson and Sohi, 2001). This retailer trait is independent of 
any specific supplier or any prior information specific to any potential partner (or other 
circumstance). A strong proclivity, for example, stems from general beliefs that information-
sharing partnering will enhance outcomes, or general preferences for joint projects, and thus 
the expected benefits from information sharing such as effectiveness and efficiency gain will 
be higher. Furthermore, the expected costs of vulnerability to opportunistic behavior, loss of 
expert power, etc. are toned down by a retailer with such a disposition. 
 
H5c-r: As the retailer’s disposition to ally with suppliers increases, retailers share higher 
degrees of market information with suppliers.  
H5c-s: As the retailer’s disposition to ally with suppliers increases, suppliers share lower 
degrees of market information with retailers. 
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H5c-rs: As the retailer’s disposition to ally with suppliers increases, the channel members 
share their market information in a more collaborative style (higher contact 
frequency, contact with higher management, formalization, exclusivity). 
 
Retailer’s Top Management Support. Another indicator for the retailer’s willingness to share 
information is also the support given by top management to collaborate with the supplier. 
Both channel members will share higher degrees of content, as the retailer exhibits more 
dedication to collaboration with the supplier, and the supplier perceives this signal of retailer 
commitment. These exchanges of commitment signals increase both benefits to share more 
information and lowers costs of opportunistic behavior. 
 
H5d-r: As support of retailer’s top management increases retailers share higher degrees of 
market information with suppliers.  
H5d-s: As support of supplier’s top management increases, suppliers share higher degrees 
of market information with retailers.   
H5d-rs: As support of supplier’s top management increases, the channel members share 
their market information in a more collaborative style (higher contact frequency, 
contact with higher management, formalization, exclusivity). 
 
Retailer’s Incentive Structure. Retailer’s incentive structure lenient to cooperate with the 
supplier stimulates the shared content by the retailer through the facilities given to make the 
channel relationship becoming to be more effective and efficient; the expected benefits are 
greater. The supportive incentive structure at the retailer’s also signals to the supplier 
commitment to collaborate in the channel relationship and subsequently inviting the supplier 
shares higher degrees of information; due to anticipation of higher channel effectiveness and 
efficiency and lower expectations concerning costs of opportunism. 
 
H5e-r: As the retailer’s incentive structure more and more supports collaboration with 
suppliers, retailers share higher degrees of market information with suppliers.  
H5e-s: As the retailer’s incentive structure more and more supports collaboration with 
suppliers, suppliers share higher degrees of market information with retailers.   
H5e-rs: As the retailer’s incentive structure more and more supports collaboration with 
suppliers, the channel members share their market information in a more 
collaborative style (higher contact frequency, contact with higher management, 
formalization, exclusivity).  
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3.4 Hypotheses on the Consequences of Information Sharing in Channel Relationships  
The right-hand part of our research framework presented in Figure 3.1 deals with the 
consequences of market information sharing in channel relationships. The investigation of 
the impact of information sharing on the consequences is performed in two ways. By 
reporting survey results (in Chapter 7) we look at the effects on joint market learning, 
channel relationship performance and quality, from the retailer’s perspective, whereas in the 
experiment (as reported in Chapter 8) we take a more detailed look at the effects of the 
retailer’s market information sharing on the channel relationship quality from a supplier’s 
stand-point. The hypotheses for the experiment will be developed in Chapter 8. Here, in the 
next part of this chapter we entirely concentrate on the hypotheses for the survey study.  
The question how to judge the performance of a channel relationship is difficult to 
answer. As demonstrated in the Chapter 2, different criteria can be employed. The 
functioning of a marketing channel relationship can be evaluated on its efficiency and how 
good it is at reducing supply chain costs (supply chain optimization approach). Another 
performance measure more related to the effectiveness of the channel relationship is the total 
amount of channel profits extracted from the consumer marketplace (the game-theoretical 
approach). The third type of criteria concerns the relationship quality: are channel members 
satisfied about the way business is conducted and its results? Are they planning continue the 
channel relationship and committed to invest in it? (empirical behavioral approach).  
Given the ultimate aim of information sharing to transform the supply chain into a 
demand chain, we want to find out whether information sharing successfully impacts this 
transformation. Following Mohr and Spekman (1994) and Tuten and Urban (2001), we took 
subjective as well as more objective indicators for the “demand chain” success. As a set of 
subjective measures, we look at channel relationship quality, in particular at economic and 
social satisfaction, and commitment. For more objective measures of success in terms of 
channel relationship performance we look at joint profits and strategic revenues. Critical in 
this transformation to a demand chain is that channel members are learning better and faster 
from consumer market developments. Therefore we included an important third set of 
consequences – joint market learning – much more measuring the process than the output. 
 
3.4.1 Joint Market Learning 
The sharing of market information is also expected to stimulate the market learning process 
within the channel relationship. The market learning process can be viewed as a cyclical one 
in which channel members’ actions lead to channel interactions with the environment, the 
environment responds, and environmental responses are interpreted by the channel members 
who learn by updating their beliefs about cause-effect (i.e., action-response) relationships 
(cf. Lee, et al. 1992; Sinkula, 1994). We compare joint market learning to the process of 
individual organization’s market learning, as described by Day (1994: p.43) and Sinkula, et 
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al. (1997), but we transpose the notion of learning by an organization to the notion of 
learning by two channel members.  Similar to the learning process between departmental 
units within a company (purchasing unit and other units; cf. Hult and Ferrell, 1997), the joint 
market learning is here extended to an inter-organizational setting (Lukas et al., 1996). The 
idea is not completely new, but Selnes and Sallis (2003) combine information sharing and 
collaborative market learning into one larger construct called relationship learning. We 
think it is important to separate the “learning process” from the “individual investments” of 
both channel firms in the form of shared content. It goes without saying that information 
sharing helps both the channel members to acquire the latest market insights and comprises 
therefore a process by which knowledge is obtained. However, the acquisition of knowledge 
and information distribution are not the only sub-processes for learning. Others are 
information interpretation and storing the knowledge into memory (Huber, 1991); so the 
exchange of market information itself does not automatically mean that both channel 
members learn together (with the ultimate objective to improve the functioning of the 
channel relationship), but it is definitely  a necessary condition for learning within the 
channel relationship (i.e., the construction of a more complete market picture, see Chapter 
1’s jigsaw picture), for then both channel members are able confront their “theories in use” 
about the marketplace with each other (Lukas, Hult, and Ferrell, 1996). This confrontation of 
the “theories-in-use” makes it possible to detect and to find solutions for two potential 
forecasting errors in channel relationships (do we minimize our supply chain costs in the 
chain? And do we maximize our delivery of consumers’ value?). 
With respect to learning, much research has been done on a firm’s absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990); viz. the firm’s ability to recognize and value new knowledge, 
ability to assimilate new knowledge, and ability to commercialize new knowledge. Lane and 
Lubatkin (1998) find that all three dimensions of a firm’s absorptive capacity promote the 
inter-firm learning. While absorptive capacity is about a firm’s qualities in receiving market 
information, we argue that the sharing market information provides the opportunity to 
absorb and thereby enhances the joint learning about the consumer marketplace.  
 
H6a: As channel members share higher degrees of their market information with each 
other, they jointly learn better about their consumer marketplace. 
 
The learning orientation within a firm largely depends on top management commitment, 
team orientation, and systems. Firms learn better when top management emphasizes the 
importance to learning, people in the organization cooperate as if they were in a team, and 
systems should be in place to stress the interconnectedness and mutual interdependence 
between the actors (Sinkula, et al., 1997; Calantone et al., 2002). Transposing these intra-
organizational findings to an inter-organizational setting, it means that the way in which 
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information is shared is also of importance. We think of it as it could make an additional 
contribution to the quality of the joint learning process, because the way in which the 
channel parties co-research and co-discover is very dependent on the task-divisions, 
coordination and how they deal with each other. Parallel to key ingredients to learning 
within firms, the sharing mode aspects respectively resemble these three aspects: top 
management involvement is accentuated by the contact frequency of higher management; 
importance of team-work is featured by the level of contact frequencies and the degree of 
exclusivity; and finally, systems installation is portrayed by the degree of formalization of 
sharing market information. Hence, we expect that the collaborative style in the sharing 
mode promotes the joint market learning. 
 
H6b: As channel members share their market information in a collaborative style, they 
jointly learn better about their consumer marketplace. 
 
3.4.2 Channel Relationship Quality 
As for the second and more subjective measure of channel success, we investigate the 
impact of information sharing is the relationship quality. Relationship quality has been 
conceptualized construct consisting of different dimensions (Kumar, et al., 1995; Van 
Bruggen et al., 2005). Here we look at the economic and social satisfaction, and 
commitment as perceived by the retailer. Economic and Social Satisfaction. We define 
satisfaction as the retailer's evaluation of the characteristics of the channel relationship 
(Frazier 1983; Ruekert and Churchill 1984) and we make a distinction between economic 
and social satisfaction (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2001). Economic satisfaction is defined as 
a channel member’s evaluation of economic outcomes that flow from the relationship with 
its partner such as sales volume, margins, and discounts (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). It 
has to do with the consideration of a channel member that the relationship is a success with 
respect to goal attainment in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Social satisfaction is 
defined as channel member’s evaluations of psychosocial aspects of the relationship, in that, 
interactions with the exchange are fulfilling, gratifying, and facile. It concerns the 
satisfaction with the social outcomes of the relationship: appreciation of the contacts with its 
partner, liking to work with partner, because it believes the partner is concerned and, 
respectful and willing to exchange ideas. (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar, 1999; 
Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). 
Commitment refers to the desire to maintain membership in the dyadic relationship 
(Morgan and Hunt 1994; Kumar, et al, 1995). In marketing channels, commitment has been 
encompassed by several dimensions, often incorporating effective commitment, expectation 
of continuity, and willingness to invest in the relationship (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Mohr 
and Nevin, 1990). Affective commitment is the desire to continue the channel relationship 
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because of positive affect toward the partner. Expectation of continuity incorporates one of 
the partner’s perceptions of both its own and the other channel party’s intention to remain in 
the relationship. The willingness to invest reflects a desire to do more than just what is 
happening now – it is an intention to become deeply involved in the relationship though 
investments of capital and effort.  
The impact of market information sharing on the quality of the channel relationship 
works via a number of mechanisms which all work in the same direction. First, information 
sharing can be perceived as a non-coercive use of power (Boyle et al., 1992) and in that 
capacity it is received with greater satisfaction (Hunt and Nevin, 1974; Gaski and Nevin, 
1985; Scheer and Stern, 1992; Brown, et al., 1995). Second, higher degrees and a 
collaborative way of sharing information can regarded as improved channel communication 
and subsequently leads to more satisfaction with the information sharer (Anderson and 
Narus, 1990; Walter et al., 2003) and higher commitments from both sides (e.g., Eggert and 
Helm, 2003).Third, information sharing can be considered an endorsement act of existing 
relational norms (Heide and John, 1992); withholding information can undermine long-held 
presumptions by the other channel member and consequently harm the relationship quality. 
Information sharing can at least assist in maintaining the relationship quality. Fourth, 
information sharing also implies an effort of investment into the relationship in order to 
create a stronger bonding between the channel parties. The ties between channel firms are 
not only strengthened thanks to the reduction in likelihood of opportunistic behavior but also 
due to a subsequent greater belief in long-term commitment intentions and commitment to 
implement cooperative plans together (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999; Gruen and Shah, 2000). 
 
H7a: As channel members share higher degrees of their market information, channel 
relationship quality increases. 
H7b: As channel members share their market information in a more collaborative style, 
the channel relationship quality increases. 
 
Social satisfaction about the relationship with a channel member is especially sensitive to 
how business dealings take place (cf. Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). In particular, when 
the rewards are given on a contingent basis (Scheer and Stern, 1992), it may negatively 
affect the recipient’s sense of self-determination or autonomy causing the unpleasant 
experience of being controlled by others (Eisenberger and Cameron, 1996; Deci, et al., 
1999). In this respect, we expect the way information is given by a supplier to have 
influence on the retailer’s social satisfaction. If information is passed on a contingency basis, 
then it could harm the social satisfaction. We think that affective commitment is also 
influenced by contingency and arbitrariness in the dealings of the other party. Sharing mode 
aspects reflecting a minimum of contingency and arbitrariness from the supplier are in 
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particular: (1) supplier’s higher management contact with supplier, (2) exclusivity given by 
supplier, and (3) the formalization in sharing market information. These three sharing modes 
put emphasis on the supplier’s unconditional commitment to sharing its market information 
with the retailer. So, when information sharing is structurally embedded in the channel 
relationship has a positive impact on social satisfaction of the retailer. 
 
H7c: The impacts of three sharing mode characteristics (i.e., supplier’s higher 
management contact, exclusivity and formalization) on social satisfaction and 
affective commitment are greater than the impacts of sharing mode on the other 
relationship quality dimensions, like economic satisfaction, willingness to invest, 
and continuity expectations. 
 
3.4.3 Channel Relationship Performance 
The motivation for transforming the channel relationship from a supply chain into a demand 
chain is that both channel members can “expand the pie” of revenues. When the popular 
business press and trade journal publications report on the impact of information sharing, 
they often use the term pie-expansion to refer to the collaborative process of creating 
mutually beneficial strategic outcomes between channel members. Market information 
sharing arrangements are designed to expand the size of the joint benefits “pie” and give 
each channel party a share of an incrementally greater pie that could not be generated by 
either channel party in isolation. Two more objective success measures reflecting pie 
expansion are Joint Profit and Strategic Revenues. Joint Profits refers to the direct profits 
that result from the dyadic collaboration effort, as opposed to those profits earned by the 
efforts of one firm alone. It is not merely a summation of the two firms' individual profits 
but instead refers to the financial outcomes that result from the interdependence of effort and 
investment that reside with the dyad (Jap, 2000; Jap and Anderson, 2003).  
Strategic Revenues. In addition to the short-term monetary result in terms of joint-
profits, in many channel relationships another motivation to engage in market information 
sharing is to achieve competitive advantages (e.g., superior access to resources, a more cost-
efficient supply chain, development of unique channel collaboration technologies). The gain 
of competitive advantages over other channel relationships is called strategic revenues. We 
define strategic revenues as “strategic benefits gained over competing dyads that enable the 
dyad to compete more effectively in the marketplace” (cf. Jap, 1999, 2000).  
The effect of the degrees in shared content on the channel relationship performance can 
be explained by the “decision-making framework” (cf. Villas-Boas, 1994), which claims that 
“more information is better because actions are better adjusted to the current state of the 
world”. When channel members disclose their market information to each other, they 
manage to adjust their actions to the two forecasting errors. Hence, we expect that an 
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increase in shared content, irrespectively by which channel party it is given, helps to lift the 
channel relationship performance.  
 
H8a: As channel members share higher degrees of their market information with each 
other, the channel relationship performance (in terms of joint profit and strategic 
revenues) increases. 
H8b: As channel members share their market information in a more collaborative style, 
the channel relationship performance (in terms of joint profit and strategic 
revenues) increases. 
 
Two different separate dimensions of the information sharing arrangements – shared content 
and sharing mode – can have a differential impact on the performance of the channel 
relationship. Disclosing higher degrees of confidential information content can be viewed as 
making a motivational investment into the channel relationship (see Chapter 2, Corsten and 
Kumar, 2005; Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1995). While the shared content is much more a 
reflection of a relational investment made by the members, the sharing mode aspects are 
much more connected with the other conceptualizations of information sharing, such as the 
use of power and communicative behavior. As indications for the collaborative nature of the 
sharing mode aspect, contact frequency, contact frequency with higher management, 
exclusivity, and formalization, they resemble more the mechanism of open communication 
behavior (eg., Anderson and Narus, 1990; Mohr et al., 1996; see Table 2.5) and the use of 
information power (eg., Gaski and Nevin, 1985; Scheer and Stern, 1992). Consequently, we 
expect that shared content has a stronger impact on the hard performance measures than the 
sharing mode aspects: joint profits, strategic revenues, economic satisfaction and willingness 
to invest. 
 
H8c: The impact of shared content on channel relationship performance (joint profits, 
strategic revenues) is greater than the impact of sharing mode. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
In this Chapter we have developed a framework for our research on the nature, antecedents, 
and consequences of market information sharing in channel relationships. Instrumental to 
the framework has been the insights gained from the review of the three main research 
perspectives taken by Supply Chain Optimization, Game Theoretic Models, and Empirical 
Behavioral studies. The overall framework consists of three parts. Each of these parts has the 
objective to address on of the respective three research questions. The first part is dedicated 
to answering the question about the nature of market information sharing. The second part is 
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directed to examining the antecedents of market information sharing, while the final and 
third part is concerned with the consequences of market information sharing. 
We have begun the construction of our research framework by distinguishing two 
dimensions in the market information sharing arrangement: shared content and sharing 
mode. As for the shared content, we have borrowed the idea from Social Penetration Theory 
that the disclosure of information about a channel member’s (own) market position is made 
up from different hierarchical degrees. With regard to the sharing mode, we include seven 
aspects reflecting the collaborative style of how market information can be exchanged in 
channel relationships.  
The next step we have taken in the development in the framework construction is the 
explanation of the benefits and costs of sharing market information sharing. In 
contemplating whether or not to share market information with one of its channel member, a 
firm anticipates gaining certain benefits from it; the benefits are the gains in demand-
enhancing effectiveness, cost-saving effectiveness, relationship quality improvement, and 
the increase in influence capacity. On the other hand, if a firm shares information, it runs the 
risk of incurring certain information sharing costs: relationship specific investments and the 
fear to be locked-in, loss of expert power, increased vulnerability to opportunistic behavior, 
and deleterious network effects.  
Part II of the research framework deals with the antecedents of market information 
sharing. In developing the hypotheses we borrowed the wide range of factors of relevant 
variables from the research review in Chapter 2 and included five sets of antecedents: 
market channel environment, supplier network, relationship characteristics, supplier 
characteristics, and retailer characteristics.  
Finally, part III is concerned with the consequences of market information sharing. The 
ultimate aim to share market information is to transform the “supply chain into a demand 
chain”. We include three main sets of consequences to indicate the success in this 
transformation: (1) joint market learning, (2) channel relationship quality, and (3) channel 
relationship performance. First, we expect that sharing of market information assists the 
channel members to learn better from the consumer marketplace. Second, we think that the 
quality of the channel relationship improves; the channel members will be more satisfied 
with the relationship and be more committed to it. Third, we anticipate that the channel 
performance improves. Information sharing channel members are going to gain more joint 
profits and create strategic revenues.  
The next chapter is going to deal with the data collection of the survey study.  
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CHAPTER FOUR DATA COLLECTION: SURVEY 
 
 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Our framework for examining the nature, antecedents and consequences of market 
information sharing in channel relationships has been introduced in the previous chapter. 
The framework describes the relationships between the antecedents and consequences of 
market information sharing channel arrangements. In order to test the relationships in the 
comprehensive model of information sharing in channel relationships, we have conducted 
two types of data collections. One is through an experiment; and that will be explicated in 
Chapter 8. The other concerns a large scale mail survey among Dutch retail buyers. This 
chapter describes the approach we followed in conducting the survey of this dissertation. 
First, it reports the way our data was collected. Second, it clarifies the setup of the 
questionnaire.  
 
4.2 Sampling Frame and Data Collection 
Sampling Frame. The sampling frame for the study was a mailing-list of Dutch retail 
organizations obtained from a semi-governmental body serving the Dutch retail industry: 
Hoofd Bedrijfschap Detailhandel (HBD). With the assistance of the HBD, trade 
associations catering the specific retail industries (i.c., MITEX and UNETO-VNI) were 
contacted to extend and update our list of retail-organizations in order to make our 
mailing-list complete. We choose six retail industries that sell tangible goods to end-
consumers:  Consumer Electronics, Do-it-yourself (DIY), Entertainment (toys, books, pet 
supply, bikes, sport equipment), Fashion (apparel, footwear, jewelry), Food 
(supermarkets), and Personal Care (drugstores, opticians). The final list included three 
types of medium-sized to large retail organizations with more than four outlets: store 
chains, franchise organizations, and buying groups. All of these retail organizations have 
in common that they centralize the buying function into one decision-making unit. Since 
the unit-of-analysis in our study is the channel relationship (retailer-supplier), an 
appropriate informant to report on the sharing of market information between retail 
organization and supplier is the retail buyer. Note that our selection of the retail 
organizations population excluded small independent stores, pop-and-mom shops, and 
retailers selling services to consumers (e.g. barbers, temporary employment agencies, 
shoemakers), because they hardly have transaction or inventory information systems 
containing useful market information to pass on to their suppliers. 
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Key informant selection. Campbell’s (1955) criteria of being (1) knowledgeable about 
the phenomenon under study and (2) able and willing to communicate with the researcher 
constituted our criteria for informant selection. Care was taken to ensure that the 
informants in our sample of buying firms were selected properly. However, because their 
knowledge and involvement were assessed via self-reports, additional evidence about their 
agreement with other sources would be desirable. For a number of reasons we have limited 
our data collection to one single informant per supplier relationship. To include multiple 
key respondents from the same organization would be less appropriate, because knowledge 
about the particular exchange of market information with one particular supplier is rather 
relationship-specific and in occasion not well spread throughout the organization. The 
retail buyer’s job autonomy is high and his typical specialization per (group of) suppliers 
and product category makes it difficult to find an additional knowledgeable informant at 
the retailer’s side of the dyad. An alternative could be to ask an informant from the 
supplier-side of the dyad. However, we did not do, that because of time limitations.  
 
Table 4.1 Survey Response Rate 
 Number of 
initial letters 
sent 
 
Number of 
retail 
organizations 
expressing 
willingness to 
participate 
% 
 
 
 
Number of 
buyers 
agreed to 
participate 
 
Number of 
responses 
actually 
received  
Response 
rate of buyers
% 
 
 
Number of retail 
organizations 
actually 
participating 
Response rate of 
organizations 
% 
 (1) (2) (2) / (1) (3) (4) (4) / (3) (5) (5) / (1) 
Industry         
Consumer Electronics 61 29 47.5 41 28 68.3 17 27.9 
DIY 19 12 63.2 23 20 90.0 15 78.9 
Entertainment 43 25 58.1 44 30 68.2 18 41.9 
Fashion 137 63 45.6 115 71 61.7 43 31.4 
Food 21 12 57.1 34 17 50.0 8 38.1 
Personal Care  26 13 50.0 26 12 46.2 10 38.5 
Total 307 154 50.0 280 178 63.6 112 
(+23*) 
36.2 
* responses from anonymous firms 
 
Initially, all 307 companies of the six retail industries from the list were contacted by 
phone to identify the contact person in charge of buying. Following Dillman’s (2000) 
suggestions we made pre-contacts with the potential respondents and explained them the 
purpose of this survey. The contact persons then received a letter with an announcement of 
the study. This letter further clarified the motivation and setup of the study; it also made a 
request for possible participation of their colleagues with a purchasing/buying 
responsibility. Within a week after the initial mailing, the researchers contacted them by 
phone and buyers from 154 organizations expressed their willingness to participate. In 
some organizations, more than one buyer took part in the study, but each participant 
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reported on a different supplier relationship. All respondents were promised a summary of 
the research findings, as well as a comparison of their industry with others in the sample. If 
they agreed to collaborate, they were sent the questionnaire. In a number of cases, the 
researchers needed to call them several times to remind them of the importance of the 
study and their promise to participate.  
Finally, data for the study were obtained from 178 buyers within retail organizations 
in different industries in the Netherlands: consumer electronics (28), DIY (20), 
entertainment (30), fashion (71), food (17), and personal care (12). The 178 completed 
questionnaires were returned by retail buyers working in at least 112 different companies 
and from six retail industries (23 buyers did not reveal the name of their firm). Response 
rates of buyers vary from 46% to 90% per industry. The overall response of organizations 
is minimally 36.2%. See table 4.1 for details. 
About 95% of the respondents were involved with the specific supplier relationship 
they had to report on (how the supplier was determined, is described in paragraph 4.3). Of 
the remaining 5%, almost all buyers felt confident in giving a good report on the supplier 
relationship. Only, three respondents reported a low level of confidence in filling out our 
questions and were dropped from further analysis. An additional one was discarded 
because of reporting on a wrong type of relationship (i.c., an advertising agency). These 
deletions turned our final sample size for analysis into 174. 
Information about the sample is given in Table 4.2. More than 50% of the buyers work 
at a retail operation with more than 60 outlets and 500 employees. Buyers from three types 
of retail organizations were recruited to participate in our study:  store chains (92); 
franchisors (39), and buying groups (35). All these types of buyers have in common that 
they are well able to inform on which and how market information is exchanged between 
the retail and the supplier organizations. 
Although all respondents are selected on the basis of their buying responsibility, 
almost 20% have additional responsibilities. Six percent have a top management position; 
14% have a sales and/or marketing job position in the company. On average, the 
respondents have more that 10 years of buying experience. Their years of experience range 
from less than a year to almost 39 years.  
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Table 4.2 Survey Sample Characteristics 
 Number % Number % 
Organizational level       
 
Firm Size (number of stores) 
 
Firm Size (yearly turnover) 
  
5-10 
11-30 
31-60 
61-100 
101-150 
150-200 
201-300 
301-500 
501-1000 
>1.000 
 
unknown 
 
15
34
28
16
24
17
13
10
9
     3
169
    5
174
8.6 
19.5 
16.1 
9.2 
13.8 
9.8 
7.5 
5.7 
5.2 
      1.7 
97.1
    2.9
100.0
(in mln consumer sales in euro’s) 
<5 
5-10 
11-30 
31-60 
61-100 
101-150 
151-200 
201-300 
301-500 
501-1.000 
>1.000 
 
unknown 
 
 
5 
8 
14 
13 
6 
9 
7 
15 
21 
5 
     7 
110 
   64 
174 
 
2.9 
 4.6 
 8.0 
 7.5 
 3.4 
 5.2 
 4.0 
 8.6 
 12.1 
 2.9 
      4.0 
 63.2 
  36.8 
100.0 
 
Firm Size (number of employees) Firm Type    
<100 
100 - 499 
500 - 999 
1.000 - 2.499 
2.500 - 4.999 
> 5.000 
24
53
27
27
28
  15
174
13.8
30.5
15.5
15.5
16.1
    8.6
100.0
Store chain 
Franchise organization 
Buying group 
 
unknown 
92 
39 
   35 
166 
    8 
174 
 
52.9 
 22.4 
    20.1 
 95.4 
    4.6 
100.0 
   
Individual level       
Job position    Year of experience in buying   
Buying position 
Top management position 
Sales / marketing position 
137
10
  23
170
    4
174
78.7 
5.7 
   13.2 
 97.7
   2.3
100.0
 until 2 years 
2 to 5 years 
5 to 10 years 
10 to 15 years 
15 to 20 years 
20 to 25 years 
16 
35 
41 
21 
19 
9 
9.2 
20.1 
23.6 
12.1 
10.9 
5.2 
Gender    more than 25 years    13 7.5 
male 
female 
128
   41
174
75.7
  24.3
100.0
  
 
154 
   20 
174 
88.5 
  11.5 
100.0 
 
4.3 Structure of the Questionnaire and Selection of the channel relationship 
Our questionnaire consisted of four main sections. In the first section, the instructions and 
guidelines were explained.  
The second section contained a sort of lottery procedure helping us to make a random 
selection of one specific supplier relationship from the respondent’s portfolio of suppliers. 
This procedure was as follows: the respondent was first asked to list five suppliers with 
whom he/she had recently been in contact. The names of the suppliers (or “anonymous” 
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abbreviations) were written on a list numbered from “1” to “5”. Then the respondent was 
asked to open an enclosed envelope containing a number (ranging from 1 to 5). This 
number determined the supplier that the retailer buyer had to report on. By randomizing 
the choice of the focal supplier relationship we aim to minimize the probability for a 
selection-bias (like the respondent’s tendency to choose the most salient supplier – in 
terms of friendship, trusted, etc.).   
As a key informant for the selected focal supplier relationship, the respondent reported 
about his organization’s dealings with this particular supplier relationship (and how he 
perceived the dealings of the supplier with his organization) by answering the questions in 
the third section. The list of questions was divided into parts corresponding to the main 
building blocks of our research framework (as presented figure 3.1). The questionnaire is 
included in Appendix IV.1.  
In the fourth and last section we checked whether the respondent felt confident in 
correctly filling out our survey questions by asking them: “To what extent have you felt 
confidence in filling out our survey questions”. As stated earlier, three respondents replied 
that they did not have that confidence and thus, they were deleted from further analysis. 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
In the present chapter we provided an overview of the data collection method for our mail 
survey. In the first paragraph, we have given a description of the sampling frame and how 
the key informant was selected. We have further described the individual and 
organizational backgrounds of our final sample of 174 retail buyers. The sample is 
characterized by retailer buyers with a wide variety in buying experience, and 
organizational backgrounds. They work at store chains, franchise organizations, and 
buying groups.  
In the second part, we explained the structure of our questionnaire and the random 
selection of the supplier relationship. The selection of the supplier relationship is 
important, because the unit-of-analysis is the channel relationship. Special attention was 
given to randomly select a supplier relationship from the retail buyer’s supplier portfolio. 
Self-selection would probably lead to merely choosing trusted and more important 
relationships; therefore we designed a lottery to randomly choose a channel relationship. 
Our objective was to have variety in the kinds of supplier relationships. In the next 
chapters we will not only report on the research findings but also on the validation of the 
measures we included in the questionnaire. 
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THE NATURE OF  
MARKET INFORMATION SHARING 
IN CHANNEL RELATIONSHIPS 
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CHAPTER FIVE THE NATURE OF 
 MARKET INFORMATION SHARING  
 IN CHANNEL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The potpourri of acronyms such as ECR, CPFR, CCRM, QR, VMI, and so on, may only 
mystify what is really important in these market information sharing arrangements. 
Whatever fancy buzzword or any other voguish word is used to typify these “arrangements 
between two vertical channel parties to share market information with the intention to 
strengthen the performance of the channel for their mutual benefits”, our purpose in this 
chapter is to look underneath all of these labels, and we want to uncover the nature of 
market information sharing. In particular, we investigate here how organizations in a 
channel differ in the way they exchange this information, and which type of market 
information they reveal to each other.  We formulate an answer to our first research 
question: What is the actual nature of market information sharing between retailers and 
suppliers?  
 
Figure 5.1 Focus of This Chapter: Nature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the findings from our survey among 174 retails buyers of Dutch retail 
organization, we will report on the nature of their market information sharing with their 
suppliers. But first we start by explaining the scales used. Because no established scale for 
Market Information Sharing  
Arrangement 
in the Channel Relationship 
Consequences 
  
• Joint Market Learning 
 
• Channel Relationship 
Quality 
 
• Channel Relationship 
Performance 
 
 
 
Antecedents  
 
• Market Channel Environment 
 
• Supplier Network 
 
• Relationship Characteristics 
 
• Supplier Characteristics 
 
• Retailer Characteristics 
Degree of Shared 
Content 
Sharing Mode 
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the content of information sharing exists, paragraph 5.2 lays out the development and 
purifications procedures for the measurement for shared content. Paragraph 5.3 explains 
the measurements employed for sharing mode. In paragraph 5.4, based on results from the 
survey we illustrate what market information and how channel members share with each 
other. We end this Chapter with a conclusion in paragraph 5.5. 
 
5.2 Measurements of the Shared Market Information Content 
As ascertained in the previous chapters, the shared content in a channel relationship was 
never measured. One tradition in social-psychology dealing with assessing how much one 
person shares his private information with another person is called self-disclosure studies. 
Common measurements in these studies the Jourard Self-disclosure scale (Jourard, 1961; 
Burnard and Morrison, 1992), self-disclosure index (Miller et al., 1983), or the self-
disclosure situations survey (SDSS, Harris, et al., 1999). Often these questionnaires are 
used in family or medical settings. Recent examples are intact families consisting of two 
adults and two children (Finkenauer et al., 2004), nurse-patient relationships (Ashmore and 
Banks, 2001), and the willingness of women with bulimic symptoms to talk about their 
eating habits (Evans and Wertheim, 2002). 
We place such self-disclosure measurement scales into our marketing channel context 
in order to measure the Shared Market Information Content. The sharing of market 
information by a retailer and by a supplier respectively with their counterpart are both 
behavioral constructs that comprise the quantity and variety of market insights passed on 
by one channel member to the other. Asking retail buyers directly about their market 
information sharing behavior and that of their suppliers can be rather difficult, because 
“market information sharing” might have different connotations among the different retail 
buyers. Rossiter (2002) names the example of asking consumers about their liking of 
CARBONATED SOFT DRINKS. Consumers are rather unfamiliar with the term and are 
likely to used different reference frames. It is then advisable to identify the main types of 
carbonated soft drinks, like COLAS, NON-COLAS, and CARBONATED MINERAL 
WATERS. In this way, Shared Market Information Content is comparable to 
CARBONATED SOFT DRINKS, because it has all the features of an abstract collective 
object (cf. Rossiter, 2002), which is a composition of objects heterogeneous in the eyes of 
the raters (i.c., retail buyers), but forms a set at a higher categorical level in the eyes of the 
researchers. As suggested by Rossiter (2002) we followed procedures to identify main 
types of market information that can be shared, such as sales figures, inventory levels, 
strategy reports, consumer research – making a list of information to be shared as complete 
as possible to cover all of the “Windows of information sharing opportunities” presented in 
Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.2). In pre-study interviews, twenty-one buyers and retail industry 
experts were asked to give their definition of information-sharing and to precisely name 
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the market information content that a retailer (can) share/s with its suppliers, and vice 
versa. These interviews generate a pool of market information items to be shared. 
Subsequently, each of these measurement items was then pre-tested in two distinct phases: 
(1) face-to-face interviews with two academic experts, and (2) a pilot survey of nine 
possible survey participants, i.c., retail-buyers. At each stage, participants were asked to 
identify items that were confusing, tasks that were difficult to perform, and any other 
problems they encountered. Items that were identified as being problematic were revised or 
eliminated, and new items were developed. Finally, we came up with a list of 36 items for 
measuring Shared Market Information Content by the retailer with the supplier. For the 
Shared Market Information Content by the supplier with the retailer, a comprehensive list 
of 33 items was produced. For both lists of information items, the scale consisted of the 
degree to which this information was passed on, by means of a 7-point-scale ranging from 
“no insight given” (=1) to “full insight given” (=7).  
After rating the extent to which these types of information are shared by retailer and 
supplier respectively, these ratings can be aggregated by the researcher, because they 
constitute the two measures of information sharing behaviors. These sets of formative 
indicators (see Jarvis, et al., 2003) can be computed into two index-scales (Rossiter, 2002). 
Thus we would like to emphasize that the indicators will not reflect but determine the 
degree to which a channel partner provides insight into its marketing operations and 
market position (a formative scale).  
We could simply make an index constituted from all of the items. However, judging 
from the descriptive data in Table 5.1, it was clear that some market information was 
passed on more frequently than others. We began to make classifications of all the items 
into more homogeneous groups; primarily based on their information domain, and to some 
extent to the observed frequency. On the retailer’s side, the measurement scale of Shared 
Market Information Content by the retailer with the supplier was compressed into four 
categories: (1) sales information, (2) logistical information, (3) category strategy 
information, and (4) competitive and customer intelligence.  
Equally on the supplier’s side, it appeared that the measurement scale of Shared 
Market Information Content by the supplier with the retailer could best be packed together 
in four categories: (1) promotional communication, (2) logistical information, (3) 
consumer market intelligence, and (4) business process intelligence.  
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Table 5.2 Hierarchical Structure in Market Information Sharing 
 
Content shared by Retailer 
 
Degree 
 
Content shared by Supplier 
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Certain categories of information are more confidential than others. Some categories of 
information require more sophisticated information processing skills from the channel 
member then others. Regardless of the actual motive, it can well be imagined that some 
market information content is passed on more difficult than other categories of market 
insight. It would, therefore, be interesting to see whether a special hierarchy in the conduct 
of information sharing exists. Table 5.2 summarizes our assumed hierarchy, in which we 
expect that if higher-level information category is shared, then it would be very likely that 
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lower-level information category is shared as well. We ranked the market insight passed on 
by the retailer into four hierarchical levels: sales information, logistic information, category 
strategy information, and customer and competitive intelligence. So, the retailer begins with 
sharing sales information, before disclosing logistical information and category strategy 
information, etc. On the other side, the supplier is expected to start with promotional 
communication prior to giving insight into logistical, consumer market intelligence and 
business process intelligence. Assuming a hierarchical order in the shared content, our 
measurements can be thought of a sort of Guttman Scale.    
In order to test the hierarchical structure in information sharing behaviors, we needed to 
check whether the probability of sharing a higher-level information category depends on the 
sharing of a lower-level information category. This can be done by checking whether the 
hierarchical structure in our measurements meet the requirements of scalability (Mokken’s 
criteria tested with Loevinger’s H-ratio). In order to test the assumed hierarchical structure 
we needed to reduce the number of responses of the original scale from 7 scale points into a 
dichotomy of responses: “no sharing” (=0; original scale points 1-3), and “sharing” (=1; 
original scale points 4-7). 
For each channel member’s four categories, we applied the majority rule as the criterion 
that should be met in order to score positively for sharing that market information category 
(item). For instance, sales information was considered to be shared by the retailer, when at 
least five out of our nine measurements. We consider logistical information to be shared, 
when at least 4 out of our 6 logistic information measurements are exchanged. 
For the retailer, the first layer concerns sales information. Exchanging this basic type of 
information tells the supplier about the general retail sales performance of its own products. 
It discloses general market expectations, sales targets and broad strategic directions. Also it 
sheds light on the effectiveness of the supplier’s in-store marketing efforts. At the top of 
Table 5.1, it shows for instance that 136 (78.2%) retailers share sales figures about the 
supplier’s own products. Hundred and fifty-three retailers report to communicates their 
overall store concept/formula to the supplier (87.9%). If we apply our majority rule (i.c., 5 
out of 9 information types is being shared), then we find that retailers disclose sales 
information in 136 (78.2%) supplier relationships in our sample (see the bottom of the 
table).  
The second and next higher level is logistical information. This type of information 
gives suppliers further details about the dynamics of the product flow and thereby enhances 
channel transparency by detailing inventory policy, stock levels, and out-of-stock (OOS) 
problems. More importantly, sharing this information explains in more detail the supplier’s 
contribution to the immediate future sales period by signaling the entire promotion calendar 
for the coming period. In our sample, 96 supplier relationships exchange retail logistical 
information, because they share at least 4 out of our 6 logistical information types. 
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The third level, category strategy, implies signaling even more classified market 
information to the supplier. This set of information is about the strategy for the product 
group, sales targets, the assortment composition, sales promotion effectiveness and out-of-
stock-problems for the whole product category. Passing on this information occurs when the 
retailer involves the supplier in Category Management practices. Practitioners in the food 
industry speak, in such a case, of giving "customer insight" to suppliers (AC Nielsen, 2002). 
Giving out these details is not without risk; buyers attach value to keeping this information 
confidential, because exposing it may weaken their bargaining position. Information 
exchange occurs in 88 channel relationships in our sample (50.6%), because 5 out of our 8 
category strategy measurements are shared. 
When a retailers also discloses competitive and customer intelligence, this can be seen 
as the absolute stage of openly sharing market information with supplier. Think of 
explaining the customer profiles visiting and buying at the retailer's stores, geographic 
distribution of product sales. It also implies giving competitive benchmarks of performance 
by telling the performance of competing products in the retailer's assortment. In 24.1 percent 
of channel relationships in our sample, suppliers receive details about their competition and 
retailer’s customers. At least 7 out of our 13 measurements needed to be affirmed in order to 
score positively on this type of information. 
In order to test the scalability of our hierarchical scale we calculated the Loevinger-H-
values (cf. Mokken, 1971) from the Mokken's scalability tests. Table 5.3 shows the cross-
tables of pairs of items. The first box confronts the two observations of sharing sales 
information (level 1) with sharing logistical information (level 2). The item assumed to be 
higher in the hierarchy (i.c., information less easily shared) is stated in the columns (i.c., 
logistical information). The lower one, sales information, is in the rows. If an hierarchy 
between these pairs of market information categories would exist then it would be unlikely 
that a retailer shares logistical information, but does not share sales information: the upper-
right cell of the first cross-tab. In our sample, there are 4 observations in which that is the 
case; so-called Guttman errors. On the other hand, there are 44 cases when sales information 
is shared, but logistic information is not shared. This shows that sharing logistic information 
is the “more difficult” item here. 
When comparing this score to the probability of having no hierarchical order between 
the pair of items, four is significantly low. The appropriate test-variable is the Loevinger H 
per pair of items. All Hi-values are above the critical value of .30. The scale coefficient H 
amounts to .64 and ∆* = 15.59 (delta-star is drawn from a normal distribution and with H-
value would be true, than delta-star is zero; here delta-star is significantly larger than zero). 
Together, these findings provide evidence that the hierarchical scale can be qualified as 
"strong" (cf. Mokken, 1971).  
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The hierarchical levels in the shared market information content by retailer (n=141) and 
the number of information items shared are correlated at 0.93 (p<0.01).  
 
Table  5.3 Scalability of Shared Information by Retailer with Supplier (response 
patterns) 
      
  Logistical information (level 2)     
  no yes  Guttman 
errors 
Hi-
score 
no 34 4 38 4 0.81 Sales information 
(level 1) yes 44 92 136   
  78 96 174   
      
  Category Strategy (level 3)    
  No Yes    
Sales information   No 37 1 38 1 0.95 
(level 1) yes 49 87 136   
  86 88 174   
 
 
 
  
Customer and Competitive intelligence  
(level 4) 
   
  No yes    
no 35 3 38 3 0.67 Sales information  
(level 1) yes 97 39 136   
  132 42 174   
      
  Category Strategy (level 3)    
  no yes    
no 53 25 78 25 0.37 Logistical 
information (level 2) yes 33 63 96   
  86 88 174   
      
  Customer and Competitive intelligence  
(level 4) 
   
  No yes    
no 67 11 78 11 0.42 Logistical 
information (level 2) yes 65 31 96   
  132 42 174   
      
  Customer and Competitive intelligence  
(level 4) 
   
  No yes    
no 82 4 86 4 0.81 Category Strategy  
(level 3) yes 50 38 88   
  132 42 174   
 
 1: Sales 2: Logistical 3: Category 
Strategy 
4: Intelligence 
1: Sales -    
2: Logistical 0.81 -   
3: Category Strategy 0.95 0.37 -  
4: Intelligence 0.67 0.42 0.81 - 
H retailer Æ supplier = 0.63 
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We deal with an observation error (a Guttman error) in the cases that cannot be classified 
according to the hierarchical structure of Shared Content in the following way: re-classifying 
them would be difficult because we do not know with certainty at which level the 
observation error occurs: at the maximum level, at the one-but-last level, or any other level. 
We choose to perform the data analyses with only the cases in which the Shared Content can 
be classified. For the Retailer’s Shared Content, all of our later analyses will therefore 
include the classifiable 141 cases. 
In a similar vein, we ranked the content of shared market information by the supplier 
with the retailer, from low to high: promotional communication, logistical information, 
consumer market intelligence, and business process intelligence. The first and elementary 
level is the promotional communication. The supplier announces to the retailer how its 
products will be promoted in the intermediate future. This principal trade marketing 
information discloses plans for advertising, instore-promotions, and consumer sales 
promotions; it also includes announcing new products, and general information about the 
strategies and market developments. At least 4 out of our 6 measurements needed to be 
affirmed in order to score positively on this type of information; a majority of the suppliers 
(114; 65%) in our sample give promotional information to the retailer (see the right half of 
Table 5.1 for the detailed list of items). 
The second level is the logistical information given to the retailer concerning supply 
lead times, inventory policy, distribution structure and out-of-stock situation for the supplier 
products. More than 3 out of our 6 measurements needed to be affirmed in order to score 
positively on this type of information: less than half of the suppliers is open about the 
logistical status of their products. Only 4 out of 10 suppliers in our sample give out this 
information. 
The subsequent higher levels of Shared Market Information Content are Consumer 
Market Intelligence and Business Process Intelligence. Consumer market intelligence 
clarifies the market situation to the retail buyer. At least 4 out of our 7 measurements for 
consumer market intelligence are needed to be affirmed in order to score positively on this 
type of information. Giving insight into the business processes of the supplier may inform 
retailers about development and/or improvement in it private label program in this product 
category. With respect to business process intelligence, 8 items (out of 14) needed to be 
affirmed.  
We also tested the hierarchical properties of this scale. The right half of Table 5.1 shows 
the descriptive statistics of this hierarchy and Table 5.4 depicts the Loevinger-Hi values for 
the scale, ranging from .30 to .93.  The total H is .54 and the delta-star value is 10.63 can be 
qualified as a "strong" scale (cf. Mokken, 1971). The hierarchical levels in the shared market 
information content by supplier (only levels 0 until 4; n=121) and the number of information 
items shared are positively correlated at r= .95 (p<.01). 
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Similar to the previous scale for Retailer’s Shared Content, the cases that cannot be 
classified according to the hierarchical structure will be excluded from our further data 
analysis. Concerning the Supplier’s Shared Content, we thereby perform our analysis on the 
set of 121 cases. 
 
Table  5.4 Scalability of Shared Information by Supplier with Retailer (response 
patterns) 
      
  Logistical information (level 2)     
  
no yes 
 Guttman 
errors 
Hi-
score 
no 46 13 59 14 .47 Promotional comm. 
(level 1) yes 55 59 114   
  101 72 173   
      
  Consumer Market information (level 3)    
  No Yes    
Promotional comm. No 50 9 59 9 .71 
(level 1) yes 31 83 114   
  81 92 173   
      
  Business Process intelligence (level 4)    
  No yes    
no 56 3 59 3 .69 Promotional comm. 
(level 1) yes 89 25 114   
  145 28 173   
      
  Consumer Market information (level 3)    
  no yes    
no 64 38 102 38 .30 Logistical information  
(level 2) yes 18 54 72   
  82 92 174   
      
  Customer and Competitive intelligence 
(level 4) 
   
  No Yes    
no 97 5 102 5 .70 Logistical information 
(level 2) yes 49 23 72   
  146 28 174   
      
  Customer and Competitive intelligence 
(level 4) 
   
  No yes    
no 81 1 82 1 .90 Consumer market 
information (level 3) yes 65 27 92   
  146 28 174   
 
 1: Promotional 2: Logistical 3: Consumer 
Market 
4: Business 
Process 
1: Promotional -    
2: Logistical .47 -   
3: Consumer Market .71 .30 -  
4: Business Process .69 .70 .92 - 
H supplier Æ retailer = .54     
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 5.3 Measurements of the Sharing Mode 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, a certain collaborative style in channel communications between 
two firms is characterized by a certain degree of formalization, exclusivity, frequent contact 
between organizations, and by involvement from people with positions at different 
management layers. Because empirical studies thus far have primarily captured the mode 
whereby market information is shared, we use established scales for each of these different 
aspects. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 list the measurement items used. The first mode-characteristic of 
market information sharing we investigate, is formalization of information sharing in the 
relationship. In contrast to previously mentioned contract formalization, this type of 
formalization relates specifically to the way the market information sharing is formalized in 
detailed arrangements, in routines and clear division of tasks. We adapt three items from 
Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) to measure this level of formalization (α = 0.85).  
 
Table 5.5 Measurements Multi-item Scale Sharing Mode Constructs 
Construct mean s.d min max α n 
Information Sharing Formalization 2.42 1.46 1.00 7.00 0.85 174 
Exclusivity Shared Market Information        
Given by Retailer 2.36 1.40 1.00 7.00 0.68 173 
Given by Supplier 1.88 1.21 1.00 6.50 0.74 173 
 
Formalization of Market Information Sharing 
(3 items, α = 0.85; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 
1999) 
 Exclusivity Shared Market Information from Retailer 
(2 items, α = 0.68; borrowed from Anderson and Weitz, 
1992) 
 
Our firm and this supplier… 
1. … have detailed agreements with each other 
about which market information we share. 
2. … have a clear division of tasks with regard 
to using the shared market information. 
3. … have clear arrangements about the 
information routines (standards, formats, etc.) 
for each of the involved parties. 
  
Our firm… 
1. … only gives market information to this supplier. 
2. … refrains from giving other suppliers of this product 
category the same amount of market information. 
3. … seldom gives the same amount of market 
information to only one supplier. (R)* 
4. … deals with many suppliers in this product category; 
we do not give the same market information to this 
supplier on an exclusive basis. (R)* 
 
  Exclusivity Shared Market Information from Supplier 
(2 items, α = 0.74; borrowed from Anderson and Weitz, 
1992) 
   
This supplier … 
1. … exclusively gives us this market information. 
2. … refrains from giving the same amount of market 
information to our competitors (other retailers). 
3. … seldom gives one retailer the same amount of market 
information on an exclusive basis. (R)* 
4. … deals with many retailers; all do not exclusively 
receive the same amount of market information. (R)* 
 
* item deleted from scale 
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Exclusivity is second sharing mode variable, and refers the extent to which a channel 
member shares the shared content on an exclusive basis. We borrow measures from 
Anderson and Weitz (1992) for both retailer and supplier exclusivity. For each, retailer and 
supplier, we measure the exclusivity of content shared with channel member by 4 items. In 
the scale purification, two items were deleted from analyses due to low loadings. The 
remaining two items obtain an alpha’s of 0.68 and 0.74 respectively. Some indication for the 
validity of these measurements is provided by our check question about the number of 
channel parties receiving at least an equal amount of market information. We found a 
significant negative correlation between the exclusivity measures and the number of parties, 
r= -0.25 (p<0.01) and r= -0.27 (p<0.01) for retailer exclusivity and supplier exclusivity 
respectively. This gives us support for the validity of our measurements. 
 
Table 5.6 Contact Frequency and Level of Retailer-Supplier interaction 
  
Contact Frequency * 
 
Absolute frequency numbers and percentages are between 
brackets. 
* 1 = never takes place; 2 = less than a year; 3 = once or twice a 
year; 4 = once or twice every quarter; 5 = once or twice a 
month; 6 = once or twice a week; 7 = daily or more often. 
 
Contact Level 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 
(s.d) 
Retail company’s contact frequency 
with:  
        
         
Sales personnel of the supplier (1) 7 
(4.0) 
2 
(1.1) 
7 
(4.0) 
38 
(21.8) 
49 
(28.2) 
53 
(30.5) 
18 
(10.3) 
5.02 
(1.34) 
Higher management of the 
supplier (with Marketing Strategy 
responsibility) (2) 
7 
(4.0) 
11 
(6.3) 
53 
(30.5) 
43 
(24.7) 
36 
(20.7) 
20 
(11.5) 
4 
(2.3) 
3.95 
(1.34) 
         
Sales personnel or higher –level 
management of the supplier 
(maximum of (1) and (2)) 
0 
(0.0) 
1 
(0.6) 
5 
(2.8) 
38 
(21.8) 
52 
(29.9) 
57 
(32.8) 
21 
(12.1) 
5.28 
(1.06) 
         
Supplier company’s contact 
frequency with:  
        
         
Buying staff of the retailer (3) 3 
(1.7) 
2 
(1.1) 
3 
(1.7) 
26 
(14.9) 
57 
(32.8) 
63 
(36.2) 
20 
(11.5) 
5.30 
(1.16) 
Higher management of the retailer 
(with Marketing Strategy 
responsibility) (4) 
13 
(7.5) 
28 
(16.1) 
51 
(29.3) 
44 
(25.3) 
25 
(14.4) 
10 
(5.7) 
3 
(1.7) 
3.47 
(1.37) 
         
buying personnel or higher-level 
management of the retailer 
(maximum of (3) and (4)) 
2 
(1.1) 
1 
(0.6) 
4 
(2.3) 
25 
(14.4) 
58 
(33.3) 
64 
(36.8) 
20 
(11.5) 
5.34 
(1.09) 
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Frequency (or quantity) of contacts between buyer and seller is measured by how often 
channel members have contact (cf. Mohr, et al., 1996). We make a distinction in the various 
contact frequencies of retailer and supplier with the different organizational levels of their 
channel partner. Table 5.6 shows, for example, that 53 retail organizations (30.5%) have 
once or twice a week contact with the supplier’s sales personnel. In 20 cases (11.5%), the 
retailer has once or twice a week contact with the supplier’s higher-level management with 
marketing strategy responsibility. Looking at the other side of the channel’s dyad, 63 
supplier organizations talk to the retailer buyers at a weekly basis; while only 10 suppliers 
speak to higher-level retail managers with marketing in the same frequency. In assessing an 
overall score for the contact frequency of the retailer with the supplier we take the maximum 
score of either the contact frequency with sales personnel or the contact frequency with 
higher management. Suppose, if the frequency of the retail company with sales personnel 
from the supplier is once a month (score = 5), and the retailer has contact with the marketing 
manager every week (score = 6), then the contact frequency of the retail organization with 
the supplier as a whole is assessed as “every week”, score 6. In the same way, we compute 
the (overall) contact frequency of the supplier with the retailer.  
Contact Frequency with Higher-level Management is the sharing mode variable 
indicating the involvement of higher-management in the sharing of market information. We 
measure this involvement by one item: the contact frequency of higher-level management 
with marketing responsibility. If a comparison is made for the involvement of higher-level 
management for both retailer and supplier, then we do not observe a large difference: most 
of the time the contact is once or twice a year. 
Table 5.7 exhibits the correlations among the sharing mode variables. The off-diagonal 
correlation score have a wide range from .08 to .84. The degree of information sharing 
formalization is positively associated with the exclusivity given by both channel members. 
Higher degrees of formalization also coincides with a higher contact frequency by both 
parties; but especially induced by involvement of higher-level management from the retailer 
(r= .25; p< .01). Yet, exclusivity of shared information content from the retailer is strongly 
connected with the more frequent involvement of supplier’s higher-level management (r= 
.26; p< .01). 
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Table 5.7 Correlation Matrix: Sharing Mode Constructs 
 Correlation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Information Sharing Mode   
   
Formalization   
1: Formalization Information Sharing 1.00   
   
Exclusivity of Shared Content   
2: Given by Retailer .16* 1.00   
3: Given by Supplier .29** .46** 1.00   
   
Contact Frequency   
4: by retailer .18* .11 .15* 1.00   
5: by supplier .18* .08 .08 .84** 1.00   
   
Contact Frequency with  
higher-level management 
  
6: from retailer .25** .15 .22** .50** .43** 1.00  
7: from supplier .12 .26** .24 .35** .40** .39**   1.00 
   
Note: * |r| ≥ .15 are significant at p<.05 for n=172; ** |r| ≥ .21 are significant at p<.01 for n=172 
 
Because it is not possible to perform a confirmatory factor analysis to validate the two 
formative shared content measures (see Jarvis, et al., 2003), we would like to see whether, 
these new measures of the degrees in shared content positively correspond with the 
collaborative style in the sharing mode and the perceptions of quality. In Table 5.8, we relate 
both dimensions of market information sharing practices (by the supplier) to the retailer’s 
quality perceptions. We based our measurement of the retailer’s quality perceptions of the 
market information on the dimensions posited by Menon and Varadarajan (1992). Retailers 
were asked to rate the quality of market information received from suppliers by 14 quality 
indicators. Results in Table 5.8 show that above all the degree of shared content by the 
supplier is strongly correlated with almost every quality aspect (minimum r = .36). The 
sharing mode aspects however are not as good indications for quality as Shared Content is. 
The sharing mode aspect having the strongest positive relationship with quality perceptions 
is the formalization of market information sharing (correlations with 11 of the 14 quality 
indicators). To a lesser extent, the exclusivity given by suppliers has significant associations 
with the retailer’s perception of quality. Contact frequency and contact frequency with 
higher management come out as almost unrelated to the retailer’s quality perceptions. 
Interestingly, contact frequency is the single sharing mode aspect that is associated with the 
perceptions of better accuracy. Perhaps, higher contact frequency does not only make the 
given information more verifiable but also puts pressure on the supplier to give the correct 
market information.  
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Table 5.8 Summary Statistics Retailer’s Perceptions of Quality of Market Information 
and Correlations with Supplier’s Information Sharing 
Retailer’s Perceived Quality of 
Supplier’s Market Information 
   
Supplier’s sharing mode 
 mean (s.d.) 
Supplier’s 
degree of 
shared 
content  
Formalization
(agreed with 
supplier) 
Exclusivity 
given by 
supplier 
Contact 
Frequency 
Contact 
Frequency 
with Higher 
Management 
        
Sufficient(ly)…        
Important 3.49  (1.76)  .49**  .19* .14 .18  -.01  
Timely 2.67  (1.77)  .36**  .27** .18 .07  .09  
Accurate 4.41  (1.63)  .41**  .02 .01 .21*  -.05  
Amount 4.67  (1.65)  .47**  .21* .12 -.02  -.06  
Reliable 4.67  (1.54)  .46**  .25** .12 .10  -.12  
Useful 3.83  (1.88)  .46**  .40** .28** .06  -.00  
Relevant 2.93  (1.73)  .44**  .17 .32** .14  .04  
Valuable 2.86  (1.83)  .51**  .30** .29** .01  .02  
Consistent 2.91  (1.81)  .50**  .21* .26** .02  -.00  
Objective 2.60  (1.67)  .40**  .30** .41** .04  -.01  
Verifiable 2.62  (1.75)  .36**  .32** .29** -.03  -.05  
Unique 2.91  (1.94)  .44**  .31** .43** -.00  .04  
Practical 3.62  (1.87)  .44**  .07 .19* .10  .09  
         
         
* p<  .05; ** p< .01; n= 117 (listwise) 
 
Our conclusion is that the strong positive relationship between the supplier’s degree of 
shared content and quality perceptions gives us a certain assurance of the measurements 
(nomological) validity. Another important conclusion that we wish to draw, is the following. 
In Chapter 2, some studies in the supply chain optimization and game theoretical tradition 
have researched the shared content and its quality as two separate dimensions. In our 
empirical data however these two aspects are very strongly related.  
 
 
5.4 Degrees of Shared Content and Sharing Mode: Descriptive Analyses 
To answer the first research question of what channel firms actually share, we will present 
the following descriptive analyses in the subsequent three paragraphs: the degree of shared 
content (5.4.1), the sharing mode (5.4.2) and the relationship between the degrees of shared 
content and the sharing mode (5.4.3). The fourth paragraph (5.4.4) reports an initial 
inspection of the differences in market information sharing practices among various channel 
contexts, and it serves as a stepping stone to testing our hypotheses on the antecedents of 
market information sharing in the Chapter hereafter. 
 
 
 
 134
Table 5.9 The Degrees in Shared Content by Retailers and Suppliers 
     
Degree 
 
Content shared by Retailer Frequency 
 (%) 
Content shared by Supplier Frequency 
(%) 
   
No 
Sharing 
(0) 
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Total 
  
   141 
(100)   
   122 
(100)   
 
5.4.1 Degrees of Shared Market Information Content 
Table 5.9 shows to what degree retailers and suppliers in our sample share market 
information. As can be concluded from the Table, the 22.0% of the retailers and 36.1% of 
suppliers do not share any market information with their respective upstream or downstream 
channel partner. Consequently, a considerable number of retailers (78%) and supplier (64%) 
do pass on market information to their channel partners, albeit in varying degrees.  
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As for retailers, 14.2% of the 141 retailers only share basic sales information with their 
suppliers. Information about logistical matters is added by 19.1% of the retailers in 
communication with their suppliers. 20.6% of the retailers do not only share their sales and 
logistical information, but also shares details of the category strategy they follow. 24.1% of 
the retailers complete the market information sharing with suppliers with competitive and 
customer intelligence.  
Regarding the suppliers, 16.4% of them restrict the exchange to promotional 
communication. Another 8.2 percent add supplementary logistical information. 23.8% of the 
suppliers also elaborate on their consumer market intelligence; and one group of 15.6% 
provides their retailer with even more insight: they pass on intelligence about their own 
business processes as well. 
At this first glance, it seems that retailers share more content than suppliers do. 
However, when we compare the degree of shared content of both retailer and supplier with 
each other, then we notice that retailers increasingly share higher degrees of their market 
information content with their counterpart; the smallest group of them (14.1%) remains at 
the lowest level, while the largest group (24.1%) shares their market information at the 
highest possible level. Instead, suppliers have a tendency to restrict their shared content to 
the one but highest level (23.6%). The group of suppliers sharing the highest possible level 
of content is smaller (15.6%).  
When we confront the individual sharing behaviors of both retailer and supplier with 
each other in Table 5.10 we get an even better idea of the extent to which the market 
information sharing takes place in a symmetrical way. Retailer-supplier relationships are the 
unit-of-analysis in this Table. The table shows the degree of shared content in the 99 channel 
relationships (in which both shared contents from retailer as well as from supplier are 
corresponding with the tested hierarchical rankings), and that, for instance, sharing of market 
information does not take place on either side in 17 out of 99 of the retailer-supplier 
relationships. In 11 channel relationships, however, the degrees in market information 
sharing are the highest as well from the supplier’s side as from the retailer’s. In three 
channel relationships (encircled in the below stated table), suppliers only share promotional 
communication with their retailers, while retailers do not share any market information. 
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Table 5.10 The Association between the Degrees of Shared Content of the Channel 
Members 
 
 
Supplier’s Degree in  
Shared Content *   
             
 0 1 2 3 4        
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 17 3 2 2 1 25  No sharing 
0 
 4 3 2 2 1 12 S    
1 
 4 6  4 1 15 S L   
2 
 7 5 1 7 3 23 S L CS  
3 
 2 1 3 7 11 24 S L CS C&CI 
4 
Retailer’s 
D
egree in 
Shared C
ontent ** 
             
 34 18 8 22 17 99 Total     
 
             
 
 * Supplier’s Shared Content Levels:  
PC = Promotional communication; L = Logistical information; CMI = Consumer Market Intelligence; BPI = 
Business process intelligence 
 
** Retailer’s Shared Content Levels: 
S = Sales information; L = Logistical information; CS = Category Strategy Information; C&CI = Customer & 
Competitive Intelligence 
 
 
The correlation between the Retailer’s degree of Shared Content and the Supplier’s degree is 
r=.55 (n=99; p<.01). So, although the two degrees of shared content are associated, the 
correlation is not perfect; that means that there are relationships in which retailer and 
supplier share different degrees of content. The 38 (17+3+7+11) cases positioned at the 
diagonal of the matrix can be considered to be examples of retailer-supplier relationships in 
which the exchange of market information occurs at a same degree in both directions. In the 
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off-diagonal cases, the sharing of market information is not mutually high to the same 
degree. In these other 61 cases, sharing market information is regarded as being 
asymmetrical. As for the 40 channel relationships below the diagonal, the retailer discloses 
relatively more of its market position than its counterpart does. Above the diagonal, there are 
21 channel relationships in which the supplier shares more information content than the 
retailer does.  
 
5.4.2 Sharing Mode 
The sharing of market information may take place in different styles; therefore we also study 
the Sharing Mode. The aspects of sharing mode considered here are: overall contact 
frequency, contact frequency of higher management (with marketing responsibility), 
exclusivity, and formalization. 
 
Table 5.11 Summary Statistics of Sharing Mode and Correlations with Degrees of 
Shared Content  
   
Shared Content 
   Retailer's degree of 
Shared Content 
(n = 141) 
Supplier's degree of 
Shared Content 
(n = 122) 
Sharing Mode mean (s.d). Corr. Corr. 
    
Contact Frequency (overall)1    
1: by retailer 5.28 (1.06) .12 .06 
2: by supplier 5.34 (1.09) .19* .13 
    
Contact Frequency of 
Higher-Level Management1 
   
3: from retailer 3.97 (1.31) .23** .18* 
4: from supplier 3.44 (1.39) .19* .13 
    
Exclusivity of Shared Content2    
5: Given by Retailer 1.88 (1.21) .10 .18* 
6: Given by Supplier 2.36 (1.40) .27** .39** 
    
Formalization2    
7: Information Sharing 2.42 (1.46) .28** .40** 
    
   
1 the frequency scales range from 1 to 7. 1 = never takes place; 2 = less than a year; 3 = once or twice a year; 4 = 
once or twice every quarter; 5 = once or twice a month; 6 = once or twice a week; 7 = daily or more often. 
2 a 7-point scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. 
Note: * |r| ≥ 0.18 are significant at p<.05 for n=122; ** |r| ≥ 0.23 are significant at p<.01 for n=122 
 
The middle part of Table 5.11 depicts how market information sharing between retailer and 
supplier takes place in our sample. The first aspect of the sharing mode is the contact 
frequency. The retailers have a contact frequency rate with the supplier’s organization 
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(overall) of 5.28 on average. This mean score is closer to “once or twice a month” (a score 
of 5) than to “once or twice a week” (a score of 6; see Table 5.6). Logically, suppliers have 
similar overall frequency contact rate with the retailer organization (either with the buying 
staff or higher management levels): the mean score is 5.34; implying that the contact of the 
supplier with the retailer organization is a bit more frequent than on a “once or twice a 
month” basis (a score of 5).  
The second aspect of sharing mode is the contact frequency with higher management 
from the retailer or the supplier with the other channel member’s organization. As for both 
retailers and suppliers, the contact of their higher management with the channel partner is 
less frequent than the overall contact frequency rate, which is logical, because the contact 
frequency with higher management is a subset from the overall contact frequency. The mean 
score for the contact frequency of higher management from the retailer with the supplier 
organization is 2.97; which indicates a contact frequency close to “once or twice every 
quarter” (nearly 3). As for the counterpart, the contact frequency of higher management 
from the supplier is slightly lower. The mean score is 2.44; indicating an average contact 
rate between “once or twice a year” (a score of 2) and “once or twice a quarter” (a score of 
3). The slight difference is not significant (t= -1.51; p=.13). 
The third aspect of sharing mode is the degree in which the shared market information 
content is kept exclusive. In our sample, the overall degree of exclusivity is low (ranging 
from 1.88 for the retailer to 2.36 for the supplier on a 7-points scale); this implies that parties 
tend to share the same degree of market information content with multiple other channel 
members. Retailers give less exclusivity (1.88) than suppliers do (2.36). This difference is 
significant (t= 4.52; p<.01). The lower exclusivity given by retailers demonstrates their 
hesitation to link up their business with one specific supplier. Retailers, in general, prefer to 
remain independent of any supplier and would like to preserve the liberty of switching 
supplying sources. 
The fourth and final aspect of sharing mode is the extent of formalization of the sharing 
of market information. Formalization of the market information process measures the degree 
in which the channel parties have made detailed and explicit agreements about the exchange 
(i.c. about which market information to share, about a clear division of tasks of using the 
exchanged market information and about routines to manage the information). We find that 
channel partners hardly specify any of such arrangements (mean score is 2.42 on a 7-points 
scale). We find formalization of information-sharing low, not only because of its absolute 
low mean score of 2.42 on a 7-points scale, but also compared to the (more general) level of 
contract formalization which we also measured (as an antecedent). In Chapter 6 we will 
report that the contract formalization (see Table 6.3) – the degree in which the relationship is 
detailed and specified and whether the contract is specifically written and formal – has an 
average of 3.23. When we perform a paired t-test on both formalization measures, then it 
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shows that contract formalization is significantly higher than formalization of information-
sharing (t = 7.48; p < .01). Also previous marketing channel studies show a much higher 
level of contract formalization (Mohr and Sohi, 1994; Mohr et al., 1996). It is surprising to 
us that only very few channel members explicitly formalize which market information they 
exchange and about the subsequent management of that information. 
So, summarizing the way in which market information is exchanged, we draw the 
following conclusions: sharing takes place at relatively high contact frequency between 
retailer and supplier, with occasional contact at higher management levels, with little 
exclusivity from either side, and with a rather low level of formalization.  
 
5.4.3 Degrees of Shared Content in relation with Sharing Mode 
One of our propositions (P2 in Chapter 3) is that higher degrees of shared content are 
embedded in channel communications which are more collaborative. It would be interesting 
to see whether the Degrees of Shared Content are related to the Sharing Modes. We expect 
that higher degrees of shared market information content go hand-in-hand with more 
frequent contact between channel parties, and in a more exclusive arrangement. If parties 
would share higher degrees of market information content, would they rather engage in 
stricter agreements and formalize their sharing of market information?  
The right-hand part of Table 5.11 reveals that the correlations between the degrees of 
shared content and aspects of the sharing mode are all positive. A number of them are 
significant. The retailer’s degree of shared content is higher when the supplier has more 
contacts with the retailer. (r= .19; p= .05). Higher degrees of market information are shared 
by the retailer, when higher management has more frequent contact: from level supplier 
management (r = .19; p= .05), and from higher retail managers themselves (r = .23; p< .05). 
Exclusivity of shared supplier’s market information goes together with higher degrees of 
shared content (r = .27; p< .01). The strongest correlation is retailer’s shared content with the 
degree of formalization. Higher degrees of formalization are associated with higher levels of 
shared content by the retailer (r = .28; p< .01). Interestingly, no significant correlation is 
found between retailer’s shared content with the overall contact frequency of the retailer (r = 
.12) and the exclusivity given by the retailer (r = .10).  
The correlation between supplier’s degree of shared content and sharing mode show a 
similar pattern. All correlation values are positive and four of them are significant. The 
contact frequency of higher management from the retail-side seems to strongly endorse the 
sharing of more content by suppliers (r = .18; p<.05). Furthermore, giving exclusivity in a 
mutual way, as well by the retailer (r = .18; p<.05) as by the supplier (r = .39; p<.05) goes 
hand-in-hand with higher degrees of shared content by the supplier. Especially, the degree of 
formalization of information sharing is connected with more supplier’s shared content 
(r=.40; p<.01).  
 140
We have noted above that exclusivity and formalization are fairly low. However, we 
now see that a clear association between these sharing mode aspects and the degrees of 
shared content is present. As information sharing progresses to higher degrees, then more 
exclusivity and formalization also exists. So, if retailers and suppliers share more content to 
a higher degree, agreements about information-sharing between channel members are more 
formalized, more exclusive, and higher-management from the retailer company is more 
engaged in the market information sharing process.  
 
5.4.4 Differences in Shared Content among Channel Contexts 
It is often stated that the level of channel collaboration and the degree of shared content 
varies among the different channel contexts, as characterized by industry, retail firm type, 
retail firm size, and supplier type (Coughlan, et al., 2001). Table 5.12 reports the variety in 
market information sharing broken down according to these context variables.  
Although the samples per industry are small, our observations tend to confirm the 
commonly held observation that retailer-supplier relationships in the food industry are 
relatively more progressive concerning the sharing of market information: 42% of the 
retailers (the mean score of the degree of shared content is 2.75) and 44% of the suppliers 
(the mean score of the degree of shared content is 3.11) are sharing to the fourth and 
maximum degree of shared content. These percentages are higher than the ones in the other 
five industries. Considering the significance of the differences, suppliers in the food industry 
are significantly more open to their retailers than their colleagues in other industries (F 
(5,116)= 2.54; p = 0.03; post-hoc analysis show that t-values of paired comparisons are only 
significant for the food industry compared with each of the other industries). The food 
industry is often named as the front-runner in exploring new ways to collaborate in channels 
and to apply advanced information technology facilitating the sharing of market information 
between retailer and supplier (evidence for being a front-runner is the participation of merely 
food companies in the ECR industry platforms). After the food industry, it seems that the 
DIY industry is most active in sharing market information (mean scores are 2.38 and 2.00 
respectively). This observation is in line with the presence of this industry in ECR activities. 
Besides the food industry, DIY is one of the few retail industries being active in (national 
and continental) ECR platforms.  
Examining the differences in sharing behaviors among the different retail firm types 
reveals no significant differences (for retailer’s shared content: F (2,133) = 1.88; p = 0.16; 
for supplier’s shared content: F (2,113) = 1.52; p = 0.22). Yet, we discover a number of 
interesting tendencies; for instance, the store chains are the retail type with tighter 
organizational structures and more control over their market information management, they 
are not relatively more open in their information sharing practices (mean score is 2.06 on a 
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scale from 0 to 4) than the other retail types. A gripping observation is to find that despite 
store chain’s better access to timely market information from their outlets than any other 
more loosely-organized retail organization type, store chain buyers are less open in sharing 
information. Perhaps, store chains behave in a more autonomic and haughtier manner in 
dealing with their suppliers.  
 
Table 5.12 Frequency Statistics of Shared Content broken down by Industry, Firm Type, 
Firm Size 
 
 
Retailer’s Degree of Shared Content * 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 Mean (S.D.) 
Industry   
   
Consumer Electronics 6 (26) 2 (9) 8 (35) 5 (22) 2 (9) 1.78 (1.31) 
Entertainment 1 (6) 2 (12.5) 4 (25) 8 (50) 1 (6) 2.38 (1.02) 
Fashion 18 (28) 10 (15) 9 (14) 13 (20) 15 (23) 1.95 (1.56) 
Food 1 (8) 2 (17) 1 (8) 3 (25) 5 (42) 2.75 (1.42) 
DIY 2 (12.5) 2 (13) 4 (25) 4 (25) 4 (25) 2.38 (1.36) 
Personal Care 3 (33) 2 (22) 1 (11) 1 (11) 1 (11) 1.67 (1.66) 
  
 F(5,135) = 1.12; p = 0.30 
   
Retail Firm Type   
   
Store Chain 14 (18) 13 (16) 20 (25) 20 (25) 13 (16) 2.06 (1.33) 
Franchise Organization 4 (14) 3 (11) 4 (14) 8 (29) 9 (32) 2.54 (1.43) 
Buying Group 10 (36) 3 (11) 3 (11) 6 (21) 6 (21) 1.82 (1.63) 
 F(2,133) = 1.88; p = 0.16 
   
   
Retail Firm Size   
   
5 – 30 outlets 11 (28) 5 (13) 6 (15) 7 (18) 11 (28) 2.05 (1.60) 
31 – 100 outlets 7 (20) 6 (17) 8 (23) 9 (26) 5 (14) 1.97 (1.36) 
>100 outlets 12 (13) 8 (13) 11 (18) 18 (30) 12 (20) 2.16 (1.42) 
 F (2,133) = 0.21; p =0.81 
   
   
Supplier Type       
Brand manufacturer 17 (19) 11 (12) 18 (20) 24 (20) 19 (21) 2.19 (1.41) 
Private Label manufacturer 14 (28) 9 (18) 9 (18) 10 (20) 9 (18) 1.82 (1.48) 
 t = 1.46; p =0.15 
   
Total 31 (22) 20 (14) 27 (19) 34 (24) 29 (20.6) 2.07 (1.45) 
   
  Continued 
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Table 5.12 Continued (Supplier’s Degree of Shared Content) 
 
 
Supplier’s Degree of Shared Content* 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 Mean (S.D) 
Industry       
   
Consumer Electronics 9 (38) 4 (17) 1 (4) 6 (25) 4 (17) 1.67 (1.61) 
Entertainment 8 (57) 2 (14) - 3 (21) 1 (7) 1.07 (1.49) 
Fashion 21 (38) 11 (20) 6 (11) 8 (15) 9 (16) 1.51 (1.53) 
Food - 1 (11) 1 (11) 3 (33) 4 (44) 3.11 (1.05) 
DIY 4 (24) 2 (112) 2 (12) 8 (47) 1 (6) 2.00 (1.37) 
Personal Care 2 (67) - - 1 (33) - 1.00 (1.73) 
 F(5,116) = 2.54; p = .03 
       
       
Retail Firm Type       
   
Store Chain 24 (36) 15 (9) 6 (9) 14 (21) 7 (11) 1.47 (1.44) 
Franchise Organization 7 (33) - 3 (14) 7 (33) 4 (19) 2.04 (1.60) 
Buying Group 10 (35) 4 (14) 1 (3) 7 (24) 7 (24) 1.90 (1.68) 
 F(2,113) = 1.52; p = .22 
       
       
Retail Firm Size       
   
5 – 30 outlets 14 (35) 6 (15) 3(8) 13 (33) 4 (10) 1.68 (1.49) 
31 – 100 outlets 12 (40) 5 (17) 5 (17) 3 (10) 5 (17) 1.47 (1.53) 
>100 outlets 17 (36) 9 (19) 2 (4) 13 (38) 6 (13) 1.71 (1.56) 
 F(2,116) = 0.26; p= .77 
   
       
Supplier Type       
Brand manufacturer 24 (30) 14 (17) 3 (4) 26 (32) 14 (17) 1.90 (1.55) 
Private Label manufacturer 20 (50) 6 (15) 7 (18) 3 (8) 4 (10) 1.13 (1.38) 
 t = 2.69; p < 0.01 
   
Total 44 (36) 20 (16) 10 (8) 29 (24) 19 (16) 1.66  (1.54) 
   
*Note: Tables states frequencies and percentages. Percentages are stated between the parentheses. 
 
The retail type with generally more loosely controlled inflow of market information, the 
franchise organizations, seem more entrepreneurial in their sharing practices. On average, 
they tend to share more market information (mean score is 2.54). A possible explanation 
might be found in their organizational structure that is aimed to cater to their member-
franchisees. That supporting structure accustoms them to share power and responsibilities 
and engage in collaborative practices with suppliers more easily. As a response to their open 
sharing, the suppliers of franchisers share more openly with them.  
The buying groups have a propensity to be more conservative in their sharing (mean 
score is 1.82). One may doubt whether the collaborative act of sharing market information 
can be harmonized with their initial reason to exist: bundling bargaining power to fight for 
better buying conditions in negotiations with suppliers. Retail buyers being brought up in the 
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adversary model of dealing with suppliers really need to make a “mind switch” to start 
sharing their market information with their suppliers.  
Concerning the retail firm size, neither the shared content of suppliers (F (2,116)=0.26 
p=.77) nor the shared content of retailers (F (2,133)=0.21; p=.81) differs significantly 
between small (until 30 outlets), medium (31 to 100 outlets) and large (more than 100 
outlets) retail operations.  
As for the supplier type, retailers do not share significantly higher degrees of market 
information content with brand manufacturers than with their private label producers 
(t=1.46; p=.15). On the other hand, brand manufacturers share much more content than their 
private label competitors (t=2.69; p<.01). Owing to their status as brand owners they might 
have conducted more consumer market research and thus must have an interesting story to 
tell to their retailers. 
To sum up, these rough first analyses find some variations in the degrees of shared 
content that can be related two channel context variables. The first context variable is the 
industry type: suppliers in the food industry significantly share higher degrees content. The 
second context variable is whether the retailer is dealing with a brand manufacturer of a 
private label manufacturer. Brand manufacturers share more content than private label 
producers. In order to understand what is really driving the degree in the retailer’s and 
supplier’s shared content, and sharing mode aspects, we will test our hypotheses with 
multivariate analysis techniques in the next chapter. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has provided details on the nature of market information sharing in channel 
relationships. We have looked beyond the numerous superficial acronyms that some 
information sharing arrangements may carry by measuring what actually is shared in a 
channel relationship, and how the sharing of information takes place. Three major findings 
have been reported. The first major finding stems from our new measure for the shared 
content. We have discovered and empirically assessed that a hierarchical structure in the 
shared content can be found. This hierarchy suggests that the sharing of market information 
manifests itself in different degrees and means that a channel member starts with sharing the 
most basic and least confidential market information before giving any disclosure about 
higher degrees of more confidential market information. Each channel member can disclose 
its market position to the other channel member in five different degrees. The lowest degree 
is sharing “zero” degrees of content; this implies that the channel members reveals nothing 
about its market position to the other one. The highest degree of shared content is “four”, in 
which the channel member shares the most confidential market information with its partner 
in the channel (i.e., competitive intelligence).  
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The second major finding in this chapter concerns the descriptive statistics on market 
information sharing in channel relationships. In our sample, the practices are quite diverse 
but sharing is fairly popular. Nearly 80% of the retailers share some market information with 
suppliers. Sixty four percent of the suppliers share some of their market information. When 
it comes down to sharing the highest degree of information, 24% of the retailers have almost 
no secrets to their channel members, while 16% of the suppliers reveal nearly everything to 
(at least one of) their retailers. On average, there is a slight asymmetry in shared content in 
our sample: retailers share slightly higher degrees in sharing with their channel partners than 
suppliers do. The sharing mode of market information is normally very frequent, is seldom 
exclusive but rarely formalized. Higher management from either side of the channel dyad is 
sporadically involved in the process of market information sharing. 
The third major finding is about the associations between Shared Content and Sharing 
Mode. In market information sharing practices between channel members, the shared 
content coincides with aspects of the sharing mode. When higher degrees of content are 
shared between channel partners, the sharing mode is more formalized, becomes more 
exclusive and involves higher-level managers from the retailer. The shared content is 
unrelated with the frequency rate at which channel members have contact with each other. 
We have begun exploring some of differences in information sharing practices in the 
differing channel contexts. In the next chapter, we are going to look more systematically for 
the antecedents in which channel members share lower or higher degrees of content, or share 
their information in a less or more collaborative style. 
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CHAPTER SIX THE ANTECEDENTS OF  
MARKET INFORMATION SHARING  
IN CHANNEL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter inspected the actual nature of market information sharing in channel 
relationships. In analyzing the shared content and sharing mode, it became clear that in 
channel relationships, the information sharing arrangements can be quite different from 
each other; meaning that there is a lot of variance in the information sharing arrangements 
to be explained. Thus, as a logically next question after finding out what and how channel 
members share their market information, this chapter’s purpose is to seek explanations for 
why firms are so different in the sharing of degrees in content and/or in their sharing mode. 
Here we aim to answer our second research question: what are the antecedents of market 
information sharing in channel relationships? We will go into discovering the factors that 
promotes retailers and suppliers to share higher degrees market information content, and 
on the factors determining in which mode market information sharing takes place in a 
channel relationship. As figure 6.1 portrays, this Chapter focuses on the left-hand side of 
our research framework.  
 
Figure 6.1 Focus of This Chapter: Antecedents 
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Following Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two step approach, we first assess the 
validation of our construct measurements by developing separate measurement models 
(paragraph 6.2), before we conduct the tests of our hypothesized relationships between the 
constructs (paragraph 6.3).  
 
6.2 Operationalization and Measurement Validation of the Antecedents 
All constructs for antecedents are grouped together in five domains: (1) market channel 
environment, (2) supplier network, (3) relationship characteristics, (4) supplier 
characteristics, and (5) retailer characteristics (see Figure 6.1). As explained in Chapter 4, 
data was collected about an existing retailer’s relationship with one (randomly selected) 
supplier. While the retailer, supplier and relationship characteristic are measured at the 
level of the dyad, both the market channel environment and supplier network variables 
were measured at the product category level (which included the competing suppliers with 
the focal supplier). Per domain of antecedents we will discuss how we operationalize the 
constructs and we subsequently assess the quality of our measurements. Whenever 
possible, measurement scales from previous research were used and when necessary these 
were modified to the setting of market information sharing in channel relationships. For 
each multi-item scale, the response categories were anchored by 1 (strongly disagree) and 
7 (strongly agree). The following procedural steps in the scale purification were taken. We 
started with examining the intercorrelations among the items designed for each scale, 
removing the items that exhibited low correlations. We then conducted a principal 
component analysis to determine the scales’ unidimensionality and discriminant validity 
and further refined the scales when necessary. Finally we conducted confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) on the scale items. Because of the large number of constructs relative to 
our sample size, it was not possible to conduct CFA at once, we therefore conducted 
confirmatory factor analyses on the groups of maximally similar constructs (here the five 
“domains”) (see also Moorman and Miner, 1997; Antia and Frazier, 2001).   
 
Market Channel Environment. In order to characterize the retail buyer’s market 
environment, we included four market channel environment factors which make it 
necessary to respond to consumer needs changes: consumer demand turbulence, consumer 
demand growth, purchase complexity and channel inertia. Table 6.1 presents the details of 
exact measurement operationalization, descriptive statistics, and confirmatory factor 
analyses. First, consumer demand turbulence is the extent to which the rate of change in 
the consumer demand is rapid and unpredictable. The measure of consumer demand 
turbulence was adapted from Jaworski and Kohli (1993)’s market turbulence. One item 
was deleted due to low inter-item correlation; the final three-item scale has an alpha of 
0.87.  
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Table 6.1 Construct Measures of Market Channel Environment 
 
Operationalization 
Consumer Demand Turbulence 
(3 items, α = 0.87) (adapted from: Jaworski and 
Kohli, 1993) 
 Purchase Complexity 
(3 items, α = 0.81) (adapted from: Cannon and 
Homburg, 2001)  
1. In this product category, consumer demand 
keeps on changing over time. 
2. Every time consumers react differently to 
marketing efforts within this product 
category. 
3. In this product category consumer 
preferences change in a rapid pace.  
4. Very unexpectedly, different consumers 
buy products from this product category.* 
 
 1. The buying process in this product category is 
relatively complex 
2. The buying process in this product category is 
relatively complicated 
3. The buying process in this product category is 
relatively technical 
Consumer Demand Growth 
(2 items, α = 0.89) 
 Channel Inertia 
(2 items, α = 0.84) 
1. During the past three years, growth in the 
consumer demand has been considerable. 
2. This product category can be called a 
"growth-market". 
 1. The buying process in this product category 
features a relatively long time-lag between 
ordering and delivery to our firm.  
2. The buying process in this product category is 
slow in its ability to react to consumer demand 
changes due to the length of the channel. 
3. The buying process in this product category is 
featured by a production capacity available in 
this channel and adjusts to consumer demand 
sluggishly.* 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Construct mean s.d min max n 
Consumer Demand Turbulence 4.54 1.50 1.00 7.00 173 
Consumer Demand Growth 4.26 1.60 1.00 7.00 172 
Purchase Complexity 3.57 1.38 1.00 7.00 173 
Channel Inertia 3.41 1.82 1.00 7.00 173 
     Continued 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 
Constructs χ2 df χ2/df TLI CFI RMSEA α
t-value 
(min)
t-value
(max)
 
Consumer demand turbulence 
Consumer demand growth 
Purchase complexity 
Channel inertia 
39.26 30 1.31 .98 .98 .043
.87
.89
.81
.84
10.86
10.23
8.06
10.95
14.24
12.24
18.08
11.28
* item was deleted from scale 
Second, we measured consumer demand growth in order to make a distinction between 
emerging and mature markets. Relatively new consumer markets are generally 
unpredictable and rapid response to changes may be required. Consumer demand growth 
was measured by two items and had an alpha of 0.89.  
The purchase complexity is the third characteristic of the market channel environment. 
A more complex buying situation makes it more difficult for a retailer to evaluate purchase 
choices a priori or even be certain about a supplier’s performance ex post. The three-items 
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measure for purchase complexity was borrowed from Cannon and Homburg (2001), and 
cover complexity, complicity and technical nature. The scale has an alpha of 0.81. 
The fourth market channel characteristic, channel inertia, complicates the possibility 
of a rapid response to market changes. Channel inertia is measured by the length of the 
time lag between retailer’s ordering at the supplier’s and selling to end-consumers. A long 
time lag may slowdown the adjustments of the channel to sudden changes in consumer 
needs. This channel inertia is measured by three items. After scale purification one item 
was deleted, resulting in an alpha of 0.84. 
We also conducted confirmatory factor analysis on the scale items of this set of market 
channel variables; and we found that all of the goodness-of-fit statistics indicate an 
adequate fit with the data with the four factors (consumer demand turbulence, consumer 
demand growth, purchase complexity, channel inertia): χ2 = 39.26, df = 30, p=.09;  TLI = 
.98; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .043). In addition with the marginally significant χ2 test, our 
conclusion is confirm with the goodness-of-fit exceeding the .90 standard. The RMSEA is 
also far below the .10 maximum. All of the measured market channel characteristics 
constructs show convergent validity because all item loadings are significant; t-values 
range from 8.06 to 18.08 and are well above the critical value for the .01 significance level 
(critical value = 2.58). Cross loadings are insignificantly low. Reliability for each construct 
was calculated in order to assess whether the specified indicators (items) are sufficient in 
their representation of their constructs. All cronbach alphas exceed the recommended level 
of .70. 
In order to investigate the discriminant validity of the constructs, we performed a 
series of chi-square difference tests by comparing constrained models to the original model 
in which we allow each construct to be distinct. In the constrained models, we forced pairs 
of constructs having a perfect correlation (r=1.0) (see Bagozzi and Yi, 1988; Steenkamp 
and Van Trijp, 1991). Evidence for discriminant validity was found, because the chi-
squares of all the constrained models significantly exceed that of the original 
unconstrained model. The smallest difference was 69.04; significantly larger than the 
critical value of 3.84 (1 df). For details about the χ2-difference tests between the assumed 
original unconstrained model and constrained models, we refer to Appendices VI.1.  
 
Supplier Network. In the sourcing of trading goods, the retailer is often dealing with a 
network of competing suppliers. Our model incorporates seven variables characterizing the 
supplier network: (1) the network horizon, (2) concentration level, (3) competition 
intensity among suppliers, (4) competition intensity among retailers, (5) information 
sharing norms among suppliers, and (6) negative and (7) positive connectedness. First, the 
supplier network horizon denotes primarily how extended the retailer’s view of the 
network is (Anderson, et al., 1994; Holmen and Pedersen, 2003). The number of supplier 
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relationships in the focal product category defines the magnitude of the supplier network 
horizon. In our sample, the retailer does business with on average 15 suppliers for each 
product category.  
Second, the supplier network concentration measures the degree of concentration in 
the network by the percentage of buying budget in the product category spent at the four 
largest supplier. (0 = less than 10%; 1 = 11 – 30% ; 2 = 31 – 60; 3 = more than 60%). The 
mean score (2.32) of network concentration variable indicates that in most cases, buying 
takes place in a rather concentrated supplier network (i.c., >60% of buying budget is spent 
at the four largest suppliers). 
Third, the competition intensity among suppliers is important characteristic for the 
supplier network. Under conditions of high competition among suppliers, retailers have 
many alternative options to satisfy their needs for market information. As a result, 
competition intensity among suppliers is likely to stimulate suppliers to share information. 
The measurement of competition intensity was adopted from Jaworski and Kohli (1993) 
alpha is 0.82 (with final four items). 
Fourth, the competition intensity among retailers also affects the dynamics in the 
supplier network. Similar to the competition measure from supplier competition, we took 
the measurement of competition intensity from Jaworski and Kohli (1993) alpha is 0.79 
(with final four items). 
Fifth, the shared norms of information sharing in the supplier network make up 
another factor affecting the vertical cooperation with retailers. The commonly held norms 
in the supplier network concerning the sharing of proprietary market information is 
measured by an adapted scale from Heide and John (1992) and two items remained after 
scale purification (alpha = 0.67). 
Sixth and seventh, negative and positive connectedness, the relationships within 
supplier network do not act in isolation but are connected to different degrees. Certain 
dealings in a relationship in the supplier network can influence other relationships. The 
degree in which cooperative efforts with the focal supplier deteriorates the dealings in any 
other supplier relationship in the network is referred to as the negative connectedness of 
the focal supplier relationship (Cook and Emerson, 1978) (3 items; alpha = 0.87). 
However, the opposite effect might also be plausible: any cooperative effort of the retailer 
with the focal supplier might elicit other cooperative actions from other suppliers in 
competition for the preference of that retailer. This likelihood on positive connectedness is 
measured by 3 items; alpha is 0.89.  
The CFA on the scale items of this set of supplier network variables showed that all of 
the test statistics (χ2= 98.28; p = .21; TLI = .99; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .014) give evidence 
for a good fit with the data. Convergent validity appears to be in order due to significantly 
high t-values (minimum t-value is 5.64) and low cross-loadings. The minimum difference 
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of 178.61 for one degree of freedom as a result from a series of χ2-difference tests confirm 
the discriminant validity of the constructs (see Appendix VI.2 for details). 
 
Table 6.2 Construct Measures of Supplier Network 
 
Operationalization 
Supplier Network Horizon 
(1 item) 
 Supplier Network Concentration 
(1 item) 
How many suppliers deliver goods to you in this 
product category? 
 What is the percentage in your buying budget for this 
product category spent at the four largest suppliers? 
(0 = less than 10%; 1 = 11 – 30% ; 2 = 31 – 60; 3 = 
more than 60%). 
 
Competition Intensity among Suppliers 
(4 items, α = 0.82) (cf. Jaworksi and Kohli, 1993) 
 Competition among Retailers 
(4 items, α = 0.79) (cf. Jaworksi and Kohli, 1993) 
1. There are many competitors of this supplier in 
this p[urchase market.* 
2. Temporary trade promotions (like discounts) 
are often used in this purchase market.* 
3. In this purchase market, they mostly compete 
on price.  
4. Within this product category, anything that 
one competitor can offer, others can match 
readily. 
5. Competition between suppliers within this 
product category is cut throat. 
6. In this purchase market, one hears of a new 
competitive move almost every day. 
 1. Competition in our marketplace is cutthroat. 
2. One hears of a new competitive move almost 
every day.  
3. The activities in our marketplace are 
particularly hostile. 
4. In our market there are many promotion-
campaigns.* 
5. In our market, anything that one retailer offers, 
others can match readily.* 
6. Our competitors are relatively strong. 
7. In our marketplace there is a lot of price 
competition.* 
 
Information-Sharing Norms among Suppliers 
(2 items, α = 0.67) (adapted from Heide and John, 
1992) 
  
Positive Connectedness 
(3 items, α = 0.89) 
 1. If our firm is going to collaborate (more) with 
this supplier, than it will be easier for us to 
collaborate with competitors of this supplier. 
2. A closer cooperation between our firm and this 
supplier will facilitate the relationship between 
our company and one of this supplier’s 
competitors. 
3. Working together to this supplier can be 
beneficial to the performances in the 
relationship with other competing companies. 
 Negative Connectedness 
(3 items, α = 0.87) 
1. In general suppliers of products in this 
product category expect that every market 
information that might help retailers, is 
passed on.*  
2. In this purchasing market it is common that 
retail companies and suppliers exchange their 
own confidential market information. 
3. In this purchasing market, suppliers and 
retailers are expected to keep each other 
posted on matters that are important to them. 
4. Suppliers and retailers inform each other 
about changes in advance.* 
 1. If our firm is going to collaborate (more) with 
this supplier, than it will be more difficult for 
us to collaborate with competitors of this 
supplier. 
2. A closer cooperation between our firm and this 
supplier will disturb the relationship between 
our company and one of this supplier’s 
competitors. 
3. Working together to this supplier can be 
detrimental to the performances in the 
relationship with other competing companies. 
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Table 6.2 Continued 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Construct mean s.d min max α n 
Supplier Network Horizon 15.09 17.78 1 120 n.a. 174 
Supplier Network Concentration 2.32 0.85 0 3 n.a. 174 
Information Sharing Norms among Suppliers 3.85 1.35 1.00 7.00 0.67 172 
Competition Intensity among Suppliers 4.09 1.36 1.00 7.00 0.82 171 
Competition Intensity among Retailers 4.94 1.03 3.00 7.00 0.79 173 
Negative Connectedness 2.83 1.37 1.00 6.67 0.87 172 
Positive Connectedness 2.96 1.30 1.00 6.33 0.89 169 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 
Constructs 
 
χ2 
 
df 
 
χ2/df 
 
TLI 
 
CFI 
 
RMSEA α
t-value
(min)
t-value 
(max)
 
Competition Intensity among 
Suppliers 
Competition Intensity among 
Retailers 
Information Sharing Norms 
Negative Connectedness 
Positive Connectedness 
98.28 95 1.03 .99 .99 .014 
.82
.79
.67
.87
.89
8.71
5.61
7.30
10.11
10.45
13.53
12.32
18.13
15.62
15.08
* Item deleted from scale 
 
Relationship Characteristics. Whereas market channel and supplier network environment 
were measured at product category level (which included the competing suppliers and the 
focal supplier), the constructs regarding the characteristics about the retailer-supplier 
relationship were measured at the relationship-level with the focal supplier only. Table 6.3 
shows that we measured six aspects: the age of the relationship, the amount of trust in the 
supplier, the transaction-specific investments made in the relationship, contact 
formalization, the supplier’s dependency on the retailer and the retailer’s dependency on 
the supplier.  
Age of the relationship was measured by a single item that assessed how long the 
retailer had done business with the supplier. In our sample, the age of the retailer-supplier 
relationship varies from four months to 40 years. On average, retailers have been trading 
with the supplier relationship nine and a half years. 
Trust. The second relationship characteristic included in the study is the amount of 
trust in the supplier. Trust is often defined as “the extent to which a firm believes that its 
exchange partner is honest and/or benevolent”. Trust in the supplier is, on the one hand, 
the retailer’s belief that the supplier is reliable, stands by its word, fulfils promised role 
obligations, and is sincere (cf. Anderson and Narus, 1990; Dwyer and Oh, 1987; Schurr 
and Ozanne, 1985), and on the other hand, the belief that the supplier is genuinely 
interested in its interests or welfare and is motivated to seek joint gains (see Geyskens, et 
al., 1998). We used a five-item scale for trust in the supplier which incorporated was the 
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major facets of trust – reliability, integrity, and confidence (based on Morgan and Hunt, 
1994; Jap, 1999); four items were used in the analysis and had an alpha of .85.   
Relationship-specific investments. The third feature of the relationship between retailer 
and supplier is the extent to which both channel members have jointly made investments 
specifically catered to their channel relationship. We relied on items of Anderson and 
Weitz (1992) and Jap (1999) to measure the scale for (dyadic) relationship-specific 
investments. The final two-item scale has an alpha of .67; due to low inter-item 
correlations we had to delete the third item. When one of the channel members terminates 
their relationship, these investments can be lost. 
Contract Formalization. The fourth characteristic of the relationship is the contract 
formalization. Contract formalization refers to the degree in which the relationship is 
detailed and specified; whether the contract between the retailer and the supplier is 
specifically written and formal (cf. Anderson, et al., 1987; Mohr et al., 1996; Lusch and 
Brown, 1996; Jap and Ganesan, 2000). It was measured by 5 items and has an alpha of .84.  
 
Table 6.3 Construct Measures of Relationship Characteristics 
 
Operationalization 
Relationship Age  
(1 item) 
 Trust in Supplier  
(4 items, α = 0.85) (cf. Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Jap, 
1999) 
About how long has your firm been doing 
business with this supplier? 
… years 
… months 
 1. The promises of this supplier are reliable.  
2. This supplier is very honest in dealing with our 
company.  
3. Our firm trusts this supplier.  
4. When problems arise, this supplier would go of 
its way to help our firm.*  
5. This supplier takes our firm’s interests into 
account, when something goes wrong.  
 
Relationship-specific Investment   
(2 items, α = 0.67) (cf. Anderson and Weitz, 
1992; Jap, 1999) 
 Contract Formalization 
(5 items, α = 0.84; adapted from Jap and Ganesan, 
2000) 
1. If this relationship were to end, we would 
be wasting a lot of knowledge that's tailored 
to their relationship.  
2. If either company were to switch to a 
competitive retailer or supplier, we would 
lose a lot of the investments made in the 
present relationship.  
3. We have invested a great deal in building 
up our joint business.* 
 
 Our firm  and this supplier … 
1. … have a specified and detailed agreement with 
each other. 
2. … have a formal written agreement stating each 
others obligations in detail. 
3. … have a contract that also includes specific 
penalties for any default. 
4. … govern our relationship with written 
contracts. 
5. … often refer to contracts in order to make a 
decision about differences of opinion. 
  Continued 
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Table 6.3 Continued 
Supplier Dependence on Retailer 
(3 items, α = 0.82) (cf. Kumar, Scheer and 
Steenkamp,1995)  
 Retailer Dependence on Supplier 
(3 items, α = 0.84) (cf. Kumar, Scheer and 
Steenkamp,1995) 
To which extent is the supplier dependent on 
your firm?  
 
1. If our firm ceases to do business with this 
supplier, then this supplier will have a 
problem in replacing compensation for the 
loss in sales from our trade area.* 
2. This supplier is through and through 
dependent on our firm. 
3. It would be difficult for this supplier to 
replace our firm.  
4. This supplier does not have a good 
alternative in our trade area.  
 To which extent is our firm dependent on this 
supplier? 
 
1. If this supplier ceases to do business with our 
firm, we will have a problem in replacing the 
loss in sales in this product category. 
2. It would be difficult for our firm to replace this 
supplier. 
3. Concerning this product category, our firm is 
through and through dependent on this 
supplier.*  
4. In this product category, our firm does not have 
a good alternative for this supplier. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Construct mean s.d min max α n 
Relationship Age 9.52 8.77 0.33 40.00 n.a. 111 
Trust in Supplier 5.23 0.98 1.00 7.00 0.85 174 
Relationship-specific Investment  3.68 1.40 1.00 7.00 0.67 171 
Contract Formalization 3.23 1.61 1.00 7.00 0.84 174 
Supplier Dependence on Retailer (a) 4.03 1.59 1.00 7.00 0.82 173 
Retailer Dependence on Supplier (b) 3.43 1.53 1.00 7.00 0.84 173 
Total Interdependence (a) + (b) 7.44 2.41 2.00 12.67 n.a. 173 
Relative Retailer Dependence | (b) – (a) | 1.62 1.18     
Relative Supplier Dependence | (a) – (b) | 1.83 1.30     
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 
Constructs χ2 df χ2/df TLI CFI RMSEA α
t-value 
(min) 
t-value 
(max) 
Trust  
Relationship-specific investments 
Contract Formalization 
Supplier dependence 
Retailer dependence 
198.98 109 1.83 0.91 0.93 .070
.85
.67
.79
.82
.84
 
8.93 
7.21 
6.16 
9.13 
8.99 
 
14.03 
8.37 
16.31 
12.20 
13.67 
* Item deleted from scale 
 
Dependency structure. The fifth relationship characteristic is the dependency structure 
between channel parties. A firm’s dependency on another firm traditionally has been 
defined in channels as the firm’s need to maintain a relationship with the other firm to 
achieve its goals (Frazier, 1983). The firm’s inability to replace the other firm has often 
been considered an indication of the firm’s dependency (Kumar, et al., 1995). We used 
prior measures developed by Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995) to measure the 
dependence structure between retailer and supplier. The two four-items measurement focus 
on each firm’s replaceability. Both reliability of the measures of supplier’s dependence and 
retailer’s dependence are well above 0.80.  
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We performed CFA to check the convergent and discriminant validity of the 
relationship constructs. The χ2 –test statistic indicated a significant difference between the 
data and the model (χ2= 198.98; p<.01), yet all of the other goodness-of-fit test statistics 
(TLI = .91; CFA = .93; RMSEA = .007) showed a good fit with the data. Also we found 
evidence for convergent validity due to the fairly high t-values (minimal t-value is 6.16; 
more than 50% of the t-values is higher than 10) and low cross-loadings. With the χ2-
difference tests we tested the discriminant validity (see Appendix VI.3 for details).  
 
Calculation of interdependency and dependence asymmetry. To assess the total 
interdependence in the channel relationship, we follow the additive method (Kim and 
Hsieh, 2003) and compute total interdependence as the sum of both dependencies on each 
other. The average total interdependence score is 7.44 (2.41) on a scale from 2 to 14. The 
interdependence asymmetry refers to the difference between each channel member’s 
dependence on the other. In line with Kumar et al. (1995, 1998)’s approach, we calculate 
the relative retailer dependence and the supplier’s relative dependence by using a spline 
regression (Marsh and Cormier, 2001). After calculating the absolute asymmetry of 
dependence as the absolute difference between retailer and supplier, we create two dummy 
variables: Dummy 1 = 1 if retailer’s dependence is greater than supplier’s dependence and 
0 if else. Dummy 2 = 1 if supplier’s dependence is greater than retailer’s dependence and 0 
if else. Next step is to develop the two new variables -- relative retailer dependence as the 
product of Dummy 1 and the absolute interdependence asymmetry and relative supplier 
dependence as the product of Dummy 2 and the absolute interdependence asymmetry. 
With these two variables, we can check whether the effects of supplier relative dependence 
is different from the retailer relative dependence. The average dependence asymmetry 
score, when the retailer was relatively more dependent (Dummy 1 = 1 – 31.1% of the 
relationships) is 1.62 (1.18). When the supplier is relatively more dependent (Dummy 2 = 
1 – 59.9%), the average dependence asymmetry score is 1.83 (1.30). In nine percent of our 
sample, the relationships were rated as perfectly symmetrical. Comparing these statistics of 
interdependence structures with previous studies (cf. Van Bruggen, et al., 2005; Kumar, et 
al., 1995; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Li and Dant, 2001; Kim and Hsieh, 2003), the channel 
relationships in our sample are featured moderate total interdependence, and relatively 
moderate asymmetry.  
 
Supplier Characteristics. Our research model incorporates four main supplier 
characteristics related to its capabilities and willingness to share market information. First, 
the supplier’s market information processing capabilities approximates its competency to 
share (useful) market information. These capabilities are measured by 7 items of market 
orientation (adapted from Jaworski and Kohli, 1993); making a distinction between three 
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sorts of skills: market-sensing, market-information dissemination, and market-relating 
capabilities (cf. Day, 1999). Market-sensing capabilities are about the supplier’s skills in 
collecting market information and is being measured by two items (α = .71). The measures 
on the skills to dissimilate market information within the organization were deleted in the 
scale purification process, due to insignificant item loadings. This might well be due to the 
difficulty for the retailer buyer to make judgments about internal procedures at the 
supplier. Being good at translating market information into successful marketing 
propositions refers to the supplier’s market-relating capabilities and is measured by two 
items (α = .85), after deleting one item with a low correlation.  
Second, goal congruency approximates the supplier’s inclination to share market 
information with the retailer, because it expresses the degree in which both supplier’s and 
retailer’s objectives are compatible.  Goal congruency (cf. Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Jap, 
1999, Smith and Barclay, 1997) measured by 4 items (of which 1 was deleted from further 
analysis) has an 0.82 alpha-score.  
Third, the top management support of the supplier is an expression of the supplier’s 
willingness to share market information with the channel member. The amount of top 
management support is displayed by the different resources made available to develop 
cooperative efforts with the channel member. We borrowed a three items measurement 
from Gruen and Shah (2000) to assess the degree of perceived management support. We 
asked the respondent to rate the support his contact person at the supplier firm receives 
from his top management. The three items have an alpha of 0.84. 
Fourth, an incentive structure lenient to cooperation with the supplier is an additional 
expression of willingness to develop cooperative efforts with the channel member. We 
employed a 3-item measurement. One (reversed) item was deleted after scale purification, 
due to low inter-item correlations. Alpha for the 2-items scale is 0.62. 
We also performed CFA for this set of supplier characteristics variables and found an 
adequate fit between the data and the model (TLI=.93; CFI = .95; RMSEA=.072), despite 
the significant high χ2 of 79.68 (df=44; p<.01). Convergent validity was confirmed by the 
significantly high t-values (minimum t-value = 5.62). Discriminant validity was tested by 
usual χ2-difference tests; all of the constructs were proven to be significantly different from 
each other; although the supplier’s market sensing and market relating capabilities were 
very similar yet significantly different (χ2 difference = 4.50; higher than the critical value 
of 3.84). See Appendix VI.4 for further details. 
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Table 6.4 Construct Measures of Supplier Characteristics 
 
Operationalization 
Market Information Processing Capabilities 
Supplier 
(4 items) 
 Goal Congruency  
(3 items, α = 0.82) (adapted from Anderson and 
Weitz, 1989) 
 
Market Sensing Capabilities (α = 0.71) 
1. This supplier performs a lot of market research 
on its own 
2. This supplier is fast in tracing changes in 
consumer preferences 
 
Market Information Dissemination Capabilities*  
3. At this supplier, all management levels are 
regularly updated about market developments. 
*  
4. Market information is professionally 
disseminated by this supplier throughout its 
organization.* 
 
Market Relating Capabilities (α = 0.85) 
5. This supplier knows well how to interpret 
market developments.* 
6. This supplier is well capable of translating 
new market insights into marketing efforts. 
7. This supplier is very good at commercializing 
market information. 
 
  
1. Our firm and this supplier pursue compatible 
goals. 
2. Both companies have the same objectives in 
this relationship in common. 
3. This supplier and our firm support each 
others’ sales and profit targets. 
4. Our objectives differ significantly from those 
of this supplier (R)* 
 
 
Top Management Support Supplier 
(3 items, α = 0.84) (adapted from Gruen and Shah, 
2000) 
 Incentive Structure Supplier 
(2 items, α = 0.62) 
The top management of this supplier … 
1. … provides our contact persons with the 
necessary financial resources to give shape to 
the collaboration with our firm.  
2. … gives our contact person sufficient time to 
give shape to the collaboration with our firm. 
3.  … makes an adequate amount of personnel 
available to our contact person for the 
collaboration with our firm. 
 
 Our main contact person at this supplier … 
1. … receives appreciation from his/her own 
organization for the way in which he/she 
cooperates with our firm as a team. 
2. … is being evaluated by his/her own 
organization for the way he manages the 
relationship with our firm. 
3. … is mainly accountable for his/her own 
individual sales. (R)* 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Construct mean s.d min max α n 
Market Information Processing Capabilities        
Market Sensing Capabilities 4.38 1.52 1.00 7.00 0.71 174 
Market Relating Capabilities 4.47 1.36 1.00 7.00 0.85 173 
Goal Congruency 4.97 1.19 1.00 7.00 0.82 174 
Top Management Support Supplier 4.66 1.41 1.00 7.00 0.84 171 
Incentive Structure Supplier 4.68 1.19 1.00 7.00 0.62 168 
      Continued 
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Table 6.4 Continued 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Constructs χ2 df χ2/df TLI CFI RMSEA 
α
t-value 
(min)
t-value 
(max)
Market information processing skills  
Market Sensing Capabilities 
Market Relating Capabilities 
Goal congruence  
Top Management Support Supplier 
Incentive Support Supplier 
79.68 44 1.81 .93 .95 .072
.71
.85
.82
.84
.62
8.72
11.22
8.63
10.50
5.62
9.91
13.25
12.14
11.97
7.03
* Item deleted from scale 
 
Retailer Characteristics. As we did with the set of supplier characteristics, we have also 
measured the retailer’s characteristics associated with its competency and willingness to 
share its market information. First, we measured the retailer’s market information 
processing capabilities: market sensing (α = 0.64) and market relating capabilities (α = 
0.92).  
Second, we asked questions about the retail firm’s predisposition to ally with suppliers 
(cf. relational proclivity, Johnson and Sohi (2001)); 4 items; alpha = 0.76) as one indicator 
for the retailer’s overall willingness to share market information with suppliers. 
 
Table 6.5 Construct Measures of Retailer Characteristics 
 
Operationalization 
Market Information Processing Capabilities Retailer 
(4 items) (adapted from Jaworksi and Kohli, 1993) 
 Firm’s predisposition to ally with Suppliers  
(Relational Proclivity) (cf. Johnson and Sohi, 
2001)(3 items, α = 0.76) 
Market Sensing Capabilities (α = 0.64) 
1. Our firm performs a lot of market research on its 
own 
2. Our firm is fast in tracing changes in consumer 
preferences 
 
Market Information Dissemination Capabilities 
3. At our firm, all management levels are regularly 
updated about market developments. *  
4. Market information is professionally 
disseminated by our firm throughout our 
organization.* 
 
Market Relating Capabilities (α = 0.92) 
5. Our firm knows well how to interpret market 
developments.* 
6. Our firm is well capable of translating new 
market insights into marketing efforts. 
7. Our firm is very good at commercializing market 
information. 
 
 In general, in my firm the view is that… 
 
1. … closer partner-type relationship with 
suppliers offer major advantages in doing 
business 
2. … teaming up and working closely with 
suppliers allows us to be more effective. 
3. … it is appropriate to share proprietary 
information with our suppliers if it is 
useful to do so. 
4. ... most often, suppliers can be trusted to 
meet their obligations.* 
5. … most of the time, suppliers will not take 
advantage of us.* 
6. … the less any supplier knows about how 
we do things, the better off we are . (R)* 
 
  Continued 
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Table 6.5 Continued 
Top Management Support Retailer (own firm) 
(3 items, α = 0.78) 
 Incentive Structure Retailer (own firm) 
(2 items, α = 0.73) (borrowed from Gruen and Shah, 
2000) 
Our top management … 
1. … provides us with the necessary 
financial resources to give shape to the 
collaboration with this supplier. 
2. … gives us sufficient time to give shape 
to the collaboration with this supplier. 
3. … makes an adequate amount of 
personnel available to us for the 
collaboration with this supplier. 
 Our firm … 
1. … gives appreciation for the way in which we 
cooperate as a team with this supplier. 
2. … evaluates us for the way we manage the 
relationship with our firm. 
3. … holds us mainly accountable for our own 
individual sales. (R)* 
   
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Construct mean s.d min max α n 
Market Information Processing Capabilities       
Market Sensing Capabilities 4.42 1.25 1.00 7.00 0.64 173 
Market Information Dissemination 
Capabilities *  
      
Market Relating Capabilities 5.13 1.10 1.00 7.00 0.92 173 
Top Management Support Retailer 4.70 1.50 1.00 7.00 0.84 172 
Incentive Structure Retailer 4.50 1.23 1.00 7.00 0.62 165 
Firm’s predisposition to ally with Suppliers 5.55 0.84 1.75 7.00 0.76 172 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Constructs 
χ2 df χ2/df TLI CFI RMSEA α
t-value 
(min) 
t-value 
(max) 
information processing 
capabilities 
Market Sensing Capabilities 
Market Relating Capabilities 
Predisposition to ally with 
suppliers 
Top Management Support 
Retailer 
Incentive Support Retailer 
 
52.82 44 1.20 .98 .99 .032
.64
.92
.76
.78
.73
5.94
13.44
8.28
8.13
8.22
9.23
15.18
11.07
13.26
9.91
* item deleted from scale 
 
Third, retailer’s top management support is another indicator for willingness to share with 
the supplier. The amount of top management support given was measured by three items; 
borrowed from Gruen and Shah (2000). We asked the respondent to rate the support 
received from his own top management. The three items have an alpha of 0.78. 
Fourth, the incentive structure lenient to cooperation with the supplier is an additional 
indication for the willingness to share information with the supplier. Comparable to the 
supplier’s scale for this construct we employed three items from Gruen and Shah (2000). 
One (reserved) item was deleted after scale purification. Alpha for the 2-items scale is 
0.73. 
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We also conducted confirmatory factor analysis on the scale items of this set of 
variables; and we found that the measurement model adequately fits the data, because all 
the test statistics are better than the threshold values as mentioned in the literature (Hair et 
al., 1998) (including the χ2 of 51.45; df=44; p= 0.17). RMSEA is .032 which falls well 
below the threshold value of .10. TLI and CFI measures are both satisfactory above the 
recommended level of .90.  
All of the measured retailer characteristics constructs show convergent validity 
because all item loadings are significant; t-values range from 5.92 to 15.18 and are well 
above the critical value for the .01 significance level (critical value = 2.58). Cross loadings 
are insignificantly low. Reliability for each construct was calculated in order to assess 
whether the specified indicators (items) are sufficient in their representation of their 
constructs. Most Cronbach alphas exceed the recommended level of .70. 
We performed a series of chi-square difference tests in order to investigate the 
discriminant validity of the constructs. Evidence for this was found, because the chi-
squares of all the constrained models significantly exceed that of the original 
unconstrained model. For details about the χ2-difference tests between the assumed 
original unconstrained model and constrained models, we refer to Appendices VI.5.  
The correlations among the finalized measures of the antecedents are presented in 
Appendix VI.6. The overview of the antecedents’ bi-variate correlations with the 
dependent variables (shared content and sharing mode) and the antecedents is given in 
Appendix VI.7. In order to prelude the use of all independent variables, we inspect this 
correlation matrix in combination with the correlations among the antecedents (in 
Appendix VI.6). The highest correlation score between blocks of antecedents is .47 
(between retailer’s relationship-specific investments and the supplier’s goal congruency). 
Within the blocks of antecedents, we find higher correlations; in particular for the 
measures of the supplier’s (.91) and retailer’s capabilities (.52). The high individual 
correlations between the antecedents warn us to be wary of possible problems of 
multicollinearity (Hair, et al., 1998).  
According to Anderson and Gerbing (1988)’s approach, we now test our hypotheses, 
and start with investigating the antecedents of Shared Content (6.3). In the subsequent 
paragraph we are going to take a closer look at the antecedents of the Sharing Mode of 
information-sharing arrangements (6.4). Since the hypotheses are directional, all statistical 
tests will be one-tailed (cf. Antia and Frazier, 2001; Frazier and Lasser, 1996). 
 
6.3 Hypothesis Testing: Antecedents of Shared Market Information Content 
Our hypotheses about the five groups of antecedents of Shared Content in channel 
relationships are tested using regression analysis. The data analysis is carried out in SPSS 
and focuses on Pearson correlation coefficients and ordinary least squares (OLS) 
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regression models. In the estimation procedure, we entered all the variables in a single step 
– through the “enter” entry mode. 
Based on findings from the previous section, we also include the two channel context 
variables that were found to be related to the degrees of shared content. Hence, both 
industry (food versus others) and supplier type (brand manufacturer versus private label 
manufacturer) were added as covariates in our estimated models.  
Table 6.6 shows the results from two OLS-regressions for our focal dependent 
variables. The first model tests the influences of antecedents on retailer’s shared content 
(paragraph 5.4.4). The second model concerns the supplier’s shared content with the 
hypothesized antecedents. Retailer’s degree of shared content (adjusted R-square = .27) 
and supplier’s degree of shared content (adjusted R-square = .34) both achieved good 
levels of predictive accuracy. Furthermore, the two equations were statistically significant 
below .01 level. The tolerance values for all variables measuring the fraction of the total 
variance in the independent variable not predicted by the other independent variables is 
high (Hair, et al., 1999). The lowest tolerance value found is .29 (much higher than the 
critical minimum value of .10; Hair et al., 1999) and this indicates that multicollinearity 
should not be a problem. 
We will now discuss the tests of the hypotheses for the different antecedents of Shared 
Content per block/domain in our research model, primarily based on the outcomes of the 
multivariate analyses and if valuable, we complement the discussion with a reference to 
the bivariate correlations matrices in Appendices VI.6 and VI.7.  
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Table 6.6 Antecedents of the Degree of Shared Market Information Content 
 Dependent Variables 
 
Retailer’s degree of 
Shared Content  
Supplier’s degree of 
Shared Content 
Independent Variables H beta scores (sign.)* H beta scores (sign.)* 
Market Channel Environment      
1a: Consumer Demand Turbulence  -.21 (.02)  H1a-s : + -.12(.84)  
1b: Consumer Demand Turbulence SQ H1a-r : ∩ -.16 (.04)   -.04(.27)  
2: Consumer Demand Growth H1b-r : + -.03 (.63)  H1b-s : + .12(.11)  
3: Purchase Complexity H1c-r : ? .13 (.16)**  H1c-s : ? .03(.78)**  
4: Channel Inertia  H1d-r : - -.15 (.08)  H1d-s : - -.04(.35)  
     
Supplier Network     
5: Network Horizon H2a-r : - .06 (.75)  H2a-s : - .00(.61)  
6: Network Concentration H2b-r : + .21 (.01)  H2b-s : - -.23(.08)  
7: Competition Intensity among Suppliers H2c-r : - .04 (.66)  H2c-s : + -.03(.60)  
8: Competition Intensity among Retailers H2d-r : + .02 (.43)  H5f-s : - .13(.83)  
9: Information Sharing Norms H2e-r : + .32 (<.01)  H2d-s : + .12(.12)  
10: Negative Connectedness  H2f-r : - -.06 (.25)  H2e-s : + .04(.34)  
11: Positive Connectedness H2g-r : + .04 (.34)  H2f-s : - -.09(.18)  
     
Relationship Characteristics     
12: Age of Relationship H3a-r : + *** H3b-1 : + *** 
13: Trust in the Supplier H3b-r : + .03 (.38)  H3b-s : + .00(.49)  
14: Relationship-specific Investment H3c-r : + .16 (.06)  H3c-s : - -.15(.10)  
15: Contract Formalization H3d-r : + -.00 (.50)  H3d-s : + .07(.19)  
16: Total Interdependence  H3e-r : + .22 (.01)  H3e-s : + .12(.02)  
17a: Relative Retailer Dependence  H3f-r : - -.05 (.31)  H3f-s : - -.17(.16)  
17b: Relative Supplier Dependence H3f-r : - .04 (.65)  H3f-s : - -.11(.16)  
     
Supplier Characteristics     
18a: Market Sensing Capabilities H4a-r : - -.22 (.03)  H4a-s : + .30(.01)  
18b: Market Relating Capabilities H4b-r : + .20 (.06)  H4b-s : + .22(.08)  
19: Goal Congruency H4c-r : + .09 (.19)  H4c-s : + .13(.18)  
20a: Top Management Support Supplier H4d-r : + -.15 (.92)  H4d-s : + .18(.08)  
20b: Incentive Structure Supplier H4e-r : + .03 (.37)  H4e-s : + .06(.36)  
     
Retailer Characteristics     
21a: Market Sensing Capabilities H5a-r : + .02 (.43)  H5a-s : - .05(.67)  
21b: Market Relating Capabilities H5b-r : + .25 (.01)  H5b-s : + .13(.17)  
22: Predisposition to ally with suppliers  H5c-r : + .15 (.06)  H5c-s : + .07(.34)  
23a: Top Management Support Retailer H5d-r : + .01 (.48)  H5d-s : + -.19(.97)  
23b: Incentive Structure Retailer H5e-r : + -.05 (.66)  H5e-s : + .01(.47)  
      
Covariates      
Industry (Food = 1; other industries = 0) + .08 (.17)   + .39(.25)  
Supplier Type (brand manufacturer = 1; 
private label = 0) 
+ -.01 (.52)    + .11(.36)  
R-square  .43    .52 
Adj. R-square  .27    .34 
F (sign.)  2.56 (<.01)    2.95 (<.01) 
N  131    111 
Notes: missing values listwise deleted; * p-value is one-tail probability; bold beta-values and p-values indicate 
acceptance of the hypothesis; ** p-value is two-tail probability due to the nature of this hypothesis.*** Note: we 
have tested the models with inclusion of the variable “relationship age” and found no significant effect. Due to the 
large number of missing values in this variable, we decided to take out this variable. Doing so did not have any 
effect on the structure of the results shown here. 
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Market Channel Environment. Consumer demand turbulence, consumer demand growth, 
purchase complexity, and channel inertia are factors of the market channel environment 
expected to have an influence on retailer’s and supplier’s shared content.  
In our research model as introduced in Chapter 3, we mentioned the contradictory 
predictions from two research perspectives concerning the effect of consumer demand 
turbulence on retailer’s shared market information content. The supply chain optimization 
approach expects a positive relationship between the level of consumer turbulence and 
shared content of the retailer, while empirical behavioral marketing channel literature 
would expect a negative relationship. Our research model combines the two types of 
predictions and H1a-r hypothesizes therefore an inverted u-shape, because in the case of low 
turbulence (stable demand), the benefits of improved inter-firm coordination outweigh the 
costs for the retailer of more dependency. However, as consumer demand becomes more 
turbulent, the predictive value of the retailer’s shared information decreases and does not 
compensate the increasing costs of becoming more dependent of the supplier.9  Our results 
do not support this hypothesis, but it discovers another nature of the non-linear 
relationship. The quadratic term is significant (b=- .16; p=.04), yet the linear term is 
negative and significant. This indicates that the shape of the curve is not an inverted-U, but 
it is concave. This form implies that the effect of consumer demand turbulence on 
retailer’s shared content is negative and becomes even more negative when turbulence 
increases (b= -.21; p= .02). So, as consumer demand becomes more turbulent, the retailer 
shies away from sharing in an accelerated way.  
We further check for the supplier’s shared content as a reaction to consumer demand 
turbulence. In Chapter 3 we posed that both research perspectives, supply chain 
optimization and empirical behavioral, would have a prediction in the same positive 
direction. The supply chain optimization perspective states that through sharing their 
market information, suppliers have a better opportunity to explain more about consumer 
demand when the environment is more turbulent. The empirical behavioral market channel 
literature would expect that suppliers faced with turbulent consumer demand rather tighten 
their buyer relationships to reduce another source of turbulence (H1a-s). Our findings show 
that this is not the case; the beta-values for both terms are not significantly positive (b=-
.12; p =.84; b=-.04; p=.27). This implies that the supplier’s degree of shared content does 
not increase in more turbulent consumer demand situations.  
Our findings support the predictions of the empirical behavioral perspective, rather 
than the one of the supply chain optimization perspective. In particular for retailers, 
sharing of their market information is diminished in an accelerated way when consumer 
                                                          
9 Note: consumer demand turbulence as a predictor variable is mean-centered (before forming the quadratic term) 
to reduce multicollinearity (Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990) 
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demand becomes more turbulent. In a turbulent environment, retailers prefer to keep their 
market information to themselves and not to engage in any close sharing arrangements 
with suppliers. They like to keep their bets open and remain flexible in switching from one 
trading partner to the other. 
Our hypothesis about the effect of consumer demand growth on sharing market 
information content (H1b-r and H1b-s) is that both retailers and suppliers share more content 
with each other in situations of a growing consumer demand. Our findings do not support 
these hypotheses, either for the retailer (b = -.03; p=.63) or for the supplier’s degrees of 
content (b= +.12; p=.11). Possibly, the effect of consumer demand growth on the 
supplier’s degrees of shared content is taken away by correlations with other explanatory 
variables (see Appendix VI.6). We find, for instance, a relatively high correlation between 
consumer demand growth and consumer demand turbulence (r=.36; p<.01). Another 
explanation for not finding a significant positive relationship between the consumer 
demand growth and shared content is that in growing markets channel parties do not need 
the help of each other so much. Or perhaps, in slowly growing saturated markets, retailers 
and suppliers do seek each others’ assistance and want each other’s market information to 
increase the profitability by improving the channel relationship’s efficiency. 
The impact of purchase complexity on degree of shared content is hypothesized in H1c-
r and H1c-s as being undirected, because the there more benefits as well as costs associated 
with information in such more technical and complicated buying situations. Our results do 
not give some evidence for any direction. There may be a tendency that product 
complexity enhances the shared content by the retailer (b = +.13; p=.16; two-tailed 
probability), but this is almost certainly not the case for the shared content by the supplier 
(b= +.03; p=.78; two-tailed probability).  
Hypotheses H1d-r and H1d-s assume that the amount of channel inertia – the length of the 
structural time lag in reacting to changes in consumer demand – inhibits the sharing of 
market information content by the channel members. We find a marginal support for one 
of the two hypotheses; i.e., for the retailer’s degrees of shared content (b = -.15; p= .08); no 
support is found for the suppliers (b= -.04; p= .35). This suggests that retailers share 
relatively less market information in channels of high inertia and that the supplier’s degree 
remains unaffected by the level of channel inertia. 
Overall, we find that the retailer’s shared content is more influenced by market 
channel environment variables; than the supplier’s shared content. The market channel 
environment’s predominant impact stems from the level of consumer demand turbulence. 
The more consumer demand turbulence, the lower degrees retailers share with their 
suppliers. We find additional influences from consumer demand growth, product 
complexity, and channel inertia. The more complex the product is, the more the retailer 
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shares; and the more inert the channel is, the less market information content is being 
exchanged by both channel parties. 
 
Market Channel Environment 
Retailer’s degree of 
Shared Content  
 
Supplier’s degree of 
Shared Content 
    
1a: Consumer Demand Turbulence --  n.s. 
1b: Consumer Demand Turbulence SQ --   
2: Consumer Demand Growth n.s.  n.s. 
3: Purchase Complexity n.s.  n.s. 
4: Channel Inertia  -  n.s. 
    
--  = negative relationship with p<.01; - = negative relationship with p<.05;  
++ = positive relationship with p<.05; + = positive relationship with p<.05; 
 
Supplier Network. We expect that the nature of the supplier network has an effect on the 
shared content in channel relationships. The supplier network is constituted by structural 
dimensions, competition intensity, information sharing norms, and connectedness. The 
structural dimensions of the supplier network are here defined by the network horizon 
(magnitude) and network concentration (H2a-r to H2b-s ). In hypothesis H2a-r we theorize that 
a larger number of suppliers (supplier network horizon) would lower the degree of shared 
content, because of the following reasons. Retailers generally prefer to source from many 
different suppliers, because they want to prevent themselves from becoming (too) 
dependent from one supplier. This buying strategy scatters the retailer buyer’s attention 
over a widespread group of smaller trading partners, and subsequently it reduces the 
opportunity to engage in more collaborative open sharing arrangements. A reduced 
opportunity to have the retailer’s attention also minimizes the possibility for the supplier to 
share higher degrees of content (H2a-s). Our study shows that the number of the suppliers 
supplying products in the product category (network horizon) does not have an effect on 
the shared content in channel relationships (for retailers: b = +.06; p=.75; for suppliers: b= 
+.00; p=.61), and hence we reject  H2a-r and H2a-s. 
Likewise, hypothesis H2b-r advances a positive relationship between network 
concentration and sharing by the retailer. A more concentrated supplier network allows the 
retailer to focus its dedication to a smaller number of important suppliers.  Hypothesis H2b-s 
however posits a negative relationship between network concentration and the supplier’s 
shared content, because a higher concentration implies for them that the retailer has strong 
ties with their direct competitors. Our study confirms the hypotheses that a higher degree 
of network concentration stimulates retailers to share more content with suppliers (b = 
+.21; p=.01) and, although marginally significant, a concentrated network impacts the 
supplier’s shared content negatively (b= -.23; p=.08). In fact, it is not so much the number 
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of suppliers, but the concentration in the supplier network having an un-balancing effect in 
market information sharing: in more concentrated supplier networks, retailers share higher 
degrees information, while suppliers tend to restrict their degrees in shared content. Later 
we will go into depth in discussing this two-edged effect of network concentration. 
In addition to structural dimensions of the supplier network, also competition intensity 
and cultural dimensions (information sharing norms) in the supplier network are 
incorporated in the study (H2c-r to H2e-s). Retailers are less tempted to share with their 
upstream trading partners if their suppliers are engaged in intense competitive wars. It is 
better for the retailer to play the divide-and-rule game in order to come up with the best 
deal when suppliers are doing their best to compete for the retailer’s preference. So in such 
competitive circumstances, there is no immediate need for the retailer to start sharing more 
content. Hypothesis H2c-r therefore assumes a negative relationship. Whereas suppliers in a 
severe competitive situation are expected to use their market information sharing as a 
competitive weapon in order to win the retailers’ preference (as an extra service to them). 
H2c-s assumes a positive relationship. The regression analyses show that there is no effect 
from competition intensity on the shared content from neither retailer nor supplier (for 
retailer: b= .04; p=.66; for supplier: b= -.03; p=.60). Competition intensity among retailers 
does not have any impact on the shared content from any channel member either (b= .02; 
p=.43 for retailer’s shared content; b= +.13; p=.83 for supplier’s shared content) 
Shared norms in the supplier network concerning information sharing with retailers 
were hypothesized to have positive effects on the shared content by both channel members 
(Hypotheses H2e-r and H2e-s). In supplier networks with favorable information-sharing 
norms, the retailers share more information (b=+.32; p<.01), whereas the effect of these 
norms on the suppliers’ shared content is not significant (b=+.12; p=.12). The relationship 
between supplier’s shared content and information-sharing norms is significant in the 
bivariate correlation matrix (r= +.23; p=.03). Probably, the relationship in the multivariate 
analysis dissolves, because some of the effect is taken away by other explanatory 
variables. A good suspect is the variable supplier’s market relating capabilities (r= .17, 
p<.05); implying that the more a supplier has developed his market relating capabilities, 
the more the retailer tends to think that the supplier operates in a network with already 
established information sharing norms. 
The amount of market information sharing may not be only dependent on 
characteristics of the supplier network as a whole, but also on possible connections among 
the different supplier relationships in the network. For that reason we included the degree 
of negative and positive connectedness of the focal retailer-supplier relationship with other 
supplier relationships. If the retailer-supplier relationship is negatively connected with 
other supplier relationships in the network, then the retailer is hampered to share 
information openly since the retailer does not want to harm the other supplier relationships 
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(Hypotheses H2f-r). Yet in such a situation, the supplier is more motivated to compete with 
its direct competitor and share more openly with the retailer (Hypotheses H2f-s is positive). 
Both hypotheses are not supported by our empirical results (for retailer: b= -.06; p=.25; for 
supplier: b= +.04; p=.34).  
If the retailer-supplier relationship is positively connected with other supplier 
relationships in the network, then the retailer might be extra motivated to share information 
openly since the retailer may provoke the other supplier relationships to start sharing with 
the retailer (Hypotheses H2g-r). We find however no support for this hypothesis either (b = 
+.04; p = .34). Positive connectedness is also to have a negative influence of the supplier’s 
shared content (Hypotheses H2g-s). We do not find evidence for this relationship. The 
shared content by the supplier appears to be unrelated with the level positive 
connectedness (b = -.09; p=.18).  
Recapitulating the supplier network effects on shared content in channel relationships; 
it occurs that this is primarily driven by two main factors. First, the concentration within 
the supplier network enhances the retailer’s shared content on the one side but it 
diminishes the supplier’s shared content on the other side. Second, the greatest influence 
on retailer’s shared content appears to come from the information sharing norms in the 
supplier network. As information sharing norms in the supplier network exist, retailers feel 
obliged to share higher degrees; the shared content by suppliers is however not affected by 
these sharing standards. The network horizon, competition intensity, positive and negative 
connectedness do not have a significant influence on the shared content from any channel 
member. 
 
Supplier Network 
Retailer’s degree of 
Shared Content  
 
Supplier’s degree of 
Shared Content 
    
5: Network Horizon n.s.  n.s. 
6: Network Concentration ++  - 
7: Competition Intensity among Suppliers n.s.  n.s. 
8: Competition Intensity among Retailers n.s.  n.s. 
9: Information Sharing Norms ++  n.s. 
10: Negative Connectedness  n.s.  n.s. 
11: Positive Connectedness n.s.  n.s. 
    
--  = negative relationship with p<.01; - = negative relationship with p<.05;  
++ = positive relationship with p<.05; + = positive relationship with p<.05; 
 
Relationship Characteristics. The influence of relationship characteristics on the shared 
content was theorized in hypotheses H3a-r to H3f-s. We expect the age of the relationship to 
have a positive effect on the sharing of both channel members, because older relationships 
have survived different and maybe difficult episodes; channel members are more 
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accustomed to each other and are likely to be more open to each other (H3a-r and H3a-s). 
Since relationship age had a lot of missing values and was never significant in the bivariate 
analyses, it was dropped from further consideration. 
Based on the numerous results from previous marketing channel studies (Morgan and 
Hunt, 1994; Geyskens, 1998) and the abundance of citations in the trade press stating the 
critical importance of trust in ECR-projects (e.g., the ECR Europe’s CPFR Guide to 
Implementation, 2001), we hypothesize that trust in the channel counterpart (i.c. supplier) 
plays a pivotal role in collaborative channel communication (H3b-r and H3b-s), or in this 
particular case, in market information sharing in channel relationships. Our study 
demonstrates that no positive effect of trust on the shared content from the retailer can be 
found (b= +.03; p=.38). Apparently, retailers do not prefer to share more content with 
suppliers that they trust more; it seems that their decision to choose a sharing partner is 
largely driven by more professional considerations, like as we will report later, dependency 
and competency, rather than sympathetic relationship sentiments as trust is. 
Despite the significant bivariate correlation score between the supplier’s degree of 
shared content and trust (r=.21; p<.05; see Appendix VI.7), trust does not significantly 
influence the shared content by the supplier (b= .00; p=.49). Probably, the influence of 
trust on the degree of shared content by the supplier is taken away by other variables: most 
likely by market sensing and relating capabilities of suppliers, because retailers tend to 
trust more suppliers with good market-sensing and market-relating capabilities (r = .22 and 
r= .28 respectively; see Appendix VI.6). As we will see later, suppliers with good relevant 
capabilities have largely a positive impact on shared content. An alternative might be that 
trust is a consequence of supplier’s degree of shared content; and that higher degrees of 
shared content (relatively higher openness) are in fact clear trust signals to the retailer that 
the supplier can be relied upon.  
The investments specially made by the retailer to cater to the supplier relationships, 
we theorize as having both a positive and a negative influence on the sharing of market 
information in the channel relationship (H3c-r and H3c-s), for the retailer and the supplier, 
respectively. On the one hand, the retailer is motivated to share market information after it 
has invested a lot in the supplier relationship, because the loss of this investment when the 
supplier relationship is terminated must be prevented (H3c-r is positive). Yet on the other 
hand, the investments made by the retailer can be considered a hostage to suppliers. 
Having such a hostage does not really stimulate them to put extra effort in the relationship 
with the retailer and therefore we expect suppliers not to share more market information 
(H3c-s is negative). We find support for both hypotheses that the amount of relationship-
specific investments increases the retailer’s shared content (b= +.16; p=.06) while – 
although marginally significant – it decreases the supplier’s shared content (b= -.15; p= 
.10); suggesting that the supplier refrains from sharing more content with the retailer, when 
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the retailer has dedicated more investments to its relationship with the supplier and 
becomes locked-in the supplier relationship. We can say that the amount of relationship-
specific investments leads to a hostage situation by the supplier. 
Contract formalization can perhaps safeguard all the information sharing efforts (and 
relationship-specific investments) made by channel parties. The hypotheses for both 
retailer’s and supplier’s shared content are that a well-formalized contract encourages 
channel members to share more market information (H3d-r and H3d-s are positive). Our 
research does not find that the contract formalization protects the extra market sharing 
investments by the channel members, does not stimulate shared content from either side 
(respectively b= - .00; p= .50; b= +.07; p= .19).  
The hypotheses about the effect of the total interdependence on the retailer’s and 
supplier’s shared content (H3e-r and H3e-s) are both positive. As for the retailer’s shared 
content, we expect that retailers choose to share higher degrees with suppliers they have 
more common interests with. The chance of misuse, leakage and loss of negotiating power 
might be less in more interdependent relationships. When it comes down to the supplier’s 
shared content, the supplier cannot afford to withhold information when he and the retailer 
are both very much dependent on each other; that might harm to his position to a too great 
extent. We find support for both effects: H3e-r for retailer’s shared content is accepted (b= 
+.22; p=.01), and H3e-s for the supplier’s shared content (b = +.12; p = .02). 
The expected effects of dependence asymmetry on the shared content of the two 
channel members (from H3f-r to H3g-s) are totally the opposite of the previous hypotheses. 
The benefits and costs of sharing information are respectively lower and higher because, in 
general, asymmetry in dependence creates an instable and conflictual situation with 
possibilities of exploitation and retaliation. We do not find any support for any of the four 
hypotheses.  
 
Relationship Characteristics 
Retailer’s degree of 
Shared Content  
 
Supplier’s degree of 
Shared Content 
    
13: Trust in the Supplier n.s.  n.s. 
14: Relationship-specific Investment +  - 
15: Contract Formalization n.s.  n.s. 
16: Total Interdependence  ++  ++ 
17a: Relative Retailer Dependence  n.s.  n.s. 
17b: Relative Supplier Dependence n.s.  n.s. 
    
--  = negative relationship with p<.05; - = negative relationship with p<.10;  
++ = positive relationship with p<.05; + = positive relationship with p<.10; 
 
All-in-all, sharing of market information with respect to the influence of relationship 
characteristics begins to look like a power game, much more than a trusting-game. Trust in 
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the supplier does not play a major role. Channel parties only share with counterparts when 
they are mutually dependent; or they share perhaps out of fear of losing their relationship-
specific investments.  
 
Supplier Characteristics. We expect to find additional explanations for the shared content 
in supplier characteristics. In the first place, the shared content may depend on the 
supplier’s capabilities to give good quality market information (market sensing 
capabilities) and to be good at processing the received market information (market relating 
capabilities). In the second place, the sharing may be influenced by the supplier’s 
willingness to behave on behalf of the retailer’s objective (goal congruency) and to invest 
extra time and effort in channel collaborations (top management support and incentive 
structure). 
In accordance to hypotheses H4a-r and H4a-s, the impact of the supplier’s market 
sensing capabilities on shared content is different for the supplier’s shared content and the 
retailer’s. On one hand, suppliers with good capabilities to sense the marketplace share 
more content with their retailers (b=+.30; p=.01; H4a-s is accepted), while on the other hand 
these skilled suppliers receive less market information content from the retailer (b= -.22; 
p=.03; H4a-r accepted). Probably the explanation is that these suppliers can (better) collect 
market information themselves; retailers are not in the position to make a valuable 
contribution and basically listen to what these suppliers have to tell them about the market 
developments. 
In agreement with hypothesis H4b-r about the effect of the supplier’s market-relating 
capabilities, we find that the relationship is significant (b= +.20; p= .06). This means that 
retailers give more of their market information to suppliers having the capabilities to 
interpret the market information well and to translate it into marketing actions.  
As posited by hypothesis H4b-s, we find a positive effect of supplier’s market 
capabilities on the shared content by suppliers; albeit marginally significant (b= +.22; 
p=.08). It demonstrates that the supplier’s good skills in relating to the market seem to go 
hand-in-hand with collaborative sharing practices as an integral part of their channel 
bonding strategy. This finding provides a tentative support to H4b-s and also matches a 
previous study by Siguaw, et al. (1999) that found that market-oriented channel parties 
tend to collude and engage in collaborative practices with one another.  
Hypotheses H4c-r to H4e-s concern the effects of the three other supplier characteristics: 
goal congruency, top management given to collaborations with the retailer, and the extent 
to which the supplier’s incentive structure rewards collaboration with the retailer.  All of 
the hypotheses are positive because they are factors allegedly inviting retailers to share 
market information (H4c-r to H4e-r) and stimulating the shared content by the supplier (H4c-s 
to H4e-s).  
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We find no support for the positive effect of goal congruency on the retailer’s or 
supplier’s shared content (b= +.09; p=19 and b= +.13; p=.18). The strong bi-variate 
correlations of goal congruency with the supplier’s shared content (r = .37; p<.01) do not 
appear to result into effects; perhaps due to the correlations with other explanatory 
variables. The supplier’s goal congruency is strongly related to the supplier’s market-
relating capabilities.  
 Some evidence is found that top management of the supplier supporting collaboration 
efforts with the retailer does have a stimulating impact on the supplier’s shared content. 
The effect that suppliers do share more information with the backup from their top 
managers (b= +.18; p= .08) (H4d-s) reaches marginal significance. Yet, top management 
support from the supplier is apparently not effective in inviting retailers to share higher 
degrees of content (b= -.15; p=.92).  
An incentive structure that rewards cooperation with the retailer does not directly 
result in more shared content from either side (retailer: b= +.03; p=.37 and supplier b= .06; 
p=.36). However, a cooperative incentive structure at the supplier’s side shows to have 
significant positive associations with the degree of shared content of the retailer (r = .21; p 
< .05); it might be that some of the effect is taken away from this variable by the total 
interdependence (r= .17; p<.05). Interdependent supplier-retailer relationships embrace a 
more cooperative incentive structure to work together with the retailer.  The incentive 
structure is also significantly related to the supplier’s shared content (r = .23; p<.01), but 
its effect does not surface perhaps due to the correlations with other explanatory variables, 
like top management support from the supplier (r=.40; p<.01). 
Summarizing the effect of supplier characteristics on shared content in channel 
relationships, we find that the most dominant factors are both supplier’s capabilities of 
market-sensing and market-relating.  Retailers care to share with suppliers good at market-
relating; not with market-sensing suppliers. Suppliers good at market-sensing and –relating 
are prone to tell their retailers about their market findings. They share even more when 
they take extra measures by giving top management support for the retailer collaboration. 
 
Supplier Characteristics 
Retailer’s degree of 
Shared Content  
 
Supplier’s degree of 
Shared Content 
    
18a: Market Sensing Capabilities --  ++ 
18b: Market Relating Capabilities +  ++ 
19: Goal Congruency n.s.  n.s. 
20a: Top Management Support Supplier n.s.  + 
20b: Incentive Structure Supplier n.s.  n.s. 
    
--  = negative relationship with p<.05; - = negative relationship with p<.10;  
++ = positive relationship with p<.05; + = positive relationship with p<.10; 
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Retailer Characteristics. Not only explanations for the degree of shared content in channel 
relationships are to be found in the supplier characteristics, but also in the characteristics of 
the retailer. The retailer’s capabilities to collect market information (market-sensing) are 
expected to stimulate the sharing by retailers (H5a-r), while it is to bring a halt to the sharing 
of suppliers (H5a-s). Retailers are then able to collect market information themselves and 
find less need for the supplier’s information. However, no support is found for these 
hypotheses (respectively, b= +.02; p= .43; b= +.05; p= .67). It seems that not all retailers 
with good market sensing capabilities automatically share their well-collected market 
intelligence with suppliers (b= +.02; p=.43). A nuance should be added here: the direct 
effect may have been taken away by the correlation with the next variable: the retailer’s 
market-relating capabilities (r=.53; p<.01). 
The capabilities to make good use of market information (market-relating) are 
expected to affect the sharing from both sides positively (H5b-r and H5b-s). First, retailers 
with good market-relating skills are expected to involve their suppliers to implement their 
market ideas. The notion of channel bonding (Day, 1994) is very much compatible with 
such types of retailer skills. Second, suppliers feel invited to share their information with 
retailers having these types of skills, because it gives them the opportunity to reflect and 
think about alternative strategies to implement their marketing ideas. We only find support 
for H5b-r on the retailer’s sharing (b= +.25; p=.01). As for H5b-s, the effect on supplier’s 
degree of shared content we cannot find confirmation (b= +.13; p= .17), in spite of the 
significant bivariate correlation between them (r= .25; p<.01). The influence of this 
variable might have been diluted by its correlations with other independent variables. 
Strong correlations with the retailer’s market-relating capabilities and supplier’s sensing 
capabilities (see Appendix VI.6) that have a significant effect on the supplier’s shared 
content (r= .16; p<.05). Retailers with good market-relating capabilities seem to team up 
with market-sensing suppliers to share more information content (conform the reference 
group theory as tested among channel members by Siguaw et al., 1998).  
Indicators for the retailer’s willingness to share information are the retailer’s 
predisposition to ally with supplier, the support given by top management to collaborate 
and the incentive structure lenient to work together with the supplier and all assist 
(possibly) the sharing in the channel (H5c-r to H5e-s). Our study finds that the only positive 
impact from this set of variables is the effect of the retailer’s disposition to ally with 
suppliers on the shared content by retailer (b=+.15; p=.06; marginally significant). 
Retailer’s top management support and an incentive structure lenient to cooperate with the 
supplier do not materialize in more shared content by the retailer (respectively, b=+.01; 
p=.48, and b= -.05; p= .66). No impact of these variables is found to positively affect the 
supplier’s degree of shared content (retailer’s top management support, b= -.19; p=.97; 
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retailer’s incentive structure, b= +.01; p=.47; predispositions to ally with suppliers, b= 
+.07; p=.34).  
Concluding, we find that two retailer characteristics affect the retailer’s shared 
content: the retailer’s marketing-relating capabilities, and the retailer’s predisposition to 
ally with suppliers. Other retailer characteristics do not lead to extra shared content by the 
retailer; and do not elicit the supplier to share more with the retailer either. 
 
Retailer Characteristics 
Retailer’s degree of 
Shared Content  
 
Supplier’s degree of 
Shared Content 
    
21a: Market Sensing Capabilities n.s.  n.s. 
21b: Market Relating Capabilities ++  n.s. 
22: Predisposition to ally with suppliers  +  n.s. 
23a: Top Management Support Retailer n.s.  n.s. 
23b: Incentive Structure Retailer n.s.  n.s. 
    
--  = negative relationship with p<.05; - = negative relationship with p<.10;  
++ = positive relationship with p<.05; + = positive relationship with p<.10; 
 
Covariates (Food Industry and Supplier Type). Considering the results found in the 
previous Chapter 5, paragraph 5.4.4, it is interesting that we did not find any industry 
effects (from food) on the actual degree of shared content from neither channel member 
(respectively, b= .08; p= .17; b= +.39; p= .25) in the multiple regression. A possible 
explanation for not finding these industry-specific differences is that sharing higher 
degrees of content does not lie in the type of industry, but can be brought into connection 
with more fundamental factors. As shown above in Table 6.7, the food industry is 
characterized by less channel inertia (mean score of food is 2.23 significantly higher than 
non-food; t= 4.31, p<.01), a structure of high supplier network concentration (mean score 
2.71 versus non-food 2.27; t=-2.77; p=.01), and a bit more favorable climate for 
collaborative channel strategies in terms of well-established norms about information 
sharing (mean score is 4.18 versus the mean score of non-food of 3.85; this difference is 
not statistically significant) that promote the exchange of market information sharing.  
The second covariate, supplier type (brand manufacturer versus private label 
manufacturer), does not have an independent effect on shared content either (resp. b= -.01; 
p= .52 and b= .11; p= .36). Probably the influence of this variable is also taken over by 
other variables in the regression. Also two other variables are linked to the supplier types: 
retailer’s dependence and supplier’s capabilities (see Appendix VI.6). Retailers are more 
dependent on brand manufacturers (t = -2.05; p= .04) than on their private label producers. 
Brand manufacturers outperform their private label competitors in their capabilities of 
market-sensing and market-relating (respectively, t= -2.41; p= .02; and t = -1.68; p=.10). 
 
 175
Table 6.7 Industry and Supplier Type Comparisons with Related Antecedent Variables 
 
 
Industry 
   
 Food Non-Food Overall t-value (sign.) 
Market Channel Environment   
Consumer Demand Turbulence 4.14 4.62 4.57 1.27 (.21) 
Consumer Demand Growth 4.38 4.24 4.26 -.35 (.73) 
Purchase Complexity 3.03* 3.62* 3.57 1.68 (.10) 
Channel Inertia 2.23*** 3.56*** 3.43 4.31 (<.01) 
   
Supplier Network Characteristics   
Network Horizon 13.00 15.28 15.06 .50 (.62) 
Network Concentration 2.71** 2.27** 2.31 -2.77 (.01) 
Competition Intensity among suppliers 4.50 4.04 4.08 -1.30 (.20) 
Information Sharing norms 4.18 3.85 3.88 -.96 (.34) 
Negative Connectedness 2.92 2.80 2.81 -.35 (.72) 
Positive Connectedness 3.39 2.93 2.98 -1.39 (.17) 
   
 
 
Supplier Type 
   
 
Brand 
Manufacturer
Private Label 
Manufacturer Overall 
 
t-value (sign.) 
Relationship Characteristics   
Trust 5.20 5.33 5.23 .82 (.42) 
Relationship-specific investments 3.59 3.86 3.68 1.18 (.24) 
Supplier Dependence on Retailer 4.09 3.85 4.03 -.94 (.35) 
Retailer Dependence on Supplier 3.59** 3.08** 3.43 - 2.05 (.04) 
   
Supplier Characteristics   
Supplier’s Market-Sensing Capabilities 4.55*** 3.97*** 4.38 - 2.41 (.02) 
Supplier’s Market-Relating Capabilities 4.58* 4.21* 4.47 -1.68 (.10) 
Goal Congruency 5.00 4.89 4.97 -.56 (.58) 
Top Management Support 4.61 4.85 4.66 1.03 (.31) 
Incentive Structure 4.73 4.62 4.68 - .54 (.59) 
   
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01   
 
In summary, we can draw the following preliminary conclusions as to the antecedents 
found to be significant in affecting the degree of content shared in a channel relationship. 
The first conclusion is that we are able to separate the important antecedents from the less 
influential ones. The latter antecedents have appeared to be of little importance in helping 
to explain the degree of shared content. One of these factors, trust, will later be discussed 
more specifically. The second conclusion to be drawn is that from those factors having an 
influence, we can qualify them as either being an endorser or as an inhibitor of shared 
content in channel relationships. In Table 6.8, the endorsers are marked by a (+) while the 
inhibitors have a (-).  
Endorsers and Inhibitors. The degree of shared content by retailers is mainly 
enhanced through seven factors: by supportive information-sharing norms in the supplier 
network, by more concentration in the supplier network, by relationship-specific 
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investments made by the retailer, by the retailer’s relationship-specific investments, by the 
total interdependency in the channel relationship, by the retailer’s market-relating 
capabilities and by the retailer’s disposition to ally with suppliers. The retailer’s degree of 
sharing is inhibited by three factors: supplier’s market-sensing capabilities, turbulence in 
consumer demand and channel inertia. 
 
Table 6.8 Endorsers and Inhibitors of Shared Content in Channel Relationships 
 
Antecedents 
 
Retailer’s degree of shared content 
 
  
Supplier’s degree of shared content 
Market Channel 
Environment 
 
• consumer demand turbulence (-) 
• channel inertia (-) 
 
  
Supplier Network  
• network concentration (+) 
• information sharing norms (+) 
 
  
• network concentration (-) 
 
Relationship 
Characteristics 
 
• total interdependence (+) 
• relationship-specific investments 
(+) 
 
  
• total interdependence (+) 
• relationship-specific investments (-) 
 
Supplier 
Characteristics 
 
• market- sensing capabilities (-) 
• market-relating capabilities (+) 
  
• market-sensing capabilities (+) 
• market-relating capabilities (+) 
• top management support (+) 
 
Retailer Characteristics  
• market-relating capabilities (+) 
• predisposition to ally with 
suppliers (+) 
  
(+) = endorser, (-) = inhibitor. 
 
The degree of shared content by the supplier is endorsed by four factors: the total 
interdependency in the channel relationship, the supplier’s market sensing capabilities, 
supplier’s market relating capabilities, and the supplier’s top management support. Two 
inhibitors cease a supplier to share higher degrees of content: higher concentration in the 
supplier network, and relationship-specific investment by the supplier. 
With the detection of these inhibitors and endorses, it becomes clear that five factors 
have a two-sided effect on the sharing of market information between channel members: 
total interdependency, relationship-specific investments by the retailer, supplier’s market-
relating capabilities, supplier’s market-sensing capabilities, and supplier network 
concentration. Suppliers that have good market-relating capabilities share higher degrees 
of market information and also invite their retailers to share with them. An increase in total 
interdependency in the channel relationship also encourages both channel members to 
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share higher degrees of their market information. Relationship-specific investments, 
supplier’s market-sensing capabilities and supplier network concentration have a more 
complicated upshot:  they are both the endorser for one party, but simultaneously an 
inhibitor for the other. 
Lessons learnt from this list of endorsers and inhibitors are that market information 
sharing is predominantly a matter of the channel firms’ capabilities and their 
interdependencies. And it is not so much a trusting game. We draw this conclusion from 
analyzing the channel member’s characteristics and the types of decisions the firm needs to 
make; and we notice then that they primarily choose for the option in which it occupies a 
position of strength.  
In the first place, information sharing can be in the retailer’s genes: a retailer with 
good market-relating capabilities and with a predisposition to ally with suppliers is keener 
to share information with suppliers. These two characteristics show that a retailer feeling 
confident of its strengths discloses much more about its own market position. Besides that 
a retailer’s information sharing strategy can also be influenced (adjusted) by a number of 
contingencies and the two types of decisions it needs to make: (1) in which product 
category, and (2) with whom to share (higher degrees of content) with. As for the first 
decision, a retailer would exhibit a preference for a product category where consumer 
demand is less turbulent, where channel inertia is low, where supplier network is 
concentrated and surveyable, and where channel members have an established a norm for 
information sharing. Clearly, such an environment is characterized by stability, flexibility, 
and munificence; that is easier to control for the retailer. 
As for the second decision needed to make – with whom to share information? - , a 
retailer would opt for sharing in channel relationships in which it add a valuable 
contribution and where it is not dominated and exploited by the supplier. A retailer shares 
its information in relationships where it manages to consolidate its position of strength and 
thus with an interdependent supplier with whom the informational investments will pay off 
sooner or later into its own benefits. Still, an interdependent supplier needs to convince the 
retailer its added value, because if a supplier is also good at market-relating, a retailer is 
tended to share more information, but if a supplier would be good at collecting market 
information itself, a retailer would prefer to stay silent and keep the market information. 
One exception on this rule is the situation when the retailers feel that they have made many 
relationship-specific investments and have a lot to lose; in this lock-in case, retailers share 
more of their market information. 
Similarly, a supplier discloses more of their own market information when it finds 
itself in a position of strength. First of all, the supplier with good market-sensing and –
relating capabilities and top management support confidently shares higher degrees of their 
market information with retailers. Its practices of market information sharing is not 
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dependent on the market channel characteristics; because the product category they choose 
to enter has been taken at a more corporate level and can (now) only be treated as a given. 
A suppliers does depend its market information sharing decision on with whom to share. In 
the supplier’s information sharing partner selection, it shares information with a retailer 
who has a common interest and benefits from strengthening the supplier’s position. 
Retailers with a high concentrated supplier network are not considered to be instrumental 
in that sense and therefore avoided. So, a supplier seeks out retail information sharing 
partners that cannot play off big competitors against each other. But when the interests of 
the retailer becomes larger than the supplier, for instance when the relationship-specific 
investments by the retailer is bigger, then it refrains from sharing. 
Hence, we conclude that channel members (both retailers and suppliers) share higher 
degrees of content only from a position of strength. Only when they think of themselves to 
be in a channel leadership position relative to or together with their counterpart, they may 
share higher degrees of market information; and when they are able to regard themselves 
as the director of the channel. 
Non-Influential Factors. Several factors show to have little power for explaining the 
degree of shared content in channel relationships: consumer demand growth, product 
complexity, competition intensity, connectedness, age of the relationship and trust. Of all 
of these factors, it is the finding of no influence by trust that counters much anecdotal 
evidence given by practitioners and theoretical hypotheses by academics.  
 
 
6.4 Hypothesis Testing: Antecedents of Sharing Mode 
Concerning the Sharing Mode, in order to test our hypotheses (from H1a-rs to H5f-rs) we 
performed seven OLS-regressions; one for each sharing mode variable: contact frequency 
by the retailer and by the supplier, the contact frequency of higher management from 
retailer and from supplier, exclusivity given by retailer, and by supplier, and the 
formalization of the market information sharing process. The results of these analyses are 
shown in Table 6.9. The explained variance per model differs to a rather large extent. The 
adjusted R-square scores range from .06 (exclusivity given by retailer) to .25 
(formalization).  
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Table 6.9 Antecedents of Sharing Mode 
 Dependent Variables 
 
 
Overall 
Contact Frequency 
Contact Frequency 
Higher Management 
Independent Variables By retailer By supplier From Retailer From Supplier 
Market Channel Environment       
1: Consumer Demand Turbulence H1a-rs : * -.02 (.43)  .00 (.49)  .03 (.77)  -.01 (.45)  
2: Consumer Demand Growth H1b-rs : + .24 (<.01)  .27 (<.01)  -.04 (.60)  .13 (.08)  
3: Purchase Complexity H1c-rs : + -.09 (.14)  -.12 (.91)  -.07 (.38)  .05(.31)  
4: Channel Inertia  H1d-rs : - -.02 (.43)  -.04 (.33)  .13 (.18)  .03 (.41)  
       
Supplier Network       
5: Network Horizon H2a-rs : - .10 (.11)  .01 (.43)  .08 (.32)  -.04 (.34)  
6: Network Concentration H2b-rs : * .01 (.43)  .04 (.69)  .06 (.42)  -.03 (.36)  
7: Supplier Competition Intensity H2c-rs : * .24 (.99)  .21 (.01)  .16 (.92)  .04 (.35)  
8: Retailer Competition Intensity H5f-rs : * .06 (.24)  .03 (.61)  .03 (.38)  .03 (.63)  
9: Information Sharing Norms H2d-rs : + .02 (.41)  .02 (.40)  -.04 (.64)  -.02 (.41)  
10: Negative Connectedness  H2e-rs : * -.11 (.10)  -.14 (.05)  -.11 (.17)  -.00 (.52)  
11: Positive Connectedness H2f-rs : * -.06 (.77)  -.04 (.32)  -.07 (.65)  -.03 (.36)  
       
Relationship Characteristics       
12: Age of the Relationship H3a-rs : + ** ** ** ** 
13: Trust in the Supplier H3b-rs : * .05 (.29)  .04 (.32)  -.02 (.79)  .02 (.42)  
14: Relationship-specific Investment H3c-rs : * .15 (.05)  .11 (.88)  .21 (.02)  .16 (.95)  
15: Contract Formalization H3d-rs : + .02 (.39)  .01 (.45)  .08 (.30)  .02 (.40)  
16: Total Interdependence  H3e-rs : + .16 (.03)  .10 (.12)  .14 (.09)  .30 (<.01)  
17a: Relative Retailer Dependence  H3f-rs : - .01 (.54)  .08 (.82)  -.10 (.27)  .02 (.58)  
17b: Relative Supplier Dependence H3f-rs : - -.05 (.28)  .01 (.54)  -.12 (.17)  -.01 (.44)  
       
Supplier Characteristics       
18a: Market Sensing Capabilities H4a-rs : * -.21 (.03)  -.11 (.84)  .03 (.81)  -.14 (.89)  
18b: Market Relating Capabilities H4b-rs : + .06 (.31)  -.02 (.56)  .03 (.78)  .14 (.13)  
19: Goal Congruency H4c-rs : + .13 (.09)  .18 (.03)  -.05 (.60)  -.14 (.92)  
20a: Top Management Support Supplier H4d-rs : + -.11 (.88)  -.09 (.83)  .08 (.37)  -.04 (.66)  
20b: Incentive Structure Supplier H4e-rs : + .27 (<.01)  .33 (<.01)  .28 (<.01)  .12 (.13)  
       
Retailer Characteristics       
21a: Market Sensing Capabilities H5a-rs : * .09 (.15)  -.11 (.89)  .15 (.10)  -.12 (.90)  
21b: Market Relating Capabilities H5b-rs : + .06 (.24)  .11 (.11)  .06 (.52)  .15 (.06)  
22: Predisposition to ally with suppliers H5c-rs : + -.05 (.73)  -.13 (.92)  .01 (.92)  .08 (.21)  
23a: Top Management Support Retailer H5d-rs : + -.04 (.69)  .06 (.24)  .03 (.77)  .10 (.14)  
23b: Incentive Structure Retailer H5e-rs : + -.16 (.93)  -.15 (.93)  -.22 (.96)  -.07 (.28)  
       
Covariates       
Industry (1 = Food; 0 = other industries)  * -.13 (.06)  -.22 (<.01)  -.19 (.02)  -.12 (.09)  
Supplier Type (1 = brand manufacturer; 0 
= private label) 
- -.23 (<.01)  -.15 (.04)  -.27 (<.01)  -.08 (.20)  
R-square .35 .36 .38 .26 
Adj. R-square .21 .21 .23 .09 
F (sign.) 2.37 (<.01) 2.43 (<.01) 2.65 (<.01) 1.51 (.06) 
N 158 158 158 158 
Continued
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Table 6.9 Continued 
 Dependent Variables 
 
 
Exclusivity Formalization 
Independent Variables Given by Retailer Given by Supplier Information Sharing 
Market Channel Environment      
1: Consumer Demand Turbulence H1a-rs : * -.17 (.05)  -.19(.97)  -.05(.29)  
2: Consumer Demand Growth H1b-rs : + .07 (.23)  .18(.02)  .02(.42)  
3: Purchase Complexity H1c-rs : + .08 (.20)  -.07(.21)  -.04(.33)  
4: Channel Inertia  H1d-rs : - -.04 (.36)  .04(.34)  -.14(.07)  
      
Supplier Network      
5: Network Horizon H2a-rs : - -.00 (.48)  .01(.47)  -.17(.02)  
6: Network Concentration H2b-rs : * -.07 (.80)  -.17(.02)  -.13(.05)  
7: Supplier Competition Intensity H2c-rs : * -.13 (.09)  .02(.40)  .15(.96)  
8: Retailer Competition Intensity H5f-rs : * -.00 (.51)  .05(.71)  -.10(.13)  
9: Information Sharing Norms H2d-rs : + -.07 (.21)  -.01(.45)  -.01(.46)  
10: Negative Connectedness  H2e-rs : * .15(.94)  -.01(.54)  -.13(.06)  
11: Positive Connectedness H2f-rs : * -.01 (.56)  .09(.85)  .10(.89)  
      
Relationship Characteristics      
12: Age of the Relationship H3a-rs : + ** ** ** 
13: Trust in the Supplier H3b-rs : * .09 (.17)  .11(.12)  -.07(.22)  
14: Relationship-specific Investment H3c-rs : * .21 (.02)  .23(.99)  .16(.04)  
15: Contract Formalization H3d-rs : + -.03 (.35)  -.03(.37)  .33(<.01)  
16: Total Interdependence  H3e-rs : + .09 (.16)  .13(.07)  .05(.29)  
17a: Relative Retailer Dependence  H3f-rs : - .01 (.54)  -.11(.11)  -.09(.14)  
17b: Relative Supplier Dependence H3f-rs : - .07 (.77)  .12(.90)  -.20(.01)  
      
Supplier Characteristics      
18a: Market Sensing Capabilities H4a-rs : * .10 (.80)  -.08(.75)  .25(.01)  
18b: Market Relating Capabilities H4b-rs : + .12 (.17)  .26(.01)  -.13(.89)  
19: Goal Congruency H4c-rs : + -.13 (.89)  -.03(.62)  .10(.14)  
20a: Top Management Support Supplier H4d-rs : + -.12 (.88)  -.12(.88)  .08(.18)  
20b: Incentive Structure Supplier H4e-rs : + .15 (.08)  .23(.01)  .06(.25)  
      
Retailer Characteristics      
21a: Market Sensing Capabilities H5a-rs : * -.07 (.76)  .03(.64)  .16(.04)  
21b: Market Relating Capabilities H5b-rs : + -.11 (.87)  -.04(.66)  .07(.21)  
22: Predisposition to ally with suppliers H5c-rs : + -.02 (.57)  -.12(.91)  -.08(.82)  
23a: Top Management Support Retailer H5d-rs : + -.07 (.75)  -.04(.65)  .01(.48)  
23b: Incentive Structure Retailer H5e-rs : + .10 (.19)  -.01(.48)  -.03(.38)  
      
Covariates      
Industry (1 = Food; 0 = other industries)  * -.08 (.19)  -.00(.48)  .05(.28)  
Supplier Type (1 = brand manufacturer; 0 
= private label) 
- -.07 (.23)  -.19(.01)  .00(.48)  
R-square .23 .28 .39 
Adj. R-square .06 .13 .25 
F (sign.) 1.37 (.13) 1.79 (.02) 2.78 (<.01) 
N 158 158 158 
* Notes: the direction of the hypothesis is explained in the text, ** we have tested the models with inclusion of the 
variable “relationship age” and found no significant effect. Due to the large number of missing values in this 
variable, we decided to take out this variable. Doing so did not have any effect on the structure of the results 
shown here.  
 
Table 6.9 above shows the direction of hypotheses by a + or a – when the direction is the 
same for all sharing mode aspects. The asteroid * indicates that the directions of the 
hypotheses can differ for the different sharing mode aspects.  Further on, during the 
discussion of the test of these *-hypotheses, we will elaborate on the specific hypothesis 
directions for each of the seven sharing modes. 
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Market Channel Environment. Sharing mode aspects are hypothesized to be influenced by 
four market channel environment factors: consumer demand turbulence, consumer demand 
growth, purchase complexity, and channel inertia. H1a-rs poses the relationship between 
consumer demand turbulence and seven aspects of the sharing modes, all reflecting a 
degree of collaborative communication between channel members. The directions of the 
hypotheses are based on the notion that retailers in general prefer to have loosely-coupled 
supplier relationships in turbulent environments, while suppliers prefer to tighten their 
buyer relationships as a response to reduce (environmental and buyer) uncertainty. That is 
why, we assume a negative effect of consumer demand turbulence on the retailer’s contact 
frequency, contact frequency of higher management, and exclusivity given by retailer. 
Whereas we expect a positive effect for the supplier’s contact frequency, contact frequency 
of higher management, and exclusivity given by supplier. We only find partial support for 
H1a-rs in one sharing mode aspect: the exclusivity given by retailer. The retailer is found to 
give less exclusivity to the supplier in these turbulent circumstances (b= -.17; p=.05). The 
hypothesis that consumer demand turbulence leads to more exclusivity given by the 
supplier cannot be accepted (b= -.19; p= .97). Otherwise than expected, it is perhaps the 
case that suppliers do not prefer to give out exclusivity in turbulent environments either. 
They would rather spread their odds among more than one retailer in these risky 
circumstances.   
Consumer demand growth is hypothesized to have positive effects on all of the 
sharing mode aspects (H1b-rs). Both parties feel the need to communicate collaboratively 
with each other in growing markets. Furthermore, there exists not much of competition 
between channel members in such a growing demand environment. We find this effect to 
occur for contact frequency, by both channel parties (retailer: b= +.24; p<.01, and supplier 
b= +.27; p<.01), contact frequency of supplier higher management (b= +.13; p= .08), and 
exclusivity by the supplier (b= +.18; p= .02). Interestingly, we did not find an effect for 
consumer demand growth on shared content (see previous findings in Table 6.6). 
Apparently, higher consumer demand growth leads to more frequent interaction and tighter 
relationships without immediately resulting in higher degrees of shared content. 
In buying situations with higher purchase complexity, more a collaborative sharing 
mode is expected to take place (H1c-rs). Purchase complexity does not affect the sharing 
mode, neither the shared content. We do not find any support for this hypothesis.  
Higher levels of channel inertia make a collaborative sharing mode less fruitful; hence 
we hypothesize the effect to be negative (H1d-rs). We only find partial support for the 
hypothesis; in particular it counts for the formalization of sharing mode (b= -.14; p= .07). 
The larger the structural inertia of the channel to react to market changes, the lesser need 
channel partners see to formalize their sharing mode.  
 182 
Overall, different aspects of the sharing mode are influenced by three different market 
channel environment variables. Consumer demand turbulence reduces the exclusivity in 
market information that parties share. The sharing of market information becomes more 
frequent when consumer demand is growing. In a growing consumer demand, suppliers 
give out exclusivity more easily and involve more often higher management in the 
dealings with retailers. Channel inertia impedes the formalization of the sharing mode. 
 
Supplier Network.  As for the effects of the supplier network on the sharing mode we 
posed six hypotheses (from H2a-rs to H2f-rs). In a supplier network with a large horizon, the 
sharing mode is expected to be less collaborative (H2a-rs). We find this effect to be true for 
formalization, for the horizon of the supplier network negatively affects formalization (b= 
-.17, p= .02). Larger supplier networks lessen the need for formalization; perhaps due to 
the increased inconvenience of reviewing all of the growing number of supplier 
relationships to verify their compliance to the formalized rules by the retail buyer. 
Supplier network concentration is expected to have different influences on different 
aspects of the sharing mode (as is indicated by the *). A more concentrated supplier 
network makes it easier for retailers to engage in more collaborative relations with a 
smaller number of their suppliers. However, a more concentrated supplier network means 
that the retailer also deals with other big (competing) suppliers. Leakage of market 
information from the supplier is in such a case extra harmful for the sharer. That is why, 
suppliers are assumed to be careful in engaging in higher levels of collaborative sharing 
modes with retailers in more concentrated supplier networks. We find some support for 
these hypotheses; two sharing modes are negatively affected; viz. the exclusivity of the 
sharing of suppliers (b= -.17; p= .02) and formalization (b= -.13; p= .05). The more 
concentrated the supplier network, the less exclusive sharing from suppliers takes place. 
This finding supports the idea that stronger ties of the retailer with other suppliers 
discourages a supplier to be more exclusive in their sharing due to potency of detrimental 
leakage; and they also refrain from formalizing the information sharing arrangement with 
the retailer. 
The hypothesis for the effect of supplier competition intensity is indicated by an 
asteroid and also needs further specification, because we expect competition intensity 
within the supplier network to have diverse effects on the sharing mode. H2c-rs varies from 
negative for retailer sharing mode variables to positive for supplier sharing mode variables. 
The idea behind these hypotheses is that more intensive competition among suppliers is 
that suppliers please harder to get the retailer’s preference and wish to start collaborative 
efforts to receive their competitive advantage. Retailers see to it that they take advantage of 
the most of suppliers’ competition and rather not limit their collaborations with only one of 
them. We find that the intensity of competition among suppliers makes supplier to have 
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more frequent contact with their retailers (supplier: b=+.21; p=.01). The hypothesized 
negative effect of competition intensity on contact frequency by the retailer is not 
supported by our findings (b=+.24; p=.99); it looks like that the opposite is true: the 
contact frequency by the retailer increases when competition among suppliers goes up; it 
looks like that retailers intensify their shopping for the best deal among competing 
suppliers – also by giving less exclusivity to them (b= -.13; p=.09). Rather than a 
hypothesized negative effect, competition tends to stimulate more involvement of higher 
management from retailers (b= +.16; p=.92). We do find marginal support for the 
hypothesis that competition intensity among suppliers encourages channel members to 
make explicit formalized arrangements concerning market information sharing (b=+.15; 
p=.96). Of all supplier network characteristics, we can thus far conclude that competition 
intensity among suppliers has one of the biggest and diverse impacts on sharing mode. 
The hypotheses for retailer competition intensity is reserved to the previous ones. H2d-
rs is positive for retailer’s sharing mode variables, and negative for the supplier’s sharing 
mode. None of the effects are found to be significant. The competition intensity of 
retailer’s does not impact the sharing mode in channel relationships. 
Our research model theorizes that the information sharing norms would be echoed in 
collaborative sharing modes (H2d-rs). However, our study only shows that the maximum 
positive beta-value is .02 for contact frequencies by the retailer (p = .41) and by the 
supplier (p = .40). Furthermore, we find hardly any support for this hypothesis in the 
bivariate correlations (see Appendix VI.1). Apparently, information-sharing norms have an 
impact on shared content of the retailer (Table 6.6), but not on the way of information 
sharing (Table 6.9). 
In negatively connected supplier relationships, we assume a dual collaborative mode 
of sharing (H2e-rs): the retailer rather avoids collaborative sharing, while the supplier tends 
to share its information in a more collaborative way. We find a marginal indication for this 
effect in the contact frequency by the retailer (b= -.11; p=.10). Stronger evidence is given 
in the effect on the formalization (b= -.13; p=.06): in negatively connected supplier 
relationships at least one of the channel partners does not want to formalize their 
information practices; perhaps to shun further harm. Although our findings do not support 
the hypothesis on the impact on the exclusivity given by retailer, we do find an indication 
that this relationship might be positive (b= +.15; p= .94), rather than negative. It is 
however difficult to exclude the possibility that the exclusivity given by the retailer has 
worsened the negative connectedness and therefore it might be that exclusivity is a cause 
rather than the consequence of negative connectedness. 
The hypothesized dual relationship of positive connectedness with sharing mode 
aspects (H2f-rs) gets no support from our research findings. The highest absolute beta-value 
of .10 (p=.89) for formalization is too low and insignificant. In the bivariate correlations, 
 184 
we find one significant relationship between positive connectedness and formalization (r = 
+.16; p = .04). In the multiple regression, this effect disappears; possibly due to the 
correlations of positive connectedness with other explanatory variables. Positive 
connectedness is correlated with relationship-specific investments (r= .20; p<.01), as 
which we will see later, also influences information sharing formalization. 
Our conclusion is that the effects of supplier network characteristics on sharing mode 
are limited, yet very different from the effects on shared content. We find four supplier 
network characteristics to affect the sharing mode. First, a larger supplier network horizon 
makes it difficult to formalize of the sharing mode. Second, the concentration in the 
supplier network trims down both the exclusivity given by suppliers and the level of 
formalization in the sharing mode. Third, competition intensity among suppliers plays an 
important role in the sharing mode; it affects the sharing mode in more than one manner: 
competition intensity increases the (overall) contact frequency between retailer and 
supplier organization, and it induces the contact frequency of high management of retailers 
(counter-intuitively). Fourth, a high level of negative connectedness discourages contact 
frequency by the retailer but stimulates the exclusivity given by the retailer.  
 
Relationship Characteristics. The research model also poses hypotheses on the influences 
of relationship characteristics on sharing mode. The sharing mode is allegedly to become 
more collaborative as the retailer-supplier relationship ages, yet due to earlier mentioned 
reasons we do not include this variable in the multiple regression analysis. Besides, 
indications are that no effect could be expected, because the bi-variate correlation scores 
are relatively low (maximal r-value is .15; see Appendix VI.7).  
We expect trust to play an important but mixed role in sharing information in a 
collaborative way: trust enhances the (overall) contact frequency between channel parties 
and promote exclusivity given to each other, but also it substitutes the immediate need for 
other sharing modes aspects with safeguarding features, such as contact with higher 
management and formalization (H3b-rs). Again (surprisingly!), trust does hardly have any 
significant influence on the way market information between channel parties is exchanged. 
Except one, all of the beta-values in the regression analyses are in the expected direction, 
but none of them are significant. The general conclusion for trust must be that its influence 
is much less than expected. It might be that variance is taken away by other variables; 
however, the highest bivariate correlations of trust with some sharing mode aspects are 
r=.11 (p= .13) (contact frequency by retailer), r = .12 (p = .13) (contact frequency by 
supplier), and r = .12 (p= .10) (exclusivity given by supplier) and are rather low and 
statistically non-significant (see Appendix VI.7). 
Hypothesis H3c-rs states that the relationship-specific investments made by the retailer 
would have a varying effect on the sharing modes (in the same direction as competition 
 185
intensity): these investments would be favorable for the retailer’s sharing mode aspects 
(overall contact frequency by retailer, higher management from the retailer and the 
exclusivity given by the retailer), yet unfavorable for the supplier’s sharing mode aspects. 
It turns out that the relationship-specific investments have the most important impact on 
the sharing mode. Retailers do not only monitor the supplier relationships with higher 
relationship-specific investments by an intensified contact frequency (b=+.15; p=.05), but 
also by involving higher management (b= +.21; p= .02), and through the formalization of 
the sharing mode (b= +.16; p=.04). Furthermore, retailers continue to make investments by 
sharing their market information on a more exclusive basis (b= +.21; p=.02 for the 
retailer). Contrary to the hypothesis, suppliers are also inclined to share on a more 
exclusive basis (b=+.23; p=.99 for the supplier; we reject our hypothesis). The supplier’s 
higher management is more likely to have more frequent contact when the retailer have 
made some relationship-specific investments (b= +.16; p = .95). This counters our initial 
hypothesis expecting a negative relationship; it might be that the involvement of higher 
management is part of the supplier’s lock-in strategy. It can be just paying lip-service 
without actually giving more market information. Thus in addition to the above reported 
two-edged impact on shared content, relationship-specific investment has a large, perhaps 
mystifying, influence on different sharing mode aspects. 
Contract formalization serving as a safeguard for relation-specific investments and 
making ties between firms stronger is theorized as having a positive influence on sharing 
mode aspects (H3d-rs). Six of the seven sharing mode aspects are not influenced by contract 
formalization; contract formalization only has an effect on formalization of information 
sharing (b= +.33; p< .01). 
The interdependency structure is proposed to affect the sharing mode rather 
straightforwardly (H3e-rs and H3f-rs). We detect an impact from the total interdependency on 
four sharing mode aspects. When the two channel members are more mutually dependent, 
the retailer has more frequently contact with the supplier (b=+.16; p+.03), higher 
management from both parties have more often contact in the exchange (b=+.14; p=.09 
and b=+.30; p<.01, for retailer’s and supplier’s higher management respectively). 
Moreover, the total interdependence has an additional positive influence on the exclusivity 
from the supplier (b=+.13; p=.07). 
The dependence asymmetry is thought to be minimizing the collaborative style of 
information sharing. Hardly any evidence is found to support this hypothesis. We only find 
that the relationships in which the supplier is relatively more dependent on the retailer, the 
sharing mode is less formalized (b=-.20; p=.01). Preferably, under such conditions the 
more dependent supplier stays away from concluding a stricter agreement on market 
information sharing with a more dominant retailer. By the same token, another speculation 
could be that a more dominant retailer does not see the need for formalization. If 
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necessary, its power difference may well be enough to extract market information from the 
more dependent supplier. 
In line with the conclusion drawn in the case of shared content, the sharing mode is a 
power-game too, and not a trusting game. Trust in the supplier has little impact on the way 
market information is shared. Safeguarding relation-specific investments, and dependency 
structure are influential antecedents determining the way in which market information is 
shared between channel members. 
 
Supplier Characteristics. The hypotheses concerning the supplier’s characteristics 
affecting the sharing mode are classified in two groups. The first group deals with the 
supplier’s capabilities to share market information (H4a-rs and H4b-rs). The effect of 
supplier’s market-sensing capabilities on sharing mode is assumed to be positive for 
supplier’s collaborative style, yet negative for the retailer’s sharing mode. We find that 
only the retailer’s contact frequency is negatively affected (b=-.21; p=.03) and the 
formalization (b=.25; p=.01). The supplier’s sharing mode is not significantly influenced 
by the supplier’s sensing capabilities. When we turn to the supplier’s market-relating 
capabilities, we expect a overall positive effect on the collaborative style in sharing 
information and also inviting retailers to have more contact, involve higher management, 
and ask for exclusivity. We detect, however, only one effect for the supplier’s market 
relating capabilities: they promote the exclusivity given by the supplier in the sharing 
mode (b = +.26; p= .01); other sharing mode aspects seem unaffected by the supplier’s 
market-relating capabilities. 
We expect the supplier’s goal congruency, top management support, and collaborative 
incentive structure to enhance the collaborative sharing mode (H4c-rs to H4e-rs). Our results 
shows some support that both goal congruency (respectively, retailer: b=+.13; p=.09 and 
supplier: b=+.18; p=.03) and the supplier’s incentive structure (respectively, retailer: 
b=+.27; p<.01 and supplier: b=+.33; p<.01) foster the contact frequency of both channel 
parties. The supplier’s collaborative incentive structure has three additional effects, 
because it also promotes the contact frequency with higher management from the retailer 
(b=+.28; p<.01) and makes both channel parties to give out their market information on a 
more exclusive basis (by the retailer b=+.15; p=.08; by the supplier b=+.23; p=.01).  
As for the supplier characteristics we can infer that mainly the supplier’s goal 
congruency the collaborative incentive structure of the supplier play a major role in the 
stimulating a collaborative sharing mode. This conclusion somewhat contrasts the previous 
paragraph’s findings that the supplier’s market-sensing, market-relating capabilities and 
top management drive shared content. Thinking ahead about managerial implications, 
practitioners should be wary that an incentive structure which promotes the collaboration 
efforts with retailers primarily results in more frequent contact (“quantity of contacts”) 
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rather than in exchanging higher levels of shared content (“quality of contacts”). Note that, 
in the previous paragraph we reported that top management support does stimulate the 
supplier to share more content (“quality”).  
 
Retailer Characteristics. Hypotheses H5a-rs to H5f-rs regard the influence of the retailer 
characteristics on the aspect of the sharing mode. We mainly expect that all of the 
characteristics assist in a more collaborative mode of sharing, except for the retailer’s 
market-sensing capabilities. Possessing good market-sensing capabilities is expected to 
only enhance the collaborative style of the retailer’s sharing mode, not the one of the 
supplier. We find some support for this idea with regard to three sharing mode aspects. 
Retailers share their market information in a more formalized way (b=+.15; p=.10) and the 
higher management of the retailer also have more frequent contact in their dealings with 
the supplier (b = + .16; p= .04).  More formalization seems that they are alert to only pass 
on their dearly collected market information under the condition of well-made regulations 
with their suppliers. Their cautiousness is also reflected in the involvement of their higher 
management. The supplier’s sharing mode is negatively affected, yet marginally 
significant (p= -.12; p= .10). 
Support for the positive hypothesis of having good market-relating capabilities (H5b-rs) 
is limited to the significant effects on (marginally) the contact with higher management of 
the supplier (b = .15; p = .06). Still, we find that formalization has a strong bivariate 
correlation with the retailer’s market-relating capabilities (r = .22; p <.01). The direct 
effect may have been taken away by the correlation between retailer’s market-sensing and 
market-relating capabilities. 
For the other retailer characteristics we do not find any confirmation of our 
hypotheses; the retailer’s predisposition to ally with suppliers, top management support, 
and the incentive structure to promote collaborative efforts with the supplier do not 
significantly influence the way in which the information is shared in the channel 
relationship.  
 
Covariates (Industry and Supplier Type). In contrast to the analyses for the degree of 
shared content, these analyses do show some effects coming from the two covariates. First, 
industry-specific influences on sharing mode exist. In the food industry, channel members 
have less contact with their counterparts (b=-.13; p= .06, and b= -.22; p<.01). Furthermore, 
it look like that in the food it is less common to have contact with higher-level 
management (retailer; b= -.19, p=.02, and supplier, b=-.12; p=.09). One explanation for 
this industry effect is that the retail purchasing in the food has had a longer history of 
professionalization; retail buying in the food industry is more according to an established 
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pattern. Yearly meetings, vendor rating and the request for sales promotions are 
consolidated in solid frameworks. 
Second, the covariate supplier type keeps its autonomic influence on the sharing 
mode: brand producers have less frequent contact with retailers (b= -.23; p<.01), and 
initiate less contact themselves (b= -.15; p=.04). They are less in contact with higher 
management of the retailer (b= -.27; p< .01), and give out their information on a less 
exclusive basis (b= -.19; p= .01). Explanation for this finding is two-folded; first, retailers 
have more strategic links with their private label producers. Second, brand manufacturers 
are known to have a broader customer base and thus more contact with other retailers. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has analyzed the antecedents of both Shared Content and Sharing Mode and 
aims to answer our second research question: what are the antecedents of market 
information sharing in channel relationships? The outcome of our regression analyses 
explaining the degree of shared content and the sharing mode is that 33 of the hypotheses 
are (partially) accepted, and the 48 others are rejected. 
Other than testing the hypotheses from the research model, our study finds that the 
antecedents of Shared Content largely differ from the antecedents of Sharing Mode (see 
Table 6.10 for an overview of the found effects). We will first start by giving a list of all of 
the most important effects found per building block. Then, we will begin to combine all of 
the given findings and conclude about the fundamental common grounds. 
 
Market Channel Environment. All four market channel environment factors play their 
proprietary role in market information sharing. Their influence is not as diverse as 
hypothesized, but far more selective. Before listing the effects we did find, it is interesting 
to mention that the shared content by suppliers remains unaffected by market channel 
conditions. The retailer’s shared content and four of the sharing modes are significantly 
influenced by the characteristics in the market channel environment. In a situation with 
high turbulent consumer demand, retailers share lower degrees of content, and neither of 
two channel parties give exclusivity to the other. When consumer demand is growing, 
retailers and suppliers do not share more information, they have more frequent contact 
with each other, supplier’s higher management is more often involved, and suppliers give 
more exclusivity. More purchase complexity makes the retailer to share more. Channel 
inertia impedes the retailer to share more and puts a halt to the formalization of the sharing 
mode. 
 
Supplier Network. Five out of the six factors of the supplier network affect the market 
information sharing in the channel relationship. The three main influential factors are 
network concentration, competition intensity among suppliers and negative connectedness. 
First, a more concentrated supplier network leads to more shared content from retailer, but 
to lower degrees of shared content by the suppliers. Network concentration also negatively 
affects the exclusivity given by suppliers and the formalization. Second, the competition 
intensity stimulates not only the contact frequency by the supplier, but also the 
formalization of sharing. Third, negative connectedness hampers the contact frequency of 
both channel members, reduces the frequency of retailer’s higher management, and limits 
formalization. Network horizon, and information sharing norms have a limited influence 
on the overall sharing practices in channel relationships. 
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Relationship Characteristics. Four of the six tested relationship characteristics affect the 
sharing of market information. The most prominent factor of these four is the 
interdependency between the channel members. In situations of more mutual 
interdependence, both channel members share more content, but it also results in 
information sharing with a higher contact frequency of the retailer with the supplier, in 
more often contact between either party’s higher management, and in more exclusivity 
given by the suppliers.  
The second important relationship characteristic is the relationship-specific investment 
by the retailer, due to the following two reasons. In the first place, relationship-specific 
investments have a two-edged impact on the shared content in the channel relationship: 
more relationship-specific investments stimulate the retailer to share higher degrees, whilst 
the supplier’s degree of shared content is lowered; and hereby worsening the locked-in 
situation for the retailer. In the second place, the investments made result in drive different 
sharing modes that may serve as safeguard mechanisms at the same time. Retailers running 
the risk of losing investments specially catered to a specific supplier relationship when that 
relationship is terminated, they are sharing their information in a certain protective style: 
they monitor the information sharing process better by increasing their overall contact 
frequency, by involving their higher management, by increasing their exclusivity of shared 
information, and by formalizing it. We also find indications that in cases of more 
relationship-specific investments made by the retailer, higher management from suppliers 
are more in contact with the retailer; this involvement is not more than a ritual dance, 
because it does not appear to materialize into more shared information from their side. 
Trust in the supplier turned out not to play an influential role in the shared content nor in 
the sharing mode. The idea raised from our analysis is that the sharing of market 
information appears to be a power game, instead of a trusting-game. This finding is quite 
interesting because in previous studies (e.g., Dwyer et al., 1987; Morgan and Hunt, 1994, 
Geyskens, et al, 1998) have argued that the role of trust is a very prominent one. It plays a 
central role in relationship building and maintenance. As a ‘key mediating variable’, trust 
is thought to be the key variable, mediating the relations between important antecedents 
(e.g., communication) and consequences (e.g., satisfaction). In our analyses, we find 
however that trust has hardly any impact on either shared content or sharing mode. We do 
find a significant bivariate correlation of trust with the supplier’s shared content. That 
could give us the argument to believe that trust might be a consequence of sharing instead 
of an antecedent. Higher degrees of shared content by suppliers signal their trustworthiness 
to retailers. Another explanation for not finding an effect might be that trust is especially 
linked with the capabilities of the supplier (see Appendix VI.6). It seems that trust is not a 
separate (psychological) factor, but perhaps important for the effectiveness of information 
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sharing. Hence, in the next chapter (on consequences) we will take a closer look at the role 
of trust on the effect of information sharing.  
 
Suppliers Characteristics. The characteristics of the supplier turn out the have the widest 
and diverse influence on both shared content and sharing mode. The three major 
characteristics are: the supplier’s market-sensing and market-relating capabilities, and the 
incentive structure of the supplier. In particular, the supplier’s market-sensing capabilities 
have a heterogeneous effect: (rather obviously) it stimulates suppliers to tell more about 
their observations made in the marketplace, whereas these suppliers make retailers to shy 
away from sharing higher degrees of content and reducing the retailers’ contact with 
suppliers. Furthermore, it seems that these well-market-sensing suppliers call for more 
formalization in the sharing mode.  
Compared to market-sensing capabilities, the supplier’s market-relating capabilities 
have a somewhat different effect. In addition to the positive effect on supplier’s degree of 
shared content, they also do encourage the retailers to share higher degrees of content with 
suppliers. Suppliers with good market-relating capabilities do not only receive more 
content from the retailer, but also know how to emphasize the exclusivity of their own 
market information to their retail partners, perhaps due to their ability to make local tailor-
made marketing efforts. 
The third important supplier characteristic is the incentive structure to promote 
collaboration with the retailer: especially the sharing mode becomes more collaborative in 
terms of more frequent contact with each other, involvement of higher management from 
the retailer, and more exclusivity given to each other.  
Two other supplier characteristics, goal congruency and top management support, 
have a more restricted influence. If the supplier’s goals are seen as more congruent with 
the retailer’s objectives, then channel parties have a more frequent contact with each other. 
Top management support may indicate higher degrees of shared content by the supplier. 
 
Retailer Characteristics. The influence of retailer characteristics on market information 
sharing is rather limited. Only three factors have a major impact. First, the retailers with 
good market-sensing capabilities do not automatically share more content of their collected 
market information, but these retailers clearly wise enough to safeguard their sharing 
through more contact of their own higher management and through a more formalized 
sharing mode. Second main driver of market information sharing is the market-relating 
capabilities of retailer having a positive effect on the degree of content shared by the 
retailer. Third retailer characteristic is the retailer’s predisposition to ally with suppliers. 
This predisposition makes retailers to share higher degrees of content with disregard to all 
other conditions. 
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All in all, sharing market information in channel relationships predominantly hinges 
on the firm’s capabilities and interdependencies. Besides these two main types of 
antecedents, we found that there are also antecedents that only affect the Sharing Mode 
without influencing the Shared Content.  
After determining in which conditions channel members share information, it would 
be interesting to see whether or not the sharing of market information pays off in a better 
functioning of the channel relationship. The following chapters are going to focus on the 
consequences of market information sharing in channel relationships. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN THE CONSEQUENCES OF MARKET 
INFORMATION SHARING IN CHANNEL 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
After having gained insights into which factors actually drive channel members to share 
their market information with each other, the next important issue to be addressed is 
knowing whether or not market information sharing in channel relationships really impacts 
the improvement in the channel relationship. This chapter therefore concentrates on our 
third research question: What are the consequences of market information sharing? As 
stated in our research framework, we expect market information sharing to have an impact 
on three indicators of a successful transformation of the supply chain into a consumer 
demand-driven chain: (1) joint market learning, (2) channel relationship quality and (3) 
relationship performance. Figure 7.1 illustrates the focus of this chapter lying at the right-
hand side of our research framework. In the same way as with the analyses of the 
antecedents, we employ Anderson and Gerbing (1988)’s two step approach to analyze the 
consequences. 
 
Figure 7.1 Focus of This Chapter: Consequences 
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7.2 Operationalization and Measurement Validation of the Consequences 
The first step is to validate our measurements of the consequences. As explained in our 
research framework, we look at three different measures as success indicators for the 
transformation from the supply chain into a consumer demand-driven chain. The latter two 
indicators concern a more objective and a more subjective measurement of success, while 
the first refers to the process: (1) joint market learning, (2) channel relationship quality, 
and (3) channel relationship performance. With the exception for joint market learning, we 
used multi-item measurement scales from previous research for the constructs for 
consequences; and applied them to our context. For each multi-item scale, the response 
categories were anchored by 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree). In verifying the 
quality of our measurement, we took the following three steps. We first examined the 
intercorrelations among the items (expect for the formative index of joint market learning) 
designed for each scale, removing items that exhibit low correlations. We then conducted 
principal component factor analyses to determine the unidimensionality and discriminant 
validity and further refined the scales when necessary. Finally, we conducted the 
confirmatory factor analysis on the scale items using Lisrel (cf. Anderson and Gerbing, 
1988).  
Joint market learning. A relatively new measurement scale is the assessment of the 
quality of joint market learning in the channel relationship. Based on the steps in market 
learning as mentioned by Day (1994), we composed a formative scale to assess the quality 
in which channel parties are together good at (1) joint detection of market developments, 
(2) jointly interpretation of the market information, (3) joint utilization of the market 
information, and (4) joint reviewing on their market learning process. Per aspect, the scale 
items used in the study are provided in the Tables 7.1. Because of the formative 
characteristics of this scale there is no need to perform a confirmatory factor analysis. The 
validity of this measure must be tested in relationship with other constructs (cf. Jarvis, 
2002; the formative nature of the scale is comparable to the measure of ECR-adoption by 
Corsten and Kumar, 2005). 
Channel relationship quality. Information sharing is also expected to positively impact 
the quality of the channel relationship. To measure relationship quality we looked at two 
evaluative measures of channel relationship quality: the retailer’s satisfaction with, and the 
retailer’s commitment to the relationship with the supplier. Two separate types of 
satisfaction, economic and social, are measured by established multiple items scales from 
Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000). Exact details about which items are employed to 
measure these constructs are provided in Table 7.2. In the scale purification process, we 
need to delete thee items for economic satisfaction, due to too low inter-item-correlations. 
For the same reason, one item is dropped from the social satisfaction scale. The retailer’s 
perceptions of commitment to the supplier relationship are measured by its willingness to 
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invest further in the relationship affective commitment, and continuity expectancy. For 
each of these aspects, one item is dropped.  
 
 
Table 7.1  Construct Measures of Joint Market Learning 
 
Operationalization 
Joint Detection of Market Developments 
(5 items) 
 Joint Interpretation of Market Developments  
(5 items) 
Concerning the detection of market developments in 
this product category, we together with this supplier 
are very good at … 
 
• Collecting market information. 
• Sensing the consumer market  
• Analyzing the product offerings of competitors 
• Investigating latent consumer needs 
• Experimenting with new products or consumer 
promotions. 
 
 Concerning the understanding of consumer demand 
development in this product category, we together 
with this supplier are very good at… 
 
• Ordering the collected market information 
• Selecting market information on the basis of 
relevance 
• Clarifying the structure of the market 
• Discovering our assumptions about the market 
• Broadening our focus on the market 
 
Joint Utilization of Market Information 
(4 items) 
 Joint reviewing of Joint Market Learning Process 
(3 items) 
Concerning the use of market information about this 
product category we together with this supplier are 
very good at … 
 
• Accurately forecasting consumer demand 
• Quickly responding to consumer demand changes 
• Adequately anticipating consumer demand 
changes 
• Effectively influencing consumer demand. 
 
 Concerning the exchange of information with this 
supplier, we together with this supplier are very 
good at… 
 
• Critically reviewing the ways market 
information is collected 
• Critically reviewing the dessimination of this 
market information 
• Critically reviewing the systematic analysis of 
our collaboration results. 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Construct mean s.d min max  n 
Joint Market Learninng 3.66 1.24 1.00 6.14  174 
Joint Detection 3.90 1.29 1.00 6.80  174 
Joint Interpretation 3.66 1.50 1.00 7.00  174 
Joint Utilization 3.85 1.30 1.00 6.50  174 
Joint Reviewing 3.23 1.43 1.00 6.33  174 
 
Channel relationship performance. The channel performance is gauged by two success 
indicators: attainment of in competitive channel advantages and joint profits. The 
competitive advantage concern “the benefits gained over competing dyads that enable the 
[channel] dyad to compete more effectively in the marketplace.” (cf. Jap, 1999, 2000). We 
used 5 items to measure it, but 2 items were deleted from further analysis (α = .88). The 
extent in which joint profits are generated is the second more objective success 
measurement. Two items are used to measure this construct (α = .89).  
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In order to validate the measures, we specified a measurement model with all five 
factors of the channel relationship quality and the two performance constructs. This model 
showed a good fit (χ2= 141.16; p<.01; CFI = .97; TLI = .96; RMSEA = .053). For each 
construct, every factor loadings were (highly) significant (the minimum t-value = 5.15, 
p<.01) and larger than .50. These measures were also tested for discriminant validity by 
the χ2-difference tests (similar procedure as explained in paragraph 6.1). The results of 
these tests can be found in Appendix VII.1. The bivariate correlations among the different 
consequences are presented in Appendix VII.2. 
 
Table 7.2  Construct Measures of Channel Relationship Quality and Performance 
 
Operationalization 
Economic Satisfaction  
(3 items; α = .76; adapted from Geyskens and 
Steenkamp, 2000) 
 Willingness to invest in the relationship with the 
supplier  
(α = .85; adapted from Kumar, et al.1995) 
1. If the supplier requested it, our firm would be 
willing to make further investment in the 
relationship with this supplier.  
2. We are willing to put more effort and 
investment in expanding the business dealings 
with this supplier. 
3. In the future our firm will work more with 
this supplier to serve the consumer better.* 
 
Affective Commitment to the relationship with this 
supplier 
(α = .78; adapted from Kumar, et al.1995) 
1. The relationship with this supplier has provided 
our firm with a dominant and profitable market 
position in this product category. 
2. The relationship with this supplier is very 
attractive with respect to economic results. 
3. The marketing policy of this supplier helps our 
firm to get more results. 
4. This supplier provides our firm with marketing 
support of high quality.* 
5. In the relationship with this supplier, the activities 
with our firm are very efficiently coordinated.* 
6. Our firm is very satisfied with the flexibility by 
which we and this supplier react to market 
changes.* 
7. The relationship with this supplier is very 
“consumer demand driven”.* 
 
 
1. Even if our firm could, we would not drop the 
supplier because we like being associated 
with them.* 
2. Our firm wants to remain a member of the 
supplier's network, because we genuinely 
enjoy our relationship with them. 
3. The positive feelings of our firm towards the 
supplier are a major reason we continue 
working with them. 
 
Social Satisfaction  
(3 items; α = .71) (adapted from Geyskens and 
Steenkamp, 2000) 
 Continuity Expectations 
(α = .89; adapted from Kumar, et al.1995) 
1. The working relationship of our firm with this 
supplier is characterized by feelings of 
hostility.(R) 
2. Interactions between my firm and this supplier 
are characterized by mutual respect. 
3. This supplier is very open about things our firm 
ought know.(R) 
4. This supplier refuses to explain the reasons for 
its policies.(R)* 
 
 1. Our firm expects our relationship with the 
supplier to continue for a long time. 
2. Renewal of relationship with supplier is 
virtually automatic.* 
3. It is likely that our firm will still be doing 
business with this supplier in 2 years. 
 
  Continued 
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Table 7.2 Continued  
Joint Profits  
(2 items, α = .89; adapted from: Jap 1999 ) 
 Attainment of competitive channel advantage 
(3 items, α = .88; adapted from: Jap, 1999)  
1. Together with this supplier we have achieved a 
high level of joint profits between us.  
2. Together with this supplier we have generated a 
lot of extra sales in this product category.  
 
 1. With this supplier we have gained strategic 
advantages over our competitors.  
2. The relationship with this supplier has 
resulted in strategic advantages for us. (R)* 
3. The benefits from this supplier relationship 
enabled us to compete more effectively in the 
consumer marketplace.  
4. The benefits from this supplier relationship 
enabled us to compete more effectively in the 
purchasing market.*  
5. This supplier relationship has resulted in 
strategically important outcomes.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Construct mean s.d min max α n 
Relationship Quality       
   Economic Satisfaction 3.93 1.20 1.00 7.00 .76 171 
   Social Satisfaction 5.56 .94 1.33 7.00 .71 172 
   Willingness to Invest 4.23 1.43 1.00 7.00 .85 172 
   Affective Commitment 4.16 1.49 1.00 7.00 .78 171 
   Continuity Expectation 5.81 1.19 1.00 7.00 .89 173 
Relationship Performance       
Joint Profit 4.81 1.32 1.00 7.00 .89 161 
Competitive channel advantage 4.35 1.39 1.00 7.00 .88 170 
 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 
Group of constructs 
 
χ2 
 
df 
 
χ2/df 
 
TLI 
 
CFI 
 
RMSEA 
t-value  
(min) 
t-value  
(max) 
Performance 
Joint Profit (1,2) 
Competitive channel 
advantage (3,5,7) 
Satisfaction 
Economic Satisf. (1,2,3) 
Social Satisfaction (8,9,10) 
Commitment 
Willingness to invest (1,2) 
Affective Commitment (5,6) 
Continuity Expectation (7,9) 
141.16 98 1.44 .96 .97 .053  
12.73 
 
11.33 
 
5.77 
5.15 
 
 
10.65 
8.33 
9.73 
 
14.55 
 
14.94 
 
12.90 
12.05 
 
 
12.34 
13.33 
15.16 
* item was deleted from scale 
 
7.3 Hypothesis Testing: Three Impacts by Market Information Sharing 
In the previous paragraph, we have assessed the validation of our construct measurements. 
According to Anderson and Gerbing (1988)’s approach, we will now take the second step 
to conduct the tests for our hypothesized relationships between the constructs. The 
research framework in Chapter 3 hypothesizes three types of impacts of market 
information sharing in channel relationships. Information sharing is assumed (1) to 
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enhance the joint market learning, (2) to improve the relationship quality, and (3) yield 
extra performance in terms of joint profits for the channel members and creation of 
competitive advantages for the channel as a whole. 
 
7.3.1 The Impact on Joint Market Learning 
The first impact expected to be made by the information sharing arrangement is the 
positive stimulation of joint market learning in the channel relationship. As we noted 
earlier, the joint market learning consists of four activities: joint detection of market 
developments, joint interpretation of market developments, joint utilization of market 
information, and the joint reflection on the market information sharing process. To test our 
hypotheses we perform five different OLS regressions: one for every joint market learning 
activity and one for the total (see Table 7.3). All five have a good model fit with minimal 
adjusted R-square of .21 and an F-value of 3.92 (p< .01). 
Our results show that the sharing of higher degrees of market information leads to 
better quality of joint market learning. Not only is the total joint market learning well 
stimulated by the supplier’s shared content (b =+.32; p< .01), but also each of the market 
learning processes are supported with the supplier’s disclosure of information: channel 
members are better at joint detection of market developments (b =+.34; p< .01), at joint 
interpretation (b =+.25; p= .01), at effectively using market information in their marketing 
efforts (b = +.29; p= .01), and at the reflection on the market information exchange in the 
channel relationship (b =+.26; p= .01), when suppliers share higher degrees of their market 
information. The contribution of the retailer’s market information to the total joint market 
information appears to be marginally significant, and positive (b =+.13; p=.08); if we look 
at the specific joint market learning processes, the effect on the total joint market learning 
is mainly derived from the assistance in better interpreting of the marketplace (b =+.18; p= 
.04) and reflecting on the market information sharing process (b =+.12; p=.09). We 
conclude that H6a can be accepted. 
Not all of the sharing mode aspects appear to play an important and constructive role 
in how channel members jointly learn about the consumer marketplace. Three aspects 
seem to have a significant positive influence. In the first place, the formalization of the 
information sharing arrangement is found to support the quality of total joint market 
process (b= +.28; p<.01), plus every of the individual joint market learning sub-processes: 
detection (b= +.24; p=.01), interpretation (b= +.27; p<.01), and reflection on the market 
information exchange itself (b= +.35; p<.01), and, albeit marginally significant, utilization 
of the market information (b= +.15; p=.07). 
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The second sharing mode assisting the joint market learning in the channel relationship is 
the contact of higher management from the retailer organization. The positive impact on 
the total of joint market learning (b=.18; p= .03) mainly stems from better joint detection 
(b=.20; p= .02), better joint interpretation (b=.15; p= .07), and joint utilization of market 
information (b=.21; p= .03). 
The third sharing mode of the information sharing arrangement playing a role in 
improving the joint market learning is the contact frequency of supplier (b=.29; p= .03). 
The contact frequency significantly helps to improve the effective usage of market 
information (b=.30; p= .05) and the reflection of market information exchange (b=.38; p= 
.01). A specific significant effect is found for the exclusivity given by the retailer: it 
positively influences the reflection of market information sharing (b= +.13; p<.07) (H6b is 
partially accepted). 
Interestingly, our analyses show a negative association between the retailer’s contact 
frequency and the quality of joint market learning. We could speculate about a reversed 
effect: if the joint market learning process is of low quality, the retailer increases its 
contact with the supplier to repair or prevent the immediate operational problems in trying 
or in failing to be more consumer-demand driven. 
  
7.3.2 The Impact on Channel Relationship Quality 
The second type of impact anticipated from market information sharing is the positive 
influence on the relationship quality between retailer and supplier. As important 
dimensions for relationship quality we included satisfaction with and commitment to the 
supplier relationship. For satisfaction we make a distinction between economic and social 
satisfaction (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). The retailer’s commitment to the supplier 
relationship is measured by three aspects (cf. Kumar et al., 1995): first, the retailer’s 
willingness to invest further in the supplier relationship. Second, the extent to which the 
retailer feels bonded to the supplier in terms of affective commitment, and third, the 
retailer’s expectancy of continuity of its relationship with the supplier. Several highly 
significant bivariate correlation scores between channel relationship quality and market 
information sharing (shared content and sharing mode) already suggest that a certain 
explanatory power is to be expected (Appendix VII.2).  
In order to test our hypotheses we perform five OLS regressions; one for each channel 
relationship quality dimension (see Table 7.4). The regressions for economic and social 
satisfaction have a good model fit (R2 are higher than .08) and a significant high F-value 
(higher than 1.96: p<.05). For the three channel relationships commitment variables – 
willingness to invest, affective commitment, continuity expectations – we find only a poor 
model fit (F-value lower than 1.27; p>.27); it could be that there are better variables to 
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explain commitment in a channel relationship. For all five regressions, the highest VIF 
value is 3.89 (for contact frequency by the retailer); which is much lower than the critical 
height of 10; allowing us to draw the conclusion that multicollinearity is not a problem 
(Hair, et al., 1999).  
We theorized that the relationship quality (as perceived by the retailer) increases when 
the channel members disclose higher degrees of market information to each other. We find 
this effect to be significant for economic satisfaction and social satisfaction. When both 
channel members share higher degrees of content with each other, the retailer seems to be 
more economically satisfied with the channel relationship (retailer’s shared content, b = 
.26; p=.01; and supplier’s shared content, b = .17; p=.08). The shared content by supplier 
also contributes to the social satisfaction of the retailer with the channel relationship (b= 
+.35; p<.01). None of the relationship commitment dimensions – willingness to invest, 
affective commitment, continuity expectations – are affected by the shared content. We 
therefore can only partially accept H7a. We assume that other factors than investigate in 
this study must explain commitment; also regarding the low bivariate correlation scores 
(see Appendix VII.2).  
The collaborative style of how market information is exchanged was also expected to 
have an (additional) stimulating effect on the channel relationship quality. Our data only 
gives partial support for that idea. Two of seven sharing mode aspects appear to have a 
significant impact on one of the five relationship quality dimensions. The continuity 
expectation of the channel relationship is positively influenced by the contact frequency of 
the retailer (b= .46; p=.01), and marginally significant for the contact frequency of higher 
management from the supplier (b=.18; p=.07). 
Since we need to reject H7b (on the effect of sharing modes on relationship quality) for 
social satisfaction and affective commitment, we automatically have to reject of the next 
hypothesis expecting that the impact of sharing mode on social satisfaction and affective 
commitment is stronger than the impact of shared content. 
 
7.3.3 The Impact on Channel Relationship Performance 
The prime motivation for market information sharing is that through this mutually 
beneficial collaborative process the channel members work on improving the functioning 
of their channel relationship to delivering the “right product in the right amounts at the 
right time”. Obviously, these improvements should pay back to both (or at least one) of 
them, and information sharing is bound to result in the expansion of the size of joint 
benefits (pie-expansion) for both of the channel members. The two more objective 
performance measurements reflecting this outcome are joint profits and competitive 
advantages for the channel as a whole. Joint profits are measures for the past outcome from 
the relationship with the supplier in terms of sales and gross margins. Furthermore, 
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information sharing channel parties are assumed to gain competitive advantages over their 
rivals, and attain strategic advantages.  
To test these hypotheses we perform two OLS regressions; one for joint profits, the 
other for competitive channel advantages (see Table 7.4). Only the latter regression has a 
good model fit (adjusted R2 is .20) and a significant high F-value (3.82: p<.01). The first 
regression – joint profit – has a poor model fit (F-value = 1.55; p>.14); apparently there are 
other variables that explain joint profit. For both regressions, the highest VIF value is 3.89 
(for contact frequency by the retailer); which is much lower than the critical height of 
10.00; allowing us to draw the conclusion that multicollinearity is not a problem (Hair, et 
al., 1999). 
Our results show that the hypothesis positing that higher degrees of shared content 
leads to higher joint profits and stronger competitive advantages can only be partially 
accepted. In particular the retailer’s degrees of shared content contributes to joint profits 
(b= +.20; p=.05) and competitive channel advantages (b= +.29; p<.01). The effect of the 
supplier’s shared content appears to be insignificant (respectively b= +.12; p=.18; and b= 
+.14; p=.12). 
We expected the sharing mode of the information sharing arrangement also to have an 
direct influence on the final outcome of joint profits and gain in competitive advantages. 
We however do not find support for that hypothesis. Sharing information in a more 
collaborative style does not immediately pay off in results. The highest absolute values of 
beta’s are b= .12 (p=.12) from higher supplier management contact frequency on the 
amount of joint profits, and b= .11 (p=.16) from the supplier’s exclusivity on the 
attainment of competitive channel advantage. There are significant bivariate correlation 
between sharing mode aspects and the channel performance, but these effects disappear in 
the multivariate analyses; probably due to their associations with the shared content 
measures. Without finding a significant relationship between any of sharing mode aspects 
and the channel relationship performance in the regression analyses, and the discovered 
positive significant impact between shared content on joint profits and competitive channel 
advantages, we can draw the conclusion to accept H8c. The impact of shared content on 
channel relationship performance (joint profits, attainment of competitive advantages) is 
greater than the impact of sharing mode. 
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7.4 Interaction effects 
After testing the hypotheses of this chapter and thinking about the results of the previous 
chapter on antecedents, a number of extra questions are raised and that gives us the need to 
perform several post-hoc analyses. One of the first issues that would be interesting to look 
into was the question whether or not the impacts of information sharing on relationship 
quality and performance would be mediated by joint market learning. Theoretically, there 
are good reasons to think about an ordering of information sharing as an “input” for the 
“process” of joint market learning with quality and performance as “outputs”. We 
subsequently performed mediation tests conform the recommendations made by Baron and 
Kenny (1986), but we found that none of these impacts was completely mediated.  
The other issue raised as a result from the previous analyses, is that some antecedents 
still play an inhibiting or perhaps an unclear role that is worth investigating. For instance, 
the roles of four antecedents, consumer demand turbulence, channel inertia, negative 
connectedness in the supplier network, and trust are still slightly unclear role in the sharing 
of market information in channels. That is for the following reasons. 
Consumer demand turbulence and channel inertia. Our analyses on the antecedents in 
Chapter 6 demonstrate that retailers naturally tend to share lower degrees of information 
when consumer demand turbulence increases and the channel becomes more inert. These 
findings are difficult to reconcile with the results and recommendations from the majority 
of Supply Chain optimization studies. These optimization studies have just shown that the 
sharing of down-stream market information (from consumers via retailers to suppliers 
upstream) is by far more valuable in situations where consumer demand is more turbulent 
and channel inertia are greater (i.c., delivery lead times are longer). Yet, it would be 
interesting to check the contingency effects of information sharing and therefore we 
theorize the expected interactions as follows. What if, despite the retailers’ normal 
information sharing habit, a retailer hares higher degrees of content in a more turbulent 
consumer demand situation, … would it then (extra) help both channel members to 
respond to consumer demand even better and consequently would sharing information pay 
back in terms of higher joint profits, stronger competitive advantages, and/or a better 
relationship quality? 
Negative connectedness and trust. Furthermore, two other antecedent variables – 
negative connectedness and trust – did not show to have any impact on the shared content 
from the channel members. Their roles remain somewhat vague, and we make an attempt 
to seek further explanation; because in management anecdotes, the negative connectedness 
in the supplier network and the lack of trust are often regarded as obstacle to share market 
information in channel relationships. Yet, our findings in Chapter 6, however, could not 
attribute a direct significant influence to them. It would be interesting to explore the role of 
these variables further, and perhaps we find that they lessen the good outcomes of 
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information-sharing. That might explain the negative-laden stories from practitioners: 
information sharing in low trusted in channel relationships might lower its effectiveness.  
In trusted channel relationships, trust may increase the impact of information sharing. A 
negative interaction effect can be expected from negative connectedness in relationships; it 
may hamper the effectiveness of information sharing. 
To explore these possible interaction effects, we performed another eight OLS 
regressions on the (total) joint market learning, the five channel relationship quality 
measures, and two channel relationship performance measures, but this time with the 
inclusion of the interaction terms for these four variables with the degree in shared content 
by each channel member.10 The regressions in Table 7.5 partly confirm these new 
hypotheses. In situations with more turbulent consumer demand, the shared content by the 
retailer (market information going upstream) proves to be more valuable because it pays 
off in an extra lift in the joint market learning (marginally significant b=.17; p = .06), 
economic satisfaction (marginally significant, b=.18; p=.08), social satisfaction (b= .23; p= 
.02), and higher willingness to invest in the supplier relationship (b= .20; p=.06) and 
stronger competitive advantage (b=.16; p=.09). This interaction effect can be quite strong, 
because the top part of Figure 7.2 shows that the impact of information sharing in higher 
consumer demand turbulent circumstances has a very sharp positive slope; information 
sharing in situations with high consumer demand turbulence delivers extra economic 
satisfaction.  The impact of the retailer’s shared content on the competitive advantage of 
the channel is also significantly higher. The value of the supplier’s shared content does not 
depend on the consumer demand turbulence (the higher absolute beta-value is b=.15 
(p=.11) for continuity expectations). 
The reverse seems true for channel inertia. In inert channels with longer time lags to 
react to consumer demand changes, the impact from the shared content by the retailer 
appears unchanged, while the impact of supplier’s content is greater then. It stimulates the 
joint market learning process (b=.39; p<.01), makes retailers more economically and 
socially satisfied (respectively, b=.25; p=.05; b=.25; p=.03), contributes extra to the joint 
profits (b=.22; p=.09), and creates competitive advantages (marginally significant, b=.16; 
p=.08).  
Although, negatively connected supplier relationships did not appear to discourage or 
encourage the channel members to share higher degrees of content (it only affects the 
sharing mode, see Chapter 6), they are neither an ideal situation for an extra positive 
                                                          
10 In total we added eight interaction terms: [TRB*shared content by retailer], [TRB*shared content by supplier], 
[INERT*shared content by retailer], [INERT*shared content by supplier], [CNNC*shared content by retailer], 
[CNNC*shared content by supplier], [TRUST*shared content by retailer], and [TRUST*shared content by 
supplier]. We mean-centered all of these variables and included all of the four main effects to reduce 
multicollinearity and misinterpretation of the effects (Irwin and McClelland, 2001). 
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impact of shared content on the three sorts of consequences. The extent of negative 
connectedness in a relationships reduces the contribution of shared content by the retailer 
on joint market learning (b= -.16; p= .06). Under these conditions the shared content by the 
retailer is less effective: it reduces the impact on joint profits (b= -.33; p=.01), and the 
creation of competitive advantage is obstructed (b= -.17; p= .06). Interestingly, when 
suppliers share higher degrees of content in negatively connected relationships, the 
continuity expectations drop significantly (b= -.25; p= .02).  
Finally, the role trust plays may depend on its effectiveness. We find that trust has 
significant interplays with the degrees of shared content by the retailer. In trusted 
relationships, the positive influence of the retailer’s degrees of shared content on joint 
market learning is even significantly greater (b=.25; p = .01) and the creation of 
competitive advantages for the channel relationship is facilitated (p=.28; p=.01). This 
finding corroborates with the study by Corsten and Kumar (2005) who also found a 
facilitating role for trust in ECR-effectiveness. The bottom part of Figure 7.2 depicts the 
differences in impact of information sharing for channel relationships with (i) low and (ii) 
high trusted relationships. These graphs clearly show that the effectiveness of information 
sharing in high trusted relationships is much greater. In low trusted relationships, the effect 
of retailer’s degree of shared content is even severely negative. If a retailer would increase 
its degree of shared content, it might hurt the quality of the joint learning process, and 
harm the competitiveness of the channel. 
Being aware of the moderating effects of these four antecedents, channel parties can 
really improve the effectiveness of their information sharing practices. When faced with a 
turbulent consumer demand, the retailer should not refrain from information sharing; 
instead it should share higher degrees of information with his supplier, because it pays off 
in extra competitiveness and joint profits. In trusted relationships, information sharing 
proofs to be much more effective in joint market learning and creating competitive channel 
advantages.  
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Figure 7.2 Examples of the Interaction Effects 
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 = main effect  = low consumer demand turbulence 
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7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated the third research question: what are the consequences of 
market information sharing? Central in this question has been which characteristics of the 
information sharing arrangement contribute to the success of transforming the channel 
relationship into a better-performing “demand-driven chain”. We therefore have 
specifically looked at the impact on three sets of consequences: (1) joint market learning, 
(2) channel relationship quality, and (3) channel performance.  
We find at least partial support for five out of our eight hypotheses stated in our 
research framework (Chapter 3). With respect to the direct effect of the shared content, all 
of the three hypotheses are (partially) confirmed. When channel firms share higher degrees 
of content, this leads to: 
 
• Better joint market learning; by disclosing higher degrees of their market 
information to each other, channel firms are better in detecting, interpreting, 
utilizing and critically reviewing their market information. 
• Improved relationship quality; the shared content by the supplier makes the 
retailer more economically and socially satisfied about the channel 
relationships. 
• Higher relationship performance; the retailer’s degrees of shared content also 
positively contribute to the joint profits and attainment of competitive 
advantages. 
 
As for the effects of the sharing mode, only one of the three hypotheses is (partially) 
confirmed; the sharing mode only plays a role in the joint market learning; in particular, 
three of the sharing mode aspects appear to play a facilitating role in enhancing joint 
market learning: viz., formalization of the information sharing arrangement, contact 
frequency of the retailer’s higher management, and the contact frequency of the supplier.  
Our conclusion therefore is that the shared content in the channel relationship is much 
more important for the success in transforming the supply chain into a more consumer 
demand-driven chain. 
We have also performed posthoc analyses to explore the presence of some interaction 
effects of four important antecedent factors. We find that in certain circumstances, shared 
content has a significant extra impact on the consequences. In inert channels, the positive 
effect of supplier’s shared content on joint market learning, economic satisfaction, social 
satisfaction, joint profit and competitive advantages becomes stronger. In trusted supplier 
relationships, the positive impact of the retailer’s shared content increases. Negatively 
connected supplier relationships may reduce the effect of retailer’s shared content on joint 
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market learning, joint profits and competitive advantages. Interestingly, we find that when 
consumer demand becomes more turbulent, the positive impact of the retailer’s shared 
content on joint market learning, economic and social satisfaction, willingness to invest, 
and competitive advantages becomes larger. This finding implies that there is a possible 
pitfall retailer should be aware of. In Chapter 6, we found that consumer demand 
turbulence diminishes the retailer’s shared content, while findings in this chapter show that 
this “pavlov”-reaction by retailers to turbulence is not an intelligent one. It is not very 
sensible for a retailer to limit the shared content because sharing because in such turbulent 
circumstances it leads an extra increase in the quality of joint market learning, better 
relationship quality, and extra competitive advantage over other channels.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION SHARING 
ON THE SUPPLIER’S PERCEPTION OF 
RELATIONSHIP QUALITY11 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, data was collected from the retailer’s perspective. Since a 
marketing channel is a set of interdependent organizations, it is interesting to examine the 
consequences of information sharing from the other channel member’s viewpoint as well. 
This chapter therefore takes on the supplier’s viewpoint. In the Chapter 7, we have 
demonstrated that information sharing can produce good results for the channel 
relationship. It is subsequently also important to know how suppliers react to information 
sharing initiatives from a retailer.  
Looking at the supplier’s reaction in detail means that we are also looking at some of 
the consequences of market information sharing, hence this chapter adds to the insights of 
the third research question “what are the consequences of market information sharing in 
channel relationships?” Not only is the other perspective different from the previous two 
studies, but it also has a dynamic approach with two measurements in time. Due to the 
experimental design we can make stronger inferences about the causal-relationship 
between information sharing and its consequences. 
Our research model for this particular study aims at describing the effect of the 
retailer’s information sharing activities on the development of its relationships with 
suppliers. Relationship development is defined here as the change in the quality of the 
relationship as perceived by the receiving party (i.e., the supplier). Our research model is 
graphically presented in Figure 8.1 and shows the influence of information sharing on the 
development of the relationship. We expect that the relational effect of information sharing 
will be moderated by two variables. 
The first moderating variable is the amount of trust in the retailer-supplier relationship 
before market information is being shared (initial trust). The second moderator is the 
extent to which relationships with various suppliers in the retailer’s portfolio of supplier-
relationships are being connected, i.e., compete with each other. 
                                                          
11 This Chapter is an adapted version of the ERIM working paper ERS-2002-84-MKT “Building Stronger 
Channel Relationships Through Information Sharing” 
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Figure 8.1 Focus of This Chapter: Impact on Relationship Quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.2 Research Model 
A firm’s critical resources may span firm boundaries and may be embedded in interfirm 
resources and routines. Information sharing between organizations is an important 
potential source of inter-organizational competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
However, organizations may not automatically be willing to share valuable information 
with trading partners especially not if they are not credibly assured that this knowledge 
will not be readily shared with competitors. Organizations that receive information from 
partners can be expected to appreciate this and to evaluate relationships in which such 
information is being shared more positively. Given the sensitive character of such 
information, especially within a competitive environment, one can expect that the 
relational effects of information sharing activities of a partner will be stronger if such 
behavior exceeds existing expectations. This will be the case if partners, who are not 
highly trusted, are sharing information. Furthermore, the relational effects of information 
sharing can be expected to be stronger if takes place on an exclusive basis with a specific 
partner in a competitive environment. 
Our research model describes the expected effects of the retailer’s information sharing 
activities on the quality of the relationship with suppliers. Our research model is 
graphically presented in Figure 8.1 and shows the hypothesized influence of information 
sharing on relationship quality. We propose that the effect of information sharing will be 
moderated by two variables. The first moderating variable is the amount of trust of the 
supplier in the relationship before market information is being shared (initial trust). The 
second moderator is the extent to which relationships with various suppliers in the 
retailer’s portfolio of supplier-relationships are being connected, i.e., competing with each 
other. 
 
Change in the Relationship Quality (∆RQ∆t) 
• Economic Satisfaction (∆ECOSAT∆t) 
• Social Satisfaction (∆SOCSAT∆t) 
• Calculative Commitment (∆CALCOMT∆t) 
• Affective Commitment (∆AFFCOMT∆t) 
H2: - 
H1: + 
H3: + 
 
Information Sharing 
(INFOSH) 
 (negative) Connectedness 
 (CNNC) 
Level of Initial Trust 
in retailer (ITR)
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8.2.1 Relationship Quality 
In building a consumer-driven supplier network, it is important for retailers to develop 
strong relationships with their suppliers. Suppliers in strong relationships are less prone to 
leave the network and perform better (e.g., Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Cannon and Perreault 
jr., 1999). The construct relationship quality characterizes the state of the retailer-supplier 
relationship.  
In our study the evaluation of the relationship quality is characterized by two 
measures: the amount of satisfaction, and the level of commitment in the relationship. 
Whereas satisfaction predominantly evaluates the past performance of the relationship and 
measures its state retrospectively, commitment takes on a prospective perspective. Most 
frequently a channel member’s (i.c. supplier) satisfaction is defined as a positive state 
resulting from the appraisal of all the aspects of a firm’s working relationship with another 
firm (in this case, the sharing retailer) (e.g., Frazier, Gill, and Kale, 1983; Gaski and 
Nevin, 1985). Two types of satisfaction can be distinguished: economic and social 
satisfaction (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar, 1999; Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). 
Economic satisfaction is defined as a channel member’s evaluation of economic outcomes 
that flow from the relationship with its partner such as sales volume, margins, and 
discounts (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). It concerns the evaluation of a relationship 
with respect to goal attainment. Social satisfaction is defined as a channel member’s 
evaluation of psycho-social aspects of the relationship. It concerns the satisfaction with the 
social outcomes of the relationship, whether interactions within the exchange are fulfilling, 
gratifying, and facile. 
Commitment is viewed as a critical indicator of future interactions in the relationship. 
It has been defined as “an implicit and or explicit pledge of relational continuity between 
exchange partners” (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987). Different forms of commitment have 
been distinguished. First, when organizations want to continue relationships because they 
like and identify with the other, it is called affective commitment (e.g., Anderson and 
Weitz, 1992). Second, calculative commitment exists when a firm continues a relationship 
because of high switching costs (Kumar, Hibbard and Stern, 1994). 
 
8.2.2 The Impact of Information Sharing on Relationship Quality 
Sharing marketing information can improve the quality of relationships through three 
mechanisms comparable to the different conceptualizations discussed earlier in Chapter 2: 
(1) as a form of improved channel communication, (2) as an exercise of non-coercive 
power, and (3) as a credible pledge for commitment or demonstration of relationship 
bonding.  
As improved communication: “channel communication is the formal as well as 
informal sharing of meaningful and timely information between firms” (Anderson and 
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Narus, 1990). Qualitatively good communication exists when the relationship is 
characterized by open communications and sharing of information (Anderson and Weitz, 
1992), which occurs frequently, bi-directionally, formal, and non-coercive (Mohr and 
Nevin, 1990). Better communication and information sharing contribute to improved 
channel operations, satisfaction and commitment (e.g. Mohr, Fisher and Nevin, 1996). 
Improved communication indirectly reduces the level of conflict through trust. Firms that 
have developed strong trust in their partners are more likely to work out disagreements 
with these partners (Anderson and Narus, 1990, p. 45). Through its impact on trust, 
information sharing also indirectly affects commitment. (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). 
Altogether, information sharing as a means of communication leads to more satisfaction 
and commitment. 
As an exercise of non-coercive power: information sharing contributes to supplier 
relationships through a second mechanism. Because suppliers value real-time market 
intelligence, retailers who collect timely and detailed shopper information have created a 
base of power over their suppliers. Sharing marketing information with a supplier can be 
conceived of as exercising a non-coercive power base: giving reward and assistance (as an 
influence strategy, see Boyle et al. 1992). As such, the bestowal of marketing information 
will be evaluated as desirable and leading to more satisfaction with the relationship (Hunt 
and Nevin, 1974; Gaski and Nevin, 1985). 
As a credible pledge for commitment or a demonstration of relationship bonding: 
information sharing also improves relationship quality because it can be regarded as a 
strong pledge of commitment of the retailer to the supplier. A pledge is an action 
undertaken by a channel member that demonstrates good faith and that binds it to the 
relationship (Anderson and Weitz, 1992). Interpreting marketing information as being of 
strategic value (as an asset) makes exclusive sharing comparable to an investment into the 
supplier relationship. The impact of such idiosyncratic investments in relationships is 
known to discourage abandoning each other and to increase commitment (Anderson and 
Weitz, 1992). 
In this study we investigate the effects of sharing information with a channel partner 
on an exclusive basis (similar to “Category Management”-arrangement as presented in 
Figure 3.3). This means that only one organization will receive the information from its 
owner, which will be an advantage for the receiver. Based on these arguments described 
above we expect that sharing information with channel partners in exclusive arrangements 
will improve relationship quality. We hypothesize that: 
H1: Information Sharing has a positive effect on the relationship quality as perceived by 
the receiving channel member. 
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Table 8.1 The Expected Effects of Information Sharing in different Trust Conditions 
 
 
Distrusting 
Channel Relationships 
Trusting 
Channel Relationships 
 
 
No Information 
sharing 
 
No information sharing has no effect on 
relationship quality 
(∆RQ = 0 ) 
 
(1) 
 
 
No information sharing has a negative 
effect on relationship quality 
(∆RQ = - ) 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
Information sharing 
 
Information sharing has a positive effect 
on relationship quality 
(∆RQ = + ) 
 
(4) 
 
Information sharing has no effect on 
relationship quality 
(∆RQ = 0 ) 
 
(3) 
 
   
 
8.2.3 The Moderating Effect of Initial Trust 
It is interesting to study how trust moderates the impact of retailer information sharing. 
The perception of the other party as not being sufficiently reliable has often been an 
impediment for making any substantial partnership investment, like an intangible asset as 
sharing critical market information is (Wilson and Mummalaneni, 1988). Moreover, trust 
defined as “the extent to which a firm believes that its exchange partner is honest and/or 
benevolent” (Geyskens, et al., 1998) plays a central role in relationships. It is generally 
considered as a “critical” (Wilson, 1995) or “key” variable (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) for 
relationship quality. Only once trust is established, firms learn that joint efforts will lead to 
outcomes that exceed what the firm would have achieved, had it acted solely in its own 
interest (Anderson and Narus, 1990). In this study we distinguish between distrusting 
relationships and relationships characterized by trust. We think of distrust as a barrier for 
further improving relationship quality. 
Table 8.1 presents the expected effects of information sharing under the two different 
trust conditions. If the retailer refrains from sharing information the effect of such behavior 
will be different when the supplier trusts the retailer relative to a situation of distrust. In a 
situation of distrust not sharing information (Cell 1) will only confirm existing 
expectations and will, therefore, not have an effect on relationship quality. In a situation 
where the supplier trusts the retailer, not sharing information (Cell 2) with the channel 
partner will conflict with the retailer’s expectations and, therefore, have a negative effect 
on relationship quality. 
If a retailer decides to share market information, it may encounter different supplier 
responses, depending on the supplier’s level of trust in the retailer. In the situation of high 
supplier trust, a retailer’s decision to share information basically responds to expectations 
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already formed by the partner and we, therefore, expect no effect of information sharing on 
relationship quality (Cell 3). If a supplier distrusts the retailer it will not expect this retailer 
to share information. In such circumstances, a retailer’s decision to share information 
exceeds the supplier’s expectations with the retailer. Hence, it will have a positive effect 
on the quality of the relationship (Cell 4). These expected effects of information sharing 
under different trust conditions lead to an expected negative moderating effect of initial 
trust on the effect of information sharing (relative to not sharing information). Therefore, 
we hypothesize the following moderating effect of initial trust on the impact of 
information sharing on relationship quality: 
 
H2: The positive impact of information sharing on the relationship quality is 
negatively affected by the level of initial trust. The relative effect of information 
sharing will be more positive in relationships characterized by distrust than in 
trusting relationships. 
 
8.2.4 The Moderating Effect of Connectedness between Supplier Relationships 
A key characteristic of sharing marketing information lies in the effects that it may have on 
relationships of the sharing organization with channel partners other than the one with 
which information is shared. Most marketing channel studies take dyadic relationships as 
their unit of analysis. Such dyadic studies draw a boundary around the focal relationship 
but ignore other significant relationships that the actors involved may have. Since 
organizations will often be part of a business network, significant network phenomena may 
make their appearance (Easton and Håkansson 1996). A business network can be defined 
as a set of two or more connected business relationships. Connected means that the extent 
of exchange in one relationship will be contingent upon (non) exchange in other 
(connected) relationships. Therefore, a second factor that we expect to influence the impact 
of information sharing on relationship quality, is the extent to which the various supplier 
relationships of the retailer are connected (Anderson, Hakansson, and Johanson, 1994). 
Connectedness is defined as: “the degree to which the exchange in one relationship is 
contingent on the other.” (Cook and Emerson, 1978). One specific form is negative 
connectedness, implying that exchange in one relationship has negative consequences for 
exchange in the other relationship (Ritter, 2000). If the relationships of a retailer with 
various suppliers compete they will be negatively connected. 
In making strategic channel decisions about information sharing on the basis of 
exclusivity, retailers realize that teaming up with one supplier may have consequences for 
relationships with other (competing) suppliers. Since marketing information is especially 
valuable in competitive markets (Raju and Roy, 2000), suppliers with a retailer 
relationship that is embedded in a network with other negatively connected (competing) 
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retailer-supplier relationships, will especially benefit from receiving information and 
appreciate it. Since an information-sharing arrangement and associated efforts (i.e., the 
retailer’s dedication) represent a scarce resource, receiving channel partners will perceive 
exclusive information sharing as a privilege over their direct competitors. Therefore, 
retailer information sharing will have a larger impact on relationship quality if 
relationships with suppliers are more strongly (negatively) connected. In competitive 
environments with connected relationships receiving marketing information on the basis of 
exclusivity will be an important asset for organizations. Maintaining relationships with 
information sharing organizations will, therefore, be important for the competitive position 
of organizations. 
We hypothesize that: 
 
H3: The effect of information sharing is positively moderated by the level of (negative) 
connectedness of the dyadic relationship with other relationships. When the 
supplier-relationships are strongly negatively connected, the impact of information 
sharing on relationship quality is higher. When supplier-relationships are weakly 
negatively or not connected, the impact of information sharing on the relationship 
quality is lower. 
 
 
8.3 Research Method 
To test our hypotheses we conducted a laboratory experiment. The experimental 
methodology has been used regularly in research in marketing channels (e.g, Stern, et al, 
1973; Busch and Wilson, 1976; Roering, 1977; Dwyer and Walker, 1981; Schurr and 
Ozanne, 1985; Eliashberg, et al., 1986; Scheer and Stern, 1992). We used the experimental 
approach because it enabled use to test the causal direction of relationships between our 
variables of interest.  
Since our dependent variable is change in relationship quality, we had to be able to 
measure the quality of the relationship at different points in time with the same 
participants. Using a laboratory setting made this possible. The set-up of our experiment is 
comparable with experiments as designed by Andaleeb (1996) and Pilling et al. (1994). 
Subjects had to solve a business case while adopting the role of a manager. 
We systematically manipulated three experimental variables: information sharing 
(no/yes), initial trust (distrust/high trust), and connectedness (low/high). All three variables 
had two levels, resulting in a 2 (between) * 2 (between) * 2 (between) factorial design, 
with eight experimental groups. 
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8.3.1 Experimental Materials and Procedure 
We developed a web-based presentation of a business case. The subjects were asked to 
adopt the role of an account-manager of a coffee roaster, called SMALSKO, and evaluated 
the quality of the relationship with a retailer, the supermarket chain SHOPHERE. By 
reading constructed company memos, trade journals, and market reports (e.g., Andaleeb, 
1996; Pilling et al., 1994), the subjects understood that the coffee roaster distributed its 
brand to consumers through a large supermarket chain (called SHOPHERE).  
It was emphasized that the coffee roaster’s marketing department valued marketing 
information and that industry experts saw the supermarket chain as highly knowledgeable 
concerning consumer purchase behavior and shopping habits. The coffee roaster 
(SMALSKO) faced one major competitor (called NUTTREE) that also did business with 
the supermarket chain SHOPHERE (see Figure 8.2). 
At the start of the experiment (see Figure 8.3 for a presentation of the sequential steps 
of the experimental procedure), subjects received information about the focal company 
(the coffee roaster SMALSKO), its major competitor (NUTTREE), and the industry 
conditions (market size, growth, and distribution). Then, dependent on the experimental 
group they were in, subjects received information about the initial trust in the supermarket 
chain (distrust/high trust) and the connectedness (low/high). 
 
Figure 8.2 Marketing Channel Situation as Depicted in Scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The subjects’ company’s initial trust in the retailer was manipulated through a memo from 
a colleague account manager that dealt with the supermarket in the past (see Appendix I 
for an example of the memos). In the distrust condition the memo stated: “you should not 
trust SHOPHERE. I don't have many good things to say. I don't trust these people to be 
very 'up front' with us.” An illustration of SHOPHERE's bad credibility from a former 
Supermarket chain SHOPHERE 
Consumers  
Competing coffee roaster NUTTREE 
(subject represents) coffee roaster SMALSKO 
focal dyad connected dyad 
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incident was also given. In the high trust condition the memo advised: “you should trust 
SHOPHERE. I have many good things to say. I trust these people to be very 'up front' with 
us.” and gives an illustration of the SHOPHERE's good credibility from a former incident. 
The manipulation proved to be successful. Subjects in the initial distrust conditions viewed 
the retailer’s honesty and benevolence significantly lower than subjects in the high-trust 
conditions. In the high trust condition, the mean scores for honesty and benevolence were 
2.93 and 2.50 respectively. Significantly lower than 4.60 for honesty (t = -13.73; p< .01) 
and 4.52 for benevolence (t= -9.65; p< .01) in the high-trust condition.  
Market reports and an article from a renowned trade journal were presented to the 
subjects to manipulate connectedness. In the high-connectedness conditions, it was made 
clear that the positioning strategies of the focal coffee coaster and its competitor 
NUTTREE were similar and that both coffee brands competed for the same consumers. 
Also, the habit of price wars was reported and that as a consequence consumers displayed 
brand-switching behavior. Furthermore, an article from a trade journal described that joint 
sales promotion efforts by the competitor in cooperation with the retailer had hurt 
SMALSKO’s sales. 
 
Figure 8.3 Experimental Procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the low-connectedness conditions, a market report stated that the positioning strategies 
differed and that SMALSKO and NUTTREE served different consumer groups. Price wars 
were uncommon and consumers were brand-loyal. This time, the article from the trade 
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case 
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case 
 
Subject fills out 
first questionnaire 
(t=1) 
Subject fills out 
second questionnaire 
(t=2) 
 
Subject randomly 
assigned to group 
 
Manipulation  
Initial Trust 
(low/high) and 
Connectedness 
(low/high) 
 
2 x 2 
Evaluation 
Supplier’s 
Perception of 
Relationship 
Quality  
At t=1 
Evaluation 
Supplier’s 
Perception of 
Relationship 
Quality 
At t=2 
Manipulation  
Information Sharing 
by Retailer  (no/yes) 
 
 
 
(2 x 2) x 2 
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journal stated that joint sales promotion efforts by the competitor in cooperation with the 
retailer had not hurt SMALSKO’s sales (see Appendix VIII for the texts in each 
condition). 
To determine whether our manipulation of the connectedness factor had been 
successful, subjects rated items from Anderson, Håkånsson and Johanson (1994)'s 
connectedness scale. This scale gauges the degree to which the exchange in one 
relationship depends on exchange of the partner with a third party. The connectedness 
manipulation proved to be successful: the participants in the high-connected condition 
perceived their relationship with the retailer to be higher connected to the competitor-
retailer relationship (mean score 5.67) than the participants in the low-connected condition 
(mean score 4.48) (t = -3.48; p<0.01). 
After reading the case materials, the subjects evaluated the quality of the relationship 
with the retailer (measure t=1 of relationship quality). To stimulate the processing of the 
business case information, the questionnaire began with a few open-ended questions (e.g., 
"In your opinion, what is the business problem that the coffee roaster faces?" and "What 
would be your course of action?"). The assessment of relationship quality at this point in 
time was based the case materials the participants read and was influenced by the initial 
trust manipulation. 
In the second part of the business case information was provided about the retailer's 
decision whether or not to start sharing (no/yes) information with the coffee roaster. The 
information that was being shared on the basis of exclusivity was Category Management 
Information (see Figure 3.3) and comparable to sharing the fourth degree of shared 
content. Whether information was provided depended on the manipulation of the third 
experimental variable (Information Sharing). After reading this part of the business case 
(see Appendix VIII.3 for details on the information sharing manipulation), the subjects 
were again asked to evaluate the relationship quality of the coffee roaster with the retailer. 
Finally, several control questions were asked to check whether the subjects had an 
idea about the specific research goals. Content analysis on the answers learned that this 
was not the case. Our web-based approach of administering the experiment provided us the 
opportunity to present our subjects high-quality stimulus materials (see Appendix VIII.1, 
VIII.2 and VIII.3 for examples of screens presented to the subjects). Finally, to assess the 
realism of the task, the business case was also shown to 12 managers from the food 
industry. Their average judgment on a scale ranging from unrealistic (1) to realistic (7) was 
5.1, showing that they found it a realistic case. 
 
8.3.2 Subjects 
Eighty master-level students participated in the experiment. They had all followed several 
courses in marketing. Their average age was 23 years and 60% was male. The students 
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were paid for participating in the study, and to stimulate their involvement they were told 
that the person with the best business solution would win a prize. The subjects were 
randomly assigned to the experimental groups and the task took them approximately 30 
minutes to finish.  
 
8.3.3 Measures 
As mentioned earlier we used two evaluative measures of the relationship quality: 
satisfaction and commitment. In measuring channel member satisfaction, we used the two 
separate multiple item scales from Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000): one for economic and 
one for social satisfaction. To measure commitment the multiple-item scale of Kumar, et 
al. (1995) was used. This scale distinguishes between calculative and affective 
commitment. The anchors for all items were 1 = strongly disagree and 7 – strongly agree 
(see Appendix VIII.4 and VIII.5 for the list of items). Altogether we thus measured four 
different relationship quality dimensions: economic satisfaction, social satisfaction, 
affective commitment, and calculative commitment. 
 
8.3.4 Measurement Validation 
Conform the approach recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988) we separated 
measurement validation from testing our hypotheses. We validated the measurements of 
the four latent relationship quality variables – economic and social satisfaction and 
calculative and affective commitment – for the two points in time we measured them (t=1 
and t=2; see Figure 8.3). 
First, we looked at the factor loadings of each item on their respective construct by 
performing an exploratory factor analysis. One item for economic satisfaction and three 
items for commitment were deleted from further analyses because they had factor loadings 
that were lower than the cut-off value of .6  (cf. Hair et al., 1998) at one or both 
measurement times (t=1 and/or t=2). 
Second, to confirm construct validity and reliability of the measurements of the 
constructs, we performed confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) using LISREL 8.5. 
Consistent with our conceptualization, we estimated the measurement model of 
relationship quality consisting of the four factors. The fit for both measurement times (t=1 
and t=2) was acceptable. The overall fit indices for t=1 were: χ2 = 102.85, RMSEA = 0.074 
and CFI=0.96 and for t=2: χ2 = 130.16 and RMSEA = 0.10 and CFI=0.93. All items in the 
4-factor model demonstrated adequate convergent validity: their loadings on the 
hypothesized construct were significant with t-values ranging from 4.86 to 12.57 (for t=1) 
and from 4.59 to 11.59 (for t=2) while no substantial cross-loadings were retained. 
Furthermore, when testing for discriminant validity, we looked at the constructs with the 
highest correlations (see Table 8.2), and checked whether they were significantly different 
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from unity. Assuming a perfect correlation between social satisfaction and affective 
commitment, the model showed a much worse model fit (∆χ2 (1) = +38.11 (t=1) and ∆χ2 
(1) = +47.08 (t=2)). Similarly, when we assumed a perfect correlation between social 
satisfaction and calculative commitment, the model showed a worse fit (∆χ2 (1) = +74.13 
(t=2) and ∆χ2 (1) = +63.61(t=2)). All measures had a composite reliability (α) greater than 
the minimum recommended level of 0.60 and 6 out of 8 measures (i.e., 4 constructs 
measured twice) exceeded the preferred level of 0.70 (Churchill, 1979; Nunnally, 1978; 
see Appendix VIII.4 for details).  
Third, we also checked for alternative structures of the relationship quality construct, 
like the 1-overall-factor model (with 1 higher-order relationship quality construct) and 
several 2-factor models. All of these models showed substantially worse fits. 
The fourth and last step in our measurement validation was testing whether the 
measurements at the different times (t=1 and t=2) were structurally comparable. For this 
purpose we assessed metric equivalence between both measurement times (cf. Steenkamp 
and Baumgartner, 1998)12. Configural invariance between t=1 and t=2 is ascertained by 
showing that the 4-factor model fits best in both times (t=1 and t=2). Furthermore, multi-
group CFA retrieves a good fit when invariant factor loadings, invariant factor correlations 
and invariant error are assumed (χ2 = 276.62 (df = 162); RMSEA = 0.095; CFI = 0.93). 
These results provide evidence of metric equivalence across the two measurement times, 
and shows that a comparison between them can be made in further analyses. 
                                                          
12 Metric equivalence problems are typically related to cross-cultural comparisons where samples are independent 
(see Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998; an example in channel research is Cannon and Homburg, 2001). Rather 
than independent samples, this study has dependent samples, meaning that, the probability of having a 
comparable factor structure between the two measurements is higher.  
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Table 8.2 Summary Statistics and Correlations for Relationship Quality Variables 
 Mean(s.d.)  Correlations*  
 
t=1  
 Economic 
Satisfaction 
Social  
Satisfaction 
Calculative 
Commitment 
Economic Satisfaction (ES1) 5.04(1.48) 
 
   
Social Satisfaction (SS1) 3.55(1.81) .227 
(.043) 
  
Calculative Commitment (CC1) 5.10(1.13) .355 
(.001) 
.433 
(<.001) 
 
Affective Commitment (AC1) 3.85(1.64) .266 
(.018) 
.761 
(<.001) 
.439 
(<.001) 
t=2       
Economic Satisfaction (ES2) 5.33(1.06)  
 
  
Social Satisfaction (SS2) 4.18(1.57) .348 
(.002) 
  
Calculative Commitment (CC2) 5.78(0.97) .468 
(<.001) 
.556 
(<.001) 
 
Affective Commitment (AC2) 4.36(1.34) .161 
(.153) 
.710 
(<.001) 
.349 
(.002) 
     
*Note: Two-tailed probability stands between brackets. 
 
The values for all four relationship quality variables were developed by calculating the 
unweighted averages of the subject’s ratings on the individual items belonging to these 
constructs. Table 8.2 contains descriptive statistics for the constructs and the correlations 
between them. 
 
8.4 Results 
The data were analyzed using four ANOVAs with two repeated measures (measurements 
at t=1 and t=2) for each of the four dependent variables. The tested models contain three 
main effects: information sharing, initial trust in the retailer, and connectedness, and the 
interaction terms of information sharing with initial trust (Information Sharing x Initial 
Trust) and with connectedness (Information Sharing x Connectedness). As we are 
interested in the (intra-supplier) change in relationship quality caused by retailer 
information sharing, we report the significance tests for the within-subject-effects in Table 
8.3. In Tables 4, 5, and 6 we present the descriptive results of our experiments. 
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Table 8.3 The Effect of Information Sharing on Satisfaction and Commitment: Results 
of Analysis of Variance 
Dependent variable: Change in Relationship Quality Degrees of 
freedom
Mean 
Square
F Value p-value η2
Economic Satisfaction 
- Constant 
- Information Sharing 
- Initial Trust in Retailer 
- Connectedness 
- Information Sharing x Initial Trust 
- Information Sharing x Connectedness 
- Error 
1
1
1
1
1
1
73
3.84
5.67
0.01
0.17
0.62
8.84
0.70
5.50
8.13
0.02
0.25
0.89
12.67
0.02
0.01
0.90
0.62
0.35
<0.01
0.07
0.10
<0.01
<0.01
0.01
0.15
Social Satisfaction 
- Constant  
- Information Sharing 
- Initial Trust in Retailer 
- Connectedness 
- Information Sharing x Initial Trust 
- Information Sharing x Connectedness 
- Error 
1
1
1
1
1
1
73
16.71
23.94
8.75
0.49
0.02
1.58
0.40
41.58
59.56
21.78
1.22
0.05
3.92
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.27
0.82
0.05
0.36
0.45
0.23
0.02
<0.01
0.05
Calculative Commitment 
- Constant 
- Information Sharing 
- Initial Trust in Retailer 
- Connectedness 
- Information Sharing x Initial Trust 
- Information Sharing x Connectedness 
- Error 
1
1
1
1
1
1
73
18.49
4.77
0.52
2.37
0.01
0.03
0.69
26.83
6.92
0.75
3.43
0.02
0.04
<0.01
0.01
0.39
0.07
0.89
0.85
0.30
0.09
0.01
0.05
<0.01
<0.01
Affective Commitment 
- Constant 
- Information Sharing 
- Initial Trust in Retailer 
- Connectedness 
- Information Sharing x Initial Trust 
- Information Sharing x Connectedness 
- Error 
1
1
1
1
1
1
73
11.27
3.55
9.20
0.21
0.11
1.70
0.42
26.58
8.37
21.71
0.49
0.25
4.02
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.48
0.62
0.05
0.27
0.10
0.23
<0.01
<0.01
0.05
 
*  p < 0.05; **  p < 0.01  
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Table 8.4  The Effect of Information Sharing on Satisfaction and Commitment: Means and 
Standard Deviation 
 t=1  t=2  Change 
{ (t=2) – (t=1) } 
 Mean 
(std. dev)
Mean 
(std. dev)
Mean 
(std. dev)
 
Economic Satisfaction  
No information sharing 5.15 (1.45) 5.09 (1.07) * - 0.06 (1.24) * 
Information sharing 4.92 (1.52) 5.58 (1.00) + 0.65* (1.28)  
  
Social Satisfaction  
No information sharing 3.63 (1.91) 3.50 (1.49) ** - 0.14 (1.00) ** 
Information sharing 3.46 (1.71) 4.90 (1.31)  + 1.44** (1.05)  
   
Calculative Commitment   
No information sharing 5.18 (1.03) 5.52 (1.15) * + 0.34 (1.22) ** 
Information sharing 5.02 (1.23) 6.06 (0.64) + 1.04** (1.12)  
  
Affective Commitment  
No information sharing 3.98 (1.59) 4.21 (1.38) + 0.22 (1.02) * 
Information sharing 3.71 (1.69) 4.52 (1.28) +0.81* (1.08)  
  
*  p < 0.05; **  p < 0.01   
 
8.4.1 The Impact of Information Sharing on Satisfaction and Commitment 
Consistent with the first hypothesis, the results show that information sharing increases the 
supplier’s satisfaction with and commitment to the relationship with the retailer.  
Information sharing lifts both the supplier’s economic and its social satisfaction with 
the retailer relationship. It leads to an increase in economic satisfaction of +0.65 points on 
average (F=8.13; p=0.01); relative to a –0.06 point average decline when retailers do not 
share information. On average, the level of social satisfaction grows +1.44 in case of an 
information-sharing retailer, in comparison with a small decline of –0.14 for relationships 
where no information is being shared. (F=59.56; p<0.01). 
Additionally, information sharing leads to a greater willingness to make further 
investments in the relationship. A supplier becomes more calculative committed (F=6.92; 
p=0.01). The rise in calculative commitment is on average +1.04, when the retailer shares 
information, compared to a non-significant increase of +0.34 for the situation where no 
information is being shared. Furthermore, a supplier feels stronger associated with an 
information-sharing retailer and is more pleased being a business partner of that retailer; as 
indicated by a greater increase in affective commitment caused by retailer information 
sharing (F=8.37; p<0.01). 
All in all, the results show that information sharing is good for building better 
supplier-relationships. The supplier’s social satisfaction experiences the strongest effect of 
information sharing (eta squared = 0.45; see Table 8.3). We accept Hypothesis 1 for all 
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four relationship quality dimensions. 
 
Table 8.5 The Effect of Information Sharing on Satisfaction and Commitment in Low-
Trust and High-Trust Relationships   
 
8.4.2 The Moderating Impact of Initial Trust  
Our second hypothesis states that the impact of information sharing on relationship quality 
is higher if the level of initial trust is low. Like hypothesized, in situations where a supplier 
distrusts the retailer, the impact of information sharing is larger for calculative 
 t=1  t=2  Change { (t=2) – (t=1) } 
 Mean 
(std.dev)
Mean (std.dev) Mean (std.dev)
Economic Satisfaction 
 
   - Distrusting Relationships 
          No information sharing 4.53 (1.57) 4.60 (1.14) + 0.08 (1.57) +0.42
          Information sharing 5.11 (1.67) 5.61 (0.98) + 0.50 (1.67)*
  
   - Trusting Relationships 
          No information sharing 5.74 (1.04) 5.55 (0.77) - 0.19 (1.04) +0.99
          Information sharing 4.75 (1.37) 5.55 (1.05) + 0.80 (1.37)*
 
Social Satisfaction 
 
   - Distrusting Relationships   
          No information sharing 1.89 (0.72) 2.26 (0.85) + 0.37 (0.78)* +1.54
          Information sharing 2.06 (0.62) 3.97 (1.09) + 1.91 (0.89)**
  
   - Trusting Relationships 
          No information sharing 5.29 (0.94) 4.67 (0.87) - 0.62 (0.96)** +1.60
          Information sharing 4.79 (1.30) 5.78 (0.81) + 0.98 (1.00)**
 
Calculative Commitment 
 
   - Distrusting Relationships 
          No information sharing 4.67 (1.10) 5.10 (1.15) + 0.43  (1.41) +0.76
          Information sharing 4.68 (1.39) 5.88 (0.68) + 1.19 (1.24)**
 
   - Trusting Relationships 
          No information sharing 5.66 (0.67) 5.92 (1.03) +0.25 (1.02) +0.65
          Information sharing 5.33 (0.99) 6.23 (0.56) +0.90 (1.00)**
 
Affective Commitment 
 
   - Distrusting Relationships 
          No information sharing 2.75 (0.88) 3.42 (1.09) + 0.67 (0.64)** +0.70
          Information sharing 2.41 (1.12) 3.79 (1.10) + 1.37 (0.83)**
 
   - Trusting Relationships 
          No information sharing 5.16 (1.17) 4.97 (1.21) - 0.19 (1.14) +0.49
          Information sharing 4.88 (1.19) 5.18 (1.05) + 0.30 (1.03)
 
*  p < 0.05; **  p < 0.01  
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commitment (+0.76 versus +0.65) and for affective commitment (+0.70 versus +0.49) 
relative to relationships characterized by high initial trust (see Table 5). These findings 
indicate that information sharing is extra helpful in relationships with distrust, which 
confirms Hypothesis 2. However, none of reported effects is statistically significant 
(calculative commitment, F=0.02, p=0.89; affective commitment, F=0.25, p=0.62). 
Furthermore, the results in Table 5 show that the increase in social and economic 
satisfaction caused by retailer information sharing is even higher (though not significantly 
different) in situations where initial trust in the retailer is high relative to initial situations 
characterized by distrust. It thus appears that regardless the initial level of trust, retailer-
supplier relationship quality always benefits from information sharing. Satisfaction and 
commitment are equally lifted in distrusting as well as in high-trust relationships. 
The only significant interesting effect we do find is the effect of information sharing 
on social satisfaction in high initial trust conditions. Under high initial trust social 
satisfaction drops (-.62) significantly (t=-2.96; p<0.01), when the retailer does not share 
information. It means that under these high initial trust circumstances, the retailer harms 
the relationship by withholding information. A possible explanation is that in high-trust 
relationships, strong relational norms (Heide and John, 1992) have developed. Often 
relational norms relate to expectations about information sharing. In high-trust 
relationships, channel partners count on each other to be timely and accurately informed. 
Withholding information will be regarded as a violation of that rule resulting in supplier 
disappointment and lower social satisfaction with the relationship. 
 
8.4.3 The Moderating Impact of Connectedness 
The third hypothesis poses that retailer information sharing will have a larger effect in 
instances where the relationships of the retailer with various retailers are negatively 
connected, i.e., where these suppliers thus face fierce competition. Overall, our results 
show support for the hypothesis (see Table 8.6). 
In low-connected relationships information sharing hardly affects economic 
satisfaction (-0.17) (t = 0.73; p=0.48). However, when supplier relationships are in strong 
competition (high-connected), suppliers appreciate information sharing and find it 
economically desirable. Consequently economic satisfaction increases (+1.61) (F=12.67; 
p<0.01). The impact of information on social satisfaction is even larger in high-connected 
relationships (+1.97), compared with a rise of +1.16 in low-connected relationships 
(+1.16) (F=3.92; p=0.05). 
With respect to future commitment to the relationship, the impact of information 
sharing only changes affective commitment (F=4.02; p=0.05). No increase in calculative 
commitment (F=0.04; p=0.85) is being realized. A possible explanation for this result 
might lie in the magnitude of the scores of calculative commitment that are already high 
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(i.e., around six on a seven-point scale). This makes it difficult to raise calculative further 
(i.e., a ceiling effect). 
In sum, we accept Hypothesis 3 for economic and social satisfaction, and for affective 
commitment. 
 
Table 8.6 The Effect of Information sharing on Satisfaction and Commitment in Low-
Connected and High-Connected Relationships 
 
 
 t=1  t=2  Change { (t=2) – (t=1) } 
 Mean (std.dev) Mean 
(std.dev)
Mean (std.dev)
Economic Satisfaction 
 
   - Low-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 4.76 (1.63) 5.10 (1.21) +0.33 (1.29) -0.17
          Information sharing 5.50 (1.07) 5.66 (1.09) +0.16 (0.94)
   **
   - High-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 5.55 (1.13) 5.08 (0.94) -0.48 (1.07) +1.61
          Information sharing 4.38 (1.69) 5.50 (0.93) +1.13 (1.39)**
 
Social Satisfaction 
 
   - Low-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 3.78 (2.05) 3.71 (1.60) -0.06 (1.14) +1.16
          Information sharing 3.86 (2.11) 4.96 (1.58) +1.10 (1.11)**
  *
   - High-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 3.48 (1.79) 3.27 (1.37) -0.22 (0.84) +1.97
          Information sharing 3.08 (1.15) 4.84 (1.04) +1.75 (0.90)**
 
Calculative Commitment 
 
   - Low-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 5.19 (1.04) 5.79 (0.95) +0.60 (1.24)* +0.65
          Information sharing 4.91 (1.43) 6.16 (0.66) +1.25 (1.38)**
 
   - High-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 5.17 (1.05) 5.23 (1.30) +0.07 (1.16) +0.78
          Information sharing 5.12 (1.04) 5.97 (0.62) +0.85 (0.78)**
 
Affective Commitment 
 
   - Low-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 4.13 (1.58) 4.48 (1.24)   +0.35 (1.05) +0.18
          Information sharing 3.96 (1.83) 4.49 (1.42) +0.53 (1.00)*
 *
   - High-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 3.83 (1.63) 3.93 (1.49) +0.10 (0.99) +0.99
          Information sharing 3.46 (1.56) 4.52 (1.14) +1.09 (1.10)**
 
*  p < 0.05; **  p < 0.01  
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8.5 Conclusions 
Information-intensive retailer-supplier collaboration promises important benefits in 
turbulent market environments. However, it is not taking place on a broad scale yet. One 
frequently named obstacle for retailers to refrain from extensive information sharing is that 
relationships between retailers and suppliers are often characterized by distrust. 
In this second study on consequences of market information sharing we examined the 
effects of information sharing by a retailer on the quality of its relationships with suppliers. 
Our results show that retailer information sharing improves the supplier relationship 
quality. The receiving supplier party not only becomes more economically and socially 
satisfied with the retailer, but also feels more committed (affective commitment) and 
promises to put more effort in the relationship with the retailer (calculative commitment). 
Our findings show that the improvement in supplier-relationship quality is as large in 
distrusting relationships as in high-trust relationships. Regardless of the level of initial trust 
in the retailer, the supplier appreciates the retailer’s information.  
With respect to the retailer portfolio of competing supplier relationships, we expected 
that the degree of connectedness between the relationships would moderate the 
relationship-strengthening effect of information sharing. Our findings indeed show that in 
more fierce competition with another supplier, reflected by negative connectedness, the 
positive impact of information sharing is amplified for economic satisfaction, social 
satisfaction, and affective commitment. 
This study responds to a number of calls in previous research. Myers et al. (2000) 
suggested conducting further research on how channel cooperation affects relationship 
closeness. Instead of implementing an operational partnership, like automated 
replenishment programs (ARP) (in this paper referred to as CRP and VMI), we examined a 
more strategic form of interfirm partnerships (as mentioned in Mentzer, et al., 2000), 
category management¸ which implies a relationship adaptation to a higher degree. An 
important lesson from our study is that such strategic information sharing has an additional 
pay-off in improving the relationship quality. Our examination of relational effects of 
information sharing also meets Frazier (1999: p.229)’s call for research on the 
consequences of sharing intelligence.  
Within the boundaries of our experimental setting, we conclude that our study 
encourages retailers to share information with suppliers because this improves the 
relationship quality. The increase in trust caused by information sharing in relationships 
characterized by initial distrust is of the same magnitude as in relationships where initial 
trust is high. The positive implication of this is that efforts to establish trust by starting 
sharing information are not deemed to fail because of initial distrust. Retailers should 
know this to avoid that they get stuck in a circular scenario. In such a scenario the supplier 
does not trust the retailer. Consequently, the retailer may feel that it does not make sense to 
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share information, which in turn makes that the supplier’s trust stays low. Starting to share 
information is an effective way for a retailer to establish trust on the part of the supplier, 
and a more trustful supplier is more likely to share his information with the retailer. In that 
way a productive (mutual) exchange will develop. This will improve the performance of 
the channel. Consequently, we recommend retail managers (e.g., category managers, 
purchasing agents) to start sharing information already in the early stages of their 
relationships with suppliers. This may help to accelerate the process of improving 
relationship quality. Another interesting finding from our study is, that relationships 
require active maintenance.  Refraining from, in this case sharing information, can 
deteriorate initially high-trust relationships. 
A final implication for retail managers concerns their dealings with competing 
suppliers. In competitive environments, suppliers appreciate receiving retailer information 
much more, and it would thus be interesting to pursue information sharing-strategies in 
such competitive settings. However, in these situations retailers will be confronted with a 
dilemma. When engaging into an exclusive information-sharing arrangement with one 
supplier and enhancing that particular relationship, the retailer may damage the 
relationships with other competing suppliers. This latter effect was not included in this 
study. 
One needs to take into consideration that this study focuses on the rosy view of 
information sharing (cf. interfirm-learning, Mohr and Sengupta, 2002): eliciting favorable 
relationship responses with the intention to build better performing supplier relationships. 
Undeniably, there are notable risks associated with sharing market information. Not only 
leakage and misusage of the information, but also outlearning by the receiving info-partner 
can make the sharing firm to become obsolete in the (near) future. All these concerns 
reflect the risky view of information sharing and raise the issue of controlling the risk of 
opportunistic behavior by the partner firm. Further research is needed on how retail firms 
can safeguard these information-sharing risks without restraining relationship quality 
improvement. Despite the fact that information sharing can improve the quality of a 
relationship it is thus not always advisable to actually pursue this activity. Organizations 
have to make a trade-off between information-sharing benefits and costs (i.e., loss of 
power and a possible negative impact on other channel relationships). 
As with any laboratory study, it is important to be prudent in generalizing from the 
findings. However, the fact that business managers from the food industry have judged our 
business case as realistic supports its external validity of the results from this first study on 
understanding the effect of information sharing.  
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CHAPTER NINE CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND 
 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 
 
 
A new era has dawned on the retailing industry, the Back-End Revolution of Retailing. The 
latest advances in information communication technology together with a growing 
standardization in product coding, and the rapid adoption of rich web-based 
communications have expanded the digital possibilities for retailers to rethink their supply 
chain relationship management. In their renewed dealings with suppliers, retailers can 
roughly choose between two types of strategies. Either they decide to compete head-on 
with suppliers, or to collaborate side-by-side with them. The competition strategy is to 
organize e-marketplaces and reverse auctions in order to drive prices down and stimulate 
competition among suppliers. The other strategy is to seek collaboration and to work 
actively together with suppliers in order to transform the channel into a demand-driven 
channel, to fulfill consumer wishes better, faster, and at lower costs. Essential for making 
such a channel partnership a success is that both channel members, retailers and suppliers, 
keep each other updated about the latest market developments. Informing each other about 
what they know about the marketplace is the topic on which this dissertation has focused: 
market information sharing. Our objective with this dissertation has been to study the 
nature, antecedents and consequences of market information sharing in channel 
relationships. In this concluding chapter, we discuss our main findings, the implications of 
our results for channel firms, the limitations of our studies, and several suggestions for 
future research. 
 
9.1 Main Findings 
We have defined a market information sharing arrangement is as an arrangement between 
two vertical channel parties to share market information with the intention to strengthen 
the performance of the channel for their mutual benefit. The reach of this definition is 
broad; because it does not only relate to explicitly arranged inter-firm agreements to share 
information, but it also includes the exchanges of market information which channel firms 
have implicitly arranged. The basic philosophy of such a collaborative channel 
arrangement is that the two firms in a channel relationship integrate each others’ market 
information in order to respond better to the continuously changing consumer demands. In 
Chapter 2, we have systematically laid out the similarities and differences among three 
main research perspectives on information sharing in channels: supply chain optimization 
 240 
studies (e.g., Lee, et al., 2000; Gavirneni, et al., 1999, Cachon and Fisher, 2000), the game-
theoretical approach (e.g., Niraj and Narasimhan, 2003; Kurtuluş, 2004), and the empirical 
behavioral approach. While the empirical studies at the heart of this dissertation (Chapters 
4, 5, 6, 7, and 8) follow the latter research tradition, our subsequent research framework 
has been built around the key insights provided by all three research perspectives. The 
theoretical underpinning of the framework has been an extension of social exchange 
theory, called social penetration theory (Chapter 3), with the purpose to seek explanations 
for the differences in actual information sharing behaviors of firms in their channel 
relationships.  
Because a firm may not share its market information with all of its channel parties in 
the same way, we have taken the channel relationship as the unit-of-analysis. Unlike, the 
recent study from Kulp et al. (2004), where supplier firms were asked about their 
information sharing practices with their retail firm customers in general, thereby ignoring 
the possible variation in firms’ information sharing practices within their portfolio of 
channel relationships. Our work particularly wants to formulate answers to our three 
research questions: (a) what is the actual nature of market information sharing by channel 
members? (Chapter 5), (b) What are the antecedents of market information sharing in 
channel relationships? (Chapter 6), And (c) what are the consequences of market 
information sharing in channel relationships? (Chapters 7 and 8). 
 
9.2 The Nature of Market Information Sharing 
In studying the nature of market information sharing we have made a distinction between 
two dimensions of such arrangements: the shared content, and the sharing mode. Much of 
channel research has examined the sharing mode, viz. the way in which channel members 
communicate with each other, in term of contact frequency, formalization and exclusivity. 
The other dimension: what information content is actually being shared in channels has 
thus far been overlooked and a new measurement scale needed to be developed. We have 
proposed a hierarchical scale for the shared information by a channel party. The motivation 
for suggesting such a type of scale comes from the different sets of arrangements found in 
channel management practice: running from very basic EDI/QR to sophisticated 
CCRM/CM arrangements. Likewise, this new scale runs from elements that are easily 
shared to elements for which there is a major reluctance to share. A hierarchical scale 
implies that in the shared market information content there are different levels or degrees; 
organizations first have to share a lower level of information before they give any 
disclosure of a higher degree of more confidential market information to their channel 
parties. And if channel firms share a higher degree of content, they automatically share the 
lower degrees of content. In our data we fit a reasonable fit for this hierarchical structure 
with five different layers in the shared content. Nearly 80% of retailers and 64% of the 
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suppliers in our sample, share at least the lowest degrees of shared content with a channel 
party. In general, firms give scanty higher degree information to their channel members: in 
only 24% of the channel relationships, retailers share market information to their highest 
degree, and in 16% of the channel relationships, the suppliers share market information to 
the highest degree.  
With respect to the way channel firms share information, the mode of sharing is on 
average somewhat collaborative. Although the typical sharing mode is with high 
frequency, it is seldom exclusive and rarely formalized. Higher management from either 
side of the channel dyad is only sporadically involved in the process of market information 
sharing. In market information sharing practices between channel members, the shared 
content coincides to some extent with aspects of the sharing mode. When higher degrees of 
content are shared between channel partners, the sharing mode is more formalized, 
becomes more exclusive and involves higher-level managers from the retailer. The shared 
content is unrelated with the frequency rate at which channel members have contact with 
each other. Even though there is a positive association between the shared content and 
several of the sharing mode aspects, they are clearly distinct aspects of the information 
sharing arrangement. This notion of separate dimensions is enforced by our finding that 
shared content and sharing mode have different antecedents and consequences. As 
mentioned before, in the analysis of information sharing between channel members, the 
emphasis in empirical behavioral stream has been on sharing mode. Distinguishing these 
separate dimensions is of vital importance in understanding the functioning of the channel 
relationship. 
 
9.1.2 The Antecedents of Market Information Sharing 
In answering our second research question, on the antecedents of market information 
sharing in channel relationships, we have developed and tested a comprehensive model 
containing antecedents drawn from the three main research perspectives.  
We will discuss the main two drivers of market information sharing: the firm’s 
strength and the mutual interdependence of firms. We will also show that sometimes 
information sharing has primarily ritual characteristics, and that it can be discouraged by 
complicated circumstances. Furthermore, we will shed light on the nature of the firms’ 
motivations to engage in information sharing arrangements; whether or not it is a trusting 
game, power game or something else. 
The firm’s position of strength. Market information sharing occurs from a position of 
strength. Our research has demonstrated that the channel members do not put all their 
cards on the table unless they are certain of their own strengths. Once a retailer or a 
supplier have better developed their market information capabilities (e.g, market-sensing 
and/or market-relating), they feel strong enough to hand over higher degrees of market 
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information content. Obviously, high degrees of self-disclosures to other channel members 
automatically imply that firms also reveal their weaknesses to channel parties that to some 
extent compete for a share in the same consumer market. The observed importance of 
firm’s capabilities corresponds with the findings from Corsten and Kumar (2005), who 
demonstrated that collaboration in the channel has a great deal to do with the smartness of 
the involved players.  
The firm’s interdependency with the other channel member. Retailers and suppliers 
share higher degrees of market information and do this in a collaborative style when they 
are mutually interdependent on each other. A firm’s interdependency with the other 
channel member is the second central theme explaining why firms share information. The 
mutual interdependence appears to serve as a backbone and drives both the two parties’ 
sharing of higher degrees of content and the collaborative style of the sharing mode. 
Mutually interdependent retailers and suppliers have a lot of intertwined interests; they 
make them exchange higher degrees of content more easily and more collaboratively.  
Rituals or deeply embedded norms. Apart from the two central themes of the firm’s 
position of strength, and interdependency, another important lesson learnt is that there are 
some antecedents only influencing the collaborative style in the sharing mode while others 
merely impact the degrees in the shared content. Some antecedents only influence the 
sharing mode, without immediately materializing into the sharing of higher degrees of 
market information in the relationship. The primary examples of this type of antecedents 
are (i) consumer demand growth, (ii) an explicit incentive structure of the supplier to 
collaborate with the retailer, and (iii) the negative connectedness of the relationship. Under 
high consumer demand growth retailers and suppliers tend to have higher contact 
frequency, and thus may appear to be more collaborative in style, yet this does not result in 
higher degrees of shared market information between two organizations. An explicit 
supportive incentive structure of the supplier to collaborate with the retailer also appears 
just to make the sharing mode more collaborative; nevertheless the supplier and retailer do 
not disclose more of their market information. In negatively connected supplier 
relationship where any forms of collaborations with the retailer have detrimental effects on 
other supplier relationships, the sharing of market information is less collaborative. All of 
these antecedents seem to elicit symbolize some sort of ritual type of sharing information, 
which does not lead to more shared content. But there are also antecedents affecting the 
shared content without influencing the sharing mode. For instance, established norms of 
information sharing in the supplier network are more fundamental, have a less ritual 
nature, but certainly have to a much stronger impact on the (retailer’s) shared content in 
the channel relationship.  
Complicating Circumstances. Two of the antecedents affecting the shared content in 
the channel relationship have come out as complicating circumstances making the passing 
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on of market information less obvious as it may seem. The first possible complication is 
the concentration in the supplier network. Collaborating in channels has usually to do with 
working together more intensively with a limited number of parties. However, our study 
shows that higher concentration in the supplier network leads to sharing higher degrees of 
content from the retailers’ sides, whereas it makes suppliers to hesitate sharing more 
information. Probably, the reason for suppliers to hold back is that in concentrated 
networks, the few of their competitors with large interests at the retailer might obtain their 
shared information. Retail organizations should therefore be aware of the negative side-
effects of concentrating their supplier network, because suppliers tend to share less market 
information then. 
The second complicating circumstance concerns the level of consumer demand 
turbulence. High turbulence in consumer demand appears to discourage retailers to sharing 
their market information. Contrary to what supply chain optimization studies would 
recommend, in turbulent times retailers tend to keep their information to themselves. 
Instead of optimizing the primary process in the supply chain by information, retailers 
prefer loose ties with their suppliers and treasure their strategic flexibility more when they 
are facing uncertain consumer demand.  
Altruism or self-interest-seeking. Sharing market information has unfolded much more 
as a calculative, rational and strategic decision for firms with primarily their own interests 
at heart than as an emotional decision of good faith and trust. A number of research 
findings point to this direction. First, trust in the supplier has demonstrated to have no 
influence on the information sharing practices of either channel party. Apparently, “just” 
trusting is not enough motivation and the sharing of market information goes beyond 
general perceptions of the supplier’s honesty, or benevolence. Firms are much more 
rational and serving their self-interest in their decision to share their market information. A 
second indication for the self-interest-seeking motivation surfaces with respect to the 
influence of relationship-specific investments by the retailer. Our results show that such 
investments make retailers share higher degrees in order to keep the relationship intact, 
while on the other hand the supplier does not feel the need to pass on more information, 
probably because the retailer is locked-in anyway. While being locked-in, the retailer tries 
to safeguard its informational investments by intensifying its own sharing mode with 
higher contract frequency, more management involvement and more formalization. 
However, the supplier remains unmoved, apparently. 
Our conclusion that information sharing is not a altruistic trusting game. However, 
this does not mean that it is an exploitative power game, because relatively dependent 
firms cannot be forced to hand over more of their information about the marketplace and 
thereby no dominating firm can take advantage of the asymmetry in dependency by 
exploiting the other dominated channel members.  
 244 
 
9.1.3 The Consequences of Market Information Sharing 
Our answers to the third research question on the consequences of market information 
sharing are based on data from a survey and a laboratory experiment. Whereas in the 
survey, the effectiveness of information sharing is studied from the retailer’s perspective, 
the experiment zooms in into relationship quality enhancement by information sharing as 
perceived by the opposite side of the channel dyad, the supplier. Both studies convey the 
message is that information sharing is helpful in building stronger channel relationships.  
With our survey we have been able to disentangle the differential effects of the shared 
content and the sharing mode on the consequences. Interestingly, we have found that the 
degree of shared content has much stronger effects on the channel relationship quality and 
performance than the various aspects of the sharing mode. When organizations share 
higher degrees of content with each other, this leads to:  
 
• Better joint market learning; channel parties learn better together from developments 
occurring in the consumer market, due to a better joint detection of consumer trends, 
joint interpretation of obtained market information, joint utilization of market 
information and a joint reflection of their market information exchange. 
• Improved relationship quality; Their working relationship improves, especially 
because they are more satisfied about what the relationship delivers in economic terms 
and how the relationship is gratifying and pleasing. The channel relationship quality 
improves, and; 
• Higher relationship performance; The performance of the channel relationship 
increases, thanks to the gains in additional joint profits and extra competitive 
advantage for the channel as a whole. 
 
The role of the sharing mode is confined to facilitating the joint market learning process; it 
does not directly lead to an out-performing channel with more joint profits and more 
competitive advantage over other channels. We have also explored under which conditions 
market information is more effective in gaining the desirable results, such as improving 
joint market learning, relationship quality and relationship performance. Three variables 
moderating the effect of market information sharing in channel relationships are: (i) 
consumer demand turbulence, (ii) trust in the relationship, and (iii) negative 
connectedness. 
Consumer demand turbulence. Interestingly, we reported earlier on that the antecedent 
consumer demand turbulence came out as an inhibiting factor for retailers to share more of 
their market information; here we found that under these circumstances of consumer 
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demand turbulence, the impact of retailer’s information sharing on relationship quality and 
performance appears to be much greater and makes channel relationship to become much 
more competitive. This implies that when faced with consumer demand turbulence, 
retailers should better overcome their initial reluctance to share their information, because 
there are plenty of examples showing it pays off. 
Trust. Additional exploration has been undertaken concerning the role of trust in the 
effectiveness of information sharing. In the survey, we have found that for the impact on 
joint market learning and the attainment of channel competitive advantage, the retailer’s 
trust in the supplier plays a facilitating role by enhancing the impact of information sharing 
on joint market learning and the attainment of channel competitive advantage. There is 
evidence that sometimes in trusted relationship not all negative or critical information is 
passed on because that might endanger the good atmosphere relationship and that would be 
an restraining role of trust limiting the effectiveness of channel collaborations (Selnes and 
Sallis, 2002). Like Corsten and Kumar (2005) we find the facilitating role of trust that trust 
increases the effectiveness of channel collaborations. Yet, the facilitating role of trust does 
not count for all consequences: as for the creation of more satisfaction and commitment in 
the relationship, trust does not play this role. Both the survey and experiment have shown 
that trust in the relationship does not enlarge or decline the effect of information sharing on 
relationship quality.  
Negative connectedness. Further explorations about the exact role of negative 
connectedness in the consequences of information sharing have given us the following 
results. In the survey, from the retailer’s perspective, negative connectedness has been 
shown to diminish the effectiveness of information shared in terms of joint market 
learning, joint profits and channel competitive advantage. It did not change the impact of 
information sharing on relationship quality from the retailer’s perspective. In the 
experiment, looking from the supplier’s perspective, information sharing has a positively 
moderated effect on relationship quality. Suppliers in negatively connected relationships 
appreciate receiving the retailer’s information sharing much more than suppliers in a less 
competitive environment.  
 
9.2 Implications for Channel Management Practice 
Practitioners dealing with indirect marketing channels have always been interested in 
transforming their routes-to-market into consumer demand-driven channels. The relevant 
question for them is whether or not market information sharing can help them to 
accomplish that objective. In the back-end revolution of retailing this question has become 
more and more prevalent since it has increased the interest in strategic options centering on 
channel collaboration. Handbooks advocating retailer-manufacturer collaboration have 
emphasized the inevitable essence of information sharing, by stating that it is “the 
 246 
lifeblood of partnership” (Martin, 1994) and because “competitive dominance will be 
achieved by an entire supply chain, with battles fought supply chain versus supply chain” 
(Blackwell, 1997). The results from this dissertation should be of interest to retailers and 
suppliers that consider pursuing a side-by-side collaboration with one of their channel 
parties. With the growing recognition of the competitive value of having demand-driven 
collaborative channel relationships, firms with a portfolio of channel relationships will 
want to maximize their channel relationship equity. Channel relational equity (cf. Sawhney 
and Zabin, (2002)’s relational equity) is the wealth-creating potential that resides in the 
firm’s relationships with channel parties. In this research we have demonstrated that 
developing information sharing arrangements can be a good instrument to upgrade a firm’s 
channel relationship equity, because they improve joint market learning, and increase 
channel relationship quality, performance. We will provide channel managers with four 
guidelines to make information sharing successful. 
 
Guideline 1: Do it! Don’t sit and wait. Take the initiative! 
Our first guideline is to do it! Information sharing with channel parties produces good 
results for transforming the relationship into a consumer demand driven channel. First, 
both information sharing channel parties will benefit from the increased joint profits and 
from the extra competitive advantage attained. Second, from the retailer’s perspective, 
information sharing in the channel relationship leads to more economically and socially 
satisfaction and joint market learning. Third, from the supplier’s viewpoint, our research 
shows that information sharing results in better appreciated and committed relationships 
with their downstream trading partners.  
Even more importantly, channel parties should not “sit and wait”. We have shown that 
retailers better take the initiative in sharing market information, because our research has 
demonstrated that it can be a good instrument to build stronger channel relationships 
(Chapter 8). Even if the relationship is initially featured by distrust, initiating information 
sharing has shown to be a good means to improve the relationship quality.  
Moreover, in contemplating their initiative, retailers should not be discouraged by 
constantly changing consumer demands, for we found that if retailers overcome their 
natural reaction not to share information under high consumer demand turbulence, they 
can stimulate joint market learning, reap joint profits, and attain channel competitive 
advantages (Chapter 7).  
Low initial trust and highly turbulent consumer demand should not be excuses for not 
sharing any market information in the channel relationship. When channel firms have 
begun to share market information they not only improve the relational atmosphere, but 
also create the opportunity to sharpen their market sensing and market relating capabilities, 
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which in turn strengthen their own firm’s position in understanding the turbulent changes 
in consumer demand even better. 
 
Guideline 2: Focus on shared content! 
Our second guideline is to focus on shared content. Our research has shown that sharing 
market information is practically not an exception, it is even quite popular. Nearly 80% of 
the retailers share some information with their suppliers, and 64% of the suppliers share 
some of their market information with retailers. Compared to previous trade journals 
surveys, these percentages appear to be surprisingly high. Furthermore on average, channel 
firms appear to have a reasonably collaborative sharing mode with a high contact 
frequency (Chapter 5).  
The problem however is that the majority of the firms focus on the wrong aspects in 
sharing their market information. Our research has given evidence that the effectiveness of 
an information sharing arrangement depends more directly on the shared content than on 
the sharing mode (Chapter 7). When we take a closer look at the exact nature of the market 
information sharing arrangement, we find that few firms share higher degrees and more 
confidential of market information: 24% of the retailers and 16% of the suppliers. In 
designing market information sharing arrangements, channel firms should focus on 
increasing the shared content 
More care is thus advisable in how to design an information sharing arrangement with 
channel parties. Disappointment is likely to occur when channel members sign an 
arrangement stating that their intention is improve the product category profits by 
increasing their contact frequency and giving each other a basic update with the most 
recent sales and promotion communication information. Then, such an arrangement could 
miss out on achieving extra competitive advantages and joint profits. For we have shown 
in this thesis that many information sharing arrangements are more effective when the 
degree of information shared rises. Rather than only increasing the collaborative style in 
the sharing mode, channel members ought to think more carefully about what type of 
market information they wish to share. The same holds true for when firms need to take an 
investment decision on the implementation of a new inter-organization information system 
for advancing channel communication. Managers should then be aware that the system’s 
added-value depends very much on how this new technology is going to affect the 
dimensions of the information sharing arrangement. If, for instance, this new technology 
merely makes it easier to increase the contact frequency, between the channel firms than its 
contribution to make the channel more demand-driven will be fairly little. It will be far less 
effective than if this new technology would facilitate the increase in the degrees of shared 
content. Channel members should arrange information sharing on shared content.  
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Guideline 3: Not all partners are equal! 
Our third guideline for channel managers is to be aware that not all partners are equal in 
their information sharing practices. Since the shared content is the key factor behind 
consumer demand-driven channels, it is important to select information sharing partners 
who are prone to share their own information content. When channel members are on the 
search for an information sharing candidate, they should assess the appropriateness of such 
an information sharing candidate on the basis of the findings from the antecedents study 
(Chapter 6).  
If the firm wanting to share is a supplier, a retailer that would qualify for information 
sharing has the following characteristics: the retailer has already made some investments in 
the supplier relationship; it is mutually dependent on the supplier firm, and it possesses 
good market-relating capabilities, and it has a general disposition to collaborate with 
retailers.  
If the firm wanting to share is a retailer, it checks for almost similar characteristics as 
a supplier does in estimating the other’s appropriateness to share information with.  The 
relationship-specific investments by the retailer should not be high; if so, then the supplier 
would sit back and even lower the degree of his shared information. A supplier that is 
more mutual interdependent of the retailer would be a more appropriate information 
sharing candidate, because such a partner would be more likely to pass on the proprietary 
market information to the relationship. A supplier would also be a more appropriate 
candidate if its market-sensing and –relating capabilities are considered to be of high 
quality. One misleading indicator for a retailer in finding a suitable supplier might be the 
explicit incentive structure of the supplier, because it merely warrants a more collaborative 
sharing mode; but it does not automatically guarantee that the supplier will be motivated to 
disclose more of its market information content.  
In all, the most important criteria to find partners prone to share market information 
content are (1) market-sensing and market-relating capabilities, and (2) mutually 
dependency. Trust in the relationship has shown not to be of overriding importance in 
finding an appropriate candidate for an information sharing strategy. It is much more 
important to focus on the firm’s capabilities and interdependency.  
 
Guideline 4: Be careful with concentrating supplier portfolio! 
Our fourth and final guideline concerns more of a warning to channel managers. They 
should be aware of how the supplier portfolio structure affects the information sharing 
activities of the channel members. Collaboration in the channel often coincides with 
rationalization of their relationship portfolio and it is fashionable to cut the number of 
suppliers and concentrate the buying budget on a smaller number (Emshwiller, 1991). 
From a retailer’s standpoint, the concentration in the supplier network stimulates the 
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sharing of market information, but we found indications that suppliers have a reverse 
reaction; they tend to refrain their sharing of market information in more concentrated 
supplier networks, where some of their biggest rivals with high stakes are also listening in 
at the retailer’s table (Chapter 6). Therefore, caution must be taken in considering any 
rationalization of the relationship portfolio. So, do not concentrate the portfolio too much, 
because it may shy away supplier to share their market information, or make such 
arrangements with the supplier that they can be assured that their information will not 
come in the wrong hands. 
 
9.3 Limitations 
As with any research, the results from the studies presented in this dissertation must be 
viewed in conjunction with their limitations.  At the same time the limitations of our two 
data collections can also be regarded to be a spring-board for ideas for further research. In 
the survey data collection with a single informant, it is impossible for us to rule out a 
potential bias from common method variance, despite all of the precautions in the 
questionnaire development and pre-testing that were taken. Furthermore, our survey was a 
one-time data collection, even though the sharing of market information in channel 
relationships is a dynamic and sequential process. The findings from the antecedents study 
and the first consequences study deal with cross-sectional data. Like the vast majority of 
channel research, our survey study works with cross-sectional data and applies it to explain 
a consecutive and dynamic process. Most of our hypotheses implicitly hold a sequence in 
time. For instance, the set of antecedents are factors leading to information sharing, and 
market information sharing results in joint profits. With respect to the experiment, we have 
data in two points in time and thus we can be more certain about the causal-relationships 
that we report on. 
The survey data collection, however, has also advantages over the experiment. It is for 
instance much stronger on external validity. While the experiment was about a fictitious 
(yet perceived as very realistic) business case, the survey was about the actual practices of 
retail buyers. The survey data also scores better on generalizability, because our sample 
consists of more than a single industry, but was taken from a wide variety of retail 
industries. We should also be careful in comparing the findings about the information 
sharing practices of the retailer with those of the supplier. We have reported that retailers 
tend to share more; however, since we asked retail buyers to fill in the questionnaire, we 
cannot exclude the possibility for a certain self-serving bias. Furthermore, despite the 
lottery procedure to randomly select one supplier relationship from the retailer’s portfolio, 
there might still be an overrepresentation of more salient and more trusted supplier 
relationship in our sample. Finally, for the first time in channel research, we propose a 
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hierarchical scale to assess the shared content of the retailer and of the supplier. This scale 
requires subsequent replication and refinement. 
 
9.4 Suggestions for Further Research 
Several researchers have noted that there is a need for longitudinal studies to advance the 
understanding of the impact of cumulative interactions between firms in forming long-term 
relationships (e.g., Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1998; Jap 1999; Narayandas and 
Rangan, 2004; Payan and McFarland 2005; Corsten and Kumar, 2005). It is obvious that 
we also would like to join their call. Ideally, we would like to examine in more detail the 
dynamics and evolution of the market information sharing arrangement; how long does it 
take until the disclosure of higher degrees in shared content materializes into success in 
transforming the chain into a demand-driven one? What would be the effects of sudden 
restrictions and other variations in the sharing of market information?  
If this ideal data collection is not feasible on the short-run, we also would like to chart 
other directions for further research that are worth of exploring. Especially, this is the case 
in dynamic and increasingly knowledge-rich market environments where building and 
maintaining consumer-driven channel networks become a critical source for competitive 
advantage. It is important for marketing practitioners and scientists alike to know more 
about successfully managing market information sharing. This discussion of future 
directions for studying market information sharing management is organized according to 
levels and alternative contexts: 
• At the relationship-level (1:1) 
• At the network-level (1:n) 
• In a new context: affiliate partner programs  
 
Successful Market Information Sharing at the relationship-level (1:1) 
What is the comparative advantage of information sharing over other methods to 
coordinate the channel? How does the division of the benefits from information sharing 
influence the effectiveness of information sharing? How can joint market learning 
optimize the effectiveness of information sharing? What will be the new role for 
syndicated data suppliers in making information sharing arrangements more effective? 
The comparative advantage of information sharing over other methods to control the 
channel coordination. Information sharing is one means to coordinate the channel and 
make it more consumer demand-driven. There are also other methods to reach this 
objective; it would be interesting to know more about the relative effectiveness of 
information sharing compared to other coordination mechanisms. In this dissertation, we 
have basically looked at the advantage of information sharing relationships over “arms-
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length”-transactions without any exchange of market information. In addition to the 
looking at the advantage over these traditional adversarial trading relationships, it would 
still be interesting to compare information sharing arrangements to other forms of 
governance, like equity-based relationships, vertical integration. These days, discounters 
like Aldi, Lidl, Zara, have equity stakes in their supplier relationships. Can high degree 
information sharing arrangements between a brand manufacturer and a retailer compete 
with these vertically integrated channels? 
Division of benefits from information sharing. In this dissertation we have primarily 
focused on how much information sharing contributes to the total channel performance and 
how to expand the pie of revenues for both of the channel members in terms of joint profits 
and the attainment of competitive channel advantages. It is also appealing to look at the 
logical next step and to investigate the sharing of the (expanded) pie. How do channel 
parties claim their piece of the bigger pie? Some initial work is done by Corsten and 
Kumar (2005); they found that despite the improved economic performance and capability 
development, ECR adoption by suppliers of a major retailer generates greater perceptions 
of negative inequity on their part. Feelings of exploitation by suppliers dealing with major 
retailers are not uncommon. Knowing that the dependency structure affects the judgments 
of inequity (Kumar, et al., 1995), it is appealing to look beyond that study how a more 
equitable (or equal) division of the benefits may contribute to the effectiveness of 
information sharing.  
Joint market learning. From our studies on consequences, we have learnt that joint 
market learning plays an important role. It would be interesting to investigate this joint 
learning process in greater detail. Studies on market learning of organizations (Baker and 
Sinkula, 1999), knowledge absorption of companies (Cohen and Levinthan, 1990; Lane 
and Lubatkin, 1998) have been well established. The concerns of the risks in inter-firm 
learning (Mohr and Sengupta, 2002) have been comprehensively laid out. However, most 
of these studies depart from the assumption of a strict role division between the teacher 
firm and the student firm. Far less is know is about the process of “reciprocal learning” 
where there is no such role division, but where both firms are co-discoverers and have their 
own specialization (Lubatkin et al., 2001). A comparable situation holds for channel 
relationships with a higher degree of information sharing arrangement (3rd and 4th degree), 
in which members simultaneously learn and teach each other about the consumer 
marketplace. We think it is an interesting venue to study in-dept this channel classroom (a 
CPFR-classroom, or CM-classroom) and adopt ideas from educational psychology 
(collaborative learning, Allport, 1954; jigsaw classroom, Vygotsky, 1986). Translating 
insights from that discipline could help us to hypothesize about the different characteristics 
of the channel-“class”-environment and their effects on learning goals. We can also 
wonder how the effect of competitors in this channel class room would be. Would there be 
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any obstructive behavior in the channel classroom of cheating, withholding information, 
secrecy? How are channel partners going to experiment with new products and retail 
concepts? Do they bring new ideas and business opportunities to the classroom that they 
picked up from somewhere else, for instance other product categories, or channels. What 
would be the effectiveness of the learning with higher-degree? To what extent does second 
loop learning occur in these arrangements (Lukas, et al., 1996). 
The new role of syndicated data suppliers. As the popularity of information-sharing 
channels keeps on growing, syndicated data suppliers, like AC Nielsen and IRI, will need 
to reconsider their added-value to channel members that obtain more market information 
themselves through sharing with each other. Traditionally, these syndicated suppliers have 
benefited from the structural holes in the exchange of market information between 
suppliers and retailers. Now that retailers and suppliers are increasingly filling up these 
gaps through new more sophisticated information sharing arrangements, several firms have 
already started to change their role of brokerage by adding value to their services 
(consulting), by generating new consumer insights across retail channels (household 
panels). An interesting research question is how can syndicated data suppliers add value to 
higher degrees information sharing arrangements? What role do they have in enhancing the 
joint market learning between channel members? If they would engage in a closer long-
term consulting relationship with a supplier and a retailer, how can syndicated data 
suppliers preserve their objectivity with other parties outside the consulted channel-dyad? 
(cf. Grayson and Ambler, 1999) 
 
Successful Market Information Sharing at the network level (1:n) 
How does the information sharing in one relationship affect the information sharing in the 
other relationship? Does the progress made in one information sharing relationship 
undermine the effectiveness of other channel relationships? How does the embedded 
network structure influence the information sharing activities? Channel firms often deal 
with more than one relationship and their information sharing does not occur in a vacuum 
but is embedded in a network of other channel relationships (e.g., Bensaou, 1999). This 
direction for future research concerns the question how a firm’s capabilities to manage 
their relationship portfolio shapes the effectiveness of information sharing practices (e.g., 
Olsen and Ellram, 1997). The present dissertation has demonstrated that two major themes 
in the information sharing activities of a firm are of vital importance. Information sharing 
is about strengthening a firm’s position by developing market information capabilities, and 
about building interdependencies. Our studies have also given evidence of the looming 
significance of a third theme: managing the network portfolio of relationships. Information 
sharing norms in the network, supplier concentration and negative connectedness have 
proven to influence the information sharing activities. The effective management of a 
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portfolio of competing relationships urges channel managers to be intelligent in how to 
deal with managing channel conflicts and exclusivity. Future studies could examine the 
leadership style of a channel member in orchestrating the winning performance of their 
whole network. Interesting questions would be: does the redundancy in ties limit the 
effectiveness of information sharing? How can complementarity of ties lift the 
effectiveness of it? What would be an optimal channel leadership style in managing the 
portfolio of relationships? Would frequent alteration in the assignment in a category 
captain be helpful in avoiding groupthink and prevent the strong channel ties cause 
members to rethink and act alike, and thus the market information that flows in the 
network becomes largely redundant. Becoming too homogenous, which hinders the 
creative processes found in more heterogeneous group (as Janis (1989) groupthink), can be 
prevented by regularly changing the portfolio in size, and structure, concentration, and 
exclusivity rights. 
 
Successful Market Information Sharing in a new context: Affiliate Partner programs 
As part of the professionalization in the front-end of retailing businesses, retailers have 
explored the ways to cater to different consumer segments through a variety of channels. 
This approach of multichanneling through the combination of brick-&-mortar channels 
with electronic (click) channels also raises the question of how market information sharing 
arrangements can be effectively applied in electronic consumer channels. Today’s 
examples of information sharing in electronic channels are confined to some basic affiliate 
marketing programs by which companies may advertise on each other’s websites other 
than their own ones, like Amazon’s Associate-program, Dell USA Home Affiliate program 
(Hoffman and Novak, 2000). Usually, affiliates received a commission if merchandise is 
bought via the links on the affiliate’s website. It would be interesting to see how the 
effectiveness of an affiliate marketing programs increases when it entails more than the 
usual passing on of elementary clickstream data sharing through third parties like 
LinkShare or BeFree, and when it includes the exchange of more confidential market 
information (higher up in the hierarchy of the shared content). These web-based alliances 
are much less interdependent of each other than traditional retail channels; yet they are 
much more information-intensive. So it would be interesting to see if such information 
sharing programs in electronic B2C channels are really more effective and consumer-
demand driven, despite their higher instability and interdependency. 
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t m
or
e 
fr
om
 d
em
an
d 
se
as
on
al
it
y 
de
cr
ea
se
s 
th
an
 c
as
es
 w
ith
 s
ho
r t
 le
ad
 ti
m
es
 (
w
ee
kl
y)
. 
L
ee
, 
Pa
dm
an
ab
ha
n,
 
an
d 
W
ha
ng
 
(1
99
7)
, M
ng
tS
ci
 
T
o 
an
al
yz
e 
fo
ur
 c
au
se
s 
of
 
th
e 
bu
llw
hi
p 
ef
fe
ct
 (
de
m
an
d 
si
gn
al
 p
ro
ce
ss
in
g,
 r
at
io
ni
ng
 
ga
m
e,
 o
rd
er
 b
at
ch
in
g,
 a
nd
 
pr
ic
e 
va
ri
at
io
ns
).
 
2-
st
ag
e 
 
1 
M
 : 
n 
R
  
 
C
P 
(P
er
io
di
c 
re
vi
ew
 i n
ve
nt
or
y 
co
nt
ro
l m
od
el
) 
• A
ut
oc
or
re
la
te
d 
co
ns
um
er
 d
em
an
d 
• S
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s:
 h
ol
di
ng
 c
os
ts
, s
ho
rt
ag
e 
pe
na
lt
y,
 o
rd
er
in
g 
co
st
s,
 p
ur
ch
as
in
g 
co
st
s 
• L
ea
d 
tim
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
re
ta
ile
r’
s 
or
de
ri
ng
 a
nd
 
re
ce
iv
in
g.
 
• C
on
st
ra
in
ts
: (
1)
 p
as
t d
e m
an
ds
 a
re
 n
ot
 u
se
d 
in
 
fo
re
ca
st
in
g;
 (
2)
 r
es
up
pl
y 
is
 in
fi
ni
te
 w
ith
 a
 f
ix
ed
 
le
ad
tim
e,
 (
3)
 n
o 
fi
xe
d 
or
de
r 
co
st
s,
 (
4)
 e
xc
es
s 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
ca
n 
be
 r
et
ur
ne
d 
w
ith
ou
t c
os
ts
 
• C
on
st
ra
in
ts
 a
re
 r
el
ax
ed
 o
ne
 b
y 
on
e 
N
on
e3
  
• “
D
ou
bl
e 
fo
re
ca
st
in
g”
 is
 a
 p
os
si
bl
e 
ke
y 
dr
iv
er
 o
f 
th
e 
bu
llw
hi
p 
ef
fe
ct
. L
on
ge
r 
le
ad
 ti
m
es
 m
ay
 a
gg
ra
va
te
 th
e 
bu
llw
hi
p 
ef
fe
ct
. A
t a
n 
up
sw
in
g 
of
 c
on
su
m
er
 d
em
an
d,
 th
e 
 r
at
io
ni
ng
 g
am
in
g 
is
 tr
ig
ge
re
d 
am
pl
if
yi
ng
 th
e 
bu
llw
hi
p 
ef
fe
ct
.  
• C
or
re
la
te
d 
or
de
ri
ng
 b
y 
re
ta
ile
rs
 h
as
 th
e 
hi
gh
es
t i
m
pa
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
bu
llw
hi
p 
ef
fe
ct
, f
ol
lo
w
ed
 b
y 
“b
al
an
ce
d 
or
de
ri
ng
” 
an
d 
“r
an
do
m
 
or
de
ri
ng
” 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 (
W
ho
le
sa
le
) 
pr
ic
e 
va
ri
at
io
ns
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
th
e 
bu
llw
hi
p 
ef
fe
ct
, d
ue
 to
 f
or
w
ar
d 
bu
yi
ng
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 b
y 
re
ta
ile
rs
. 
T
ay
lo
r 
(1
99
9)
, 
IJ
L
M
 
T
o 
de
ve
lo
p 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 f
or
 
qu
al
if
yi
ng
 th
e 
bu
llw
hi
p 
ef
fe
ct
 in
 s
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
ns
. 
3-
st
ag
e 
 
1S
 : 
1S
 : 
1M
n.
a.
 
n.
a.
 (
no
te
: w
ee
kl
y 
de
m
an
d 
da
ta
 o
ve
r 
an
 8
 w
ee
k 
pe
ri
od
 f
or
 tw
o 
hi
gh
 v
ol
um
e 
pr
od
uc
ts
; i
n 
th
e 
ca
r 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 in
du
st
ry
 (
1 
st
ee
l m
ill
: 1
 s
te
el
 s
er
vi
ce
 
ce
nt
er
: 1
 c
om
po
ne
nt
 s
up
pl
ie
r)
 
N
on
e3
  
• D
em
an
d 
am
pl
if
ic
at
io
n 
oc
cu
rs
 n
ot
 o
nl
y 
du
e 
to
 v
a r
ia
bi
lit
y 
in
 e
nd
-
de
m
an
d,
 b
ut
 a
ls
o 
du
e 
to
 o
th
er
 f
ac
to
rs
: s
up
pl
y 
ca
pa
ci
ty
, m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 
re
lia
bi
lit
y,
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
an
d 
pr
ic
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s.
 
C
ac
ho
n 
(1
99
9)
, 
M
ng
tS
ci
 
T
o 
st
ud
y 
su
pp
lie
r’
s 
de
m
an
d 
va
ri
an
ce
 a
nd
 s
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s 
un
de
r 
di
ff
er
en
t 
or
de
ri
ng
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
by
 th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
fo
r 
re
ta
ile
rs
 (
ba
tc
h 
si
ze
s,
 o
rd
er
 in
te
rv
al
s)
. 
2-
st
ag
e 
 
1 
M
 : 
n 
R
  
C
P 
(P
er
io
di
c 
re
vi
ew
 i n
ve
nt
or
y 
co
nt
ro
l m
od
el
) 
• S
to
ch
as
tic
 s
ta
tio
na
ry
 c
on
su
m
er
 d
em
an
d 
(i
nd
ep
en
de
nt
 a
cr
os
s 
re
ta
il
er
s 
an
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
pe
ri
od
s)
 
• S
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s:
 h
ol
di
ng
 c
os
ts
 (
M
),
 h
ol
di
ng
 
co
st
s 
an
d 
sh
or
ta
ge
 c
os
t (
R
) 
• S
up
pl
ie
rs
 o
rd
er
 p
ol
ic
y 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s:
 b
at
ch
 
si
ze
s,
 le
ng
th
 o
rd
er
 in
te
rv
al
s,
 o
rd
er
in
g 
sc
he
du
le
s 
(s
yn
ch
ro
ni
ze
d,
 b
al
an
ce
d,
 r
an
do
m
) 
N
on
e3
  
• D
em
an
d 
va
ri
an
ce
 d
ep
en
ds
 o
n 
th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f 
co
ns
um
er
 d
em
an
d 
tu
rb
ul
en
ce
 (
no
rm
al
 <
 p
oi
ss
on
 <
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
bi
no
m
in
al
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n)
 
• D
em
an
d 
va
ri
an
ce
 w
ill
 g
en
er
al
ly
 d
ec
lin
e 
as
 th
e 
re
ta
ile
r’
s 
or
de
r 
in
te
rv
al
 is
 le
ng
th
en
ed
 o
r 
as
 th
ei
r 
or
de
r 
ba
tc
h 
si
z e
 is
 in
cr
ea
se
d.
 
• B
al
an
ci
ng
 o
rd
er
 s
ch
ed
ul
es
 (
i.e
., 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 r
et
ai
le
rs
 in
 
ev
er
y 
pe
ri
od
) 
is
 a
 m
ea
ns
 to
 d
am
pe
n 
de
m
an
d 
va
ri
an
ce
 a
nd
 s
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s 
Fr
an
so
o 
an
d 
W
ou
te
rs
 (
20
00
),
 
SC
M
 
T
o 
di
sc
us
s 
th
e 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
pr
ob
le
m
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
qu
an
tif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
bu
llw
hi
p 
ef
fe
ct
. 
3-
st
ag
e 
 
1M
 : 
7D
C
: 
50
0R
 
n.
a.
 
n.
a.
 (
no
te
: d
ai
ly
 d
e m
an
d 
da
ta
 th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 tw
o 
su
pp
ly
 c
ha
in
s 
du
ri
ng
 a
 6
 w
ee
k 
pe
ri
od
).
 
N
on
e3
  
• A
 c
er
ta
in
 d
eg
re
e 
of
 d
em
an
d 
am
p l
if
ic
at
io
n 
is
 d
et
ec
te
d 
in
 b
ot
h 
su
pp
ly
 c
ha
in
s.
 
• B
ul
lw
hi
p 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ne
ed
s 
to
 b
e 
w
el
l d
ef
in
ed
; e
sp
ec
ia
ll
y 
th
e 
co
rr
ec
t 
se
qu
en
ce
 o
f 
da
ta
 a
gg
re
ga
tio
n 
ne
ed
s 
to
 b
e 
ag
re
ed
 u
po
n 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 
co
m
pa
re
 d
at
a.
  
 280  
 St
ud
y,
 A
ut
ho
rs
 
(y
ea
r)
,  J
ou
rn
al
 
O
bj
ec
t i v
e 
Su
pp
ly
 
C
ha
in
 
S t
r u
c t
u r
e1
 
Pe
rs
pe
ct
i v
e2
 
M
od
el
,  n
at
ur
e 
co
ns
um
er
 d
em
an
d,
 su
pp
ly
 
ch
ai
n 
co
sts
,  c
on
str
ai
nt
s/a
ss
um
pt
io
ns
 
N
at
ur
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
s h
a r
e d
 
Fi
nd
in
gs
  
C
h e
n ,
 D
re
z n
e r
, 
R
y a
n  
a n
d  
S i
m
c h
i-
L
e v
i 
(2
0 0
0 )
 , 
M
n g
tS
c i
 
T
o  
d e
te
rm
in
e  
th
e  
im
p a
c t
 o
f 
d e
m
a n
d  
fo
re
c a
s t
in
g  
o n
 th
e  
b u
llw
h i
p  
e f
fe
c t
. 
2 -
s t
a g
e  
 
1  
M
 : 
1  
R
 
n .
a .
 
(P
e r
io
d i
c  
re
v i
e w
 in
v e
n t
o r
y  
c o
n t
ro
l m
o d
e l
) 
• A
u t
o c
o r
re
la
te
d  
i.d
.d
. c
o n
s u
m
e r
 d
e m
a n
d  
 
•  S
im
p l
e  
m
o v
in
g  
a v
e r
a g
e  
c o
n s
u m
e r
 d
e m
a n
d  
fo
re
c a
s t
 b
y  
re
ta
ile
r 
•  O
rd
e r
 c
y c
le
 le
a d
 ti
m
e  
N
o n
e3
  
•  D
em
a n
d  
v a
ri
a n
c e
 c
a n
 b
e  
d e
c r
e a
s e
d  
b y
 th
e  
fo
llo
w
in
g 
th
re
e  
te
c h
n i
q u
e s
: w
h e
n  
m
o r
e  
h i
s t
o r
ic
a l
 p
e r
io
d s
 a
re
 in
c l
u d
e d
 in
 r
e t
a i
le
r’
s  
d e
m
a n
d  
fo
re
c a
s t
, o
rd
e r
 c
y c
le
 le
a d
 ti
m
e  
d e
c r
e a
s e
s ,
 c
o n
s u
m
e r
 
d e
m
a n
d  
is
 m
o r
e  
c o
rr
e l
a t
e d
 o
v e
r 
tim
e  
 Va
lu
e  
o f
 I n
fo
r m
a t
io
n  
S h
a r
in
g  
H
ar
ih
ar
an
 a
nd
 
Z
ip
ki
n 
(1
99
5)
, 
M
ng
tS
ci
 
 
T
o 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f 
ad
va
nc
e 
w
ar
ni
ng
s 
of
 
cu
st
om
er
 d
em
an
d 
on
 to
ta
l 
ch
ai
n 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
in
 a
 m
ak
e-
to
-s
to
ck
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t. 
> 
2 
st
ag
es
 
1 
S 
: 1
M
 
(:
1R
) 
C
P 
(P
er
io
di
c 
re
vi
ew
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
co
nt
ro
l m
od
el
) 
• C
us
to
m
er
 d
em
an
d 
ha
s 
Po
is
so
n 
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n 
 
• L
ea
d 
tim
es
 f
or
 s
up
pl
y 
de
li
ve
ry
: 
co
ns
ta
nt
/s
to
ch
as
tic
  
• S
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s:
 in
ve
nt
or
y-
ho
ld
in
g,
 
ba
ck
or
de
r 
pe
na
lt
y 
 
 
A
dv
an
ce
 
w
ar
ni
ng
s 
of
 
co
ns
um
er
 
de
m
an
d 
(=
an
no
un
ci
ng
 
du
e 
da
te
 o
f 
de
m
an
d)
 
• A
dv
an
ce
 w
ar
ni
ng
s 
ar
e 
sh
ar
ed
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
th
at
 im
pr
ov
es
 s
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 in
 p
re
ci
se
ly
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
w
ay
 a
s 
a 
re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 
(s
up
pl
y)
 le
ad
 ti
m
es
. 
B
ou
rl
an
d,
 
Po
w
el
l, 
P
yk
e 
(1
99
6)
, E
JO
R
 
  
T
o 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f 
tim
el
y 
de
m
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
e 
le
ve
ls
 b
ot
h 
at
 th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
an
d 
th
e 
cu
st
om
er
 f
ir
m
. 
2-
st
ag
e 
1 
M
 : 
1 
R
 
M
 
(P
er
io
di
c 
re
vi
ew
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
co
nt
ro
l m
od
el
) 
• C
on
su
m
er
 d
em
an
d 
is
 n
or
m
al
ly
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
ed
 
• O
rd
er
 c
yc
le
 s
yn
ch
ro
ni
za
tio
n 
(N
/Y
) 
• S
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s:
 o
rd
er
in
g,
 b
ac
ko
rd
er
, 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
ho
ld
in
g 
co
st
s 
(M
) 
• L
ea
d 
tim
e 
fo
r 
de
liv
er
y 
to
 r
et
ai
le
r 
(d
et
er
m
in
is
tic
; 
he
ld
 c
on
st
an
t)
 
• C
on
st
ra
in
ts
: C
os
t o
f 
tim
el
y 
de
m
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is
 f
ix
ed
, n
o 
le
ad
 ti
m
e 
fo
r 
de
liv
er
y 
to
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
T
im
el
y 
de
m
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 a
 s
in
gl
e-
pr
od
uc
t, 
m
ak
e-
to
-
st
oc
k 
su
pp
ly
 
ch
ai
n.
  
• T
he
 v
al
ue
 o
f 
sh
ar
in
g 
tim
el
y 
co
ns
um
er
 d
em
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
w
he
n 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
ho
ld
in
g 
co
st
s,
 c
on
su
m
er
 
de
m
an
d,
 a
nd
 o
ff
se
t t
im
e 
in
cr
ea
se
.  
• L
ar
ge
r 
of
fs
et
 ti
m
es
 m
ea
n 
th
at
 th
e 
re
pl
en
is
hm
en
t p
er
io
ds
 a
re
 n
ot
 
sy
nc
hr
on
iz
ed
.  
• V
al
ue
 o
f 
tim
el
y 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
re
ta
ile
r 
is
 r
ef
le
ct
ed
 in
 b
et
te
r 
se
rv
ic
e 
by
 th
e 
su
pp
lie
r,
 a
t l
ow
er
 c
os
ts
.  
 
Fi
sh
er
 a
nd
 
R
am
an
 (
19
96
),
 
O
R
 
T
o 
de
ve
lo
p 
m
et
ho
ds
 f
or
 
im
pr
ov
in
g 
fo
re
ca
st
in
g 
an
d 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
pl
an
ni
ng
 in
 a
 
si
ng
le
 c
ap
ac
ita
te
d 
su
pp
li
er
, 
m
ul
tip
le
 p
ro
du
ct
 s
ea
so
na
l 
de
m
an
d 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t t
o 
im
pr
ov
e 
sy
st
em
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. 
2-
st
ag
e 
1 
M
 : 
n 
R
 
 (t
w
o 
pe
ri
od
s)
 
M
 
(N
ew
sb
oy
-t
yp
e 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
m
od
el
) 
• S
ho
rt
 s
al
es
 s
ea
so
n 
• S
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s:
 o
ve
rp
ro
du
ct
io
n 
an
d 
un
de
rp
ro
du
ct
io
n 
co
st
s 
• C
on
st
ra
in
ts
: l
im
ite
d 
ca
pa
ci
ta
te
d 
su
pp
lie
r,
 o
rd
er
 
ba
tc
h 
si
ze
 
• N
ot
e:
 e
m
pi
ri
ca
l t
es
t d
at
a 
fr
om
 a
ct
ua
l 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
m
od
el
 
R
et
ai
le
r’
s 
or
de
r 
(=
fo
re
ca
st
) 
is
 
ba
se
d 
on
 
sa
le
s 
of
 
re
la
te
d 
ite
m
s 
• T
he
 e
ff
ec
tiv
en
es
s 
of
 Q
ui
ck
 R
es
po
ns
e 
(Q
R
) 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 a
re
 te
st
ed
 
an
d 
co
m
pa
re
d 
to
 th
e 
ac
tu
al
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 w
ith
in
 a
 c
om
pa
ny
.  
• R
es
ul
ts
 s
ho
w
 (
ho
w
ev
er
) 
no
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 s
al
es
. P
ro
fi
ts
 a
re
 la
rg
er
, 
th
ro
ug
h 
a 
be
tte
r 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
of
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
co
st
s 
an
d 
a 
be
tte
r 
as
se
ss
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
ri
sk
 o
f 
di
ff
er
en
t i
te
m
s 
(l
es
s 
ov
er
pr
od
uc
tio
n,
 a
nd
 le
ss
 u
nd
er
pr
od
uc
tio
n)
 
Iy
er
 a
nd
 B
er
ge
n 
(1
99
7)
, M
ng
tS
ci
 
 
T
o 
m
ak
e 
a 
co
m
pa
ri
so
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
tr
ad
iti
on
al
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
w
ith
 a
n 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 Q
R
 in
 
a 
si
ng
le
 p
ro
du
ct
 M
-R
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t. 
2-
st
ag
e 
 
1 
M
 : 
1 
R
  
 (t
w
o 
pe
ri
od
s)
 
C
P 
(N
ew
sb
oy
 ty
pe
 (
m
ul
ti-
st
ag
e)
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
m
od
el
) 
• S
ho
rt
 s
al
es
 s
ea
so
n 
• S
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s:
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
ho
ld
in
g 
co
st
s,
 
go
od
w
ill
 c
os
t f
or
 u
ns
at
is
fi
ed
 d
em
an
d 
in
 a
 
se
as
on
 
• U
nl
im
ite
d 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 
• L
ea
d 
tim
e 
or
de
r-
de
liv
er
y 
(d
et
er
m
in
is
tic
, 
st
oc
ha
st
ic
) 
R
et
ai
le
r’
s 
or
de
r 
(=
fo
re
ca
st
) 
is
 
ba
se
d 
on
 
sa
le
s 
of
 
re
la
te
d 
ite
m
s 
• I
m
pl
em
en
tin
g 
Q
R
 m
ay
 n
ot
 im
pr
ov
e 
th
e 
pr
of
its
 o
f 
su
pp
lie
rs
. 
V
ol
um
e 
co
m
m
itm
en
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
re
ta
ile
r 
m
ak
e 
Q
R
 a
ttr
ac
tiv
e 
fo
r 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r.
  
• W
ho
le
sa
le
 p
ri
ce
 c
om
m
itm
en
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
re
ta
ile
r 
do
 n
ot
 m
ak
e 
Q
R
 
m
or
e 
lu
cr
at
iv
e 
to
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
. 
C
he
n 
(1
99
8)
, 
M
ng
tS
ci
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at
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 c
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 d
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 d
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• D
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• C
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 d
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at
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 d
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 d
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fo
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at
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sh
ar
in
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al
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tio
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m
at
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ar
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 v
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in
fo
rm
at
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 1
.7
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 o
n 
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ag
e 
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it
h 
th
e 
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gh
es
t 
va
lu
e 
of
 9
%
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• T
he
re
 a
re
 in
di
ca
tio
ns
 th
at
 th
e 
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lu
e 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
w
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n 
th
e 
nu
m
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r 
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ag
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 b
at
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at
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 m
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.  
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o d
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 d
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n d
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b l
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p l
y  
c h
a i
n  
c o
s t
s :
 in
v e
n t
o r
y  
h o
ld
in
g  
c o
s t
, 
b a
c k
o r
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a d
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a d
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a d
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e p
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e d
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u m
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a c
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e p
le
n i
s h
m
e n
t s
tr
a t
e g
ie
s ;
 in
fo
rm
a t
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 d
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 m
o r
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 d
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 d
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e c
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 b
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e d
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 d
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l m
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 d
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 d
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 m
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at
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t f
ro
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 o
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itm
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 d
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 D
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 c
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 b
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at
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 d
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at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
fo
r 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r.
 
C
he
n,
 D
re
zn
er
, 
R
ya
n 
an
d 
Si
m
ch
i-
L
ev
i 
(2
00
0)
, p
ar
t I
I,
 
M
ng
tS
ci
 
T
o 
de
te
rm
in
e 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f 
ce
nt
ra
liz
ed
 d
em
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 th
e 
bu
llw
hi
p 
ef
fe
ct
 in
 a
 m
ul
ti-
st
ag
e 
su
pp
ly
 
ch
ai
n.
 
M
ul
ti 
N
-
st
ag
e 
 
C
P 
(P
er
io
di
c 
re
vi
ew
 i n
ve
nt
or
y 
co
nt
ro
l m
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 d
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 d
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 d
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 d
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 r
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m
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 d
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er
en
t 
se
gm
en
ts
 (
re
gu
la
r 
vs
 p
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st
s,
 
pe
na
lt
y 
fo
r 
lo
st
 s
al
es
 (
R
),
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
ho
ld
in
g 
co
st
s 
(M
) 
 
• C
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re
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l m
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 b
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, d
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 d
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 p
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 f
ro
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at
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 b
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 f
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 d
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pr
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 d
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 c
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e 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
e 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 o
f 
su
pp
ly
 c
ha
in
s 
in
 s
et
tin
gs
 
w
he
re
 f
or
ec
as
ts
 a
re
 
dy
na
m
ic
al
ly
 u
pd
at
ed
 a
t m
or
e 
th
an
 o
ne
 lo
ca
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
su
pp
ly
 c
ha
in
 (
th
e 
be
ne
fi
ts
 o
f 
C
F,
  c
ol
la
bo
ra
tiv
e 
fo
re
ca
st
in
g)
 
2-
st
ag
e 
 
 1 
M
 : 
1 
R
  
M
 a
nd
 R
 
(P
er
io
di
c 
re
vi
ew
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
co
nt
ro
l p
ro
bl
em
) 
• C
on
su
m
er
 d
em
an
d 
is
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t, 
an
d 
id
en
tic
al
ly
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
ed
 a
cr
os
s 
tim
e 
(n
or
m
al
 
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n)
 (
no
te
: t
he
 a
na
ly
si
s 
is
 r
es
tr
ic
te
d 
to
 
ca
se
s 
w
ith
 lo
w
 v
ar
ia
bi
lit
y 
of
 d
em
an
d)
 
• S
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s:
 h
ol
di
ng
 c
os
ts
, s
ho
rt
ag
e 
pe
na
lt
y/
ba
ck
-o
rd
er
 c
os
ts
, f
or
 r
et
ai
le
r 
an
d 
su
pp
lie
r.
 
• B
at
ch
 o
rd
er
 s
iz
es
. 
• L
ea
d 
tim
e 
(d
et
er
m
in
is
tic
, v
ar
ia
bl
e)
 
• C
on
st
ra
in
ts
: s
up
pl
ie
r 
ha
s 
an
 u
nl
im
ite
d 
so
ur
ce
 o
f 
su
pp
ly
  
 
Fo
re
ca
st
s 
fo
r 
fu
tu
re
 
de
m
an
d 
 
 D
iv
er
si
ty
 in
 
fo
re
ca
st
in
g 
ca
pa
bi
lit
ie
s 
of
 
su
pp
lie
r 
an
d 
re
ta
ile
r 
• D
em
an
d 
fo
re
ca
st
in
g 
he
lp
s 
to
 d
ec
re
as
e 
su
pp
ly
 c
ha
in
 c
os
t b
y 
11
%
 
on
 a
ve
ra
ge
. S
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s 
ar
e 
lo
w
er
ed
 b
y 
an
 e
xt
ra
 8
 %
 if
 
fo
re
ca
st
in
g 
is
 c
on
du
ct
ed
 c
ol
le
ct
iv
el
y.
 T
he
 e
ff
ec
tiv
en
es
s 
of
 
co
lla
bo
ra
tiv
e 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
w
he
n 
fo
re
ca
st
in
g 
ca
pa
bi
lit
ie
s 
of
 c
ha
nn
el
 
m
em
be
rs
 a
re
 d
iv
er
si
fi
ed
. 
• B
en
ef
its
 o
f 
co
lla
bo
ra
tiv
e 
fo
re
ca
st
in
g 
ar
e 
la
rg
er
 w
he
n 
le
ad
 ti
m
es
 
ar
e 
sm
al
le
r.
 
 
M
oi
nz
ad
eh
 
(2
00
2)
, M
ng
tS
ci
 
T
o 
co
m
pa
re
 th
e 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
s 
of
 a
 f
ul
ly
 
in
fo
rm
ed
 c
ha
nn
el
 w
ith
 th
at
 
of
 a
 c
ha
nn
el
 u
si
ng
 
in
st
al
la
tio
n 
st
oc
k 
po
lic
ie
s 
1 
M
 : 
n 
R
 
(i
de
nt
ic
al
 
re
ta
ile
rs
) 
C
P 
(P
er
io
di
c 
re
vi
ew
 i n
ve
nt
or
y 
co
nt
ro
l m
od
el
) 
• S
ta
tio
na
ry
 r
an
do
m
 c
on
su
m
er
 d
em
an
d 
at
 r
et
ai
le
r 
(P
oi
ss
on
) 
• L
ea
d 
tim
e 
in
 d
el
iv
er
y 
to
 r
et
ai
le
r 
is
 r
an
do
m
 
• S
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s:
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
ho
ld
in
g 
co
st
s,
 
ba
ck
or
de
r/
sh
or
ta
ge
 c
os
ts
 
• C
on
st
ra
in
t: 
ou
ts
id
e 
so
ur
ce
 to
 th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
ha
s 
am
pl
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 a
nd
 it
s 
re
pl
en
is
hm
en
t l
ea
d 
tim
e 
is
 c
on
st
an
t 
 
In
ve
nt
or
y 
st
at
us
 a
nd
 
co
ns
um
er
 
de
m
an
d 
ac
tiv
it
y 
at
 
re
ta
ile
r 
• S
ha
ri
ng
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
le
ad
s 
to
 a
n 
av
er
ag
e 
sa
vi
n g
 o
f 
3.
2%
, w
ith
 a
 
m
ax
im
um
 s
av
in
g 
of
 3
4.
9%
 
• T
he
 v
al
ue
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
w
he
n:
 (
1)
 s
up
pl
ie
r’
s 
le
ad
 ti
m
e 
to
 d
el
iv
er
 to
 r
et
ai
le
rs
 is
 lo
ng
, (
2)
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 r
et
ai
le
rs
 is
 n
ot
 
la
rg
e,
 (
3)
 o
rd
er
 q
ua
nt
iti
es
 a
re
 e
ith
er
 n
ot
 to
o 
sm
a l
l o
r 
to
o 
la
rg
e,
 a
nd
 
(4
) 
th
e 
ra
tio
n 
of
 u
ni
t h
ol
di
ng
 c
os
t o
f 
th
e 
re
ta
ile
r 
to
 th
at
 o
f 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
is
 e
ith
er
 n
ot
 to
o 
sm
al
l o
r 
to
o 
la
rg
e.
 
C
he
un
g 
an
d 
L
ee
 
(2
00
2)
 
M
ng
tS
ci
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
be
ne
fi
ts
 o
f 
V
M
I p
ro
gr
am
s 
in
 m
ul
tip
le
 
re
ta
ile
r 
se
tti
ng
s;
 s
pe
ci
al
ly
 th
e 
be
ne
fi
ts
 f
ro
m
 c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
of
 s
hi
pm
en
ts
 to
 r
et
ai
le
rs
 a
nd
 
fr
om
 r
eb
al
an
ci
ng
 s
to
ck
in
g 
po
si
tio
ns
 
1 
M
 : 
n 
R
  
(r
et
ai
le
rs
 in
 
cl
os
e 
pr
ox
im
ity
; 
re
su
pp
ly
 in
 
1 
de
liv
er
y 
tr
ip
) 
C
P 
(P
er
io
di
c 
re
vi
ew
 i n
ve
nt
or
y 
co
nt
ro
l m
od
el
) 
• S
ta
tio
na
ry
 r
an
do
m
 c
on
su
m
er
 d
em
an
d 
at
 r
et
ai
le
r 
(P
oi
ss
on
) 
• L
ea
d 
tim
e 
in
 d
el
iv
er
y 
to
 r
et
ai
le
r 
is
 c
on
st
an
t 
• S
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s:
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
ho
ld
in
g 
co
st
s,
 
ba
ck
or
de
r/
sh
or
ta
ge
 c
os
ts
 (
fo
r 
th
e 
re
ta
ile
r)
 
• C
on
st
ra
in
ts
: o
ut
si
de
 s
ou
rc
e 
to
 th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
ha
s 
am
pl
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 a
nd
 it
s 
re
pl
en
is
hm
en
t l
ea
d 
tim
e 
is
 c
on
st
an
t; 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 m
in
im
al
 s
hi
pm
en
t s
iz
e 
 
C
on
su
m
er
 
de
m
an
d,
 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
po
si
tio
n,
 a
nd
 
re
-o
rd
er
 
po
lic
y 
• I
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
en
ab
le
s 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
to
 c
oo
rd
in
at
e 
sh
ip
m
en
ts
 
to
 r
et
ai
le
rs
; a
nd
 th
er
eb
y 
to
 r
e d
uc
e 
re
ta
ile
r’
s 
(i
nv
en
to
ry
 h
ol
di
ng
) 
co
st
s.
  
• T
hi
s 
va
lu
e 
fr
om
 s
hi
pm
en
t c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
is
 la
rg
er
 w
he
n 
th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
in
g 
re
ta
ile
rs
 in
cr
ea
se
, a
nd
 th
e 
ra
tio
 b
et
w
ee
n 
m
in
im
um
 
sh
ip
m
en
t s
iz
e 
an
d 
co
ns
um
er
 d
em
an
d 
va
ri
ab
ili
ty
 g
oe
s 
up
. 
• I
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
al
so
 m
ak
es
 it
 p
os
si
bl
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
to
 
re
ba
la
nc
e 
st
oc
k 
in
 th
e 
re
ta
ile
r 
ne
tw
or
k.
 T
he
 v
al
ue
 o
f 
re
ba
la
nc
in
g 
st
oc
k 
is
 g
re
at
er
 w
he
n 
th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
in
g 
re
ta
ile
rs
 g
ro
w
 
• B
ot
h 
be
ne
fi
ts
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
ho
w
ev
er
 a
 d
ec
re
as
in
g  
re
tu
rn
 to
 s
ca
le
 
(n
um
be
r 
of
 r
et
ai
le
rs
).
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ud
y,
 A
ut
ho
rs
 
(y
ea
r)
,  J
ou
rn
al
 
O
bj
ec
t i v
e 
Su
pp
ly
 
C
ha
in
 
S t
r u
c t
u r
e1
 
Pe
rs
pe
ct
i v
e2
 
M
od
el
,  n
at
ur
e 
co
ns
um
er
 d
em
an
d,
 su
pp
ly
 
ch
ai
n 
co
sts
,  c
on
str
ai
nt
s/a
ss
um
pt
io
ns
 
N
at
ur
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
s h
a r
e d
 
Fi
nd
in
gs
  
Z
h a
o ,
 e
t a
l. 
(2
0 0
2 )
, E
J O
R
 
 
T
o  
a s
s e
s s
 th
e  
im
p a
c t
 o
f 
fo
re
c a
s t
in
g  
m
o d
e l
 s
e l
e c
ti
o n
 
o n
 th
e  
v a
lu
e  
o f
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g  
in
 a
 s
u p
p l
y  
c h
a i
n  
w
ith
 o
n e
 c
a p
a c
ita
te
d  
a n
d  
m
u l
tip
le
 r
e t
a i
le
rs
 
2 -
s t
a g
e  
1  
M
 : 
n  
R
 
M
 a
n d
 R
 
(P
e r
io
d i
c  
re
v i
e w
 in
v e
n t
o r
y  
c o
n t
ro
l m
o d
e l
) 
•  F
o u
r 
c o
n s
u m
e r
 d
e m
an
d  
p a
tte
rn
s  
(c
o n
s t
a n
t, 
s e
a s
o n
a l
 w
ith
o u
t t
re
n d
s,
 s
e a
s o
n a
l w
ith
 a
n  
in
c r
e a
s i
n g
 tr
e n
d ,
 s
e a
s o
n a
l w
ith
 d
e c
re
a s
in
g  
tr
e n
d )
. 
•  S
u p
p l
y  
c h
a i
n  
c o
s t
s :
 tr
a n
s p
o r
ta
tio
n  
c o
s t
s ,
 o
rd
e r
-
p r
o c
e s
s i
n g
 c
o s
ts
, i
n v
e n
to
ry
 h
o l
d i
n g
 c
o s
ts
, 
b a
c k
o r
d e
r/
s h
o r
ta
g e
 c
o s
ts
 (
fo
r 
th
e  
re
ta
ile
rs
),
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
se
t-
up
 c
os
ts
, i
nv
en
to
ry
 h
ol
di
ng
 
co
st
s,
 b
ac
ko
rd
er
/s
ho
rt
ag
e 
co
st
s 
(f
or
 th
e 
su
pp
lie
r)
 
• L
ea
d 
tim
e 
of
 d
el
iv
er
y 
is
 c
on
st
an
t (
on
e 
pe
ri
od
) 
• C
on
st
ra
in
ts
: s
up
pl
ie
r 
ha
s 
fi
xe
d 
ca
pa
ci
ty
; t
he
re
 
is
 n
o 
m
in
im
al
 s
hi
pm
en
t s
iz
e 
  
D
e m
a n
d  
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n ,
 
F u
tu
re
 o
rd
e r
 
p l
a n
s  
•  I
n f
o r
m
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g  
re
d u
c e
s  
to
ta
l s
u p
p l
y 
c h
a i
n  
c o
s t
s ,
 c
o s
ts
 o
f 
th
e  
re
ta
ile
r,
 a
n d
 c
o s
ts
 o
f 
th
e  
s u
p p
lie
r;
 it
 in
c r
e a
s e
s  
th
e  
s e
rv
ic
e  
le
v e
ls
 o
f 
th
e  
s u
p p
lie
r 
a n
d  
th
e  
re
ta
ile
r.
  
•  T
h e
 im
p a
c t
 o
f 
fu
tu
re
 o
rd
e r
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g  
o n
 s
u p
p l
y  
c h
a i
n  
c o
s t
s  
re
d u
c t
io
n  
is
 g
re
a t
e r
 th
a n
 d
e m
a n
d  
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g .
 
•  T
h e
 b
e n
e f
its
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g  
g o
 u
p  
w
h e
n  
th
e  
re
ta
ile
r 
u s
e s
 
m
o r
e  
a d
v a
n c
e d
 a
n d
 m
o r
e  
a c
c u
ra
te
 f
o r
e c
a s
tin
g 
m
e t
h o
d s
. 
C
he
n 
an
d 
Y
u 
(2
00
5)
, M
&
SO
 
 
T
o 
qu
an
tif
y 
th
e 
va
lu
e 
of
 
su
pp
lie
r’
s 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
de
liv
er
y 
le
ad
tim
es
 to
 th
e 
re
ta
ile
r 
2-
st
ag
e 
1 
M
 : 
1 
R
 
R
 
(P
er
io
di
c 
re
vi
ew
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
co
nt
ro
l m
od
el
) 
• i
.d
.d
. r
an
do
m
 c
on
su
m
er
 d
em
an
d 
at
 r
et
ai
le
r 
• S
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s:
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
ho
ld
in
g 
co
st
s,
 
ba
ck
or
de
r/
sh
or
ta
ge
 c
os
ts
 (
fo
r 
th
e 
re
ta
ile
r)
 
• L
ea
d 
tim
e 
of
 d
el
iv
er
y 
is
 r
an
do
m
 (
kn
ow
n 
by
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r)
 
• C
on
st
ra
in
ts
: o
ut
si
de
 s
ou
rc
e 
to
 th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
ha
s 
am
pl
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 a
nd
 it
s 
re
pl
en
is
hm
en
t l
ea
d 
tim
e 
is
 c
on
st
an
t; 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 m
in
im
al
 s
hi
pm
en
t s
iz
e 
 
L
ea
d 
tim
e 
of
 
de
liv
er
y 
fr
om
 
su
pp
lie
r 
to
 
re
ta
ile
r 
• S
ha
ri
ng
 le
ad
tim
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
by
 th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
al
lo
w
s 
th
e 
re
ta
ile
r 
to
 
op
tim
iz
e 
re
pl
en
is
hm
en
t d
ec
is
io
ns
; t
he
 v
al
ue
 o
f 
th
is
 u
ps
tr
ea
m
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ca
n 
be
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
, u
p 
to
 4
1%
  
• T
he
 b
en
ef
its
 in
cr
ea
se
 w
he
n 
le
ad
 ti
m
es
 v
ar
y 
a  
lo
t a
nd
 w
he
n 
co
ns
um
er
 d
em
an
d 
ha
s 
a 
hi
gh
 v
ol
um
e.
 
 Re
la
tiv
e 
Va
lu
e 
of
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
in
g 
 
Pa
rl
ar
 a
nd
 W
en
g 
(1
99
7)
, M
ng
tS
ci
 
T
o 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f 
jo
in
t 
co
or
di
na
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 a
nd
 s
up
pl
y 
to
 
m
ee
t u
nc
er
ta
in
 d
em
an
d 
in
 
lim
ite
d 
tim
e 
fr
am
e 
2-
st
ag
e 
 1 
S 
: 1
 M
 
(t
w
o 
pe
ri
od
s)
 
C
P 
(N
ew
sb
oy
-t
yp
e 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
m
od
el
) 
• P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n 
of
 r
an
do
m
 c
on
su
m
er
 
de
m
an
d 
is
 k
no
w
n 
• S
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s:
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
se
t-
up
 c
os
ts
, b
ac
ko
rd
er
 c
os
ts
, s
al
va
ge
 
(m
ar
kd
ow
n,
 o
r 
di
sp
os
al
 c
os
t )
, m
at
er
ia
l o
rd
er
in
g 
co
st
 
• C
on
st
ra
in
t: 
a 
ne
w
sb
oy
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
m
od
el
; v
iz
. 
re
su
pp
ly
 is
 n
ot
 p
os
si
bl
e.
 
  
C
us
to
m
er
 (
M
) 
de
m
an
d 
da
ta
 
• T
ot
al
 (
ch
an
ne
l)
 p
ro
fi
t i
s 
hi
gh
er
 in
 c
as
e 
of
 jo
in
t c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
is
 
(i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
an
d 
ce
nt
ra
liz
ed
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g)
;  
• T
he
 v
al
ue
 o
f 
jo
in
t c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
w
he
n 
m
at
er
ia
l-
re
la
te
d 
co
st
s 
in
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 p
er
io
d 
ar
e 
m
uc
h 
th
an
 in
 th
e 
fi
rs
t p
er
io
d.
 
• V
ar
ia
tio
ns
 in
 b
ac
ko
rd
er
 c
os
ts
, u
ni
t s
al
es
 p
ri
ce
s,
 m
ea
n 
cu
st
om
er
 
de
m
an
d,
 a
nd
 u
ni
t s
al
va
ge
 h
av
e 
m
uc
h 
le
ss
 im
pa
ct
 o
n 
to
ta
l p
ro
fi
ts
 
du
e 
to
 c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
M
 a
nd
 S
. 
A
na
nd
 a
nd
 
M
en
de
ls
on
 
(1
99
7)
, M
ng
tS
ci
 
T
o 
m
od
el
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
co
or
di
na
tio
n 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 o
n 
th
e 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 o
f 
a 
fi
rm
 f
ac
in
g 
un
ce
rt
ai
n 
de
m
an
d 
in
 
m
ul
tip
le
 h
or
iz
on
ta
l m
ar
ke
ts
 
2-
st
ag
e 
 
1 
ce
nt
er
 (
M
) 
: n
 b
ra
nc
he
s 
(R
) 
C
P 
(N
ew
sb
oy
-t
yp
e 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
m
od
el
) 
• C
on
su
m
er
 d
em
an
d 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
(l
ow
 o
r 
hi
gh
 
st
at
e)
, n
ot
 a
cr
os
s 
tim
e 
• S
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s:
 m
ar
gi
na
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
co
st
s 
• L
oc
al
 s
pe
ci
fi
c 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
at
 th
e 
br
an
ch
es
 (
 i.
c.
, 
R
 )
  
C
on
su
m
er
 
de
m
an
d 
an
d 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
da
ta
 
 E
rr
or
 in
 
tr
an
sm
is
si
on
 
of
 lo
ca
l 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
• V
al
ue
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
(s
ha
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 d
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 c
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at
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 b
ra
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is
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e r
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o d
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n d
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n d
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 r
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p m
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d l
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p l
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h o
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 c
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n d
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n d
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e m
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a t
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t m
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u c
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a t
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 c
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a c
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 d
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 m
ak
e 
it 
w
or
k.
 
 
2-
st
ag
e 
1 
M
 : 
1 
M
-
D
C
 a
nd
 7
 
V
M
I-
R
 
M
 a
nd
 R
 
n.
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at
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l d
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re
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 d
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 o
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I b
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 m
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t f
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 m
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 c
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 c
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 d
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re
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l m
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 d
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 d
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 d
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• C
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 f
or
 r
ep
le
ni
sh
m
en
t r
et
ai
l 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
C
on
su
m
er
 
de
m
an
d 
an
d 
re
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at
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 o
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 c
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 c
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 c
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 c
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 c
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ad
iti
on
al
 
re
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 p
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 d
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 c
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 c
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• C
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 b
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e.
 
In
ve
nt
or
y 
po
lic
y 
an
d 
da
ta
 
• T
he
 V
M
I 
ag
re
em
en
t p
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 c
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 d
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 f
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 d
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ro
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at
io
ns
 in
 
w
hi
ch
 is
 d
ea
lt 
w
ith
 
co
ns
um
er
 d
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 c
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 b
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 d
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 c
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 c
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at
io
n 
(V
M
I)
; (
3)
 
D
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 d
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 d
em
an
d 
is
 a
ut
oc
or
re
la
te
d 
(a
 la
rg
er
 
po
rt
io
n 
of
 d
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at
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 c
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 d
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at
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 b
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 c
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 d
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 p
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• C
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 d
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 c
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 d
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at
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 r
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 f
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 p
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 r
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a l
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at
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u l
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 d
e l
iv
e r
y  
le
a d
 ti
m
e  
re
d u
c t
io
n ,
 s
h a
ri
n g
 c
u s
to
m
e r
 
in
fo
rm
a t
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l d
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a t
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 c
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e c
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ry
 r
an
do
m
 c
on
su
m
er
 d
em
an
d 
(i
.d
.d
.)
 
• U
ns
at
is
fi
ed
 d
em
an
d 
is
 f
ul
ly
 b
ac
kl
og
ge
d 
• S
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
co
st
s:
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
ho
ld
in
g 
co
st
, 
ba
ck
or
de
r 
co
st
 
• L
ea
d 
tim
es
: p
ro
du
ct
io
n/
tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n,
 a
nd
 
or
de
r 
de
la
y 
(b
ot
h 
co
ns
ta
nt
s)
, a
ss
um
ed
 to
 b
e 
eq
ua
l f
or
 e
ac
h 
st
ag
e 
• C
on
st
ra
in
t: 
ba
tc
h 
si
ze
 f
or
 r
ep
le
ni
sh
m
en
t 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
 
C
on
su
m
er
 
de
m
an
d 
• T
he
 b
en
ef
its
 o
f 
sh
ar
in
g 
co
ns
um
er
 d
em
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 te
rm
s 
of
 
lo
w
er
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
co
st
s 
an
d 
ba
ck
or
de
r 
co
st
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
en
tir
e 
ch
ai
n 
is
 
re
al
ly
 m
at
er
ia
liz
ed
, w
he
n 
th
e 
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
(t
ea
m
) 
in
ce
nt
iv
e 
sc
he
m
e 
is
 b
ei
ng
 u
se
d.
 T
he
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
er
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
w
ho
le
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
ch
an
ne
l; 
no
t o
nl
y 
th
ei
r 
ow
n 
st
ag
e/
lin
k.
 
1,
2  
S 
= 
su
pp
lie
r 
; M
 =
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
; D
 =
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
or
; R
 =
 r
et
ai
le
r;
 C
P  
= 
C
en
tr
al
 P
la
nn
er
 
3  
N
o 
m
ar
ke
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
sh
ar
ed
; t
he
 r
et
ai
le
r/
 d
ow
n s
tr
ea
m
 c
ha
nn
el
 m
em
be
r 
on
ly
 p
as
se
s 
on
 o
rd
er
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
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SU
M
M
A
R
Y 
O
F 
TH
E 
ST
U
D
IE
S 
O
F 
TH
E 
G
A
M
E-
TH
EO
R
ET
IC
A
L 
A
PP
R
O
A
C
H
  
  
 
 
 
 
Pl
a y
e r
s  P
r o
fit
 fu
n c
tio
n  
r e
v e
n u
e s
 (+
), 
c o
s ts
 (-
) 
 
 
 
 
S t
u d
y ,
 A
u t
h o
r s
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
O
b j
e c
tiv
e  
S e
t o
f 
p l
a y
e r
s  
S t
a g
e s
, T
y p
e *
G
a m
e  
s e
q u
e n
c e
 
M
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r  
Re
ta
ile
r  
 U
n c
e r
ta
in
tie
s  
N
a t
u r
e 
o f
 
in
fo
r m
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
e d
 
K
e y
 fi
n d
in
g s
 
G
a l
-O
r 
(1
9 9
1 )
, J
IE
 
T
o  
in
v e
s t
ig
a t
e  
if
 
of
fe
ri
ng
 c
er
ta
in
 
co
nt
ra
ct
s 
to
 r
et
ai
le
r 
ca
n 
im
ita
te
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 o
f 
an
 
in
te
gr
at
ed
 c
ha
nn
el
  
1 M
 : 
1 R
 
3 ,
 P
,Q
 
(1
) 
M
 o
ff
e r
s  
a  
F r
a n
c h
is
e  
F e
e  
co
nt
ra
ct
 o
r 
a 
R
et
ai
l P
ri
ce
 
M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 c
on
tr
ac
t; 
(2
) 
re
ta
ile
r 
gi
ve
s 
de
m
an
d 
an
d 
co
st
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
(p
os
si
bl
y 
w
ith
 o
r 
w
ith
ou
t n
oi
se
 o
r 
bi
as
);
 (
3)
 R
 a
cc
ep
ts
 o
r 
re
je
ct
s 
of
fe
r 
M
: w
h o
le
s a
le
 
pr
ic
e,
 f
ra
nc
hi
se
 
fe
e 
(+
) 
 
R
: r
e t
a i
l 
pr
ic
e,
 u
ni
t 
sa
le
s 
(+
),
 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
e,
 
fr
an
ch
is
e 
fe
e 
(-
) 
 
C
o n
s u
m
e r
 
de
m
an
d 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
(l
in
ea
r 
fu
nc
tio
n 
w
ith
 r
an
do
m
 
te
rm
) 
C
o n
s u
m
e r
 
de
m
an
d 
an
d 
co
st
  
(w
ith
 o
r 
w
ith
ou
t 
no
is
e)
 
•  W
h e
n  
v e
rt
ic
a l
 in
te
g r
a t
io
n  
is
 ta
k e
n  
a s
 a
 b
e n
c h
m
a r
k ,
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
by
 th
e 
re
ta
ile
r 
do
es
 n
ot
 
ou
tp
er
fo
rm
 v
er
tic
al
 in
te
gr
at
io
n.
 
• T
he
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
m
or
e 
st
ri
ct
er
 r
et
ai
l p
ri
ce
 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 c
on
tr
ac
t i
s 
be
tte
r 
th
an
 th
e 
fr
an
ch
is
e 
fe
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 (
= 
a 
fo
rm
 o
f 
a 
qu
an
tit
y 
fo
rc
in
g 
co
nt
ra
ct
).
 
C
hu
 a
nd
 M
es
si
ng
er
 
(1
99
7)
, I
JR
M
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 p
f 
m
ar
ke
t 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 o
n 
in
di
vi
du
al
 a
nd
 to
ta
l 
ch
an
ne
l p
ro
fi
ts
. 
1M
 : 
1R
 
2,
 P
 
(1
) 
M
 a
nd
 R
 c
an
 c
ho
os
e 
to
 a
cq
ui
re
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t t
he
 d
em
an
d 
pa
ra
m
et
er
 a
t (
di
ff
er
en
t)
 c
os
ts
; (
2)
 M
 
an
d 
R
 c
ho
os
e 
th
e 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 p
ri
ce
 
an
d 
re
ta
il 
m
ar
gi
n.
 
 N
ot
e:
 p
la
ye
rs
 a
re
 a
llo
w
ed
 to
 
pu
rc
ha
se
 d
em
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
as
 a
 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
op
tio
n 
pr
io
r 
to
 p
la
yi
ng
 th
e 
(n
on
-c
oo
pe
ra
tiv
e)
 p
ri
ci
ng
 g
am
e.
  
N
ot
e:
 p
la
ye
rs
 h
av
e 
a 
sy
m
m
et
ri
c 
pr
of
it 
fu
nc
tio
n,
 e
xc
ep
t f
or
 th
e 
fi
xe
d 
am
ou
nt
 f
or
 d
em
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 c
os
ts
 
M
: w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
e 
(+
),
 u
ni
t 
sa
le
s 
(+
),
 
de
m
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 
co
st
s 
(-
) 
 
R
: r
et
ai
l 
pr
ic
e,
 u
ni
t 
sa
le
s 
(+
),
 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
e,
 
de
m
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 
co
st
s 
(-
) 
 
C
on
su
m
er
 
de
m
an
d 
fu
nc
tio
n 
(a
 li
ne
ar
 f
un
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
 
ab
ou
t 
co
ns
um
er
s’
 p
ri
ce
 
el
as
tic
it
y 
(s
lo
pe
).
 
N
on
e 
• A
cq
ui
si
tio
n 
of
 d
em
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
by
 e
ac
h 
ch
an
ne
l 
m
em
be
rs
 le
ad
s 
to
 g
re
at
er
 a
bs
ol
ut
e 
pr
of
its
 a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
gr
ea
te
r 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 c
ha
nn
el
 p
ro
fi
ts
 f
or
 th
at
 c
ha
n n
el
 
m
em
be
r.
 
• T
ot
al
 c
ha
nn
el
 p
ro
fi
ts
 a
re
 h
ig
he
r 
w
he
n 
on
ly
 o
ne
 
m
em
be
r 
ha
s 
de
m
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
• D
em
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
le
ad
s 
to
 a
 s
m
oo
th
in
g 
of
 r
ea
liz
ed
 
de
m
an
d 
• T
he
 c
os
ts
 o
f 
ac
qu
ir
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
fl
ue
nc
es
 th
e 
de
ci
si
on
s 
to
 a
cq
ui
re
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
• W
he
n 
th
e 
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
 is
 th
at
 b
ot
h 
ch
an
ne
l m
em
be
rs
 
ac
qu
ir
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 s
uc
h 
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
 is
 n
ot
 a
 
pr
is
on
er
’s
 d
ile
m
m
a.
 
Si
ed
m
an
n 
an
d 
Su
nd
ar
ar
aj
an
 
(1
99
7)
, W
P 
T
o 
m
od
el
 th
e 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
by
 a
 r
et
ai
le
r.
 
2M
 : 
1R
 
2,
 n
.a
. 
(1
) 
R
 o
ff
er
s 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
M
s 
a 
ca
te
go
ry
 m
an
ag
em
en
t c
on
tr
ac
t, 
(2
) 
M
 a
cc
ep
ts
 o
r 
re
je
ct
s 
of
fe
r.
 
M
: s
tr
at
eg
ic
 
sa
le
s 
an
d 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
re
ve
nu
e,
 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
re
ve
nu
e,
 e
xt
ra
 
ba
rg
ai
ni
ng
 
po
w
er
 (
+)
, l
os
s 
of
  c
on
-t
ra
ct
ua
l 
pa
ym
en
t (
-)
 
R
: 
co
nt
ra
ct
ua
l 
pa
ym
en
t (
+)
, 
op
er
at
io
na
l 
sa
vi
ng
s 
(+
),
 
lo
ss
 o
f 
ba
rg
ai
ni
ng
 
po
w
er
 (
-)
 
 
no
ne
 in
cl
ud
ed
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
 (e
xc
lu
si
ve
ly
 
to
 1
 M
) 
• R
et
ai
le
r 
is
 a
bl
e 
to
 e
xt
ra
ct
 a
ll 
th
e 
ex
tr
a 
ou
tc
om
es
 f
ro
m
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g.
 
 
 
2M
 : 
1R
 
2,
 n
.a
. 
(1
) 
R
 o
ff
er
s 
bo
th
 M
s 
in
di
vi
du
al
 
V
M
I 
co
nt
ra
ct
s,
 (
2)
 M
s 
ei
th
er
 a
cc
ep
t 
or
 r
ej
ec
t o
ff
er
. 
Id
em
. 
Id
em
. 
no
ne
 in
cl
ud
ed
 
In
ve
nt
or
y 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
(n
ot
 
ex
cl
us
iv
el
y 
to
 1
 M
) 
      
• R
et
ai
le
r 
is
 a
bl
e 
to
 e
xt
ra
ct
 a
ll 
th
e 
ex
tr
a 
ou
tc
om
es
 f
ro
m
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g.
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P l
ay
er
s P
ro
fi t
 fu
nc
t io
n 
re
ve
nu
es
 (+
),  
co
sts
 (-
) 
 
 
 
 
S t
u d
y ,
 A
u t
h o
r s
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
O
b j
e c
tiv
e  
S e
t o
f 
p l
a y
e r
s  
S t
a g
e s
, T
y p
e *
G
a m
e  
s e
q u
e n
c e
 
M
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r  
Re
ta
ile
r  
 U
n c
e r
ta
in
tie
s  
N
a t
u r
e 
o f
 
in
fo
r m
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
e d
 
K
e y
 fi
n d
in
g s
 
D
e s
ir
a j
u  
a n
d  
M
o o
rt
h y
 (
1 9
9 7
) 
M
n g
tS
c i
 
T
o  
s t
u d
y  
h o
w
 
p e
rf
o r
m
a n
c e
 
re
q u
ir
e m
e n
t 
c o
n t
ra
c t
s  
im
p r
o v
e  
th
e  
c h
a n
n e
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. 
1 M
 : 
1 R
 
4 ,
 P
,Q
 
(1
) 
M
 o
ff
e r
s  
m
a r
k e
tin
g  
a r
ra
n g
e m
e n
t 
to
 R
; (
2 )
 R
 a
c c
e p
ts
 o
r 
re
je
c t
s  
o f
fe
r;
 
(3
) 
M
 o
ff
e r
s  
a  
m
e n
u  
o f
 w
h o
le
s a
le
 
p r
ic
e  
a n
d  
fr
a n
c h
is
e  
fe
e  
c o
n t
ra
c t
s ;
 
(4
) 
R
 a
c c
e p
ts
 o
r 
re
je
c t
s  
o f
fe
r.
 
M
: w
h o
le
s a
le
 
p r
ic
e ,
 u
n i
t 
s a
le
s ,
 f
ra
n c
h i
s e
 
fe
e  
(+
),
 u
n i
t 
c o
s t
s  
(-
) 
 
R
: r
e t
a i
l 
p r
ic
e ,
 u
n i
t 
s a
le
s ,
 (
+ )
, 
w
h o
le
s a
le
 
p r
ic
e ,
 s
e r
v i
c e
 
co
st
s,
 
fr
an
ch
is
e 
fe
e 
(-
) 
 
c o
n s
u m
e r
 
d e
m
a n
d  
d e
p e
n d
s  
o n
 r
e t
a i
l p
ri
c e
 
a n
d  
s e
rv
ic
e  
le
v e
l. 
C
o n
s t
a n
t t
e r
m
 is
 
un
ce
rt
ai
n;
 it
 m
ay
 
be
 lo
w
 o
r 
hi
gh
. 
N
o n
e ;
  
 M
a r
k e
tin
g  
a r
ra
n g
e m
e n
t 
(w
ith
 
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
 
fo
r 
pr
ic
e 
an
d/
or
 
se
rv
ic
e)
 w
ith
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
•  In
 a
ll 
m
a r
k e
tin
g  
a r
ra
n g
e m
e n
ts
 o
ff
e r
e d
, a
 jo
in
t 
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g  
s y
s t
e m
 n
e e
d s
 to
 b
e  
in
 p
la
c e
. 
•  If
 m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r 
is
 c
o n
fr
o n
te
d  
w
ith
 c
o n
s u
m
e r
 d
e m
a n
d  
u n
c e
rt
a i
n t
y  
(r
e t
a i
le
r 
h a
s  
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
o n
 a
c t
u a
l 
d e
m
a n
d )
, t
h e
n  
b o
th
 p
ri
c e
 a
n d
 s
e r
v i
c e
 r
e q
u i
re
m
e n
ts
 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
of
fe
re
d,
 to
 in
cr
ea
se
 to
ta
l c
ha
nn
el
 p
ro
fi
t a
nd
 
to
 r
ea
ch
 a
 P
ar
et
o 
so
lu
tio
n.
 
• R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 o
nl
y 
se
t f
or
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o 
(p
ri
ce
 o
r 
se
rv
ic
e)
 le
ad
 to
 le
ss
 th
an
 o
pt
im
al
 o
ut
co
m
es
 f
or
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r.
 
R
oy
 (
20
00
),
 I
JR
M
 
  
T
o 
de
ve
lo
p 
an
al
yt
ic
al
 m
od
el
 to
 
co
m
pa
re
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
de
m
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ch
an
ne
l p
ro
fi
ta
bi
lit
y 
in
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 c
ha
nn
el
 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 
1M
 : 
1R
 
an
d 
 
1M
 : 
1R
 
(2
 
ex
cl
us
iv
e 
ch
an
ne
ls
) 
 vs
.  
 1 
M
-R
 
an
d 
 
1 
M
-R
 
(2
 
ve
rt
ic
al
ly
 
in
te
gr
.)
 
 vs
. 
 1 
M
 : 
1 
R
an
d 
1M
-R
2,
P 
A
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 tw
o 
pr
ic
e-
se
tti
ng
 
ga
m
es
: (
1)
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
ch
an
ne
l a
nd
 
(2
) 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
ch
an
ne
ls
.  
W
ith
in
 
th
e 
ch
an
ne
l: 
in
 c
as
e 
of
 a
 
St
ac
ke
lb
er
g 
ch
an
ne
l, 
th
e 
le
ad
er
 s
et
s 
th
e 
pr
ic
e 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
to
 th
e 
w
ho
le
 
ch
an
ne
l. 
In
 c
as
e 
of
 a
 v
er
tic
al
ly
 
in
te
gr
at
ed
 c
ha
nn
el
, b
y 
de
fi
ni
tio
n,
 
on
e 
pl
ay
er
 d
et
er
m
in
es
 th
e 
re
ta
il 
pr
ic
e.
 B
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
ch
an
ne
ls
: 
in
de
pe
nd
en
tl
y 
pr
ic
e 
is
 s
et
 (
a 
N
as
h-
ty
pe
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n)
 
 no
te
: i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
in
 th
e 
St
ac
ke
lb
er
g-
ch
an
ne
l i
s 
as
su
m
ed
 a
nd
 
bo
th
 c
ha
nn
el
 m
em
be
rs
 b
as
e 
th
ei
r 
de
ci
si
on
s 
on
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 
M
: w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
e,
 u
ni
t s
al
es
 
(+
),
 u
ni
t c
os
ts
 
(-
) 
 
R
: r
et
ai
l 
pr
ic
e,
 u
ni
t 
sa
le
s 
(+
),
 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
e,
 r
et
ai
l 
pr
ic
e 
co
m
pe
tit
or
 
(+
) 
 
co
ns
um
er
 
de
m
an
d 
(b
as
e 
le
ve
l i
s 
a 
ra
nd
om
 
va
ri
ab
le
) 
 
C
on
su
m
er
 
de
m
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
 A
cc
ur
ac
y 
of
 
fo
re
ca
st
s 
• T
he
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
m
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
 a
nd
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 o
n 
ch
an
ne
l p
ro
fi
t d
ep
en
ds
 
on
 th
e 
ch
an
ne
l t
yp
e;
 in
 v
er
tic
al
ly
 in
te
gr
at
ed
 c
ha
nn
el
s,
 
th
e 
ra
te
 o
f 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 c
ha
nn
el
 p
ro
fi
ts
 w
ith
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
w
ith
 m
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
; i
n 
St
ac
ke
lb
er
g 
ch
an
ne
ls
, t
he
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
ch
an
ne
l p
ro
fi
t d
ec
re
as
es
 w
ith
 m
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
 
• T
he
 e
ff
ec
t o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 o
n 
ch
an
ne
l  p
ro
fi
t 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
w
ith
 c
ro
ss
-p
ri
ce
 e
ff
ec
ts
 (
co
m
pe
tit
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
su
pp
lie
rs
).
 
• W
he
n 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
ch
an
ne
ls
 is
 lo
w
, t
he
 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 is
 b
ig
ge
r 
in
 v
er
tic
al
 
ch
an
ne
ls
 
• G
iv
en
 th
e 
co
m
pe
tin
g 
ch
an
ne
l i
s 
St
ac
ke
lb
er
g,
 a
nd
 
w
he
n 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n 
is
 h
ig
h,
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 in
 a
 S
ac
ke
lb
er
g 
 c
ha
nn
el
 is
 b
ig
ge
r 
th
an
 in
 a
 
ve
rt
ic
al
 in
te
gr
at
ed
 c
ha
nn
el
 
• G
iv
en
 th
e 
co
m
pe
tin
g 
ch
an
ne
l i
s 
ve
rt
ic
al
ly
 in
te
gr
at
ed
, 
a 
V
er
tic
al
ly
 in
te
gr
at
ed
 c
ha
nn
el
 b
en
ef
its
 m
or
e 
fr
om
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
ec
is
io
n 
th
an
 S
ta
ck
el
be
rg
 c
ha
nn
el
s 
D
on
oh
ue
 (
20
00
),
 
M
ng
tS
ci
 
T
o 
de
ve
lo
p 
su
pp
ly
 
co
nt
ra
ct
s 
en
co
ur
ag
in
g 
co
or
di
na
tio
n 
by
 
sh
ar
in
g 
de
m
an
d 
fo
re
ca
st
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
1 
M
 : 
1 
R
 
2,
Q
 
Pr
ic
e-
se
tti
ng
 g
am
e 
(m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
is
 
St
ac
ke
lb
er
g 
le
ad
er
) 
St
ud
y 
of
 a
 tw
o-
pe
ri
od
, t
w
o-
m
od
e 
re
pl
en
is
hm
en
t 
pr
ob
le
m
 in
 a
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r-
re
ta
ile
r 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t. 
T
he
 s
ys
te
m
 is
 
co
or
di
na
te
d 
by
 a
 p
ri
ci
ng
 s
ch
em
e.
 
 
M
: u
ni
t 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
co
st
s 
(i
nc
lu
de
s 
ho
ld
in
g 
an
d 
de
liv
er
y 
co
st
s 
pe
r 
un
it)
 
de
pe
nd
s 
on
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
m
od
e 
(s
lo
w
 
an
d 
ch
ea
p 
/f
as
t 
an
d 
ex
pe
ns
iv
e)
, 
re
tu
rn
 p
ri
ce
 f
or
 
un
so
ld
 g
oo
ds
 (
-
),
 w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
es
 (
+
) 
R
 : 
pr
ic
e,
 
sa
lv
ag
e 
va
lu
e 
(+
),
 s
ho
rt
ag
e 
pe
na
lt
y 
(-
) 
 
C
on
st
ra
in
t: 
bo
th
 
ch
an
ne
l m
em
be
rs
 
kn
ow
 th
e 
to
ta
l 
de
m
an
d 
fo
re
ca
st
 
 
U
pd
at
es
 o
f 
de
m
an
d 
fo
re
ca
st
s 
(n
ew
 m
ar
ke
t 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n)
 
 A
cc
ur
ac
y 
of
 
fo
re
ca
st
s 
• If
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 o
ff
er
s 
su
pp
ly
 c
on
tr
ac
t i
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 
fo
r 
de
m
an
d 
up
da
te
 f
or
 s
ec
on
d 
pe
ri
od
, t
he
n 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
pr
od
uc
es
 m
or
e.
 
• If
 w
ho
le
sa
le
 m
ar
gi
ns
 f
or
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
ar
e 
ke
pt
 
eq
ua
l, 
th
en
 th
e 
ch
an
ne
l i
s 
no
t c
oo
rd
in
at
ed
 
• T
he
 p
re
di
ct
ab
ili
ty
 s
er
ve
s 
th
e 
m
ak
in
g 
of
 e
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
pr
ic
in
g 
co
nt
ra
ct
s 
an
d 
m
ai
nl
y 
he
lp
s 
th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
 it
s 
sh
ar
e 
of
 th
e 
to
ta
l c
ha
nn
el
 p
r o
fi
ts
. 
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P l
ay
er
s P
ro
fi t
 fu
nc
t io
n 
re
ve
nu
es
 (+
),  
co
sts
 (-
) 
 
 
 
 
S t
u d
y ,
 A
u t
h o
r s
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
O
b j
e c
tiv
e  
S e
t o
f 
p l
a y
e r
s  
S t
a g
e s
, T
y p
e *
G
a m
e  
s e
q u
e n
c e
 
M
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r  
Re
ta
ile
r  
 U
n c
e r
ta
in
tie
s  
N
a t
u r
e 
o f
 
in
fo
r m
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
e d
 
K
e y
 fi
n d
in
g s
 
L
i (
2 0
0 2
),
 M
n g
tS
c i
 
T
o  
e x
a m
in
e  
th
e  
in
c e
n t
iv
e s
 f
o r
 f
ir
m
s  
to
 s
h a
re
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
v e
rt
ic
a l
ly
. 
1  
M
 : 
n  
R
3 ,
Q
 
(1
) 
E
a c
h  
re
ta
ile
r 
d e
c i
d e
s  
w
h e
th
e r
 to
 
d i
s c
lo
s e
 h
is
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
a n
d  
th
e  
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r 
d e
c i
d e
s  
w
h e
th
e r
 to
 
a c
q u
ir
e  
s u
c h
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n ;
 a
n d
 e
a c
h  
re
ta
ile
r 
o b
s e
rv
e s
 h
is
 s
ig
n a
l a
n d
 th
e  
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
ob
se
rv
es
 s
ha
re
d 
si
gn
al
s 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 m
ad
e 
ea
rl
ie
r;
 
(2
) 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
se
ts
 
th
e 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 p
ri
ce
; (
3)
 u
po
n 
re
ce
iv
in
g 
th
e 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 p
ri
ce
, t
he
 
re
ta
ile
rs
 c
ho
os
e 
sa
le
s 
le
ve
ls
; a
nd
 
up
on
 r
ec
ei
vi
ng
 th
e 
re
ta
ile
rs
’ 
or
de
rs
, 
th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
pr
od
uc
es
 to
 m
ee
t 
th
e 
re
ta
ile
r’
s 
de
m
an
d.
 
 
M
: w
h o
le
s a
le
 
p r
ic
e ,
 u
n i
t s
a l
e s
 
(+
) 
 
R
: r
e t
a i
l 
p r
ic
e ,
 u
n i
t 
s a
le
s  
(+
),
w
h o
le
s a
le
 
p r
ic
e  
(-
) 
 
C
o n
s u
m
e r
 
d e
m
a n
d  
u n
c e
rt
a i
n t
y  
(r
a n
d o
m
 te
rm
) 
 
D
e m
a n
d  
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
a t
 r
e t
a i
le
r 
 C
o s
t 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
 
•   T
h e
 m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r 
is
 b
e t
te
r 
o f
f 
w
ith
 a
c q
u i
ri
n g
 
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
fr
o m
 m
o r
e  
re
ta
ile
rs
 in
 a
ll 
c i
rc
u m
s t
an
c e
s ;
 
e a
c h
 r
e t
a i
le
r 
is
 w
o r
s e
 o
ff
 b
y  
d i
s c
lo
s i
n g
 h
is
 
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
to
 th
e  
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r 
in
 a
ll 
c i
rc
u m
s t
an
c e
s  
(d
u e
 le
a k
a g
e  
o f
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
to
 o
th
e r
 (
c o
m
p e
tin
g )
 
no
n-
sh
ar
in
g 
re
ta
ile
rs
);
 T
hi
s 
di
sc
ou
ra
ge
s 
re
ta
ile
rs
 
fr
om
 p
as
si
ng
 b
ac
k 
de
m
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 a
 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
ba
si
s.
 
• If
 th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
co
m
pe
ns
at
es
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n-
sh
ar
in
g 
re
ta
ile
rs
 f
or
 th
ei
r 
lo
ss
es
 in
 p
ro
fi
ta
bi
lit
y 
by
 o
ff
er
in
g 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 p
ri
ce
 in
ce
nt
iv
es
 to
 th
em
, o
nl
y 
un
de
r 
 
N
ir
aj
 a
nd
 
N
ar
as
im
ha
n 
(2
00
3)
, W
P 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
un
de
r 
w
hi
ch
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
co
or
di
na
te
s 
th
e 
ch
an
ne
l. 
1 
M
 : 
1 
R
4,
P 
Pr
ic
e-
se
tti
ng
 g
am
e 
(m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
is
 
st
ac
ke
lb
er
g 
le
ad
er
).
 
 Se
qu
en
ce
s 
of
 4
 m
ov
es
: (
1)
 M
 
de
ci
de
s 
to
 o
ff
er
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t w
ith
 r
et
ai
le
r,
 (
2)
 R
 
de
ci
de
s 
to
 a
cc
ep
t o
r 
re
je
ct
, (
3)
 M
 
se
ts
 w
ho
le
sa
le
 p
ri
ce
, (
4)
 R
 s
et
s 
re
ta
il 
pr
ic
e 
M
: w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
e,
 u
ni
t s
al
es
 
(+
),
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
co
ns
um
er
 
de
m
an
d 
st
at
e 
 
 
R
: r
et
ai
l 
pr
ic
e,
 u
ni
t 
sa
le
s 
(+
),
 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
e 
(-
),
 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 
co
ns
um
er
 
de
m
an
d 
st
at
e 
 
C
on
su
m
er
 
de
m
an
d 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
(a
 
tw
o 
po
in
t 
B
er
no
ui
lli
 
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n 
to
 
m
od
el
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
fu
tu
re
s)
. 
 
T
ru
th
-t
el
lin
g 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 
in
di
ca
te
d 
by
 
a 
re
lia
bi
lit
y 
( 
r )
 
 C
om
pl
em
en
t
ar
it
y 
of
 
ch
an
ne
l 
m
em
be
r’
s 
m
ar
ke
t 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
 
• In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
al
w
ay
s 
re
su
lts
 in
 a
 m
or
e 
co
or
di
na
te
d 
ch
an
ne
l o
ut
co
m
e  
by
 w
ay
 o
f 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
to
ta
l c
ha
nn
el
 p
ro
fi
ts
. 
• A
 r
et
ai
le
r 
w
ith
 p
oo
r 
qu
al
it
y 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is
 
un
lik
el
y 
to
 f
or
m
 a
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
al
lia
nc
e.
  
 
 
2M
 : 
1 
R
 
4,
P 
Pr
ic
e-
se
tti
ng
 g
am
e 
(m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 
ar
e 
St
ac
ke
lb
er
g 
le
ad
er
s)
. 
 Se
qu
en
ce
s 
of
 4
 m
ov
es
: (
1)
 M
s 
de
ci
de
 to
 o
ff
er
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t w
ith
 r
et
ai
le
r,
 (
2)
 R
 
de
ci
de
s 
to
 a
cc
ep
t o
r 
re
je
ct
 o
ff
er
s 
by
 
M
s,
 (
3)
 M
s 
se
t w
ho
le
sa
le
 p
ri
ce
, (
4)
 
R
 s
et
s 
re
ta
il 
pr
ic
e.
 
        
 
 
Id
em
. 
R
el
ia
bi
lit
y 
of
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
w
he
n 
bo
th
 
M
s 
sh
ar
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
• C
om
pe
tit
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 a
nd
 s
uf
fi
ci
en
tl
y 
hi
gh
 r
el
ia
bl
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
le
ad
s 
to
 a
sy
m
m
et
ri
c 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g,
 w
ith
 h
ig
he
r 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 p
ri
ce
s,
 
an
d 
a 
lo
w
er
 v
ar
ia
nc
e 
in
 th
e 
qu
an
tit
y 
so
ld
. 
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P l
ay
er
s P
ro
fi t
 fu
nc
t io
n 
re
ve
nu
es
 (+
),  
co
sts
 (-
) 
 
 
 
 
S t
u d
y ,
 A
u t
h o
r s
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
O
b j
e c
tiv
e  
S e
t o
f 
p l
a y
e r
s  
S t
a g
e s
, T
y p
e *
G
a m
e  
s e
q u
e n
c e
 
M
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r  
Re
ta
ile
r  
 U
n c
e r
ta
in
tie
s  
N
a t
u r
e 
o f
 
in
fo
r m
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
e d
 
K
e y
 fi
n d
in
g s
 
G
u  
a n
d  
C
h e
n  
(2
0 0
4 )
, W
P  
T
o  
m
o d
e l
 b
ila
te
ra
l 
b a
rg
a i
n i
n g
 in
 th
e  
c h
a n
n e
l r
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
in
 c
o m
b i
n a
tio
n  
w
ith
 
th
e  
s t
ra
te
g i
c  
d e
c i
s i
o n
 
to
 s
ha
re
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
1  
M
 : 
1  
R
4 ,
Q
 
Q
u a
n t
it
y -
s e
tti
n g
 g
a m
e  
(a
 b
a r
g a
in
in
g  
g a
m
e )
 
 G
a m
e  
S e
q u
e n
c e
: (
1 )
 c
h a
n n
e l
 
d e
c i
d e
s  
to
 s
h a
re
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n ,
 (
2 )
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
an
d 
re
ta
ile
r 
ne
go
tia
te
 
th
e 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 p
ri
ce
, (
3)
 r
et
ai
le
r 
de
ci
de
s 
on
 o
rd
er
 q
ua
nt
it
y 
an
d 
re
ta
il 
pr
ic
e,
 (
4)
 m
ar
ke
t d
em
an
d 
is
 
re
al
iz
ed
. 
M
: W
h o
le
s a
le
 
p r
ic
e ,
 u
n i
t s
a l
e s
 
(+
) 
 
R
: r
e t
a i
l 
p r
ic
e ,
 u
n i
t 
s a
le
s  
(+
),
 
w
h o
le
s a
le
 
p r
ic
e  
(-
) 
 
B
a r
g a
in
in
g  
p o
w
e r
 r
e t
a i
le
r,
 
C
o n
s u
m
e r
 
d e
m
a n
d  
(a
 tw
o  
p o
in
t B
e r
n o
u i
lli
 
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n 
to
 
m
od
el
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
fu
tu
re
s)
. 
  
N
o n
e ;
  
P r
e d
ic
tiv
e  
p o
w
e r
 o
f 
th
e  
m
a r
k e
t 
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
(1
00
%
 
ac
cu
ra
te
 
co
ns
um
er
 
de
m
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n)
 
•  In
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g  
ta
k e
s  
p l
a c
e  
if
 r
e t
a i
le
r’
s  
b a
rg
a i
n i
n g
 p
o w
e r
 is
 s
u f
fi
c i
e n
tl
y  
lo
w
 o
r 
s u
ff
ic
ie
n t
ly
 
h i
g h
; t
h e
 c
h a
n n
e l
 a
v o
id
s  
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g  
if
 th
e 
re
ta
ile
r’
s  
b a
rg
a i
n i
n g
 p
o w
e r
 is
 in
 th
e  
in
te
rm
e d
ia
te
 
ra
n g
e .
  
• A
s 
co
ns
um
er
 d
em
an
d 
in
cr
ea
se
s,
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
oc
cu
rs
 if
 th
e 
re
ta
ile
r 
ha
s 
hi
gh
 b
ar
ga
in
in
g 
po
w
er
; n
o 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
oc
cu
rs
 if
 th
e 
re
ta
ile
r 
ha
s 
lo
w
 
ba
rg
ai
ni
ng
 p
ow
er
. 
 
K
ur
tu
lu
ş (
20
04
),
 
W
P 
T
o 
in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
th
e 
an
tit
ru
st
 is
su
es
 th
at
 
m
ay
 a
ri
se
 a
s 
a 
re
su
lt 
of
 th
e 
ca
te
go
ry
 
ad
vi
se
r 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
.  
2 
M
 : 
1 
R
4,
P 
Pr
ic
e-
se
tti
ng
 g
am
e 
(M
1,
 2
 a
re
 
St
ac
ke
lb
er
g 
le
ad
er
s)
. 
 Se
qu
en
ce
s 
of
 4
 m
ov
es
: (
1)
 M
s 
de
ci
de
 to
 o
ff
er
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t w
ith
 r
et
ai
le
r,
 (
2)
 R
 
de
ci
de
s 
to
 a
cc
ep
t o
r 
re
je
ct
 o
ff
er
s 
by
 
M
s,
 (
3)
 M
s 
se
t w
ho
le
sa
le
 p
ri
ce
s 
si
m
ul
ta
ne
ou
sl
y,
 (
4)
 R
 s
et
s 
re
ta
il 
pr
ic
es
 f
or
 M
s 
pr
od
uc
ts
 a
nd
 o
rd
er
s 
qu
an
tit
ie
s.
 
M
1,
2:
 w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
e 
(+
),
 u
ni
t 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
co
st
, w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
e 
co
m
pe
tit
or
 (
-)
 
 
R
: f
ix
ed
 f
ee
 
 
C
on
st
ra
in
t: 
sh
el
f 
sp
ac
e 
is
 li
m
ite
d.
 
N
on
e 
 
 (b
as
e 
ca
se
) 
• T
he
 c
at
eg
or
y 
ad
vi
so
r 
M
1 
ta
ke
s 
ad
va
nt
ag
e 
an
d 
re
du
ce
s 
its
 r
et
ai
l p
ri
ce
, w
he
re
as
 it
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
its
 
co
m
pe
tit
or
s 
M
2’
s 
re
ta
il 
pr
ic
es
 
• T
he
 to
ta
l c
at
eg
or
y 
pr
of
it 
in
 th
e 
ca
te
go
ry
 a
dv
is
er
 
sc
en
ar
io
 is
 lo
w
er
 d
ue
 to
 th
e 
de
cr
ea
se
 in
 th
e 
a v
er
ag
e 
re
ta
il 
pr
ic
es
. 
 
 
 
2 
M
 : 
1 
R
4,
 P
 
Pr
ic
e-
se
tti
ng
 g
am
e 
(m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 
ar
e 
St
ac
ke
lb
er
g 
le
ad
er
s)
. 
M
1 
is
 c
at
eg
or
y 
ad
vi
se
r.
 
 Se
qu
en
ce
s 
of
 4
 m
ov
es
: (
1)
 M
2 
of
fe
rs
 it
s 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 p
ri
ce
 to
 th
e 
re
ta
ile
r,
 (
2)
 R
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
(w
ho
le
sa
le
 p
ri
ce
 M
2,
 m
in
im
um
 
pr
of
it 
ta
rg
et
, s
he
lf
 s
pa
ce
, (
3)
 T
he
 
ca
te
go
ry
 a
dv
is
or
 M
1 
 d
ec
id
es
 w
ha
t 
re
ta
il 
pr
ic
es
 to
 r
ec
om
m
en
d 
to
 th
e 
re
ta
ile
r,
 (
4)
 R
 s
et
s 
re
ta
il 
pr
ic
es
 in
 
lin
e 
w
ith
 c
at
eg
or
y 
ad
vi
se
r’
s 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
. 
M
1:
 w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
e 
(+
),
 u
ni
t 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
co
st
, w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
e 
co
m
pe
tit
or
, 
su
bs
tit
ut
ab
ili
ty
 
(-
) 
 
R
: m
in
im
um
 
pr
of
it 
ta
rg
et
 
(+
).
 
 
C
on
st
ra
in
t: 
sh
el
f 
sp
ac
e 
is
 li
m
ite
d;
  
C
at
eg
or
y 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
 (c
om
pe
tit
or
’s
 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
e,
 to
ta
l 
sh
el
f 
sp
ac
e,
 
ca
te
go
ry
 
pr
of
it 
ta
rg
et
) 
 
C
or
be
tt,
 Z
ho
u 
an
d 
T
an
g 
(2
00
4)
, 
M
ng
tS
ci
 
T
o 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
va
lu
e 
to
 
a 
su
pp
lie
r 
of
 
ob
ta
in
in
g 
be
tte
r 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t a
 
bu
ye
r’
s 
co
st
 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
1 
M
 : 
n 
R
2,
Q
 
(1
) 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
do
es
 o
r 
do
es
 n
ot
 
re
ce
iv
e 
(c
om
pl
et
e)
 c
os
t s
tr
uc
tu
re
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fr
om
 b
uy
er
; (
2)
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
of
fe
rs
 a
 (
m
en
u 
of
) 
co
nt
ra
ct
(s
) 
an
d 
re
ta
ile
r 
ch
oo
se
s 
an
 
or
de
r 
qu
an
tit
y 
ba
se
d 
on
 h
er
 in
te
rn
al
 
co
st
.  
M
: w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
e 
un
it 
sa
le
s,
 
(+
),
 s
id
e 
pa
ym
en
t (
-)
 
R
: r
et
ai
l 
pr
ic
e,
 u
ni
t 
sa
le
s 
(+
),
 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 
pr
ic
e,
 
re
ta
ili
ng
 c
os
t 
(-
) 
C
os
t s
tr
uc
tu
re
 is
 
un
ce
rt
ai
n 
to
 
su
pp
lie
r 
R
et
ai
le
r’
s 
co
st
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
• T
he
 v
al
ue
 o
f 
th
e 
re
ta
ile
r’
s 
co
st
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
to
 th
e  
su
pp
lie
r 
is
 h
ig
he
r 
un
de
r 
tw
o-
pa
rt
 c
on
tr
ac
ts
 
• T
he
 v
al
ue
 o
f 
of
fe
ri
ng
 tw
o-
pa
rt
 c
on
tr
ac
ts
 is
 h
ig
he
r 
un
de
r 
fu
ll 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
(v
iz
., 
re
ta
ile
r 
fu
ll
y 
di
sc
lo
se
s 
co
st
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
) 
• T
he
 p
ro
po
rt
io
n 
of
 b
uy
er
s 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
w
ill
 c
ho
os
e 
to
 
ex
cl
ud
e 
ca
n 
be
 s
ub
st
an
tia
l. 
* 
P 
an
d 
Q
 s
ta
nd
 f
or
 th
e 
ty
pe
 o
f 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n 
ga
m
e 
pl
ay
ed
 d
ur
in
g 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
ev
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
ga
m
e :
 P
 =
 p
ri
ce
, Q
 =
 q
ua
nt
it
y
  290
 A
PP
EN
D
IX
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SU
M
M
A
R
Y 
O
F 
TH
E 
ST
U
D
IE
S 
O
F 
EM
PI
R
IC
A
L 
B
EH
A
VI
O
R
A
L 
A
PP
R
O
A
C
H
  
 S
tu
d y
, A
u t
h o
r s
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
Re
s e
a r
c h
 O
b j
e c
tiv
e  
Em
p i
r ic
a l
 B
a s
is  
(s
a m
p l
e  
s iz
e ,
 r e
s p
o n
s e
 
r a
te
) 
Co
n c
e p
tu
a l
iz
a t
io
n  
I n
fo
r m
a t
io
n  
S h
a r
in
g  
in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
c e
d e
n t
s  a
n d
 C
o n
s e
q u
e n
c e
s  
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
e y
 fi
n d
in
g s
 
E
x e
r c
is e
 o
f 
in
fo
r m
a t
io
n  
p o
we
r  
 
 
 
 
 
H
u n
t a
n d
 N
e v
in
 
(1
9 7
4 )
, J
M
R
 
T
o  
a s
s e
s s
 th
e  
re
la
tio
n s
h i
p  
b e
tw
e e
n  
p o
w
e r
 in
 a
 
ch
an
ne
l a
nd
 th
e 
so
ur
ce
s 
of
 
po
w
er
. 
S u
rv
e y
 a
m
o n
g  
U
S  
fa
s t
 
fo
o d
 f
ra
n c
h i
s e
e s
 (
8 1
5 ,
 
22
.3
%
) 
E
x p
e r
t p
o w
e r
 o
f 
th
e  
fr
a n
c h
is
o r
 is
 a
 n
o n
-c
o e
rc
iv
e  
p o
w
e r
 s
o u
rc
e  
b a
s e
d  
o n
 th
e  
e x
te
n t
 o
f 
k n
o w
le
d g
e  
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
 a
ttr
ib
ut
es
 to
 th
e 
fr
an
ch
is
or
 
w
ith
in
 a
 g
iv
en
 a
re
a.
 T
he
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t i
te
m
s 
ap
pr
oa
ch
in
g 
th
e 
id
ea
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
ar
e:
 
si
te
 lo
ca
tio
n 
as
si
st
an
ce
, d
el
et
io
ns
 a
nd
 a
dd
iti
on
s 
to
 
pr
od
uc
t l
in
e,
 d
ay
-t
o-
da
y-
bu
si
ne
ss
 a
dv
ic
e,
 a
nd
 
pr
ic
in
g 
as
si
st
an
ce
 
*  
N
o  
a n
te
c e
d e
n t
s ;
 *
 C
o n
s e
q u
e n
c e
s :
 
p e
rc
e i
v e
d  
p o
w
e r
 p
o s
iti
o n
 o
f 
in
fl
ue
nc
er
 (
+)
, s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
of
 
in
fl
ue
nc
ee
 (
+)
. 
*  
N
o n
-c
o e
rc
iv
e  
p o
w
e r
 s
o u
rc
e s
 c
o n
tr
ib
u t
e  
le
s s
 to
 
th
e  
p e
rc
e i
v e
d  
p o
w
e r
 p
o s
iti
o n
 o
f 
th
e  
fr
a n
c h
is
o r
 th
a n
 
co
er
ci
ve
 p
ow
er
 s
ou
rc
es
; *
 F
ra
nc
hi
so
rs
 c
an
 in
cr
ea
se
 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
s'
 s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
by
 r
el
yi
ng
 m
or
e 
on
 n
on
-
co
er
ci
ve
 s
ou
rc
es
 o
f 
po
w
er
 a
nd
 le
ss
 o
n 
co
er
ci
ve
 
so
ur
ce
s 
of
 p
ow
er
. 
E
tg
ar
 (
19
78
),
 J
R
 
T
o 
de
te
rm
in
e 
if
 c
ha
nn
el
 
le
ad
er
s 
us
e 
di
ff
er
en
t m
ea
ns
 
to
 a
ch
ie
ve
 p
ow
er
 in
 
di
ff
er
en
t c
ha
nn
el
 
su
rr
ou
nd
in
gs
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
re
ta
il 
de
al
er
s 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 
th
ei
r 
su
pp
lie
r 
of
 a
 
m
aj
or
 g
ro
up
 o
f 
pr
od
uc
ts
 th
ey
 s
el
l (
40
 
w
ith
 lo
ng
-t
er
m
 
co
nt
ra
ct
, 4
9 
w
ith
ou
t 
co
nt
ra
ct
) 
Pr
ov
is
io
n 
of
 m
ar
ke
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
is
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
13
 
m
ea
ns
 o
f 
po
w
er
 m
ea
su
re
d;
 it
 lo
ad
s 
on
 th
e 
fa
ct
or
 
"p
ro
m
ot
io
na
l s
up
po
rt
".
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: c
ha
nn
el
 c
on
tr
ac
ts
 
(+
);
 *
 N
o 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 te
st
ed
 
* 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 c
on
tr
ol
li
ng
 th
ei
r 
ch
an
ne
l 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 w
ith
 c
on
tr
ac
ts
 r
el
y 
on
 "
no
n-
tr
ad
iti
on
al
" 
m
ea
ns
 o
f 
po
w
er
 a
nd
 p
ro
vi
de
 
pr
om
ot
io
na
l s
up
po
rt
 to
 g
ai
n 
co
nt
ro
l o
ve
r 
th
ei
r 
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n.
 
B
ro
w
n,
 L
us
ch
, a
nd
 
M
ue
hl
in
g 
(1
98
3)
, 
JR
 
T
o 
de
sc
ri
be
 a
nd
 te
st
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 a
m
on
g 
ba
se
s 
of
 p
ow
er
, d
ep
en
de
nc
y,
 
pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
 o
f 
po
w
er
, a
nd
 
pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
 o
f 
co
nf
lic
t 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
m
an
ag
er
s 
an
d 
as
si
st
an
t 
m
an
ag
er
s 
of
 r
et
ai
l 
st
or
es
 (
13
9,
 n
.a
.)
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
po
w
er
 is
 a
 n
on
-e
co
no
m
ic
 p
ow
er
 b
as
e 
an
d 
re
fe
rs
 to
 th
e 
(s
up
pl
ie
r’
s)
 a
bi
lit
y 
to
 (
1)
 p
ro
vi
de
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
no
t p
re
vi
ou
sl
y 
m
ad
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
to
 th
e 
re
ta
ile
r,
 a
nd
 (
2)
 in
te
rp
re
t e
xi
st
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 
w
ay
s 
th
at
 a
re
 m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l b
ut
 n
ot
 y
et
 k
no
w
n 
by
 th
e  
re
ta
ile
r 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 p
ow
er
 p
er
ce
pt
io
ns
 o
f 
in
fl
ue
nc
er
 (
0)
, d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
(+
),
 
co
nf
lic
t (
-)
 
* 
In
 c
on
tr
as
t t
o 
ec
on
om
ic
 p
ow
er
 b
as
es
 (
re
w
ar
d 
an
d 
co
er
ci
on
),
 n
on
-e
co
no
m
ic
 p
ow
er
 b
as
es
 li
ke
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
po
w
er
 a
re
 n
ot
 d
ir
ec
tl
y 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
 o
f 
po
w
er
; *
 N
on
-e
co
no
m
ic
 p
ow
er
 
ba
se
s 
do
 e
nf
or
ce
 d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
ed
 
fi
rm
, b
ut
 r
ed
uc
e 
th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
co
nf
lic
t i
n 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
 
Fr
az
ie
r 
an
d 
Su
m
m
er
s 
(1
98
4)
, 
JM
 
T
o 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 u
se
d 
by
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 a
nd
 it
s 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
in
te
rf
ir
m
 
ag
re
em
en
t  
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
ne
w
 
ca
r 
de
al
er
s 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 
th
ei
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
(1
84
, 
46
%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 is
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
an
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gy
 w
he
re
by
 th
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
in
g 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
r e
r 
us
es
 
di
sc
us
si
on
s 
on
 g
en
er
al
 b
us
in
es
s 
is
su
es
 a
nd
 
op
er
at
in
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 to
 tr
y 
to
 a
lte
r 
th
e 
de
al
er
's 
ge
ne
ra
l p
er
ce
pt
io
ns
 o
f 
ho
w
 to
 b
e 
m
os
t p
ro
fi
ta
bl
e.
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 in
te
rf
ir
m
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t 
(+
) 
* 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 is
 th
e 
do
m
in
an
t i
nf
lu
en
ce
 
st
ra
te
gy
 in
 c
ha
nn
el
 r
e l
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 w
ith
 h
ig
h 
in
te
rd
ep
en
cy
; *
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 is
 f
re
qu
en
cy
 
us
ed
 w
ith
 r
eq
ue
st
s 
as
 a
n 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gy
; *
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 b
y 
th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
pr
om
ot
es
 th
e 
de
al
er
's 
ag
re
em
en
t o
n 
di
ff
er
en
t 
de
ci
si
on
 is
su
es
. 
G
as
ki
 a
nd
 N
ev
in
 
(1
98
5)
, J
M
R
 
T
o 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
di
ff
er
en
tia
l 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
ex
er
ci
se
d 
an
d 
un
ex
er
ci
se
d 
po
w
er
 s
ou
rc
es
 
in
 c
ha
nn
el
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
de
al
er
s 
fr
om
 o
ne
 
in
du
st
ri
al
 m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
(2
38
, 
37
.5
%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 a
 f
or
m
 o
f 
an
 e
xe
rc
is
ed
 n
on
-
co
er
ci
ve
 p
ow
er
 s
ou
rc
e 
("
gi
vi
ng
 b
us
in
es
s 
ad
vi
se
" 
is
 
th
e 
ite
m
 c
om
in
g 
cl
os
es
t t
o 
th
e 
co
nc
ep
t o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g)
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: n
on
-c
oe
rc
iv
e 
po
w
er
 
so
ur
ce
 (
+)
; *
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 c
on
fl
ic
t 
(-
),
 s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
(+
),
 p
ow
er
 (
+)
, 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 (
+)
 
* 
T
he
 e
xe
rc
is
e 
of
 n
on
-c
oe
rc
iv
e 
po
w
er
 h
as
 a
 
st
ro
ng
er
 p
os
iti
ve
 e
ff
ec
t o
n 
po
w
er
, d
ea
le
r 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
an
d 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 th
an
 th
e 
pr
es
en
ce
 o
f 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 s
ou
rc
es
 o
f 
po
w
er
; *
 T
he
 e
xe
rc
is
e 
of
 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 p
ow
er
 r
ed
uc
es
 c
ha
nn
el
 c
on
fl
ic
t m
or
e 
th
an
 th
e 
m
er
e 
pr
es
en
ce
 o
f 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 p
ow
er
 
so
ur
ce
s;
 *
 A
s 
m
or
e 
of
 a
 p
ow
er
 s
ou
rc
e 
is
 h
el
d 
b y
 a
 
fr
an
ch
is
or
, a
s 
le
ss
 p
r o
po
rt
io
na
te
ly
 o
f 
it 
w
ill
 
ea
ct
ua
ll
y 
be
 u
se
d.
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St
ud
y,
 A
ut
ho
rs
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 O
bj
ec
t i v
e 
Em
pi
ric
al
 B
as
is 
(s
a m
p l
e  
s iz
e ,
 r e
s p
o n
s e
 
r a
te
) 
Co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
in
g 
in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
ce
de
nt
s a
nd
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
K
a l
e  
(1
9 8
6 )
, J
M
R
 
T
o  
s t
u d
y  
th
e  
re
la
tio
n s
h i
p  
b e
tw
e e
n  
a  
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r's
 
p o
w
e r
 a
n d
 it
s  
c h
o i
c e
 o
f 
in
fl
u e
n c
e  
s t
ra
te
g i
e s
 
S u
rv
e y
 a
m
o n
g  
In
d i
a n
 
d e
a l
e r
s  
in
 th
e  
tu
n g
s t
e n
 
c a
rb
id
e  
to
o l
 in
d u
s t
ry
 
re
p o
rt
in
g  
o n
 th
e i
r 
re
la
tio
n s
h i
p  
w
ith
 
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r 
(5
1 ,
 
5 0
%
) 
T
h e
 f
re
q u
e n
c y
 o
f 
u s
e  
o f
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
e x
c h
a n
g e
 a
s  
a n
 in
fl
u e
n c
e  
s t
ra
te
g y
 (
c f
. F
ra
z i
e r
 a
n d
 S
u m
m
er
, 
1 9
8 4
) 
*  
A
n t
e c
e d
e n
ts
: p
e r
c i
e v
e d
 
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r 
p o
w
e r
 (
-)
, u
s a
g e
 
fr
e q
u e
n c
y  
o f
 o
th
e r
 in
fl
u e
n c
e  
s t
ra
te
g i
e s
 
*  
T
h e
 g
re
a t
e r
 th
e  
p o
w
e r
 o
f 
a  
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r,
 th
e  
m
o r
e  
fr
e q
u e
n t
ly
 h
ig
h  
p r
e s
s u
re
 m
e a
n s
 o
f 
in
fl
u e
n c
e  
(i
.e
., 
th
re
a t
s ,
 p
ro
m
is
e s
, a
n d
 le
g a
tis
tic
 p
le
a s
) 
a r
e  
u s
e d
 to
 a
lte
r 
th
e  
d e
a l
e r
' d
e c
is
io
n  
m
a k
in
g ;
 *
 
R
e l
a t
iv
e l
y  
lo
w
 p
re
s s
u r
e  
in
fl
u e
n c
e  
s t
ra
te
g i
e s
 h
a v
e 
n e
g a
tiv
e  
c o
rr
e l
a t
io
n s
 w
ith
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
e x
c h
a n
g e
 
H
un
t, 
M
en
tz
er
 a
nd
 
D
an
es
 (
19
87
),
 J
B
R
 
T
o 
in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
th
e 
fa
ct
or
s 
le
ad
in
g 
to
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
of
 a
 
le
ss
 p
ow
er
fu
l c
ha
nn
el
 
m
em
be
r 
to
 th
e 
w
is
he
s 
of
 
th
e 
m
or
e 
po
w
er
fu
l c
ha
nn
el
 
m
em
be
r 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
pl
um
bi
ng
 m
at
er
ia
l 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 
re
po
st
in
g 
on
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 w
ith
 
bu
ild
in
g 
co
nt
ra
ct
or
s 
(4
77
, 3
7%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
liz
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
qu
al
ity
 
in
 e
xe
rc
is
in
g 
ex
pe
rt
 p
ow
er
 (
e.
g.
, t
he
 q
ua
lit
y 
of
 d
ay
-
to
-d
ay
 b
us
in
es
s 
ad
vi
ce
) 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
(+
) 
 
* 
M
os
t t
es
te
d 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 s
ou
rc
es
 o
f 
po
w
er
 le
ad
 
to
 a
 h
ig
he
r 
lik
el
ih
oo
d 
of
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
ex
pe
rt
 p
ow
er
. 
K
ei
th
, J
ac
ks
on
 a
nd
 
C
ro
sb
y 
(1
99
0)
, J
M
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
on
 
ch
an
ne
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 u
nd
er
 
tw
o 
di
ff
er
en
t d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
. 
L
ab
or
at
or
y 
fi
el
d 
ex
pe
ri
m
en
t a
m
on
g 
br
ok
er
s 
in
 th
e 
fo
od
 
in
du
st
ry
 (
23
2,
 2
3.
2%
) 
as
ki
ng
 th
ei
r 
ju
dg
m
en
ts
 
on
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 s
ce
na
ri
os
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 a
n 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
po
w
er
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: d
ep
en
de
nc
y 
of
 
(t
ar
ge
t)
 c
ha
nn
el
 m
em
be
r 
(m
od
er
at
or
);
 *
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 
(t
ar
ge
t's
) 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
(+
),
 
(t
ar
ge
t's
)p
er
ce
iv
ed
 c
on
tr
ol
 (
-)
, 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
(0
) 
* 
T
he
 e
ff
ec
t o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
as
 p
ow
er
 u
se
 
on
 th
e 
re
ad
in
es
s 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
is
 s
lig
ht
ly
 lo
w
er
 th
an
 
ot
he
r 
us
es
 o
f 
po
w
er
; *
 S
im
ila
r 
to
 o
th
er
 p
ow
er
 u
se
s,
 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 g
re
at
er
 
in
 h
ig
he
r 
de
pe
nd
en
t r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
; *
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
as
 a
 p
ow
er
 b
as
e 
is
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 a
s 
w
ea
ke
r 
th
an
 a
no
th
er
 p
ow
er
 b
as
e;
 *
 I
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 
re
ce
iv
ed
 w
ith
 m
or
e 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
by
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
ch
an
ne
l m
em
be
r 
th
an
 r
ew
ar
d 
or
 c
oe
rc
io
n 
is
. 
Fr
az
ie
r 
an
d 
R
od
y 
(1
99
1)
, J
M
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
re
ci
pr
oc
al
 
us
e 
of
 n
on
-c
oe
rc
iv
e 
an
d 
co
er
ci
ve
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 b
y 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
an
d 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 w
ith
 
ch
an
ne
l p
ow
er
 a
nd
 c
on
fl
ic
t 
Su
rv
ey
. I
nd
us
tr
ia
l 
di
st
ri
bu
to
rs
 (
30
0,
 3
3%
) 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 a
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 is
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
to
 b
e 
an
 
el
em
en
t o
f 
a 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
g y
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: m
ag
ni
tu
de
 o
f 
po
w
er
 
(+
);
 la
te
nt
 c
on
fl
ic
t (
s:
-,
 d
:0
),
 
m
an
if
es
t c
on
fl
ic
t (
+
);
 *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 a
tti
tu
de
 to
w
ar
ds
 
co
nf
lic
t r
es
ol
ut
io
n 
(+
) 
(n
ot
e:
 ju
st
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 w
er
e 
te
st
ed
; n
o 
di
st
in
ct
io
n 
w
as
 m
ad
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
) 
* 
Si
m
ila
r 
to
 c
oe
rc
iv
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
, n
on
-
co
er
ci
ve
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 a
re
 r
ec
ip
ro
ca
t e
d 
by
 
ch
an
ne
l m
em
be
rs
; *
 F
ir
m
s 
w
ith
 h
ig
h 
po
w
er
 a
re
 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 m
ak
e 
us
e 
of
 n
on
-c
oe
rc
iv
e 
in
fl
ue
n c
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
; *
 L
at
en
t c
on
fl
i c
t l
es
se
ns
 th
e 
su
pp
lie
r's
 
us
e 
of
 n
on
-c
oe
rc
iv
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
tg
ie
s,
 b
ut
 it
 d
oe
s  
no
t a
ff
ec
t t
he
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
or
's
 u
se
 o
f 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
; *
 M
an
if
es
t c
on
fl
ic
t 
in
te
re
st
in
gl
y 
pr
om
ot
es
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 n
on
-c
oe
rc
iv
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 b
y 
bo
th
 c
ha
nn
el
 m
em
be
rs
; *
 
M
or
e 
fr
eq
ue
nt
 u
se
 o
f 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 b
y 
ei
th
er
 c
ha
nn
el
 m
em
be
r 
cr
ea
te
s 
a 
po
si
tiv
e 
at
tit
ud
e 
fo
r 
co
nf
li
ct
 r
es
ol
ut
io
n 
B
oy
le
, D
w
ye
r,
 
R
ob
ic
he
au
x,
 a
nd
 
Si
m
ps
on
 (
19
92
),
 
JM
R
 
T
o 
de
ve
lo
p 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 
of
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 a
nd
 
tw
o 
em
pi
ri
ca
l t
es
ts
 in
 
di
ff
er
en
t r
el
at
io
na
l 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 in
 o
rd
er
 to
 
ex
am
in
at
io
n 
th
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
an
d 
“c
on
te
nt
” 
in
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 
ch
an
ne
l s
tr
uc
tu
re
s.
 
T
w
o 
su
rv
ey
 s
tu
di
es
; 
16
8 
au
to
m
ob
ile
 d
ea
le
rs
 
(4
9%
) 
an
d 
65
1 
au
to
m
ob
ile
 ti
re
 d
ea
le
rs
 
(3
5.
6%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 r
eg
ar
de
d 
as
 a
n 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gy
. O
th
er
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 a
re
 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n,
 p
ro
m
is
e,
 r
eq
ue
st
, l
eg
al
is
tic
, a
nd
 
th
re
at
. 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: r
el
at
io
ni
sm
 
(s
ol
id
ar
it
y,
 m
ut
ua
lit
y,
 f
le
xi
bi
lit
y)
 
(+
),
 O
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
(+
),
 F
ra
nc
hi
se
 (
+)
, 
A
lig
nm
en
t (
+
),
 S
up
pl
ie
r 
ty
pe
 (
+)
; *
 
N
o 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 te
st
ed
 
* 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 e
nh
an
ce
d 
by
 m
or
e 
re
la
tio
na
lis
m
 in
 th
e 
de
al
er
-s
up
pl
ie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p;
 *
 
Fo
rm
al
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
s 
(s
uc
h 
as
 o
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
an
d 
fr
an
ch
is
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
) 
en
fo
rc
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
ev
en
 m
or
e 
th
an
 r
el
at
io
na
lis
m
 
  292
 St
ud
y,
 A
ut
ho
rs
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 O
bj
ec
t i v
e 
Em
pi
ric
al
 B
as
is 
(s
a m
p l
e  
s iz
e ,
 r e
s p
o n
s e
 
r a
te
) 
Co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
in
g 
in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
ce
de
nt
s a
nd
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
S c
h e
e r
 a
n d
 S
te
rn
 
(1
9 9
2 )
, J
M
R
 
T
o  
u n
d e
rs
ta
n d
 th
e  
e f
fe
c t
s  
o f
 a
 s
u c
c e
s s
fu
l e
x p
lic
it 
in
fl
u e
n c
e  
e x
e r
c i
s e
 b
y  
e x
a m
in
in
g  
b i
th
 th
e  
ty
p e
 o
f 
in
fl
u e
n c
e  
e x
e r
c i
s e
d  
a n
d  
th
e  
p e
rf
o r
m
a n
c e
 o
u t
c o
m
e s
 
g e
n e
ra
te
d  
b y
 th
e  
b e
h a
v i
o r
 
ad
op
te
d 
in
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
at
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
L
a b
o r
a t
o r
y  
e x
p e
ri
m
e n
t; 
2 3
3  
M
B
A
 s
tu
d e
n t
s  
in
 
th
e  
ro
le
 o
f 
m
a r
k e
tin
g  
m
a n
a g
e r
 f
a c
in
g  
a  
s t
ra
te
g i
c  
d e
c i
s i
o n
 to
 
c a
rr
y  
a  
n e
w
 p
ro
d u
c t
 
fr
o m
 a
 s
u p
p l
ie
r 
In
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
e x
c h
a n
g e
 b
y  
th
e  
o t
h e
r 
c h
a n
n e
l m
e m
b e
r 
is
 s
e e
n  
a s
 a
 n
o n
-c
o n
tig
e n
t p
o s
iti
v e
 in
fl
u e
n c
e  
a t
te
m
p t
. 
*  
N
o  
a n
te
c e
d e
n t
s  
te
s t
e d
 (
u n
c e
rt
a i
n t
y  
o f
 p
e r
fo
rm
a n
c e
 o
u t
c o
m
e s
, 
c o
n t
in
g u
e n
c y
 o
f 
in
fl
u e
n c
e  
a t
te
m
p t
s )
; 
*  
C
o n
s e
q u
e n
c e
s :
 s
a t
is
fa
c t
io
n  
(+
),
 
tr
u s
t (
+ )
, c
o m
m
itm
e n
t (
+
),
 a
tti
tu
d e
 
a b
o u
t n
e w
 p
ro
d u
c t
 (
+ )
, p
a r
tn
e r
 
o u
tc
o m
e  
a t
tr
ib
u t
io
n s
 (
+ )
, a
u t
o n
o m
y  
(+
) 
*  
W
h e
n  
p e
rf
o r
m
a n
c e
 o
u t
c o
m
e s
 a
re
 u
n k
n o
w
n ,
 a
 
p o
s i
tiv
e  
in
fl
u e
n c
e  
a t
te
m
p t
 b
y  
o n
e  
c h
a n
n e
l m
e m
b e
r 
(f
.i.
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g )
 r
e s
u l
ts
 in
 m
o r
e 
tr
u s
t a
n d
 
s a
tis
fa
c t
io
n  
b y
 th
e  
o t
h e
r 
c h
a n
n e
l p
a r
tn
e r
, a
n d
 m
o r
e  
a u
to
n o
m
y  
B
ri
ll 
(1
99
4)
, J
B
R
 
T
o 
de
ve
lo
p 
an
d 
te
st
 a
n 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
m
od
el
 
ex
pl
ai
ni
ng
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
su
pp
lie
r 
po
w
er
 
an
d 
op
po
rt
un
is
m
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
to
p 
m
an
ag
er
s 
of
 g
as
ol
in
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
st
at
io
n 
fr
an
ch
is
es
 (
15
1,
 1
5%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 r
eg
ar
de
d 
as
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 
(a
ttr
ib
ut
ed
) 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
fr
om
 th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
as
 a
 
re
su
lt 
of
 u
si
ng
 h
is
 e
xp
er
tis
e 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: r
el
at
io
na
l 
re
st
ri
ct
iv
en
es
s 
(+
),
 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l/d
ea
le
r’
s 
m
or
al
e 
(+
),
 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l/d
ea
le
r’
s 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
(-
);
 
N
o 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 te
st
ed
.  
* 
E
xp
er
t p
ow
er
 is
 a
n 
im
po
rt
an
t i
nd
ic
at
or
 o
f 
(a
ttr
ib
ut
ed
) 
so
ci
al
 p
ow
er
; *
 A
s 
ex
pe
ct
ed
, t
he
 
at
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r’
s 
so
ci
al
 p
ow
er
 b
y 
th
e 
de
al
er
/r
et
ai
l f
ra
nc
hi
se
e 
is
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 
re
st
ri
ct
iv
en
es
s 
an
d 
m
or
al
e;
 y
et
 u
nd
er
m
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
de
al
er
’s
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
(c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
an
d 
op
po
rt
un
is
m
).
 
G
un
dl
ac
h 
an
d 
C
ad
ot
te
 (
19
94
),
 
JM
R
 
T
o 
ex
pl
or
e 
th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 o
f 
in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nc
e 
m
ag
ni
tu
de
 
(c
oh
es
io
n)
 a
nd
 r
el
at
iv
e 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 (
po
w
er
 
ad
va
nt
ag
e)
 
L
ab
or
at
or
y 
st
ud
y 
in
 a
 
si
m
ul
at
ed
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
ch
an
ne
l; 
17
9 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 f
ro
m
 
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pe
rs
ua
si
on
 is
 a
 f
or
m
 o
f 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 
in
te
rf
ir
m
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
(m
ea
su
re
m
en
t b
y 
4 
ite
m
s)
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: m
ag
ni
tu
de
 o
f 
in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nc
e 
(m
:+
; d
:+
),
 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 o
f 
in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nc
e 
(m
:n
s;
 d
:+
) 
* 
A
s 
th
e 
ch
an
ne
l m
em
be
r's
 jo
in
t d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
in
cr
ea
se
s,
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pe
rs
ua
si
on
 
in
cr
ea
se
s;
 *
 T
he
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r's
 u
se
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pe
rs
ua
si
on
 is
 n
ot
 a
ff
ec
te
d 
by
 th
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
po
w
er
 in
 
th
e 
ch
an
ne
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p;
 *
 T
he
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
or
's 
us
e 
of
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pe
rs
ua
si
on
 is
 p
os
iti
ve
ly
 r
el
at
ed
 to
 th
e  
re
la
tiv
e 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 o
f 
th
ei
r 
in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nc
e 
B
ro
w
n,
 L
us
ch
, a
nd
 
N
ic
ho
ls
on
 (
19
95
),
 
JR
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 
po
w
er
 u
sa
ge
 o
n 
co
m
m
itm
en
t a
nd
 h
ow
 th
es
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
ar
e 
m
od
er
at
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
po
w
er
 a
sy
m
m
et
ry
 in
 
th
e 
ch
an
ne
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
fa
rm
 
eq
ui
pm
en
t d
ea
le
rs
 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 it
s 
de
al
in
gs
 w
ith
 th
ei
r 
m
aj
or
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
(2
03
, 
19
.3
%
) 
T
w
o 
pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
us
es
 o
f 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
no
n-
m
ed
ia
te
d 
po
w
er
 r
el
at
ed
 to
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
ar
e 
(1
) 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
po
w
er
 (
4 
ite
m
s 
on
 "
kn
ow
in
g 
m
or
e"
, 
"b
et
te
r 
in
fo
rm
ed
")
 a
nd
 (
2)
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 e
xp
er
t p
ow
e r
 
(4
 it
em
s 
on
 g
et
tin
g 
go
od
 a
dv
is
e,
 o
n 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
ex
pe
rt
is
e)
. 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
: *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 r
et
ai
le
r's
 
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l c
om
m
itm
en
t (
+)
, 
re
ta
ile
r's
 n
or
m
at
iv
e 
co
m
m
itm
en
t (
+)
, 
at
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
 o
f 
su
pp
lie
r's
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 (
+)
, r
et
ai
le
r's
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 (
+)
 
* 
T
he
 u
se
 o
f 
no
n-
m
ed
ia
te
d 
po
w
er
 b
y 
th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
re
su
lts
 in
 m
or
e 
no
rm
at
iv
e 
re
ta
ile
r 
co
m
m
itm
en
t t
o 
th
e 
ch
an
ne
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p;
 *
 in
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 w
ith
 a
 m
or
e 
po
w
er
fu
l r
et
ai
le
r,
 th
e  
us
e 
of
 n
on
-m
ed
ia
te
d 
po
w
er
 r
ed
uc
es
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l c
om
m
itm
en
t. 
* 
N
on
-m
ed
ia
te
d 
po
w
er
 
us
e 
di
re
ct
ly
 a
nd
 in
di
re
ct
ly
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
es
 to
 a
 b
et
te
r 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. 
B
ro
w
n,
 J
oh
ns
on
, 
an
d 
K
oe
ni
g 
(1
99
5)
, 
IJ
R
M
 
T
o 
co
m
pa
re
 th
e 
ps
yc
ho
m
et
ri
c 
pr
op
er
tie
s 
of
 
bo
th
 th
e 
di
re
ct
 a
nd
 in
di
re
ct
 
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
 to
 m
ea
su
ri
ng
 
th
e 
so
ur
ce
s 
of
 p
ow
er
 in
 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
ch
an
ne
ls
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
re
ta
il 
st
or
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 th
ei
r 
m
aj
or
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
(7
8,
 
16
.7
%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
gi
ve
n 
by
 th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
is
 a
 d
ir
ec
t 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t o
f 
a 
su
pp
lie
r 
po
w
er
 s
ou
rc
e.
 A
n 
in
di
re
ct
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t o
f 
so
ur
ce
s 
of
 p
ow
er
 is
 th
e 
qu
al
it
y 
of
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
ac
tiv
iti
es
, q
ua
lit
y 
of
 
tr
ad
e 
pr
om
ot
io
n 
su
pp
or
t. 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: p
ow
er
 a
tt
ri
bu
tio
ns
 
(+
),
 c
on
fl
ic
t (
-)
, s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
(+
);
 *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 p
ow
er
 a
tt
ri
bu
tio
ns
 
(+
),
 c
on
fl
ic
t (
-)
, s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
(+
) 
(n
ot
e:
 th
e 
st
ud
y 
pr
es
en
ts
 a
 
no
m
ol
og
ic
al
 n
et
 o
f 
co
ns
tr
uc
ts
 a
nd
 
do
es
 n
ot
 m
ak
e 
a 
di
st
in
ct
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
).
 
* 
T
he
 c
on
st
ru
ct
 v
al
id
it
y 
of
 in
di
re
ct
 (
e.
g.
 H
un
t a
nd
 
N
ev
in
, 1
97
4)
 a
nd
 d
ir
ec
t (
e,
g,
 F
ra
zi
er
 a
nd
 
Su
m
m
er
s,
 1
98
4)
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 a
re
 e
qu
al
ly
 g
oo
d;
 *
 
D
ir
ec
t m
ea
su
re
s 
of
 s
ou
rc
es
 o
f 
po
w
er
 m
ea
su
re
 
po
w
er
 in
 th
e 
ch
an
ne
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 b
et
te
r;
 *
 I
n 
th
e 
te
st
 f
or
 n
om
ol
og
ic
al
 v
al
id
it
y,
 n
on
-m
ed
ia
te
d 
an
d 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 p
ow
er
 r
el
at
e  
ne
ga
tiv
el
y 
to
 c
on
fl
ic
t 
an
d 
po
si
tiv
el
y 
to
 s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n;
 *
 A
 p
os
iti
ve
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
po
w
e r
 a
ttr
ib
ut
io
ns
 a
nd
 n
on
-
m
ed
ia
te
d 
or
 n
on
co
er
ci
ve
 p
ow
er
 is
 f
ou
nd
. 
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ric
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 B
as
is 
(s
a m
p l
e  
s iz
e ,
 r e
s p
o n
s e
 
r a
te
) 
Co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
in
g 
in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
ce
de
nt
s a
nd
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
B
o y
le
 a
n d
 D
w
y e
r 
(1
9 9
5 )
, J
B
R
 
T
o  
u n
d e
rs
ta
n d
 th
e  
in
te
rp
la
y  
o f
 p
o w
e r
, b
u r
e a
u c
ra
c y
, 
in
fl
u e
n c
e  
s t
ra
te
g i
e s
, a
n d
 
p e
rf
o r
m
a n
c e
 
S u
rv
e y
 a
m
o n
g  
U
S  
in
d u
s t
ri
a l
 p
ro
d u
c t
 
d i
s t
ri
b u
to
rs
 r
e p
o r
tin
g  
o n
 o
n e
 o
f 
th
e i
r 
s u
p p
lie
rs
 (
3 1
4 ,
 4
4 .
3 %
) 
In
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
e x
c h
a n
g e
 is
 r
e g
a r
d e
d  
a s
 a
 n
o n
-c
o e
rc
iv
e  
ty
p e
 o
f 
in
fl
u e
n c
e  
s t
ra
te
g y
  b
y  
th
e  
s u
p p
lie
r 
(c
f.
 
F r
a z
ie
r 
a n
d  
S u
m
m
e r
, 1
9 8
4 )
 
*  
A
n t
e c
e d
e n
ts
: s
u p
p l
ie
r 
p o
w
e r
 (
+ )
, 
fo
rm
a l
iz
a t
io
n  
(+
),
 c
e n
tr
a l
iz
a t
io
n  
(n
s )
; *
 C
o n
s e
q u
e n
c e
s :
 p
e r
fo
rm
a n
c e
 
(+
) 
*  
In
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
e x
c h
a n
g e
 is
 m
o r
e  
u s
e d
 in
 
re
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 w
ith
 a
 p
o w
e r
fu
l s
u p
p l
ie
r 
a n
d  
w
h e
re
 
fo
rm
a l
iz
a t
io
n  
is
 a
p p
lie
d ;
 *
 I
n f
o r
m
a t
io
n  
e x
c h
a n
g e
 is
 
th
e  
o n
ly
 in
fl
u e
n c
e  
s t
ra
te
g y
 th
a t
 in
c r
e a
s e
s  
th
e  
p e
rf
o r
m
a n
c e
. R
e c
o m
m
e n
d a
tio
n  
d o
e s
 n
o t
 c
o n
tr
ib
u t
e  
s i
g n
if
ic
a n
tl
y ,
 a
n d
 th
e  
c o
e r
c i
v e
 in
fl
u e
n c
e  
s t
ra
te
g i
e s
 
a r
e  
d e
tr
im
e n
ta
l t
o  
th
e  
p e
rf
o r
m
a n
c e
.  
Si
m
ps
on
 a
nd
 M
ay
o 
(1
99
7)
, J
B
R
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
di
re
ct
 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 
co
er
ci
ve
 a
nd
 n
on
-c
oe
rc
iv
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 o
n 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n,
 c
om
m
itm
en
t 
an
d 
tr
us
t i
n 
di
ff
er
en
t 
ch
an
ne
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
be
er
 
di
st
ri
bu
to
rs
 r
ep
or
tin
g 
on
 a
 m
aj
or
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
(3
31
, 2
6.
4%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 p
ar
t o
f 
th
e 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gy
 (
5 
ite
m
s)
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s;
 *
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 
Sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
(+
),
 T
ru
st
 (
+
),
 
C
om
m
itm
en
t (
+)
 
* 
N
on
-c
oe
rc
iv
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 r
es
ul
t i
n 
hi
gh
er
 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n,
 tr
us
t a
nd
 c
om
m
itm
en
t; 
* 
In
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 f
ea
tu
re
d 
w
ith
 r
el
at
io
na
lis
m
, t
he
 
co
ns
tr
uc
tiv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
is
 
si
gn
if
an
tl
y 
re
du
ce
d 
R
aw
w
as
, V
ite
ll,
 
an
d 
B
ar
ne
s 
(1
99
7)
, 
JB
R
 
T
o 
in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
th
e 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
of
 m
an
ag
in
g 
co
nf
lic
t b
y 
ut
ili
zi
ng
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 p
ow
er
 s
ou
rc
es
 
in
 a
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
ch
an
ne
l 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t U
S 
re
ta
ile
rs
 r
ep
or
tin
g 
ab
ou
t t
he
ir
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 w
ith
 th
ei
r 
pr
im
ai
ry
 
ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
 
w
ho
le
sa
le
r 
(5
51
, 
27
.5
%
) 
T
he
 u
se
 o
f 
ex
pe
rt
 p
ow
er
 is
 th
e 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
of
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
in
 th
e 
ch
an
ne
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: u
se
 o
f 
op
po
rt
un
is
tic
 
po
w
er
 (
ns
),
 r
ew
ar
d 
po
w
er
 u
se
 (
+
),
 
co
er
ci
ve
 p
ow
er
 u
se
 (
-)
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 p
ow
er
 (
-)
, 
co
ns
tr
uc
tiv
e 
co
nf
lic
t (
+)
, s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
(n
s)
 
* 
R
ew
ar
d 
us
e 
of
 p
ow
er
 g
o 
ha
nd
-i
n-
ha
nd
 w
ith
 th
e 
ex
pe
rt
 u
se
 o
f 
po
w
er
; *
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 e
xp
er
t p
ow
e r
 
le
ad
s 
to
 a
 le
ss
 d
ir
ec
t i
nf
lu
en
ce
 (
po
w
er
 u
se
),
 b
ut
 it
 
st
im
ul
at
es
 c
on
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
co
nf
lic
t 
K
im
 (
20
00
),
 J
A
M
S 
T
o 
ad
dr
es
s 
tw
o 
qu
es
tio
ns
: 
do
es
 c
ha
nn
el
 c
lim
at
e 
m
od
er
at
e 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
in
te
rf
ir
m
 p
ow
er
 p
ro
ce
ss
; 
an
d 
w
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 o
n 
re
la
tio
na
l e
xc
ha
ng
e 
(s
ol
id
ar
it
y)
. 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
in
du
st
ri
al
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
or
s 
fo
r 
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 
in
du
st
ri
al
 s
up
pl
ie
s 
an
d 
ha
rd
w
ar
e 
(2
76
, 3
2.
3%
) 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
su
pp
lie
rs
 (
67
, 
50
.7
%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 a
 f
or
m
 o
f 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gy
 (
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
ith
 r
eq
ue
st
s)
. 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: i
nt
er
fi
rm
 p
ow
er
 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 (
ns
),
 m
ag
ni
tu
de
 o
f 
po
w
er
 (
+)
; *
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 
su
pp
lie
r's
 u
se
 o
f 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 (
+
) 
* 
U
se
 o
f 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 le
ad
s 
to
 
m
or
e 
so
lid
ar
it
y 
in
 th
e 
di
st
ri
bu
to
r-
su
pp
lie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
 *
 T
he
 u
se
 o
f 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 s
tr
at
e g
ie
s 
by
 o
ne
 c
ha
nn
el
 m
em
be
r 
is
 r
ec
ip
ro
ca
te
d 
by
 th
e 
ot
he
r.
 *
 N
on
-c
oe
rc
iv
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 a
re
 
ap
pl
ie
d 
in
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 w
ith
 a
 h
ig
he
r 
le
ve
l o
f 
m
ag
ni
tu
de
 o
f 
po
w
er
. 
L
ee
 (
20
01
),
 J
B
R
 
T
o 
ex
pl
or
e 
th
e 
pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
 
of
 C
hi
ne
se
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
or
s 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
th
e 
cl
as
si
fi
ca
ti
on
 
of
 p
ow
er
 s
ou
rc
es
. 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
C
hi
ne
se
 
di
st
ri
bu
to
rs
 f
ro
m
 o
ne
 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l J
oi
nt
-
V
en
tu
re
 b
re
w
er
y 
(9
5,
 
79
.2
%
) 
T
he
 s
up
pl
ie
r's
 u
se
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is
 la
be
le
d 
as
 a
 
no
n-
ag
gr
es
si
ve
 u
se
 o
f 
po
w
er
 s
ou
rc
e 
(m
ea
su
re
s 
ar
e 
co
nf
or
m
 B
ro
w
n 
et
.a
l.,
 1
99
5a
) 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 c
on
fl
ic
t (
-)
, 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
(+
) 
* 
T
he
 u
se
 o
f 
no
n 
ag
gr
es
si
ve
 p
ow
er
 s
ou
rc
es
 d
ir
e c
tly
 
co
nt
ri
bu
te
s 
to
 s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ch
an
ne
l, 
bu
t a
ls
o 
in
di
re
ct
ly
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
lo
w
er
in
g 
of
 th
e 
le
v e
l o
f 
co
nf
lic
t i
n 
th
e 
ch
an
ne
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p.
 
T
ik
oo
 (
20
02
),
 J
R
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
fr
an
ch
is
e 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
 a
s 
a 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ta
l v
ar
ia
bl
e 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 a
nd
 f
ra
nc
hi
so
r 
us
e 
of
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
s 
 f
ro
m
 o
ne
 
fr
an
ch
is
e 
sy
st
em
 (
39
6,
 
27
.8
%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 is
 a
n 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gy
 b
y  
th
e 
fr
an
ch
is
or
 w
ith
 n
o 
sp
ec
if
ic
 a
ct
io
n 
re
qu
es
te
d 
o r
 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
in
di
ca
te
d 
(c
f.
 B
oy
le
, e
t.a
l. 
19
92
) 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: f
ra
nc
hi
se
es
 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
 (
0)
, f
ra
nc
hi
se
e'
s 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 o
n 
fr
an
ch
is
or
 (
0)
 
* 
T
he
 u
se
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 a
s 
an
 in
fl
ue
n c
e 
st
ra
te
gy
 b
y 
th
e 
fr
an
ch
is
er
 is
 n
ot
 r
ed
uc
ed
 w
he
n 
th
e 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
s 
be
co
m
e 
le
ss
 d
ep
en
de
nt
.  
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p l
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s p
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Co
nc
ep
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al
iz
at
io
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In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
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in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
ce
de
nt
s a
nd
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
H
u  
a n
d  
S h
e u
 
(2
0 0
5 )
, I
M
M
 
T
o  
s t
u d
y  
th
e  
fa
c t
o r
s  
in
fl
u e
n c
in
g  
c h
a n
n e
l 
s o
lid
a r
it
y  
S u
rv
e y
 a
m
o n
g  
T
a i
w
a n
e s
e  
P D
A
-
fr
a n
c h
is
e e
s  
re
p o
rt
in
g  
o n
 th
e i
r 
m
a i
n  
s u
p p
lie
r 
(1
2 6
, n
.a
.)
 
In
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
e x
c h
a n
g e
 is
 r
e g
a r
d e
d  
a s
 a
 n
o n
-c
o e
rc
iv
e  
in
fl
u e
n c
e  
s t
ra
te
g y
. 
*  
A
n t
e c
e d
e n
ts
: c
h a
n n
e l
 a
s y
m
m
e t
ry
 
(+
);
 *
 C
o n
s e
q u
e n
c e
s :
 c
h a
n n
e l
 
c l
im
a t
e  
h a
rm
o n
y  
(+
),
 c
h a
n n
e l
 
s o
lid
a r
it
y  
(+
) 
*  
C
h a
n n
e l
 a
s y
m
m
e t
ry
 in
 f
a v
o r
 o
f 
th
e  
s u
p p
lie
r 
le
a d
s  
to
 m
o r
e  
u s
e  
o f
 n
o n
-c
o e
rc
iv
e  
(i
n f
o r
m
a t
io
n  
e x
c h
a n
g e
) 
b y
 th
e  
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r;
 *
 T
h e
 u
s e
 o
f 
a  
n o
n -
c o
e r
c i
v e
 in
fl
u e
n c
e  
s t
ra
te
g y
 c
o n
tr
ib
u t
e s
 to
 th
e  
c h
a n
n e
l h
a r
m
o n
y  
a n
d  
s o
lid
a r
it
y  
Pa
ya
n 
an
d 
M
cF
ar
la
nd
 (
20
05
),
 
JM
 
T
o 
de
ve
lo
p 
a 
co
m
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 th
eo
ry
 
pr
ed
ic
tin
g 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 in
 
ga
in
in
g 
ch
an
ne
l m
em
be
r 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
ow
ne
rs
 a
nd
 m
an
ag
er
s 
of
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
of
 
sp
ec
ia
lt
y 
to
ol
s 
an
d 
fa
st
en
er
s 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 is
 r
eg
ar
de
d 
as
 a
 n
on
-c
oe
rc
iv
e 
st
ra
te
gy
 e
m
ph
as
iz
in
g 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
of
 d
at
a 
w
ith
ou
t 
an
y 
ex
pl
ic
it 
re
qu
es
t a
nd
 c
on
cl
ud
in
g 
cl
ai
m
 o
r 
w
ar
ra
nt
y.
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
(+
) 
 
* 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 is
 n
ot
 a
n 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
no
n-
co
er
ci
ve
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
st
ra
te
gy
 in
 d
em
an
di
ng
 c
ha
nn
el
 
m
em
be
r’
s 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e;
 *
 R
at
io
na
lit
y 
(t
he
 s
ou
rc
e 
pr
es
en
ts
 r
ea
so
ns
 a
cc
om
pa
ni
ed
 w
ith
 s
up
po
rt
iv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fo
r 
a 
ta
rg
et
 to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 a
 r
eq
ue
st
) 
w
ith
 a
 f
ul
l a
rg
um
en
t s
tr
uc
tu
re
 is
 p
ro
ve
n 
to
 b
e 
m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
to
 g
ai
n 
ch
an
ne
l m
em
be
r 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Co
m
m
un
ic
at
iv
e 
 
Ch
an
ne
l B
eh
av
io
r 
 
 
 
 
B
ro
w
n 
(1
98
1)
, J
R
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
ch
an
ne
l 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 a
cr
os
s 
di
ff
er
en
t t
yp
es
 o
f 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
ch
an
ne
ls
 
(c
on
ve
nt
io
na
l, 
ad
m
in
is
te
re
d,
 c
on
tr
ac
tu
al
, 
co
rp
or
at
e)
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
re
ta
il 
m
an
ag
er
s 
of
 r
et
ai
l 
ou
tle
ts
 f
ro
m
 s
ix
 
di
ff
er
en
t p
ro
du
ct
 
cl
as
se
s 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 
le
ad
in
g 
br
an
d 
(8
4,
 n
o 
re
po
rt
 o
n 
re
sp
on
se
 r
at
e)
 
C
ha
nn
el
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 a
re
 c
om
pa
re
d 
on
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
as
pe
ct
s:
 (
1)
 d
eg
re
e 
of
 in
te
ns
it
y,
 (
2)
 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n,
 (
3)
 d
eg
re
e 
of
 
fo
rm
al
iz
at
io
n,
 (
4)
 r
ec
ip
ro
ci
ty
, a
nd
 (
5)
 c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n.
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: t
yp
e 
of
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
ch
an
ne
l; 
* 
N
o 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 te
st
ed
 
* 
T
he
 d
eg
re
e 
of
 in
te
ns
it
y 
(w
ith
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
re
so
ur
ce
 c
om
m
itm
en
t a
nd
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y)
 is
 
hi
gh
er
 in
 c
on
tr
ac
tu
al
 c
ha
nn
el
s 
th
an
 in
 c
on
ve
nt
io
na
l 
ch
an
ne
l r
el
at
io
ns
; *
 W
he
n 
ch
an
ne
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 
ar
e 
go
ve
rn
ed
 b
y 
co
rp
or
at
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
, t
he
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 te
nd
 to
 b
e 
m
or
e 
fo
rm
al
iz
ed
, m
or
e 
re
ci
pr
oc
at
ed
, m
or
e 
co
op
er
at
iv
e.
  
A
nd
er
so
n,
 L
od
is
h 
an
d 
W
ei
tz
 (
19
87
),
 
JM
R
 
T
o 
de
sc
ri
be
 th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f 
fi
na
nc
ia
l i
nc
en
tiv
es
 a
nd
 
as
pe
ct
s 
of
 th
e 
ch
an
ne
l 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
on
 th
e 
al
lo
ca
tio
n 
by
 c
ha
nn
el
 
m
em
be
rs
 a
cr
os
s 
va
ri
ou
s 
su
pp
lie
rs
. 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
ag
en
ci
es
 r
ep
or
tin
g 
on
 
th
ei
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 w
ith
 
49
2 
pr
in
ci
pa
ls
 (
71
, 
23
.7
%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 r
ep
re
se
nt
ed
 a
s 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 a
s 
a 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
fe
at
ur
e.
 I
te
m
s 
ar
e 
th
e 
qu
al
it
y 
of
 k
ee
pi
ng
 in
fo
rm
ed
, g
iv
in
g 
ad
vi
ce
 o
n 
m
ar
ke
tin
g,
 f
re
qu
en
cy
, a
nd
 c
la
ri
fy
in
g 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 a
ge
nc
y 
ti
m
e 
sp
en
t 
pe
r 
pr
in
ci
pa
l (
+)
 
* 
A
ge
nc
ie
s 
(f
.i.
 r
et
ai
le
rs
) 
ap
pe
ar
 to
 s
pe
nd
 m
or
e 
tim
e 
th
an
 e
co
no
m
ic
al
ly
 "
op
tim
al
" 
(i
n 
th
e 
sh
or
t r
un
) 
on
 p
ri
nc
ip
al
s 
(f
.i.
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
) 
w
ith
 w
ho
m
 th
e y
 
ha
ve
 g
oo
d 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
. 
A
nd
er
so
n 
an
d 
W
ei
tz
 (
19
89
),
 
M
rk
Sc
i 
T
o 
de
sc
ri
be
 th
e 
ch
an
ne
l 
m
em
be
r's
 p
er
ce
pt
io
n 
of
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
co
nt
in
ui
ty
 
w
ith
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 a
s 
a 
fu
nc
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
of
 th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r,
 th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r's
 p
ol
ic
y 
de
ci
si
on
s 
an
d 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
, 
an
d 
th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
od
uc
er
-c
ha
nn
el
 m
em
be
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
ag
en
ci
es
 r
ep
or
tin
g 
on
 
th
ei
r 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 (
95
, 3
2%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
; t
he
 
in
te
ns
iv
e 
tw
o-
w
ay
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 
pl
an
s,
 p
ro
gr
am
s,
 e
xp
ec
ta
ti
on
s,
 g
oa
l s
et
tin
g,
 a
nd
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 e
va
lu
at
io
n.
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: C
ul
tu
ra
l s
im
ila
ri
ty
 
(n
s)
, P
er
ce
iv
ed
 C
om
pe
te
nc
e 
(+
),
 
T
ru
st
 (
+)
, A
ge
 o
f 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
(-
),
 S
ta
ke
s 
(+
);
 *
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 
Pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
C
on
tin
ui
ty
 o
f 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
(n
s)
, T
ru
st
 (
+
) 
* 
T
he
 e
xt
en
t o
f 
tw
o-
w
ay
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 is
 
gr
ea
te
r 
in
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 h
i g
he
r 
tr
us
t l
ev
el
s;
 *
 O
ld
er
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 in
vo
lv
e 
le
ss
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
ra
th
er
 
th
an
 m
or
e;
 *
 C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
le
ve
ls
 d
o 
no
t a
pp
ea
r 
to
 b
e 
lo
w
er
 w
ith
 f
or
e i
gn
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 d
es
pi
te
 
po
ss
ib
le
 b
ar
ri
er
s;
 *
 M
or
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
oc
cu
rs
 in
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 w
hi
ch
 in
vo
lv
e 
hi
gh
er
 s
ta
ke
s 
to
 o
ne
 o
r 
bo
th
 p
ar
tie
s,
 a
nd
 in
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
is
 
pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
to
 b
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
; *
 T
ru
st
 in
 th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
is
 e
nh
an
ce
d 
by
 th
e 
de
gr
ee
 o
f 
tw
o-
w
ay
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
; *
 C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
ha
ve
 a
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
 im
pa
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 th
at
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ill
 c
on
tin
ue
. 
 
295
St
ud
y,
 A
ut
ho
rs
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 O
bj
ec
t i v
e 
Em
pi
ric
al
 B
as
is 
(s
a m
p l
e  
s iz
e ,
 r e
s p
o n
s e
 
r a
te
) 
Co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
in
g 
in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
ce
de
nt
s a
nd
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
A
n d
e r
s o
n  
a n
d  
N
a r
u s
 (
1 9
9 0
),
 J
M
 
T
o  
s t
u d
y  
d i
s t
ri
b u
to
r 
a n
d  
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r 
w
o r
k i
n g
 
p a
rt
n e
rs
h i
p s
 
S u
rv
e y
 a
m
o n
g  
U
S  
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r 
a n
d  
d i
s t
ri
b u
to
r 
fi
rm
s  
fr
o m
 
th
e  
N
a t
io
n a
l 
A
s s
o c
ia
tio
n  
o f
 
W
h o
le
s a
le
rs
-
D
is
tr
ib
u t
o r
s ,
 a
n  
as
so
ci
at
io
n 
re
pr
es
en
tin
g 
m
or
e 
th
an
 
11
0 
in
du
st
ri
es
 (
48
8,
 
9.
8%
) 
A
s  
o n
e  
o f
 th
e  
c o
n s
tr
u c
ts
 u
n d
e r
ly
in
g  
th
e  
p r
o c
e s
s  
of
 
w
o r
k i
n g
 to
g e
th
e r
 in
 a
 p
a r
tn
e r
s h
ip
, c
o m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
is
 d
e f
in
e d
 a
s  
“ e
x c
h a
n g
e  
o f
 m
e a
n i
n g
fu
l a
n d
 ti
m
el
y  
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
b e
tw
e e
n  
[c
h a
n n
e l
 m
e m
b e
rs
]”
 
*  
A
n t
e c
e d
e n
ts
: R
e l
a t
iv
e  
d e
p e
n d
e n
c e
 
(d
:n
s ,
 s
:+
),
 O
u t
c o
m
e s
 G
iv
e n
 
C
o m
p a
ri
s o
n  
L
e v
e l
 (
+ )
; *
 
C
o n
s e
q u
e n
c e
s :
 c
o o
p e
ra
ti
o n
 (
+ )
, t
ru
s t
 
(+
),
 f
u n
c t
io
n a
lit
y  
o f
 c
o n
fl
ic
t (
d :
+ ;
 
s :
n s
),
 c
o n
fl
ic
t (
s :
-)
, s
a t
is
fa
c t
io
n  
(s
:+
) 
T
o g
e t
h e
r 
w
ith
 ‘
O
u t
c o
m
e s
 g
iv
e n
 c
o m
p a
ri
s o
n  
le
v e
l’
 
a n
d  
‘r
e l
a t
iv
e  
d e
p e
n d
e n
c e
’ 
, c
o m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
a p
p e
ar
 
to
 b
e  
c r
iti
c a
l e
x o
g e
n o
u s
 c
o n
s t
ru
c t
s  
in
 e
x p
la
in
in
g 
w
o r
k i
n g
 r
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p s
. C
o m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
re
s u
lts
 in
 
m
o r
e  
c o
o p
e r
a t
io
n ;
 a
n d
 in
d i
re
c t
ly
 in
 tr
u s
t. 
A
nd
er
so
n 
an
d 
W
ei
tz
 (
19
92
),
 J
M
R
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
of
 
co
m
m
itm
en
t b
y 
bo
th
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 a
nd
 
di
st
ri
bu
to
rs
 in
 c
ha
nn
el
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
lo
ca
l 
sa
le
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
es
 o
r 
di
st
ri
ct
 m
an
ag
er
s 
fr
om
 
on
e 
of
 1
1 
di
vi
si
on
s 
of
 
fi
ve
 la
rg
e 
U
S 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 a
nd
 th
ei
r 
di
st
ri
bu
to
rs
 (
37
8 
dy
ad
s;
 
64
.8
%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
liz
ed
 a
s 
pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
 o
f 
tw
o-
w
ay
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
su
pp
lie
r 
an
d 
di
st
ri
bu
to
r.
 M
ea
su
re
d 
by
 6
 it
em
s.
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
: *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 C
om
m
itm
en
t t
o 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 o
th
er
 c
ha
nn
el
 
m
em
be
r 
(+
),
 P
er
ce
pt
io
ns
 o
f 
co
m
m
itm
en
t t
o 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
by
 
ot
he
r 
ch
an
ne
l m
em
be
r 
(+
) 
* 
T
w
o-
w
ay
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
on
 r
ai
se
s 
co
m
m
itm
en
t 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
bo
th
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
an
d 
di
st
ri
bu
to
r;
 *
 M
or
e 
in
te
ns
iv
e 
bi
-d
ir
ec
tio
na
l c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
he
lp
s 
to
 
m
ai
nt
ai
n 
th
e 
re
in
fo
rc
in
g 
cy
cl
e 
of
 c
om
m
itm
en
ts
. 
M
or
ga
n 
an
d 
H
un
t 
(1
99
4)
, J
M
 
T
o 
m
od
el
 th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 o
f 
tr
us
t 
an
d 
co
m
m
itm
en
t i
n 
de
al
er
-
su
pp
lie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
na
tio
na
l t
ir
e 
de
al
er
s 
an
d 
re
tr
ad
er
s 
re
po
rt
 o
n 
th
ei
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 (
20
4,
 
14
.6
%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
liz
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 
of
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
(f
.i.
, k
ee
pi
n g
 
in
fo
rm
ed
 o
f 
ne
w
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
ts
; c
om
m
un
ic
at
in
g 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
s)
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 tr
us
t (
+
),
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
co
m
m
itm
en
t (
in
di
re
ct
 +
),
 
ac
qu
ie
sc
en
ce
 (
in
di
re
ct
 +
),
 
pr
op
en
si
ty
 to
 le
av
e 
(i
nd
ir
ec
t -
),
 
co
op
er
at
io
n 
(i
nd
ir
ec
t  +
),
 f
un
ct
io
na
l 
co
nf
lic
t (
in
di
re
ct
 +
),
 d
ec
is
io
n-
m
ak
in
g 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
(i
nd
ir
ec
t -
) 
* 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
is
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
th
re
e 
fa
ct
or
s 
di
re
ct
ly
 in
fl
ue
nc
in
g 
tr
us
t; 
* 
O
pp
or
tu
ni
st
ic
 b
eh
av
io
r 
ha
rm
s 
tr
us
t t
hr
ee
 ti
m
es
 a
s 
m
uc
h 
as
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
sh
ar
ed
 v
al
ue
s 
ca
n 
re
pa
ir
 it
; *
 T
he
 s
ec
on
d 
la
rg
es
t (
in
di
re
ct
) 
po
si
tiv
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
of
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
is
 o
n 
co
op
er
at
io
n;
 *
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
on
 tr
us
t a
nd
 c
om
m
itm
en
t, 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
al
so
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
es
 to
 th
e 
re
du
ct
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
pr
op
en
si
ty
 to
 le
av
e,
 a
nd
 d
ec
is
io
n-
m
ak
in
g  
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
M
oh
r 
an
d 
So
hi
 
(1
99
5)
, J
R
 
T
o 
in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 n
or
m
s 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
on
 th
e 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y,
 b
i-
di
re
ct
io
na
lit
y,
 a
nd
 
fo
rm
al
it
y 
of
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
fl
ow
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
ch
an
ne
l p
ar
tie
s 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
co
m
pu
te
r 
de
al
er
s 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
ei
r 
su
pp
lie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 (
12
5;
 
22
.4
%
) 
D
if
fe
re
nt
 a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
fl
ow
s 
(f
re
qu
en
cy
, f
or
m
al
it
y 
an
d 
bi
di
re
ct
io
na
lit
y)
 a
re
 
ex
am
in
ed
 in
 r
el
at
io
n 
w
ith
 n
or
m
s 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
th
at
 a
re
 a
ss
um
ed
 to
 g
ui
de
 b
eh
av
io
r.
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 F
re
qu
en
cy
 (
+)
, 
B
id
ir
ec
tio
na
lit
y 
(+
),
 F
or
m
al
it
y 
(+
),
 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
Q
ua
lit
y 
(+
),
 
Sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
(i
nd
ir
ec
t: 
+)
, d
is
to
rt
io
n 
an
d 
w
ith
ho
ld
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
(i
nd
ir
ec
t: 
-)
 
* 
N
or
m
s 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
en
co
ur
ag
es
 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y,
 b
i-
di
re
ct
io
na
lit
y,
 a
nd
 f
or
m
al
it
y;
 *
 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
bi
-d
ir
ec
tio
na
lit
y 
an
d 
fo
rm
al
it
y 
do
 
no
t a
ff
ec
t t
he
 q
ua
lit
y 
pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
 o
f 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
 *
 C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
co
nt
ri
bu
te
s 
to
 q
ua
lit
y 
pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
 (
tim
el
y,
 
ad
eq
ua
te
, c
om
pl
et
e)
. *
 F
or
m
al
it
y 
se
em
s 
to
 h
av
e 
an
 
in
hi
bi
tin
g 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
di
st
or
tio
n 
an
d 
w
ith
ho
ld
in
g  
of
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 *
 T
he
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 q
ua
lit
y 
of
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
is
 p
os
iti
ve
ly
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 a
 
de
al
er
's 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
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, J
o u
r n
a l
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 O
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ec
t i v
e 
Em
pi
ric
al
 B
as
is 
(s
a m
p l
e  
s iz
e ,
 r e
s p
o n
s e
 
r a
te
) 
Co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
in
g 
in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
ce
de
nt
s a
nd
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
M
o h
r,
 F
is
h e
r 
a n
d  
N
e v
in
 (
1 9
9 6
),
 J
R
 
T
o  
in
v e
s t
ig
a t
e  
th
e  
im
p a
c t
 
o f
 c
o l
la
b o
ra
tiv
e  
c o
m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
in
 d
if
fe
re
n t
 
ty
p e
s  
o f
 c
h a
n n
e l
 
re
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 (
v a
ry
in
g  
in
 
le
v e
l o
f 
in
te
g r
a t
io
n  
a n
d  
d e
g r
e e
 o
f 
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r 
co
nt
ro
l)
 
S u
rv
e y
 a
m
o n
g  
o w
n e
rs
 
a n
d  
m
a n
a g
e r
s  
o f
 
h a
rd
w
a r
e  
d e
a l
e r
s  
in
 th
e  
c o
m
p u
te
r 
in
d u
s t
ry
 
(1
2 5
, 2
2 .
4 %
) 
C
o m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
b e
tw
e e
n  
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r 
a n
d  
d e
a l
er
 
is
 c
o l
la
b o
ra
tiv
e  
w
h e
n  
th
e  
fr
e q
u e
n c
y  
is
 h
ig
h ,
 m
o r
e  
fo
rm
a l
iz
e d
, t
w
o -
w
a y
s ,
 a
n d
 h
a s
 n
o n
-c
o e
rc
iv
e  
c o
n t
e n
t 
*  
A
n t
e c
e d
e n
ts
: M
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r 
c o
n t
ro
l 
(a
c h
ie
v e
d  
in
fl
u e
n c
e  
o v
e r
 d
e a
le
r 
d e
c i
s i
o n
s ,
 4
 it
e m
s )
, i
n t
e g
ra
tio
n  
(i
n d
e p
e n
d e
n t
, f
ra
n c
h i
s e
, c
o m
p a
n y
-
o w
n e
d )
; b
o t
h  
v a
ri
a b
le
s  
a r
e  
s i
g n
if
ic
a n
tl
y  
c o
rr
e l
a t
e d
 w
ith
 th
e  
le
v e
l o
f 
c o
lla
b o
ra
tiv
e  
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
le
ng
th
 
(+
),
 d
ea
le
r 
si
ze
 (
ns
),
 c
on
fl
ic
t (
ns
):
 *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 d
ea
le
r's
 
co
m
m
itm
en
t, 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n,
 
co
or
di
na
tio
n 
*  
C
o l
la
b o
ra
tiv
e  
c o
m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
le
a d
s  
to
 h
ig
h e
r 
d e
a l
e r
's  
c o
m
m
itm
e n
t, 
s a
tis
fa
c t
io
n ,
 a
n d
 
c o
o r
d i
n a
tio
n .
 *
 I
n  
m
o r
e  
in
te
g r
a t
e d
 m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r-
re
ta
ile
r 
re
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
, t
h e
 e
ff
e c
t o
f 
c o
lla
b o
ra
tiv
e  
c o
m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
o n
 s
a t
is
fa
c t
io
n  
a n
d  
c o
o r
d i
n a
tio
n  
is
 
le
s s
. *
 C
o l
la
b o
ra
tiv
e  
c o
m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
h a
s  
a  
s t
ro
ng
e r
 
p o
s i
tiv
e  
e f
fe
c t
 o
n  
o u
tc
o m
e s
 u
n d
e r
 lo
w
-c
o n
tr
o l
 
si
tu
at
io
ns
. 
G
as
se
nh
ei
m
er
, 
B
au
cu
s,
 a
nd
 
B
au
cu
s 
(1
99
6)
, 
JB
R
 
T
o 
se
e 
if
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
iv
e 
(c
ha
nn
el
) 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
m
iti
ga
te
s 
th
e 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 o
pp
or
tu
ni
sm
 o
n 
ou
tc
om
es
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
s 
fr
om
 1
9 
fr
an
ch
is
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
 
(1
62
, 7
.2
%
) 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
iv
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
is
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
sh
ar
in
g 
m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l a
nd
 ti
m
el
y 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 A
lth
ou
gh
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t p
ri
m
ar
il
y 
fo
cu
se
s 
on
 v
er
tic
al
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n,
 it
 a
ls
o 
in
cl
ud
es
 s
om
e 
ite
m
s 
on
 
ho
ri
zo
nt
al
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
s.
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 f
ra
nc
hi
se
 s
ys
te
m
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 (
+)
, s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n(
+)
 
* 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
iv
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
di
re
ct
ly
 im
pa
ct
s 
fr
an
ch
is
e 
sy
st
em
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
, o
ff
se
tti
ng
 th
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
of
 o
pp
or
tu
ni
sm
, b
ut
 d
oe
s 
no
t m
od
er
at
e 
th
e 
di
re
ct
 im
pa
ct
 o
f 
op
po
rt
un
is
m
 o
n 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
; 
* 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
iv
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
no
t o
nl
y 
pa
rt
ia
ll
y 
of
fs
et
s 
th
e 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
op
po
rt
un
is
m
 o
n 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n,
 b
ut
 a
ls
o 
re
du
ce
s  
th
e 
di
re
ct
 e
ff
ec
t o
f 
op
po
rt
un
is
m
 o
n 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
 s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n.
 
C
el
ly
 a
nd
 F
ra
zi
er
 
(1
99
6)
, J
M
R
 
T
o 
en
ha
nc
e 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
of
 o
ut
co
m
e-
 a
nd
 b
eh
av
io
r-
ba
se
d 
co
or
di
na
tio
n 
ef
fo
rt
s 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
di
st
ri
bu
to
rs
 in
 a
n 
in
du
st
ri
al
 p
ro
du
ct
 
ch
an
ne
l r
ep
or
tin
g 
on
 a
 
su
pp
lie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
(2
54
, 2
6.
7%
) 
In
 th
ei
r 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
w
ith
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
or
s,
 s
up
pl
ie
rs
 
m
ay
 d
if
fe
re
nt
ia
te
 th
ei
r 
em
ph
as
is
 o
n 
ei
th
er
 
ou
tc
om
es
 o
r 
be
ha
vi
or
. 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
(+
),
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
fa
m
ili
ar
it
y,
 
su
pp
lie
r 
re
so
ur
ce
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts
 (
-)
, 
su
pp
lie
r 
re
pl
ac
ab
ili
ty
, d
is
tr
ib
ut
or
 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
, d
is
tr
ib
ut
or
 v
al
ue
-a
dd
ed
 ; 
* 
N
o 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 te
st
ed
. 
* 
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
 p
ro
m
ot
es
 th
e 
em
ph
as
is
 o
n 
bo
th
 o
ut
co
m
e 
an
d 
be
ha
vi
or
; *
 T
he
 
su
pp
lie
r's
 f
am
ili
ar
it
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
od
uc
t-
m
ar
ke
t p
ut
s 
m
or
e 
em
ph
as
is
 o
n 
be
ha
vi
or
-b
as
ed
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 
w
ith
 th
e 
di
st
ri
bu
to
r;
 S
up
pl
ie
r's
 r
es
ou
rc
e 
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
s 
lim
it 
th
e 
em
ph
as
is
 o
n 
bo
th
 a
sp
ec
ts
; *
 T
he
 
di
st
ri
bu
to
r's
 o
w
n 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
 p
ut
s 
m
or
e 
em
ph
as
is
 
on
 th
e 
ou
tc
om
e.
 
K
im
 a
nd
 F
ra
zi
er
 
(1
99
7)
, P
&
M
 
T
o 
in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
th
e 
m
ai
n 
dr
iv
in
g 
fo
rc
es
 o
f 
di
st
in
ct
iv
e 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s 
of
 
di
st
ri
bu
to
r's
 c
om
m
itm
en
t 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
D
is
tr
ib
ut
or
s 
in
 th
re
e 
U
S 
in
du
st
ri
es
: 
in
du
st
ri
al
 m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t, 
in
du
st
ri
al
 s
up
pl
ie
s 
an
d 
ha
rd
w
ar
e 
(2
76
; 3
2.
3%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
liz
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
su
pp
lie
r.
 T
hr
ee
 
ite
m
s 
m
ea
su
ri
ng
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
in
di
ca
te
 th
e 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
in
 w
hi
ch
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 m
ar
ke
t 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
an
d 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 a
re
 e
xc
ha
ng
ed
, a
 r
e v
ie
w
 
an
d 
fe
ed
ba
ck
 o
n 
ea
ch
 o
th
er
's 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 is
 g
iv
en
 
an
d 
ga
th
er
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 c
us
to
m
er
 n
ee
ds
. 
* 
N
o 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
 te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
tr
us
tw
or
th
in
es
s 
(+
),
 m
an
if
es
t 
co
nf
lic
t (
-)
, b
eh
av
io
ra
l c
om
m
itm
en
t, 
af
fe
ct
iv
e 
co
m
m
itm
en
t, 
co
nt
in
ua
nc
e 
co
m
m
itm
en
t 
* 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
di
st
ri
bu
to
r 
an
d 
su
pp
lie
r 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r's
 tr
us
tw
or
th
in
es
s 
an
d 
de
cr
ea
se
s 
m
an
if
es
t c
on
fl
ic
t; 
* 
In
 tu
rn
, a
 d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 
m
an
if
es
t c
on
fl
ic
t m
ak
es
 c
on
tin
ua
nc
e 
an
d 
af
fe
ct
iv
e 
co
m
m
itm
en
ts
 g
ro
w
. 
R
os
s,
 A
nd
er
so
n 
an
d 
W
ei
tz
 (
19
97
),
 
M
ng
tS
ci
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
of
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 o
f 
co
m
m
itm
en
t 
in
 th
e 
ch
an
ne
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
ag
en
ts
 f
ro
m
 
tw
o 
m
aj
or
 f
ir
m
s 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
co
un
te
rp
ar
t 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 th
ei
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
(4
52
 
dy
ad
s,
 a
ge
nt
s:
 5
4%
, 
co
m
pa
ny
 p
er
so
nn
el
: 
71
%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
liz
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
le
ve
l 
of
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
ag
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
fi
rm
. 
It
 is
 m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 4
 it
em
s:
 k
ee
pi
ng
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r 
w
el
l-
in
fo
rm
ed
, n
o 
he
si
ta
tio
n 
to
 g
iv
e 
ea
ch
 o
th
er
 to
o 
m
uc
h 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 s
ee
ki
ng
 a
dv
is
e 
an
d 
co
un
se
l 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
ef
fo
rt
s,
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
is
 
lik
e 
an
 o
pe
n 
bo
ok
. 
* 
N
o 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
 te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 o
f 
co
m
m
itm
en
t (
-)
 
* 
H
ig
he
r 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
re
du
ce
s 
th
e 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
of
 c
om
m
itm
en
t a
sy
m
m
et
ry
; *
 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
is
 a
ls
o 
fo
un
d 
to
 b
e 
hi
gh
ly
 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
ith
 c
om
m
itm
en
t t
o 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p,
 to
 
de
pe
nd
en
cy
 u
po
n 
co
un
te
rp
ar
t, 
co
ng
ru
en
cy
 o
f 
go
al
s 
w
ith
 th
os
e 
of
 c
ou
nt
er
pa
rt
, a
nd
 c
ur
re
nt
 a
nd
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
pr
of
it 
fr
om
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
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p l
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Co
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al
iz
at
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In
fo
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at
io
n 
Sh
ar
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in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
ce
de
nt
s a
nd
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
L
i a
n d
 D
a n
t 
(1
9 9
7 )
, J
A
M
S  
T
o  
e x
p l
o r
e  
th
e  
e f
fe
c t
s  
o f
 
E
x c
lu
s i
v i
ty
 o
n  
c o
m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
in
 c
h a
n n
e l
s  
S u
rv
e y
 a
m
o n
g  
d e
a l
e r
s  
in
 th
e  
o f
fi
c e
 
p h
o t
o c
o p
ie
r 
in
d u
s t
ry
 
re
p o
rt
in
g  
o n
 a
 s
u p
p l
ie
r 
re
la
tio
n s
h i
p  
(5
7 3
, 
2 2
.4
%
) 
T
h e
 e
x t
e n
t t
o  
w
h i
c h
 tr
a d
e  
p a
rt
ie
s  
a c
tiv
e l
y  
e x
c h
a n
g e
 
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
w
ith
 o
n e
 a
n o
th
e r
. C
o m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
m
e a
s u
re
m
e n
t e
m
p h
a s
iz
e s
 tw
o -
w
a y
 c
o m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
(n
o t
e :
 o
n e
 it
e m
 o
f 
th
e  
fo
u r
 m
e a
s u
re
s  
e x
p e
c t
a t
io
n s
) 
*  
A
n t
e c
e d
e n
ts
: r
e l
a t
io
n a
li
s m
 
(m
u t
u a
lit
y ,
 s
o l
id
a r
it
y ,
 r
o l
e  
in
te
g r
it
y )
 
(+
);
 *
 C
o n
s e
q u
e n
c e
s :
 e
x c
lu
s i
v i
ty
 
(+
),
 p
e r
fo
rm
a n
c e
 (
in
d i
re
c t
: +
) 
*  
E
x c
lu
s i
v e
 d
e a
le
r 
a r
ra
n g
e m
e n
ts
 h
a v
e  
c l
o s
e r
 
re
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 w
ith
 th
e i
r 
s u
p p
lie
rs
 a
n d
 th
e y
 
c o
m
m
u n
ic
a t
e  
m
o r
e  
fr
e q
u e
n t
ly
 w
ith
 e
a c
h  
o t
h e
r 
th
an
 
n o
n -
e x
c l
u s
iv
e  
d e
a l
e r
-s
u p
p l
ie
r 
a r
ra
n g
e m
e n
ts
; *
 
T
h e
s e
 r
e s
u l
ts
 s
e e
m
 to
 c
o n
tr
a s
t t
h e
 tr
a d
iti
o n
a l
 
o p
p o
rt
u n
is
tic
 p
e r
s p
e c
tiv
e  
o n
 s
u p
p l
ie
r's
 u
s e
 o
f 
p o
w
e r
 in
 d
e p
e n
d e
n t
 r
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p s
. 
L
eu
th
es
se
r 
(1
99
7)
, 
IM
M
 
T
o 
as
se
ss
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 
re
la
tio
na
l b
eh
av
io
rs
 o
n 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
qu
al
it
y 
an
d 
sh
ar
e 
of
 b
us
in
es
s 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 m
an
ag
er
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
N
A
PM
 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 th
e 
m
os
t 
re
ce
nt
 p
ro
du
ct
 p
uc
ha
se
 
m
ee
tin
g 
w
ith
 a
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
(4
54
, 5
9.
3%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 s
ee
n 
as
 r
el
at
io
na
l b
eh
av
io
r 
an
d 
di
vi
de
d 
in
to
 th
re
e 
m
ai
n 
fo
rm
s:
 in
iti
at
in
g,
 
si
gn
al
in
g,
 a
nd
 d
is
cl
os
in
g 
be
ha
vi
or
s 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
qu
al
it
y 
(+
),
 s
ha
re
 o
f 
bu
si
ne
ss
 (
in
di
re
ct
 +
) 
* 
In
iti
at
in
g,
 s
ig
na
lin
g,
 a
nd
 d
is
cl
os
in
g 
be
ha
vi
or
 b
y 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
el
ev
at
es
 th
e 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
qu
al
it
y 
as
 a
ss
es
se
d 
by
 th
e 
bu
ye
r;
 *
 r
ic
hn
es
s 
of
 th
e 
in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
 b
et
w
ee
n 
su
pp
lie
r 
an
d 
bu
ye
r 
do
es
 n
ot
 
af
fe
ct
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
qu
al
it
y;
 *
 G
re
at
er
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
qu
al
it
y 
le
ad
s 
to
 a
 h
ig
he
r 
sh
ar
e 
of
 
bu
si
ne
ss
; *
 T
he
 p
os
tiv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
qu
al
it
y 
on
 b
us
in
es
s 
sh
ar
e 
on
ly
 ta
ke
s 
pl
ac
e 
on
 
re
la
tiv
el
y 
lo
w
 im
po
rt
an
t p
ur
ch
as
e 
si
tu
at
io
ns
 
C
an
no
n 
an
d 
H
om
bu
rg
 (
20
01
),
 
JM
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
ho
w
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
be
ha
vi
or
s 
af
fe
ct
 th
e 
cu
st
om
er
 f
ir
m
's 
co
st
s 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
G
er
m
an
 
an
d 
U
S 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 
m
an
ag
er
s 
(4
78
, 3
3.
0%
) 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
w
ith
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
is
 a
na
ly
ze
d 
in
 f
ou
r 
as
pe
ct
s:
 f
re
qu
en
cy
, m
od
al
it
y 
an
d 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
sh
a r
ed
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 T
he
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f 
sh
ar
ed
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 2
 it
em
s 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
: *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 c
us
to
m
er
 c
os
ts
 (
-)
, 
cu
st
om
er
 in
te
ns
io
ns
 to
 e
xp
an
d 
pu
rc
ha
se
s 
fr
om
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
(+
) 
* 
T
he
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
do
es
 n
ot
 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
th
e 
cu
st
om
er
 f
i r
m
's 
co
st
s;
 *
 F
re
qu
en
cy
 
an
d 
ri
ch
ne
ss
 o
f 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
do
es
 h
el
p 
to
 lo
w
er
 
cu
st
om
er
 f
ir
m
's 
co
st
s.
 
G
oo
dm
an
 a
nd
 
D
io
n 
(2
00
1)
, I
M
M
 
T
o 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r’
s 
pr
od
uc
t 
sa
la
bi
lit
y 
as
 a
 d
et
er
m
in
an
t 
of
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
or
’s
 
co
m
m
itm
en
t 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
di
st
ri
bu
to
rs
 r
ep
or
tin
g 
on
 th
ei
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 h
ig
h-
te
ch
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 
(2
13
, 3
1.
9%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
liz
ed
 a
s 
pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
 o
f 
tw
o-
w
a y
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
su
pp
lie
r 
an
d 
di
st
ri
bu
to
r.
 M
ea
su
re
d 
by
 4
 it
em
s.
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 c
om
m
itm
en
t (
ns
) 
 
* 
T
he
 in
fl
ue
nc
e 
of
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 is
 f
ou
nd
 to
 b
e 
no
n-
si
gn
if
ic
an
t; 
th
e 
au
th
or
s 
ex
pl
ai
n 
th
at
 it
 is
 n
ot
 
th
e 
qu
an
tit
y 
of
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
, b
ut
 th
e 
qu
al
it
y 
of
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 th
at
 w
ou
ld
 f
ur
th
er
 c
om
m
its
 th
e 
di
st
ri
bu
to
r 
to
 th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 p
ar
tn
er
. 
Sc
hu
ltz
 a
nd
 E
va
ns
 
(2
00
2)
, J
PS
SM
 
T
o 
ex
pl
or
e 
th
e 
de
te
rm
in
an
ts
 a
nd
 o
ut
co
m
es
 
of
 c
ol
la
bo
ra
tiv
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
in
 c
ha
nn
el
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
ac
co
un
t 
m
an
ag
er
s 
fr
om
 o
ne
 
C
PG
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 c
us
to
m
er
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 (
12
2,
 
48
%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 s
ee
n 
as
 c
ol
la
bo
ra
tiv
e  
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
(c
f.
 M
oh
r,
 e
t.a
l, 
19
96
):
 f
re
qu
en
cy
, 
di
re
ct
io
n,
 m
od
al
it
y)
 a
nd
 s
tr
a t
eg
ic
 c
on
te
nt
. S
tr
at
eg
ic
 
co
nt
en
t o
f 
th
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
in
cl
ud
es
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l o
pp
or
tu
n i
tie
s,
 o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s 
fo
r 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t, 
an
d 
ba
rr
ie
rs
 to
 c
ha
ng
e.
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 k
ey
 a
cc
ou
nt
 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
e 
ro
le
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 (
+)
, 
tr
us
t i
n 
ke
y 
ac
co
un
t r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
e 
(+
),
 s
yn
er
gi
c 
so
lu
tio
ns
 (
+
) 
* 
A
ll 
fo
ur
 a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
co
lla
bo
ra
tiv
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
co
nt
ri
bu
te
 to
 b
et
te
r 
ou
tc
om
es
 (
ro
le
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
, 
tr
us
t, 
fi
nd
in
g 
sy
ne
rg
et
ic
 s
ol
ut
io
ns
);
 *
 C
on
ta
ct
 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
be
tw
ee
n 
ac
co
un
t  m
an
ag
er
 a
nd
 c
us
to
m
er
 
is
 th
e 
m
os
t i
m
po
rt
an
t f
or
 r
el
at
io
na
l d
ev
el
op
m
en
t; 
* 
St
ra
te
gi
c 
co
nt
en
t i
s 
se
co
nd
 im
po
rt
an
t c
on
tr
ib
ut
or
. 
R
ei
d,
 B
ol
m
an
 
Pu
lli
ns
 a
nd
 P
la
nk
 
(2
00
2)
, I
M
M
 
T
o 
ad
dr
es
s 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f 
pu
rc
ha
se
 s
itu
at
io
n 
on
 s
al
es
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
be
ha
vi
or
s 
us
ed
 b
y 
sa
le
s 
pe
rs
on
ne
l 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
N
A
PM
 p
ur
ch
as
in
g 
ag
en
ts
 (
51
8,
 2
2.
4%
) 
T
he
 p
er
sp
ec
tiv
e 
on
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 th
e 
lo
o k
 
at
 c
us
to
m
er
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
sa
le
s 
be
ha
vi
or
s 
fr
om
 a
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e:
 g
et
tin
g,
 g
iv
in
g,
 a
nd
 
us
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
by
 th
e 
se
lle
r 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: p
ur
ch
as
e 
co
m
pl
ex
it
y 
* 
G
iv
in
g  
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
oc
cu
rs
 m
os
t f
or
 m
od
er
at
e 
co
m
pl
ex
 p
ur
ch
as
in
g 
si
tu
at
io
ns
; *
 G
et
tin
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
(b
y 
th
e 
se
lle
r)
 ta
ke
s 
pl
ac
e 
in
 m
or
e 
co
m
pl
ex
 b
uy
in
g 
si
tu
at
io
ns
 
E
gg
er
t a
nd
 H
el
m
 
(2
00
3)
, I
M
M
 
T
o 
in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
tr
an
sp
ar
an
cy
 (
ho
w
 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
es
 to
 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n,
 v
al
ue
, 
re
pu
rc
ha
se
 in
te
nt
io
n)
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
G
er
m
an
 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 m
an
ag
er
s 
fr
om
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 
in
du
st
ri
es
 (
30
1,
 3
1.
4%
) 
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 is
 th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
's 
su
bj
ec
tiv
e 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
of
 b
ei
ng
 in
fo
rm
ed
 a
bo
ut
 
re
le
va
nt
 a
ct
io
ns
 a
nd
 p
ro
pe
r t
ie
s 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
pa
rt
y 
in
 
th
e 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 c
us
to
m
er
 v
al
ue
 (
+
),
 
cu
st
om
er
 s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
(+
),
 
re
pu
rc
ha
se
 in
te
nt
io
n 
(i
nd
ir
ec
t: 
+)
, 
se
ar
ch
 f
or
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
es
 (
in
di
re
ct
: -
),
 
w
or
d-
of
-m
ou
th
 (
in
di
re
ct
: +
) 
* 
T
ra
ns
pa
re
nc
y 
gi
ve
n 
by
 th
e 
ve
nd
or
 (
up
st
re
am
 
ch
an
ne
l m
em
be
r)
 le
ad
s 
to
 h
ig
he
r 
cu
st
om
er
 v
al
ue
 
an
d 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n;
 *
 S
ub
se
qu
en
tl
y,
 r
ep
ur
ch
as
e 
in
te
nt
io
n 
an
d 
w
or
d-
of
-m
ou
th
 is
 g
en
er
at
ed
, a
nd
 th
e 
se
ar
ch
 f
or
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
es
 is
 d
is
co
ur
ag
ed
. 
W
al
te
r,
 M
ul
le
r,
 
H
el
fe
rt
, a
nd
 R
itt
er
 
(2
00
3)
, I
M
M
 
T
o 
de
te
rm
in
e 
w
hi
ch
 d
ir
ec
t 
an
d 
in
di
re
ct
 f
un
ct
io
ns
 in
 a
 
su
pp
lie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
co
nt
ri
bu
te
 to
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
qu
al
it
y 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
G
er
m
an
 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 
pr
of
es
si
on
al
s 
fr
om
 b
ot
h 
co
ns
um
er
 a
nd
 
in
du
st
ri
al
 g
oo
ds
 
in
du
st
ri
es
 (
23
0,
 4
1.
1%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
by
 th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
is
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
ed
 a
s 
an
 in
di
re
ct
 f
un
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
 T
he
 s
co
ut
 f
un
ct
io
n 
co
nc
er
ns
 th
e 
pa
ss
in
g 
on
 o
f 
te
ch
ni
ca
l, 
ex
ch
an
ge
 o
r 
m
ar
ke
t-
re
la
te
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
 (
ne
ga
tiv
e 
co
rr
el
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
of
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
es
 a
nd
 q
ua
lit
y 
of
 
in
di
re
ct
 f
un
ct
io
n)
; *
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
qu
al
it y
 (
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n,
 
tr
us
t a
nd
 c
om
m
itm
en
t)
 (
+)
 
* 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
by
 th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
(s
co
ut
 
fu
nc
tio
n)
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 in
di
re
ct
 f
un
ct
io
ns
 (
m
ar
ke
t, 
in
no
va
tio
n 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t a
nd
 s
oc
ia
l s
up
po
rt
) 
co
nt
ri
bu
te
 p
os
iti
ve
ly
 to
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
qu
al
it
y;
 *
 
W
he
n 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
su
pp
ly
 s
ou
rc
es
 b
ec
om
e 
sc
ar
ce
, 
th
e 
co
nt
ri
bu
tio
n 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
go
es
 u
p.
 
  298
 St
ud
y,
 A
ut
ho
rs
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 O
bj
ec
t i v
e 
Em
pi
ric
al
 B
as
is 
(s
a m
p l
e  
s iz
e ,
 r e
s p
o n
s e
 
r a
te
) 
Co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
in
g 
in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
ce
de
nt
s a
nd
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
B
o n
n e
r 
a n
d  
C
a l
a n
to
n e
 (
2 0
0 5
),
 
IM
M
 
T
o  
s t
u d
y  
th
e  
m
e d
ia
tin
g  
ro
le
 o
f 
b u
y e
r’
s  
a t
te
n t
io
n  
(p
re
fe
re
n c
e )
 to
w
a r
d  
a  
s p
e c
if
ic
 s
u p
p l
ie
r 
o n
 th
e  
re
la
tio
n s
h i
p  
b e
tw
e e
n  
re
la
tio
n a
lis
m
 a
n d
 p
u r
c h
a s
e  
b e
h a
v i
o r
 
S u
rv
e y
 a
m
o n
g  
U
S  
p u
rc
h a
s i
n g
 m
a n
a g
e r
s  
fr
o m
 in
d u
s t
ri
a l
 
m
a c
h i
n e
 
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
ri
n g
, 
e l
e c
tr
o n
ic
 e
q u
ip
m
e n
t, 
tr
a n
s p
o r
ta
tio
n  
eq
ui
pm
en
t, 
an
d 
ho
sp
ita
l i
nd
us
tr
ie
s 
(1
19
, n
.a
.)
. 
In
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g  
is
 r
e g
a r
d e
d  
a s
 a
n  
in
d i
c a
to
r 
fo
r 
th
e  
d e
g r
e e
 o
f 
re
la
tio
n a
lis
m
 in
 th
e  
b u
y e
r-
s u
p p
lie
r 
re
la
tio
n s
h i
p .
 
*  
N
o  
a n
te
c e
d e
n t
s ;
 *
 C
o n
s e
q u
e n
c e
s :
 
b u
y e
r 
a t
te
n t
io
n  
(+
),
 f
a v
o r
a b
le
 
c u
s t
o m
e r
 p
u r
c h
a s
e  
b e
h a
v i
o r
 
*  
R
e l
a t
io
n i
s m
 (
th
a t
 in
c l
u d
e s
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
ar
in
g  
w
ith
 s
u p
p l
ie
r)
 le
a d
s  
to
 a
 h
ig
h e
r 
b u
y e
r 
a t
te
n t
io
n  
to
w
a r
d s
 th
e  
s u
p p
lie
r,
 w
h i
c h
 in
 tu
rn
 le
a d
s  
to
 
fa
v o
ra
b l
e  
p u
rc
h a
s e
 b
e h
a v
io
r 
(s
te
a d
y  
s t
re
a m
 o
f 
in
c o
m
e ,
 a
n d
 lo
w
 c
o s
t)
 
K
im
 a
nd
 H
si
eh
 
(2
00
3)
, J
M
R
 
T
o 
fi
nd
 a
 b
es
t w
ay
 to
 
ca
pt
ur
e 
th
e 
in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nc
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
in
 a
 c
ha
nn
el
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
25
3 
U
S 
m
an
ag
er
s 
fr
om
 
in
du
st
ri
al
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
or
s 
in
 in
du
st
ri
al
 
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
/e
qu
ip
m
en
t 
an
d 
su
pp
lie
s 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
liz
ed
 a
s 
pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
 o
f 
tw
o-
w
ay
 o
pe
n 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
di
st
ri
bu
to
r 
an
d 
su
pp
lie
r 
(c
f.
 A
nd
er
so
n 
an
d 
W
ei
tz
, 1
99
2)
. 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: i
nt
er
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
(u
ni
la
te
ra
l a
nd
 b
ila
te
ra
l)
, 
ch
an
ne
l m
an
ag
em
en
t s
tr
uc
tu
re
 (
ns
.)
, 
ag
e 
(n
s.
),
 in
te
ns
it
y 
of
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
(n
s.
),
 e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l m
un
if
ic
en
ce
 
(+
),
 e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l v
ol
at
ili
ty
 (
ns
.)
, 
su
pp
lie
r 
si
ze
 (
ns
),
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
in
te
ns
it
y 
(n
s)
. 
* 
B
ila
te
ra
l c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
is
 h
er
e 
co
m
bi
ne
d 
in
 o
ne
 
m
ea
su
re
 w
ith
 c
om
m
itm
en
t; 
* 
T
he
 e
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
ow
n 
an
d 
pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
 o
f 
ot
he
r’
s 
de
pe
nd
en
cy
 a
re
 
di
ff
er
en
t; 
O
w
n 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 le
ad
s 
to
 m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g,
 w
hi
le
 th
e 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
ch
an
ne
l p
ar
ty
 h
as
 a
n 
in
iti
al
 p
os
iti
ve
 e
ff
ec
t, 
bu
t l
at
er
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 p
oi
nt
, c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
fr
om
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
ch
an
ne
l m
em
be
r 
de
cl
in
es
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Re
la
tio
na
l n
or
m
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ei
de
 a
nd
 J
oh
n 
(1
99
2)
, J
M
 
T
o 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f 
so
ci
al
 n
or
m
s 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
ef
fe
ct
s 
on
 in
te
rf
ir
m
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 
O
E
M
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 
su
pp
lie
rs
 (
15
5 
bu
ye
r 
sa
m
pl
e,
 2
6.
8%
; 6
0 
su
pp
lie
r 
sa
m
pl
e)
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
ov
er
la
pp
in
g 
no
rm
s 
ty
pe
s 
pr
es
cr
ib
in
g 
be
ha
vi
or
 d
ir
ec
te
d 
to
w
a r
d 
m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 b
uy
er
 c
on
tr
ol
 (
+)
 
* 
A
s 
th
e 
bu
ye
r 
m
ak
es
 m
or
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p,
 th
e 
bu
ye
r's
 p
er
ce
pt
io
ns
 o
f 
co
nt
ro
l a
re
 lo
w
er
ed
; *
 th
e 
pr
es
en
ce
 o
f 
m
or
e 
re
la
tio
na
l n
or
m
s 
in
 th
e 
bu
ye
r-
su
pp
lie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
he
lp
s 
to
 r
es
to
re
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
co
nt
ro
l b
y 
th
e 
bu
ye
r.
 
H
ei
de
, a
nd
 M
in
er
 
(1
99
2)
, A
M
J 
T
o 
ex
pl
or
e 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
pa
tte
rn
s 
on
 
co
op
er
at
io
n 
in
 a
 c
ha
nn
el
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
Su
rv
ey
. P
ur
ch
as
in
g 
ag
en
ts
 f
ro
m
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 f
ir
m
s 
in
 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l m
ac
hi
ne
ry
, 
el
ec
tr
on
ic
al
 a
nd
 e
le
ct
ri
c 
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
, a
nd
 
tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
eq
ui
pm
en
t (
15
5,
 
26
,8
%
) 
an
d 
su
pp
lie
rs
 
(6
0,
 6
2.
5%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
fo
ur
 d
om
ai
ns
 o
f 
co
op
er
at
io
n.
 O
th
er
 d
om
ai
ns
 a
re
: f
le
xi
bi
lit
y,
 s
ha
re
d 
pr
ob
le
m
 s
ol
vi
ng
, a
nd
 r
es
tr
ai
nt
 in
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 p
ow
e r
. 
It
 is
 m
ea
su
re
d 
on
 a
 4
 it
em
 s
ca
le
 m
ea
su
ri
ng
 th
e 
re
sp
on
de
nt
's 
as
se
ss
m
en
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
de
gr
ee
 to
 w
hi
ch
 
ea
ch
 p
ar
ty
 is
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 d
is
cl
os
es
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
th
at
 
m
ay
 f
as
ci
lit
at
e 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
pa
rt
y'
s 
ac
tiv
iti
es
, a
s 
op
po
se
d 
to
 k
ee
pi
ng
 a
ll 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
op
ri
et
ar
y.
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: E
xt
en
de
dn
es
s 
(+
),
 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 d
el
iv
er
y 
(n
s)
, 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 a
m
bi
gu
it
y 
(n
s)
, 
cu
st
om
iz
at
io
n 
(+
),
 m
on
th
s 
to
 r
ep
la
ce
 
su
pp
lie
r 
(n
s)
, m
on
th
s 
to
 r
ep
la
ce
 
bu
ye
r 
(n
s)
, l
en
gt
h 
of
 p
ri
or
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
(n
s)
; *
 N
o 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 te
st
ed
 
* 
T
he
 e
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
ar
e 
fo
st
er
ed
 b
y 
a 
lo
ng
er
 e
xt
en
de
dn
es
s 
of
 th
e 
bu
ye
r-
se
lle
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
Pi
lli
ng
, C
ro
sb
y,
 
an
d 
Ja
ck
so
n 
(1
99
4)
, J
B
R
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
di
m
en
si
on
s 
on
 
ex
ch
an
ge
 a
rr
an
ge
m
en
ts
 
L
ab
or
at
or
y 
E
xp
er
im
en
t 
am
on
g 
m
id
le
ve
l 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 p
er
so
nn
el
 
in
 th
e 
ae
ro
sp
ac
e,
 
el
ec
tr
on
ic
s,
 a
nd
 
de
fe
ns
e 
in
du
st
ry
 (
22
9,
 
un
kn
ow
n 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
) 
T
he
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is
 a
 d
im
en
si
on
 o
f 
re
la
tio
na
lis
m
. T
he
 n
or
m
s 
co
nc
er
n 
th
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 o
f  
di
ff
er
en
t t
yp
es
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
(i
nc
lu
di
ng
 
pr
op
ri
et
ar
y,
 lo
ng
-t
er
m
 f
or
ec
as
tin
g,
 a
nd
 p
ro
du
ct
 
de
si
gn
) 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: a
ss
et
 s
pe
ci
fi
ci
ty
 (
+)
, 
ex
te
rn
al
 u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
 (
-)
, f
re
qu
en
cy
 
of
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 (
+)
; N
o 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 te
st
ed
 
* 
If
 th
e 
co
st
s 
to
 d
ev
el
op
 a
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
in
cr
ea
se
, i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 w
ill
 in
cr
ea
se
; *
 N
o  
su
pp
or
t w
as
 f
ou
nd
 f
or
 th
e 
hy
po
th
es
es
 th
at
 th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 m
on
ito
ri
ng
 a
nd
 th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 g
ua
rd
in
g 
ag
ai
ns
t 
op
po
rt
un
is
m
 in
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
. 
299
St
ud
y,
 A
ut
ho
rs
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 O
bj
ec
t i v
e 
Em
pi
ric
al
 B
as
is 
(s
a m
p l
e  
s iz
e ,
 r e
s p
o n
s e
 
r a
te
) 
Co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
in
g 
in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
ce
de
nt
s a
nd
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
M
o h
r 
a n
d  
S o
h i
 
(1
9 9
5 )
, J
R
 
T
o  
in
v e
s t
ig
a t
e  
th
e  
e f
fe
c t
s  
o f
 n
o r
m
s  
o f
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g  
in
fl
u e
n c
e  
o n
 th
e  
fr
e q
u e
n c
y ,
 b
i-
d i
re
c t
io
n a
lit
y ,
 a
n d
 
fo
rm
a l
it
y  
o f
 
c o
m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
fl
o w
s  
be
tw
ee
n 
ch
an
ne
l p
ar
tie
s 
S u
rv
e y
 a
m
o n
g  
c o
m
p u
te
r 
d e
a l
e r
s  
re
p o
rt
in
g  
o n
 o
n e
 o
f 
th
e i
r 
s u
p p
lie
r 
re
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 (
1 2
5 ;
 
2 2
.4
%
) 
D
if
fe
re
n t
 a
s p
e c
ts
 o
f 
c o
m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
fl
o w
s  
(f
re
q u
e n
c y
, f
o r
m
a l
it
y  
a n
d  
b i
d i
re
c t
io
n a
lit
y )
 a
re
 
e x
a m
in
e d
 in
 r
e l
a t
io
n  
w
ith
 n
o r
m
s  
o f
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
th
a t
 a
re
 a
s s
u m
e d
 to
 g
u i
d e
 b
e h
a v
io
r.
 
*  
N
o  
a n
te
c e
d e
n t
s  
te
s t
e d
; *
 
C
o n
s e
q u
e n
c e
s :
 F
re
q u
e n
c y
 (
+ )
, 
B
id
ir
e c
tio
n a
lit
y  
(+
),
 F
o r
m
a l
it
y  
(+
),
 
C
o m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
Q
u a
lit
y  
(+
),
 
S a
tis
fa
c t
io
n  
w
ith
 C
o m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
(i
n d
ir
e c
t: 
+ )
, d
is
to
rt
io
n  
a n
d  
w
ith
h o
ld
in
g  
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
(i
n d
ir
e c
t: 
-)
 
*  
N
o r
m
s  
o f
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g  
e n
c o
u r
a g
e s
 
fr
e q
u e
n c
y ,
 b
i-
d i
re
c t
io
n a
lit
y ,
 a
n d
 f
o r
m
a l
it
y;
 *
 
C
o m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
b i
-d
ir
e c
tio
n a
lit
y  
a n
d  
fo
rm
a l
it
y  
d o
 
n o
t a
ff
e c
t t
h e
 q
u a
lit
y  
p e
rc
e p
tio
n s
 o
f 
c o
m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n .
 *
 C
o m
m
u n
ic
a t
io
n  
fr
e q
u e
nc
y  
c o
n t
ri
b u
te
s  
to
 q
u a
lit
y  
p e
rc
e p
tio
n s
 (
tim
e l
y ,
 
a d
e q
u a
te
, c
o m
p l
e t
e )
. *
 F
o r
m
a l
it
y  
s e
e m
s  
to
 h
av
e  
a n
 
in
hi
bi
tin
g 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
di
st
or
tio
n 
an
d 
w
ith
ho
ld
in
g 
of
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 *
 T
he
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 q
ua
lit
y 
of
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
is
 p
os
iti
ve
ly
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 a
 
de
al
er
's 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
 
Jo
sh
i a
nd
 A
rn
ol
d 
(1
99
8)
, J
B
R
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 th
e 
po
si
tiv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 a
nd
 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
ho
ld
s 
un
de
r 
va
ri
ou
s 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
of
 
re
la
tio
na
l n
or
m
s 
R
ol
e-
pl
ay
in
g 
ex
pe
ri
m
en
t a
m
on
g 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 a
ge
nt
s 
fr
om
 
va
ri
ou
s 
in
du
st
ri
es
 
ev
al
ua
tin
g 
a 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 
sc
en
ar
io
 (
14
7,
 n
.a
.)
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 is
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
liz
ed
 a
s 
on
e 
se
t 
of
 s
ha
re
d 
va
lu
es
 in
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p,
 a
nd
 r
ef
er
s 
to
 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
n 
th
at
 th
e 
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
be
ha
vi
or
 f
or
 b
ot
h 
ex
ch
an
ge
 p
ar
tie
s 
is
 to
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
e 
fr
eq
ue
nt
ly
, 
in
fo
rm
al
ly
, a
nd
 w
ith
 f
ul
l-
di
sc
lo
su
re
. 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
* 
D
ep
en
de
nc
e 
ge
ne
ra
te
s 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
on
ly
 u
nd
er
 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
of
 h
ig
h 
re
la
tio
na
l n
or
m
s;
 *
 U
nd
er
 lo
w
 
re
la
tio
na
l n
or
m
s,
 d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
do
es
 n
ot
 le
ad
 to
 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
C
an
no
n 
an
d 
Pe
rr
ea
ul
t j
r 
(1
99
9)
, 
JM
R
 
T
o 
de
ve
lo
p 
an
 e
m
pi
ri
ca
lly
 
gr
ou
nd
ed
 ta
xo
no
m
y 
of
 
bu
si
ne
ss
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
N
A
PM
 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 m
an
ag
er
s 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 o
ne
 
su
pp
lie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
(4
28
, 2
2.
0%
) 
T
he
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 is
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
si
x 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
co
nn
ec
to
rs
; i
t i
s 
op
er
at
io
na
liz
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
se
t o
f 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
e 
sh
ar
in
g  
of
 
pr
op
ri
et
ar
y 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 s
ha
ri
ng
 o
f 
co
st
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 in
cl
us
io
n 
of
 p
ro
du
ct
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
m
ee
tin
gs
, a
nd
 s
ha
ri
ng
 s
up
pl
y 
an
d 
de
m
an
d 
fo
re
ca
st
s 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: a
va
ila
bi
lit
y 
of
 
al
te
rn
at
iv
es
, s
up
pl
y 
m
ar
ke
t 
dy
na
m
is
m
, i
m
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
su
pp
ly
, 
co
m
pl
ex
it
y 
of
 s
up
pl
y;
 *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 
su
pp
lie
r,
 S
up
pl
ie
r 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
* 
T
he
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 is
 th
e 
m
os
t p
ro
m
im
en
t 
fe
at
ur
e 
in
 tw
o 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
ty
pe
s:
 (
1)
 th
e 
co
lla
bo
ra
tiv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p,
 a
nd
 (
2)
 th
e 
"c
us
to
m
e r
 is
 
ki
ng
".
 *
 I
n 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
ty
pe
s 
"b
ar
e 
bo
ne
s"
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 is
 th
e 
le
as
t d
ev
el
op
ed
; *
 
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
ty
pe
s 
fe
au
tu
ri
ng
 in
te
ns
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 o
ut
pe
rf
or
m
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
t y
pe
s.
  
Ja
p 
an
d 
G
an
es
an
 
(2
00
0)
, J
M
R
 
T
o 
ev
al
ua
te
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
th
re
e 
co
nt
ro
l m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 
fo
r 
sa
fe
gu
ar
di
ng
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n-
sp
ec
if
ic
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
do
w
ns
tr
ea
m
 
ch
an
ne
lm
em
be
rs
 o
f 
on
e 
ch
em
ic
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
(1
45
7,
 
40
%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 is
 m
ea
su
re
d 
as
 a
s 
re
la
tio
na
l 
no
rm
; w
he
th
er
 it
 is
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
fr
om
 b
ot
h 
ch
an
ne
l 
m
em
be
rs
 to
 s
ha
re
 a
ny
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
(c
f.
 D
w
ye
r 
an
d 
O
h,
 1
98
8;
 H
ei
de
 a
nd
 J
oh
n,
 1
99
2)
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
  p
er
ce
pt
io
n 
of
 
co
m
m
itm
en
t t
o 
ch
an
ne
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
(+
),
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 (
in
di
re
ct
: 
+)
, c
on
fl
ic
t (
in
di
re
c t
: -
),
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
(i
nd
ir
ec
t: 
-)
. 
* 
R
el
at
io
na
l n
or
m
s 
ha
ve
 a
 p
os
iti
ve
 e
ff
ec
t o
n 
pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
 o
f 
su
pp
lie
r's
 c
om
m
itm
en
t; 
* 
H
ig
h 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
re
la
tio
n 
no
rm
s 
do
 n
ot
 m
iti
ga
te
 th
e 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f 
th
e 
re
ta
ile
r's
 T
S
I 
on
 s
up
pl
ie
r 's
 
co
m
m
itm
en
t i
n 
al
l p
ha
se
s 
of
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p;
 *
 
R
el
at
io
na
l n
or
m
s 
pl
ay
 a
 m
iti
ga
tin
g 
ro
le
 in
 th
e 
bu
ild
up
 p
ha
se
.  
Jo
hn
so
n 
an
d 
So
hi
 
(2
00
1)
, I
JR
M
 
T
o 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
of
 a
 
fi
rm
's 
pr
ed
is
po
si
tio
ns
 o
n 
its
 
be
ha
vi
or
 to
 r
el
at
e 
to
 o
th
er
 
fi
rm
s 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
gU
S 
m
an
ag
er
s 
re
po
rt
 o
n 
in
te
rf
ir
m
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 
(1
76
, 2
3%
),
 2
*2
 d
es
ig
n 
to
 s
el
ec
t i
nt
er
fi
rm
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 
T
he
 q
ua
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
d 
is
 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 th
is
 s
tu
dy
. I
t i
s 
ab
ou
t t
he
 e
xt
en
t t
o 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
fl
ow
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is
 s
uf
fi
ci
en
tl
y 
ac
cu
ra
te
, a
m
ou
nt
, u
se
fu
l, 
re
lia
bl
e,
 c
on
si
st
en
t, 
on
 
tim
e,
 im
po
rt
an
t, 
re
le
va
nt
. 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: s
tr
at
eg
ic
 in
te
nt
 
(i
nd
ir
ec
t +
),
 r
el
at
io
na
l p
ro
cl
iv
it
y 
(i
nd
ir
ec
t +
) 
co
nn
ec
te
dn
es
s 
(+
);
 N
o 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 te
st
ed
 
* 
T
he
 f
lo
w
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
fi
rm
s 
au
gm
en
ts
 
(i
n 
qu
al
it
y 
an
d 
qu
an
tit
y)
 w
he
n 
th
e 
fi
rm
s 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
co
nn
ec
te
d;
 *
 F
ir
m
s 
w
ith
 a
 s
tr
on
ge
r 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
in
te
nt
 
an
d 
m
or
e 
re
la
tio
na
ll
y 
pr
oc
liv
e,
 h
av
e 
m
or
e 
co
nn
ec
te
d 
tie
s 
w
ith
 th
ei
r 
al
lie
s 
an
d 
ul
tim
at
e l
y 
w
ill
 
be
 e
xc
ha
ng
in
g 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 
A
nt
ia
 a
nd
 F
ra
zi
er
 
(2
00
1)
, J
M
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
se
ve
ri
ty
 o
f 
co
nt
ra
ct
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t b
y 
fr
an
ch
is
or
s 
in
 r
es
po
ns
e 
to
 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
 b
y 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
s 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
Fr
an
ch
is
or
s 
fr
om
 s
ix
 
di
ff
er
en
t i
nd
us
tr
ie
s 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 w
ith
 a
 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 m
ea
su
re
d 
as
 a
 r
el
at
io
na
l 
no
rm
 (
cf
. H
ei
de
 a
nd
 J
oh
n,
 1
99
2)
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 S
ev
er
it
y 
of
 C
on
tr
ac
t 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t (
-)
 
* 
W
he
n 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
a 
fr
an
ch
is
or
 a
nd
 
fr
an
ch
is
ee
 is
 ty
pi
fi
ed
 b
y 
re
la
tio
ni
sm
 (
w
ith
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 a
s  
a 
no
rm
al
 p
ra
ct
ic
e)
, t
he
 
se
ve
ri
ty
 o
f 
co
nt
ra
ct
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t w
ill
 b
e 
le
ss
; *
 T
he
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
re
la
ti o
ni
sm
 a
nd
 s
ev
er
it
y 
of
 
co
nt
ra
ct
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t i
s 
w
ea
ke
ne
d 
w
he
n 
th
e 
fr
an
ch
is
or
 h
as
 m
ad
e 
m
or
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
to
 
th
e 
ch
an
ne
l s
ys
te
m
 (
w
he
n 
th
e 
st
ak
es
 a
re
 la
rg
er
) 
  300
 St
ud
y,
 A
ut
ho
rs
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 O
bj
ec
t i v
e 
Em
pi
ric
al
 B
as
is 
(s
a m
p l
e  
s iz
e ,
 r e
s p
o n
s e
 
r a
te
) 
Co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
in
g 
in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
ce
de
nt
s a
nd
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
B
e l
lo
, C
h e
la
ri
u ,
 
a n
d  
Z
h a
n g
 (
2 0
0 3
),
 
J B
R
 
T
o  
e x
a m
in
e  
th
e  
fa
c t
o r
s  
th
a t
 
e n
h a
n c
e  
o r
 in
h i
b i
t t
h e
 
d e
v e
lo
p m
e n
t o
f 
re
la
tio
n a
lis
m
 b
e t
w
e e
n  
a  
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r 
a n
d  
its
 
fo
re
ig
n  
d i
s t
ri
b u
to
r 
in
 a
n  
e x
p o
rt
 c
h a
n n
e l
 
S u
rv
e y
 a
m
o n
g  
U
S  
e x
p o
rt
 e
x e
c t
u t
iv
e s
 o
f 
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
rs
 
re
p o
rt
in
g  
o n
 a
 s
in
g l
e  
e x
p o
rt
 d
is
tr
ib
u t
o r
 (
2 9
0 ,
 
7 2
%
) 
In
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g  
is
 m
e a
s u
re
d  
a s
 a
 r
e l
a t
io
n a
l 
n o
rm
 (
c f
. H
e i
d e
 a
n d
 J
o h
n ,
 1
9 9
2 )
 (
in
 a
d d
iti
o n
 to
 
s o
lid
a r
it
y  
a n
d  
fl
e x
ib
ili
ty
) 
*  
A
n t
e c
e d
e n
ts
: r
e s
o u
rc
e  
in
a d
e q
u a
c y
 
to
 m
a n
a g
e  
c h
a n
n e
l (
-)
, 
m
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r's
 d
e p
e n
d e
n c
e  
(+
),
 
m
a r
k e
t v
o l
a t
ili
ty
 (
-)
, P
s y
c h
ic
 
d i
s t
ra
n c
e  
(n
s )
, p
ro
d u
c t
 c
o m
p l
e x
it
y  
(+
),
 h
u m
a n
 c
o n
te
n t
 (
+ )
; *
 
C
o n
s e
q u
e n
c e
s :
 p
e r
fo
rm
a n
c e
 (
+
) 
*  
R
e s
o u
rc
e  
in
a d
e q
u a
c y
 a
n d
 m
a r
k e
t v
o l
a t
ili
ty
 
im
p e
d e
 th
e  
d e
v e
lo
p m
e n
t o
f 
re
la
tio
n a
lis
m
 in
 th
e 
c h
a n
n e
l r
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p ;
 *
 M
a n
u f
a c
tu
re
r's
 
d e
p e
n d
e n
c e
,  
a n
d  
h u
m
a n
 c
o n
te
n t
 p
ro
m
o t
e  
re
la
tio
n a
lis
m
; *
 R
e l
a t
io
n a
lis
m
 is
 p
o s
iti
v e
ly
 r
e l
a t
e d
 
to
 a
 b
e t
te
r 
(d
is
tr
ib
u t
o r
's )
 p
e r
fo
rm
a n
c e
 
D
em
on
str
at
io
n 
of
  
Re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
Bo
nd
in
g 
 
 
 
 
N
oo
rd
ew
ie
r,
 J
oh
n 
an
d 
N
ev
in
 (
19
90
),
 
JM
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
bu
ye
r-
su
pp
lie
r 
in
te
rf
ac
e 
an
d 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 in
 r
ep
et
iv
el
y-
us
ed
-i
te
m
s 
pr
oc
ur
em
en
t 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
O
E
M
 
pu
rc
ha
se
rs
 o
f 
a 
co
m
m
od
it
y 
(i
.e
. b
al
l 
an
d 
ro
lle
r 
be
ar
in
gs
) 
(1
40
, 2
8.
9%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
ve
 e
le
m
en
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
re
la
tio
na
l g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
su
pp
lie
r 
an
d 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n.
 T
he
y 
m
ea
su
re
 it
 a
s 
th
e 
de
gr
ee
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
ov
id
ed
 to
 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r:
 (
1)
 W
e 
gi
ve
 to
 [
pa
rt
ne
r]
 u
sa
ge
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
to
 h
el
p 
hi
m
 p
la
n 
fo
r 
ou
r 
ne
ed
s;
 (
2)
 W
e 
ke
ep
 o
ur
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
in
fo
rm
ed
 o
f 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
pl
an
s.
; 
(3
) 
 W
e 
re
gu
la
rl
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
w
ith
 lo
ng
-r
an
ge
 
fo
re
ca
st
s 
of
 s
up
pl
y 
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
; (
4)
 W
e 
in
fo
rm
 
su
pp
lie
r 
in
 a
dv
an
ce
 o
f 
im
pe
di
ng
 d
es
ig
n 
ch
an
ge
s.
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
(n
o 
re
po
rt
),
 d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
of
 b
uy
er
 (
no
 r
ep
or
t)
, d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
of
 
su
pp
lie
r 
(n
o 
re
po
rt
),
 c
on
tr
ol
 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
(r
el
at
iv
e 
pr
ic
e,
 d
is
ta
nc
e,
 
am
ou
nt
);
 *
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 T
ur
no
ve
r 
(n
s)
, P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
on
-t
im
e 
de
liv
er
y 
(+
 
in
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
),
 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 A
cc
ep
ta
bl
e 
(+
 in
 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
) 
* 
B
en
ef
ic
ia
l e
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
re
la
tio
na
lis
m
 (
i.e
. 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
ov
id
ed
 to
 s
up
pl
ie
r)
 o
n 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 o
cc
ur
 o
nl
y 
w
he
n 
th
e 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
ar
e 
re
la
tiv
el
y 
hi
gh
. 
H
ei
de
 a
nd
 J
oh
n 
(1
99
0)
, J
M
R
 
T
o 
id
en
tif
y 
th
e 
de
te
rm
in
an
ts
 o
f 
jo
in
t a
ct
io
n 
in
 b
uy
er
-s
el
le
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
O
E
M
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 a
nd
 th
ei
r 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 s
up
pl
ie
rs
 
(1
15
 b
uy
er
 s
am
pl
e,
 6
0 
su
pp
lie
r 
sa
m
pl
e)
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
as
 a
 f
or
m
 o
f 
jo
in
t a
ct
io
n;
 jo
in
t  
ac
tio
n 
is
 th
e 
de
gr
ee
 o
f 
in
te
rp
en
et
ra
tio
n 
of
 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l b
ou
nd
ar
ie
s.
 B
ot
h 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
 
in
vo
lv
e 
ea
ch
 o
th
er
 in
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
. O
ne
 s
et
 o
f 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
is
 lo
ng
-t
er
m
 p
la
nn
in
g 
(c
f.
 S
pe
km
an
, 1
98
8)
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
sp
ec
if
ic
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 b
y 
bu
ye
r 
(+
),
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
sp
ec
if
ic
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 b
y 
su
pp
lie
r 
(+
),
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
co
nt
in
ui
ty
 o
f 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
(+
),
 v
er
if
ic
at
io
n 
ef
fo
rt
s 
by
 th
e 
bu
ye
r 
(+
);
 N
o 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
te
st
ed
 
* 
C
lo
se
 b
uy
er
-s
el
le
r 
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
s 
em
er
ge
 f
ro
m
 th
e  
ne
ed
 to
 s
af
eg
ua
rd
 tr
an
sa
c t
io
n-
sp
ec
if
ic
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
; 
* 
T
he
 n
ee
d 
to
 v
er
if
y 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
rs
 e
ff
or
ts
 in
c r
ea
se
s 
w
he
n 
th
e 
bu
ye
r 
ha
s 
m
ad
e 
m
or
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 a
nd
 th
e 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 h
as
 a
 h
ig
he
r 
de
gr
ee
 o
f 
am
bi
gu
it
y.
  
G
un
dl
ac
h,
 A
ch
ro
l, 
an
d 
M
en
tz
er
 
(1
99
5)
, J
M
 
T
o 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
of
 
co
m
m
itm
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
in
 
te
rm
s 
of
 c
re
di
bi
lit
y 
an
d 
pr
op
or
tio
na
lit
y 
(m
ut
ua
lit
y)
 
L
ab
or
at
or
y 
st
ud
y;
 1
30
 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 f
ro
m
 
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
 o
ve
r 
tw
o 
pe
ri
od
s 
(6
5 
ea
ch
 
pe
ri
od
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
liz
ed
 a
s 
a 
co
m
m
itm
en
t i
np
ut
. T
he
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 c
on
fi
de
nt
ia
l 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 s
ha
ri
ng
 o
f 
pr
op
ri
et
ar
y 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t f
ir
m
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 s
tr
at
eg
ie
s,
 d
ed
ic
at
ed
 
op
er
at
io
na
l d
ec
is
io
ns
, a
nd
 e
xc
lu
si
ve
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
ar
e 
th
e 
fo
ur
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 o
f 
co
m
m
itm
en
t i
np
ut
. 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 r
el
at
io
na
l s
oc
ia
l 
no
rm
s 
(+
),
 o
pp
or
tu
ni
sm
 b
y 
ot
he
r 
ch
an
ne
l m
em
be
r 
(-
),
 lo
ng
-t
er
m
 
co
m
m
itm
en
t i
nt
en
tio
ns
 (
+)
 
* 
C
re
di
bi
lit
y 
of
 c
om
m
itm
en
t i
np
ut
s 
le
ad
s 
to
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f 
re
la
tio
na
l s
oc
ia
l n
or
m
s 
an
d 
lo
ng
-
te
rm
 c
om
m
itm
en
t i
nt
en
tio
ns
; *
 P
er
ce
pt
io
ns
 o
f 
op
po
rt
un
is
tic
 b
eh
av
io
r 
by
 o
th
er
 c
ha
nn
el
 m
em
be
r 
ar
e 
re
du
ce
d 
by
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f 
re
la
tio
na
l s
oc
i a
l 
no
rm
s.
 
C
am
pb
el
l (
19
95
),
 
M
S
I 
T
o 
em
pi
ri
ca
ll
y 
te
st
 w
he
th
er
 
a 
fi
rm
's 
se
ar
ch
 f
or
 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
e 
af
fe
ct
s 
its
 s
up
pl
y 
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 c
ho
ic
es
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
E
ur
op
ea
n 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 
m
an
ag
er
s 
an
d 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
m
an
ag
er
s 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 th
ei
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 
pa
ck
ag
in
g 
su
pp
lie
rs
 
(1
14
, 8
7.
7%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
liz
ed
 a
s 
an
 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 b
uy
er
 c
om
m
itm
en
t (
do
w
n 
st
re
am
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g)
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: t
he
 f
ir
m
's 
st
ra
te
gy
 o
f 
fa
st
 d
el
iv
er
y 
(n
s)
, f
ir
m
's 
st
ra
te
gy
 o
f 
fa
st
 in
no
va
tio
n 
(+
),
 th
e 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
of
 
m
ut
ua
l t
ru
st
 (
+)
; *
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 
jo
in
t p
ro
bl
em
 s
ol
vi
ng
 (
+)
, b
ar
ri
er
s 
to
 
im
ita
te
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
by
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s 
(i
nd
ir
ec
tl
y 
+)
 
* 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
by
 th
e 
bu
ye
r 
le
ad
s 
to
 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
pr
ob
le
m
 s
ol
vi
ng
 in
 th
e 
ch
an
ne
l 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p;
 *
 J
oi
nt
 p
r o
bl
em
 s
ol
vi
ng
 m
ak
es
 it
 
m
or
e 
di
ff
ic
ul
t f
or
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s 
to
 im
ita
te
 th
e 
st
ra
te
gy
; *
 W
he
n 
th
e 
bu
ye
r 
fi
rm
 p
ur
su
es
 a
 f
as
t 
in
no
va
tio
n 
st
ra
te
gy
, t
he
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
w
ith
 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
is
 in
te
ns
if
ie
d;
 *
 P
er
ce
iv
ed
 m
ut
ua
l t
ru
st
 
in
te
ns
if
ie
s 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
ev
en
 m
or
e.
 
B
en
sa
ou
 a
nd
 
V
en
ka
tr
am
an
 
(1
99
5)
, M
ng
tS
ci
 
T
o 
un
co
ve
r 
ta
xo
no
m
ie
s 
of
 
in
te
ro
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 a
nd
 to
 
re
se
ar
ch
 th
e 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 th
es
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
co
nf
ig
ur
at
io
ns
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
pu
rc
ha
se
rs
 o
r 
en
gi
ne
er
s 
fr
om
 3
 U
S 
an
d 
11
 
Ja
pa
ne
se
 c
ar
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 r
ep
or
tin
g 
on
 
a 
sp
ec
if
ic
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
(4
47
, 4
3%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 a
 c
on
st
itu
te
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
ro
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s.
 N
e x
t 
to
 m
ul
tip
lic
it
y 
(n
um
be
r 
of
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
ch
an
ne
ls
),
 f
re
qu
en
cy
 (
of
 m
ut
ua
l v
is
its
),
 a
nd
 
fo
rm
al
iz
at
io
n 
(c
on
tr
ol
/c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n)
, j
oi
nt
 a
ct
io
n 
an
d 
th
e 
sc
op
e 
of
 u
se
 o
f 
IT
 r
el
at
e 
to
 th
e 
sh
ar
in
g 
o f
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
(c
on
te
nt
) 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
(n
o 
re
po
rt
),
 p
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
(n
o 
re
po
rt
),
 ta
sk
 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
(n
o 
re
po
rt
);
 *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
ra
tin
gs
, 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n,
 f
ou
r 
bu
ff
er
 le
ve
ls
 
* 
T
he
 ta
xo
no
m
y 
di
sc
ov
er
ed
 c
on
si
st
s 
of
 5
 ty
pe
s 
of
 
in
te
ro
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l t
ie
s:
 (
1)
 r
em
ot
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p,
 (
2)
 
el
ec
tr
on
ic
 c
on
tr
ol
, (
3)
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nc
e,
 
(4
) 
st
ru
ct
ur
al
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
, (
5)
 m
ut
ua
l a
dj
us
tm
e n
t: 
* 
T
he
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 is
 r
ic
h 
an
d 
in
te
ns
e 
in
 
th
e 
el
ec
tr
on
ic
 in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nt
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
; *
 T
he
 
re
m
ot
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
ha
s 
a 
lim
ite
d 
ex
ch
an
ge
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
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St
ud
y,
 A
ut
ho
rs
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 O
bj
ec
t i v
e 
Em
pi
ric
al
 B
as
is 
(s
a m
p l
e  
s iz
e ,
 r e
s p
o n
s e
 
r a
te
) 
Co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
in
g 
in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
ce
de
nt
s a
nd
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
L
u s
c h
 a
n d
 B
ro
w
n  
(1
9 9
6 )
, J
M
 
T
o  
in
v e
s t
ig
a t
e  
h o
w
 
u n
ila
te
ra
l v
e r
s u
s  
b i
la
te
ra
l 
d e
p e
n d
e n
c y
 in
fl
u e
n c
e s
 th
e  
s e
le
c t
io
n  
o f
 c
o n
tr
a c
t f
o r
m
s  
a n
d  
h o
w
 th
is
 in
fl
u e
n c
e s
 
re
la
tio
n a
l b
eh
a v
io
r 
a n
d  
p e
rf
o r
m
a n
c e
. 
S u
rv
e y
 a
m
o n
g  
s m
a l
l 
U
S  
m
e r
c h
a n
t 
w
h o
le
s a
le
rs
 a
n d
 a
g e
n t
s  
in
 d
u r
a b
le
 g
o o
d s
 o
r 
n o
n -
d u
ra
b l
e  
g o
o d
s  
re
p o
rt
in
g  
o n
 th
e i
r 
m
a j
o r
 s
u p
p l
ie
r 
(4
5 4
, 
28
.8
%
) 
In
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
e x
c h
a n
g e
 is
 c
o n
c e
p t
u a
liz
e d
 a
s  
o n
e  
of
 
th
e  
s i
x  
d i
m
e n
s i
o n
s  
o f
 r
e l
a t
io
n a
l b
e h
a v
io
r.
 T
h e
 
e x
te
n t
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
e x
c h
a n
g e
 b
y  
b o
th
 w
h o
le
s a
le
r 
a n
d  
s u
p p
lie
r 
a r
e  
m
e a
s u
re
d  
s e
p e
ra
te
ly
. B
ot
h  
a r
e  
s t
ro
n g
ly
 c
o r
re
la
te
d  
w
ith
 e
a c
h  
o t
h e
r.
 
*  
A
n t
e c
e d
e n
ts
: b
ila
te
ra
l d
e p
e n
d e
n c
e  
(+
),
 d
e p
e n
d e
n c
e  
a y
m
m
e t
ry
 (
n s
),
 
c h
a n
n e
l c
o n
tr
a c
tin
g  
(e
x p
lic
it:
+  
v e
rs
u s
 n
o r
m
a t
iv
e :
 n
s )
, r
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
a g
e  
(n
s )
, l
o n
g -
te
rm
 o
ri
e n
ta
tio
n  
(+
);
 *
 
C
o n
s e
q u
e n
c e
s :
 W
h o
le
s a
le
-
D
is
tr
ib
u t
o r
 P
e r
fo
rm
a n
c e
 (
n s
) 
*  
N
o r
m
a t
iv
e  
c o
n t
ra
c t
in
g  
s t
im
u l
a t
e s
 th
e  
re
la
tio
n a
l 
b e
h a
v i
o r
; r
a t
h e
r 
th
a n
 e
x p
lic
it 
c o
n t
ra
c t
in
g ;
 *
 
B
ila
te
ra
l d
e p
e n
d e
n c
e  
in
 th
e  
c h
a n
n e
l r
e l
at
io
n s
h i
p  
in
c r
e a
s e
s  
th
e  
re
la
tio
n a
l b
e h
av
io
r;
 *
 C
o n
tr
a r
y  
to
 th
e  
le
n g
th
 o
f 
te
 r
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p ,
 th
e  
lo
n g
-t
e r
m
 o
ri
e n
ta
tio
n  
d o
e s
 in
fl
u e
n c
e  
re
la
tio
n a
l b
e h
a v
io
r 
p o
s i
tiv
el
y ;
 *
 N
o  
s u
p p
o r
t i
s  
fo
u n
d  
fo
r 
a  
p o
s i
tiv
e  
c o
n t
ri
b u
tio
n  
o f
 
re
la
tio
na
l b
eh
av
io
r 
on
 th
e 
w
ho
le
sa
le
r-
di
st
ri
bu
to
r 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 (
!)
 
D
on
ey
 a
nd
 C
an
no
n 
(1
99
7)
, J
M
 
T
o 
id
en
tif
y 
th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
of
 tr
us
t i
n 
bu
ye
r-
se
lle
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 a
nd
 to
 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f 
su
pp
lie
r 
tr
us
t a
nd
 s
al
es
 
pe
rs
on
 tr
us
t o
n 
a 
bu
yi
ng
 
fi
rm
’s
 c
ur
re
nt
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
ch
oi
ce
 a
nd
 f
ut
ur
e 
pu
rc
ha
se
 
in
te
nt
io
ns
. 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f 
th
e 
N
A
PM
, U
S 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
  
m
an
ag
er
s 
of
 in
du
st
ri
al
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 f
ir
m
s 
(2
10
, 3
1%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
liz
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r’
s 
w
ill
in
gn
es
s 
to
 s
ha
re
 c
on
fi
de
nt
ia
l 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
w
ith
 th
ei
r 
cu
st
om
er
s.
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
 te
st
ed
; 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 T
ru
st
 in
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
fi
rm
 (
ns
).
 
* 
T
he
 s
up
pl
ie
r’
s 
(p
er
ce
iv
ed
) 
w
ill
in
gn
es
s 
to
 s
ha
re
 
co
nf
id
en
tia
l i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
bu
ye
r 
do
es
 n
ot
 
af
fe
ct
 th
e 
bu
ye
r’
s 
tr
us
t i
n 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
fi
rm
.  
A
ch
ro
l a
nd
 
G
un
dl
ac
h 
(1
99
9)
, 
JR
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 
co
nt
ra
ct
s 
an
d 
re
la
tio
na
l 
no
rm
s 
to
 s
af
eg
ua
rd
 a
ga
in
st
 
op
po
rt
un
is
m
 a
nd
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
in
 th
e 
co
nt
ex
t o
f 
as
ym
m
et
ri
c 
co
m
m
itm
en
ts
 
by
 e
xc
ha
ng
in
g 
pa
rt
ie
s.
 
E
xp
er
im
en
t w
ith
 a
 
si
m
ul
at
io
n 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l r
ol
e 
pl
ay
in
g:
 1
01
 u
sa
bl
e 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 r
eg
ar
de
d 
as
 a
n 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
f o
r 
co
m
m
itm
en
t (
di
sc
lo
si
ng
 c
on
fi
de
nt
ia
l i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t i
nd
us
tr
y/
m
ar
ke
t c
on
di
tio
ns
, c
om
pe
tit
or
s,
 a
nd
 
ch
an
ne
l p
ar
tn
er
s;
 p
ro
vi
di
ng
 p
ro
pr
ie
ta
ry
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t f
ir
m
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 s
tr
at
eg
ie
s)
. 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
: *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 P
er
ce
iv
ed
 
op
po
rt
un
is
tic
 b
eh
av
io
r 
(-
) 
* 
M
or
e 
(a
sy
m
m
et
ri
c)
 c
om
m
itm
en
ts
 to
 a
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
pr
om
ot
es
 o
pp
or
tu
ni
sm
 b
y 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
pa
rt
y;
 *
 R
el
at
io
na
l n
or
m
s 
re
du
ce
 th
e 
da
ng
er
 f
or
 
op
po
rt
un
is
m
; *
 E
ve
n 
w
he
n 
th
e 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 in
 
co
m
m
itm
en
ts
 in
cr
ea
se
, t
he
 e
ff
ec
t o
f 
re
la
tio
na
l 
no
rm
s 
w
ill
 r
es
tr
ic
t o
pp
or
tu
ni
sm
 e
ve
n 
m
or
e.
 
K
im
 (
19
99
),
 I
JR
M
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
a 
be
ha
vi
or
al
 
el
em
en
t o
f 
re
la
tio
na
l 
ex
ch
an
ge
: j
oi
nt
 a
ct
io
n.
  
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
D
is
tr
ib
ut
or
s 
in
 th
re
e 
U
S 
in
du
st
ri
es
: 
in
du
st
ri
al
 m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t, 
in
du
st
ri
al
 s
up
pl
ie
s 
an
d 
ha
rd
w
ar
e 
(2
76
; 3
2.
3%
) 
In
te
r-
fi
rm
 a
ct
io
n 
is
 th
eo
ri
ze
d 
as
 a
 m
ul
tid
im
en
si
on
al
 
co
ns
tr
uc
t a
nd
 o
pe
ra
tio
na
li
ze
d 
as
 a
 f
or
m
at
iv
e 
sc
al
e 
(c
f.
 H
ei
de
 a
nd
 J
oh
n,
 1
99
0)
; T
he
 r
es
po
nd
en
ts
 
in
di
ca
te
 to
 w
ha
t d
eg
re
e 
th
ey
 u
nd
er
ta
ke
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 jo
in
tly
 w
ith
 th
ei
r 
su
pp
lie
r:
 (
1 )
 
G
at
he
ri
ng
 m
ar
ke
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n;
 (
2)
 C
us
to
m
er
 n
ee
ds
 
an
al
ys
is
; (
3)
 A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
su
pp
or
t; 
(4
) 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
re
vi
ew
; (
5)
 S
et
tin
g 
sa
le
s 
ta
rg
et
s 
or
 g
oa
ls
; (
6)
 S
a l
es
 
ca
lls
; (
7)
 S
al
es
 p
ro
m
ot
io
n 
pr
og
ra
m
s 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 (
+)
, s
er
vi
ce
 
di
ff
er
en
tia
tio
n 
(+
),
 c
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
in
te
ns
it
y 
(n
s)
, d
is
tr
ib
ut
or
 s
pe
ci
al
iz
ed
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t (
+)
, c
us
to
m
er
 v
ol
at
ili
ty
 
(n
s)
, d
is
tr
ib
ut
or
 m
ot
iv
at
io
na
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
t (
in
di
re
ct
 +
),
 c
us
to
m
er
 
he
te
ro
ge
ne
it
y 
(n
s)
, c
us
to
m
er
 
m
un
if
ic
en
ce
 (
-)
, t
ec
hn
ic
al
 
so
ph
is
tic
at
io
n 
(+
),
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
co
m
m
itm
en
t (
+)
 
* 
In
te
r-
fi
rm
 jo
in
t a
ct
io
n 
is
 m
ot
iv
at
ed
 b
y 
ec
on
om
iz
in
g 
(t
ra
ns
ac
tio
n 
co
st
 e
co
no
m
ic
s)
 a
nd
 
st
ra
te
gi
zi
ng
 m
ot
iv
es
; *
 B
ot
h 
th
e 
di
st
ri
bu
to
r's
 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 a
nd
 n
ee
d 
fo
r 
se
rv
ic
e 
di
ff
er
en
tia
tio
n 
pr
om
ot
e 
th
e 
di
st
ri
bu
to
r's
 jo
in
t a
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 a
 
su
pp
lie
r.
  
Jo
sh
i a
nd
 S
tu
m
p 
(1
99
9)
, J
A
M
S 
T
o 
en
ri
ch
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 o
f 
th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
of
 jo
in
t 
ac
tio
n 
in
 b
uy
er
-s
el
le
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
C
an
ad
ia
n 
O
E
M
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 a
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
(1
84
, 3
0.
1%
) 
Jo
in
t a
ct
io
n 
is
 th
e 
no
n-
eq
ui
ty
 m
od
e 
of
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
in
 w
hi
ch
 b
ot
h 
bu
ye
r 
an
d 
se
lle
r 
co
op
er
at
iv
e 
on
 
ce
rt
ai
n 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 th
at
 a
re
 im
po
rt
an
t f
or
 b
ot
h 
pa
r t
ie
s;
 
on
e 
of
 s
uc
h 
ac
tio
ns
 is
 th
e 
sh
ar
in
g 
of
 lo
ng
-t
er
m
 
in
te
nt
io
ns
 a
nd
 m
ak
in
g 
pl
an
s.
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: b
uy
er
’s
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
n-
sp
ec
if
ic
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 (
+
),
 s
up
pl
ie
r’
s 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n-
sp
ec
if
ic
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 (
+)
, 
de
ci
si
on
-m
ak
in
g 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
(-
),
 
tr
us
t (
+)
 
* 
Jo
in
t a
ct
io
n 
is
 e
nh
an
ce
d 
by
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
n-
sp
ec
if
ic
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 f
ro
m
 b
ot
h 
pa
rt
ie
s 
(b
uy
er
 a
nd
 s
el
le
r)
; *
 
de
ci
si
on
-m
ak
in
g 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
an
d 
lo
w
er
 tr
us
t 
de
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
de
gr
ee
 o
f 
jo
in
t a
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p;
 *
 T
he
 e
ff
ec
t o
f 
th
e 
bu
ye
r’
s 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n-
sp
ec
if
ic
 in
ve
st
m
en
t i
s 
en
ha
nc
ed
 b
y 
de
ci
si
on
-m
ak
in
g 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
an
d 
tr
us
t. 
B
uv
ik
 a
nd
 J
oh
n 
(2
00
0)
, J
M
 
T
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
co
nt
in
ge
nc
y 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 
ve
rt
ic
al
 c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
on
 th
e 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
co
st
s 
in
 a
 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
S 
 
pu
rc
ha
se
rs
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 a
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
(1
61
, 2
8.
2%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 s
ee
n 
as
 p
ar
t o
f 
ve
rt
ic
al
 
co
or
di
na
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
ch
an
ne
l p
ar
tie
s.
 V
er
tic
al
 
co
or
di
na
tio
n 
is
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
“e
ff
or
t t
o 
re
du
c e
 th
e 
pr
ob
le
m
s 
of
 m
ak
in
g 
pr
od
uc
t c
ha
ng
es
, p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
pl
an
ni
ng
, a
nd
 th
e 
lik
e.
” 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 T
ra
ns
ac
ti
on
 c
os
ts
 
* 
A
lth
ou
gh
 v
er
tic
al
 c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
ad
ds
 to
 th
e 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
co
st
s,
 th
e 
be
ne
fi
ts
 o
f 
it 
in
 te
rm
s 
of
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
co
st
 r
ed
uc
tio
n 
ar
e 
gr
ea
te
r 
w
he
n 
(e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l)
 u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
 in
cr
ea
se
s.
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 St
ud
y,
 A
ut
ho
rs
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 O
bj
ec
t i v
e 
Em
pi
ric
al
 B
as
is 
(s
a m
p l
e  
s iz
e ,
 r e
s p
o n
s e
 
r a
te
) 
Co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
in
g 
in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
ce
de
nt
s a
nd
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
G
ru
e n
 a
n d
 S
h a
h  
(2
0 0
0 )
, J
R
 
T
o  
te
s t
 a
 th
e o
re
tic
a l
 m
o d
e l
 
d e
s i
g n
e d
 to
 e
x p
la
in
 
c a
te
g o
ry
 m
a n
a g
e m
e n
t 
p e
rf
o r
m
a n
c e
 
S u
rv
e y
 a
m
o n
g  
U
S  
m
a n
a g
e r
s  
re
s p
o n
s i
b l
e  
fo
r 
c a
te
g o
ry
 
m
a n
a g
e m
e n
t a
t 
p a
c k
a g
e d
 g
o o
d  
c o
m
p a
n i
e s
 (
1 2
8 ,
 
a r
o u
n d
 2
6 -
3 0
%
) 
P r
e -
p l
a n
n i
n g
 a
g r
e e
m
e n
t b
e t
w
e e
n  
th
e  
re
ta
ile
r 
a n
d  
s u
p p
lie
r 
in
v o
lv
e s
 e
s t
a b
lis
h i
n g
 c
o m
m
o n
 o
b j
e c
tiv
e s
, 
a g
re
e i
n g
 o
n  
th
e  
a p
p r
o a
c h
, a
n d
 g
a i
n i
n g
 b
u y
-i
n  
fr
om
 
a l
l p
a r
tie
s  
in
 v
o l
v e
d  
in
 th
e  
c a
te
g o
ry
 m
a n
a g
e m
e n
t 
p r
o c
e s
s .
 P
re
-p
la
n n
in
g  
c o
v e
rs
 a
g r
e e
m
e n
t o
n  
c a
te
g o
ry
 d
e f
in
iti
o n
, c
a t
e g
o r
y  
ro
le
, d
a t
a  
to
 b
e  
u s
e d
 
in
 th
e  
p r
o c
e s
s ,
 m
e a
s u
re
m
e n
t c
ri
te
ri
a ,
 a
n d
 h
eu
ri
s t
ic
s  
us
ed
 f
or
 d
ec
is
io
ns
. 
*  
N
o  
a n
te
c e
d e
n t
s  
te
s t
e d
; *
 
C
o n
s e
q u
e n
c e
s :
 o
p p
o r
tu
n i
s t
ic
 
b e
h a
v i
o r
 (
-)
, c
a t
e g
o r
y  
p l
a n
 
o b
je
c t
iv
it
y  
(+
),
 R
e t
a i
le
r 
" s
y s
te
m
 
tr
u s
t"
 (
+
),
 C
a t
e g
o r
y  
P l
a n
 
Im
p l
e m
e n
ta
tio
n  
(+
),
 C
a t
e g
o r
y  
P e
rf
o r
m
a n
c e
 (
in
d i
re
c t
: +
) 
*  
In
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g  
a s
 o
u t
lin
e d
 b
y  
th
e  
p r
e p
la
n n
in
g  
a g
re
e m
e n
t d
o e
s  
n o
t o
n l
y  
d i
s c
o u
ra
g e
 
re
ta
ile
r's
 o
p p
o r
tu
n i
s t
ic
 b
e h
av
io
r,
 b
u t
 a
ls
o  
c r
e a
te
s  
a  
m
o r
e  
o b
je
c t
iv
e  
c a
te
g o
ry
 p
la
n .
 *
 A
 p
re
p l
a n
n i
n g
 
a g
re
e m
e n
t a
n d
 a
 m
o r
e  
o b
je
c t
iv
e  
p l
a n
 h
e l
p s
 to
 
e s
ta
b l
is
h  
m
o r
e  
re
ta
ile
r's
 tr
u s
t i
n  
th
e  
s y
s t
e m
 o
f 
c a
te
g o
ry
 m
a n
a g
e m
e n
t a
n d
 s
u b
s e
q u
e n
tl
y  
en
co
ur
ag
es
 it
s 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n;
 *
 B
ot
h 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
pl
an
 o
bj
ec
tiv
it
y 
im
pr
ov
es
 
ca
te
go
ry
 m
an
ag
em
en
t p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
M
ye
rs
, D
au
gh
er
ty
 
an
d 
A
ut
ry
 (
20
00
),
 
JR
 
T
o 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
in
fl
ue
nc
in
g 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 a
ut
om
at
ic
 
re
pl
en
is
hm
en
t p
ro
gr
am
s.
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ou
nc
il 
of
 L
og
is
tic
s 
M
an
ag
em
en
t (
C
L
M
) 
w
ith
 A
R
P 
sy
st
em
 (
98
, 
19
.0
%
) 
A
s 
a 
pr
ox
y 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 c
ha
nn
el
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
, 
th
is
 s
tu
dy
 m
ea
su
re
s 
th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
co
m
m
itm
en
t t
o 
au
to
m
at
ic
 r
ep
le
ni
sh
m
en
t p
ro
gr
am
s:
 (
1)
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t c
om
m
itm
en
t, 
(2
) 
re
so
ur
ce
 
co
m
m
itm
en
t, 
an
d 
(3
) 
th
or
ou
gh
 a
dv
an
ce
 p
la
nn
in
g.
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
, o
nl
y 
m
od
er
at
or
s 
fo
r 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
ar
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
; *
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 A
R
P 
co
st
 e
ff
ec
tiv
en
es
s 
(+
),
 A
R
P 
se
rv
ic
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
(+
),
 e
co
no
m
ic
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 (
ns
),
 s
tr
at
eg
ic
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 (
in
di
re
ct
 +
) 
* 
M
an
ag
er
ia
l c
om
m
itm
en
t t
o 
A
R
P 
is
 p
os
iti
ve
ly
 
re
la
te
d 
to
 A
R
P 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s;
 in
 c
os
t e
ff
ec
tiv
en
es
s,
 
sh
or
te
r 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
ru
ns
, s
m
al
le
r 
sh
ip
m
en
ts
, 
re
du
ce
d 
re
lia
nc
e 
on
 f
or
ec
as
ts
, d
el
ay
 f
in
al
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n.
 *
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 s
er
vi
ce
 e
ff
ec
tiv
en
es
s,
 
m
or
e 
fr
eq
ue
nt
 d
el
iv
er
ie
s,
 n
ew
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
, 
m
or
e 
re
ce
iv
er
 f
ri
en
dl
y 
lo
ad
s,
 a
nd
 m
or
e 
pr
ed
ic
ta
bl
e 
or
de
r 
cy
cl
e;
 *
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n 
in
te
ns
it
y 
le
ad
s 
to
 lo
w
e r
 
A
R
P 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s.
  
H
an
df
ie
ld
 a
nd
 
B
ec
ht
el
 (
20
02
),
 
IM
M
 
T
o 
de
ve
lo
p 
an
d 
te
st
 a
 
m
od
el
 e
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
su
pp
ly
 c
ha
in
 
re
sp
on
si
ve
ne
ss
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
N
A
PM
 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 m
an
ag
er
s 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 a
 k
ey
-
in
pu
t s
up
pl
ie
r 
(9
7,
 
19
.4
%
).
  
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 tr
ea
te
d 
as
 a
n 
in
di
ca
to
r  
fo
r 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
hu
m
an
-s
pe
ci
fi
c 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 m
ad
e 
by
 
th
e 
bu
ye
r 
in
to
 th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: S
ite
-s
pe
ci
fi
c 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
(+
);
 *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 tr
us
t (
n.
s.
),
 
re
sp
on
si
ve
ne
ss
 (
+)
 
* 
M
ai
nl
y 
th
e 
si
te
-s
pe
ci
fi
c 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r 
m
ot
iv
at
e 
th
e 
re
ta
ile
r 
to
 d
ed
ic
at
e 
m
or
e 
hu
m
an
-s
pe
ci
fi
c 
as
se
ts
 (
an
d 
sh
ar
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n)
 to
 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p;
 *
 T
he
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f 
hu
m
an
-s
pe
ci
fi
c  
as
se
ts
 in
ve
st
ed
 in
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
do
es
 n
ot
 a
ff
ec
t 
th
e 
su
pp
lie
r’
s 
re
sp
on
si
ve
ne
ss
, w
hi
ch
 is
 d
ri
ve
n 
b y
 
tr
us
t a
nd
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
. 
M
av
on
do
 a
nd
 
R
od
ri
go
 (
20
01
),
 
JB
R
 
T
o 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
di
m
en
si
on
s 
on
 
th
e 
in
te
rp
er
so
na
l a
nd
 in
te
r-
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l c
om
m
itm
en
t 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
A
us
tr
al
ia
n 
(2
16
, 
33
.7
%
) 
an
d 
C
hi
ne
se
 
(9
6,
 2
8.
7%
) 
bu
si
ne
ss
es
 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 a
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 a
 
C
hi
ne
se
 c
om
pa
ny
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 r
eg
ar
de
d 
as
 a
 f
ac
et
 o
f 
in
te
rp
er
so
na
l c
om
m
itm
en
t (
e.
g.
, p
ro
vi
di
ng
 v
al
ua
bl
e 
m
ar
ke
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n)
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: s
oc
ia
l b
on
di
ng
 (
+
),
 
co
op
er
at
io
n 
(+
),
 tr
us
t (
+
),
  f
ac
e 
(n
.s
.; 
in
di
re
ct
 +
),
 ti
m
e-
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
(+
),
 
re
ci
pr
oc
it
y 
(n
.s
.)
; *
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 
in
te
ro
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l c
om
m
itm
en
t (
+)
 
* 
B
ei
ng
 a
 f
ac
et
 o
f 
in
te
rp
er
so
na
l c
om
m
itm
en
t, 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n-
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 f
ou
nd
 to
 b
e 
an
 im
po
rt
an
t 
an
te
ce
de
nt
 to
 in
te
ro
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l c
om
m
itm
en
t; 
* 
Fo
ur
 f
av
or
ab
le
 (
so
ft
) 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
di
m
en
si
on
s 
ar
e 
fo
un
d 
to
 b
e 
im
po
rt
an
t e
nh
an
ce
m
en
t-
fa
ct
or
s 
to
 
in
te
r-
pe
rs
on
al
 c
om
m
itm
en
t. 
H
om
bu
rg
, 
W
or
km
an
, a
nd
 
Je
ns
en
 (
20
02
),
 J
M
 
T
o 
de
ri
ve
 th
e 
co
re
 d
es
ig
n 
di
m
en
si
on
s 
of
 K
ay
 
A
cc
ou
nt
 M
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 
de
ve
lo
p 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 to
 
m
ea
su
re
 th
es
e 
di
m
en
si
on
s.
 
T
o 
id
en
tif
y 
an
 ta
xo
no
m
y 
of
 
K
A
M
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 a
nd
 
ex
pl
or
e 
th
e 
ou
tc
om
es
 
U
S 
an
d 
G
er
m
an
 
m
an
ag
er
s 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r 
sa
le
s 
in
 f
iv
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
-t
o-
bu
si
ne
ss
 
se
ct
or
s 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 
th
ei
r 
m
os
t i
m
po
rt
an
t s
et
 
of
 b
us
in
es
s 
cu
st
om
er
s 
(3
85
, 2
3.
3%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 id
en
tif
ie
d 
as
 a
 c
or
e 
de
si
gn
 
di
m
en
si
on
 o
f 
ke
y 
ac
co
un
t m
an
ag
em
en
t; 
an
d 
m
ai
nl
y 
m
ea
su
re
d 
as
 a
n 
ac
tiv
it
y 
in
te
ns
it
y 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
: *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 k
ey
 a
cc
ou
nt
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t e
ff
ec
tiv
en
es
s 
(+
),
 
ov
er
al
l o
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l e
ff
ec
tiv
en
es
s 
* 
E
ig
ht
 ty
pe
s 
of
 K
ey
-A
cc
ou
nt
-M
an
ag
em
en
t h
av
e 
be
en
 d
is
tin
gu
is
he
d;
 *
 T
he
 in
te
ns
it
y 
of
 a
ct
iv
iti
e s
 
(a
nd
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g)
 is
 h
ig
he
st
 in
 th
e 
cr
os
s -
fu
nc
tio
na
l d
om
in
an
t K
A
M
-t
yp
e;
 *
 T
he
re
 is
 li
ttl
e  
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f 
ex
tr
a 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
or
 p
ro
fi
ta
bi
lit
y 
of
 
th
is
 ty
pe
 o
f 
K
A
M
 
C
la
ro
, H
ag
el
aa
r,
 
an
d 
O
m
ta
 (
20
03
),
 
IM
M
 
T
o 
as
se
ss
 th
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
of
 
de
te
rm
in
an
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n,
 d
ya
di
c,
 a
nd
 
bu
si
ne
ss
 e
nv
ir
on
m
en
t o
n 
re
la
tio
na
l g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
an
d 
ul
tim
at
el
y 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
D
ut
ch
 p
la
nt
 g
ro
w
er
s 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 b
uy
er
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 (
12
4,
 
20
.7
%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 p
ar
t o
f 
th
e 
jo
in
t p
la
nn
in
g  
in
 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
bu
ye
r-
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
an
d 
co
nc
er
ns
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 to
 w
hi
ch
 f
ut
ur
e 
co
nt
in
ge
nc
ie
s 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
l d
ut
ie
s 
an
d 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
ar
e 
m
ad
e 
ex
pl
ic
it 
ex
-a
nt
e 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: e
xc
ha
ng
e 
m
od
e/
fi
xe
d 
lin
es
 (
+)
, h
um
an
 T
S
I 
(n
s)
, p
hy
si
ca
l 
T
S
I (
+)
, l
en
gt
h 
bu
si
ne
ss
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
(n
s)
, i
nt
er
-p
er
s.
 tr
us
t (
ns
),
 in
te
r-
or
g.
 
tr
us
t (
+)
, n
et
w
or
k 
in
te
ns
it
y 
(+
),
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t i
ns
ta
bi
lit
y 
(n
s)
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 s
al
es
 g
ro
w
th
 r
at
e 
(+
),
 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
(n
s)
 
* 
T
he
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
m
od
e,
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
ph
ys
ic
al
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n-
sp
ec
if
ic
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
, i
nt
er
-
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l t
ru
st
, a
nd
 n
et
w
or
k 
in
te
ns
it
y 
ha
ve
 a
 
po
si
tiv
e 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
on
 jo
in
t p
la
nn
in
g;
 *
 J
oi
nt
 
pl
an
ni
ng
 in
 a
 b
uy
er
-r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
st
im
ul
at
es
 th
e 
sa
le
s 
gr
ow
th
, b
ut
 d
oe
s 
no
t h
av
e 
a 
po
si
tiv
e  
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n.
  
303
St
ud
y,
 A
ut
ho
rs
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 O
bj
ec
t i v
e 
Em
pi
ric
al
 B
as
is 
(s
a m
p l
e  
s iz
e ,
 r e
s p
o n
s e
 
r a
te
) 
Co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
in
g 
in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
ce
de
nt
s a
nd
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
W
o r
k m
a n
, 
H
o m
b u
rg
, a
n d
 
J e
n s
e n
 (
2 0
0 3
),
 
J A
M
S  
T
o  
e x
p l
o r
e  
th
e  
d e
te
rm
in
a n
ts
 o
f 
K
e y
 
A
c c
o u
n t
 M
a n
a g
e m
e n
t 
e f
fe
c t
iv
e n
e s
s  
a n
d  
e x
a m
in
e  
th
e  
im
p a
c t
 o
f 
K
E
M
 
e f
fe
c t
iv
e n
e s
s  
o n
 
p e
rf
o r
m
a n
c e
 a
n d
 
pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y 
U
S  
a n
d  
G
e r
m
a n
 
m
a n
a g
e r
s  
re
s p
o n
s i
b l
e  
fo
r 
s a
le
s  
in
 f
iv
e  
b u
s i
n e
s s
-t
o -
b u
s i
n e
s s
 
s e
c t
o r
s  
re
p o
rt
in
g  
o n
 
th
e i
r 
m
o s
t i
m
p o
rt
a n
t s
e t
 
o f
 b
u s
in
e s
s  
c u
s t
o m
e r
s  
(3
85
, 2
3.
3%
) 
In
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g  
is
 id
e n
tif
ie
d  
a s
 a
 c
o r
e  
d e
s i
g n
 
d i
m
e n
s i
o n
 o
f 
k e
y  
a c
c o
u n
t m
a n
a g
e m
e n
t; 
a n
d  
m
a i
n l
y  
m
e a
s u
re
d  
a s
 a
n  
a c
tiv
it
y  
in
te
n s
it
y  
(c
f.
 H
o m
b u
rg
, 
W
o r
k m
a n
 a
n d
 J
e n
s e
n ,
 2
0 0
2 )
 
*  
N
o  
a n
te
c e
d e
n t
s  
te
s t
e d
; *
 
C
o n
s e
q u
e n
c e
s :
 K
A
M
 e
ff
e c
tiv
e n
e s
s  
(+
),
 p
e r
fo
rm
a n
c e
 in
 th
e  
m
a r
k e
t 
(i
n d
ir
e c
t: 
+ )
, P
ro
fi
ta
b i
lit
y  
(i
n d
ir
e c
t: 
+ )
 
*  
T
h e
 in
te
n s
it
y  
o f
 K
e y
 A
c c
o u
n t
 M
a n
a g
e m
e n
t 
a c
tiv
iti
e s
 (
o f
 w
h i
c h
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
s h
a r
in
g  
is
 o
n e
) 
c o
n t
ri
b u
te
s  
p o
s i
tiv
e l
y  
to
 th
e  
K
A
M
 e
ff
e c
tiv
e n
e s
s ;
 *
 
In
te
re
s t
in
g  
is
 th
a t
 f
o r
m
a l
iz
a t
io
n  
c o
n t
ri
b u
te
s  
n e
g a
tiv
e l
y  
to
 th
e  
K
A
M
 e
ff
e c
tiv
e n
e s
s ;
 to
p  
m
a n
a g
e m
e n
t i
n v
o l
v e
m
e n
t i
s  
a  
m
u c
h  
b e
tte
r 
c o
n t
ri
b u
to
r.
 
Se
ln
es
 a
nd
 S
al
lis
 
(2
00
3)
, J
M
 
T
o 
in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
th
e 
fa
ct
or
s 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
le
ar
ni
ng
; a
nd
 s
pe
ci
fi
ca
ll
y 
lo
ok
in
g 
at
 th
e 
ro
le
 o
f 
tr
us
t 
in
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p-
le
ar
ni
ng
 
pr
oc
es
s 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
ke
y 
bu
ye
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 
w
ith
 S
ca
nd
in
av
ia
n 
se
lle
r 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
(3
15
, 4
0%
) 
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
le
ar
ni
ng
 is
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
a 
jo
in
t a
ct
iv
it
y 
be
tw
ee
n 
a 
su
pp
lie
r 
an
d 
a 
cu
st
om
er
 in
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
tw
o 
pa
rt
ie
s 
sh
ar
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 w
hi
ch
 is
 th
en
 jo
in
tl
y 
in
te
rp
re
te
d 
an
d 
in
te
gr
at
ed
 in
to
 a
 s
ha
re
d 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p-
do
m
ai
ng
-s
pe
ci
fi
c 
m
em
or
y 
th
at
 
ch
an
ge
s 
th
e 
ra
ng
e 
or
 li
ke
lih
oo
d 
of
 p
ot
en
tia
l 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p-
do
m
ai
n-
sp
ec
if
ic
 b
eh
av
io
r.
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: C
ol
la
bo
ra
tiv
e 
co
m
m
itm
en
t (
+)
, i
nt
er
na
l 
co
m
pl
ex
it
y 
(n
s)
, e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
(+
),
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
n-
sp
ec
if
ic
 
as
se
t (
+)
, r
el
at
io
na
l t
ru
st
 (
+)
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 (
+)
 
* 
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
le
ar
ni
ng
 (
an
d 
th
er
eb
y 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g)
 is
 s
tim
ul
at
ed
 b
y 
a 
co
lla
bo
ra
tiv
e 
co
m
m
itm
en
t, 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n-
sp
ec
if
ic
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
, a
nd
 
tr
us
t; 
* 
T
he
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
is
 
en
ha
nc
ed
 b
y 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
le
ar
ni
ng
; *
 Y
et
, 
hi
gh
er
 le
ve
ls
 o
f 
tr
us
t r
ed
uc
e 
th
is
 p
os
iti
ve
 e
ff
ec
t; 
th
is
 is
 c
al
le
d 
th
e 
“h
id
de
n 
co
st
s 
of
 tr
us
t”
 b
ec
au
se
 
tr
us
t m
ay
 e
vo
ke
 a
 s
ys
te
m
at
ic
 a
vo
id
an
ce
 o
f 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 lo
w
er
 th
e 
in
ce
nt
iv
e 
to
 b
e 
cr
iti
ca
l, 
a 
lo
ss
 o
f 
cr
ea
tiv
ity
 (
gr
ou
pt
hi
nk
).
  
Su
br
am
an
i a
nd
 
V
en
ka
tr
am
an
 
(2
00
3)
, A
M
J 
T
o 
st
ud
y 
ho
w
 jo
in
t 
de
ci
si
on
-m
ak
in
g 
an
d 
“q
ua
si
-i
nt
eg
ra
tio
n”
 h
el
p 
to
 
sa
fe
gu
ar
d 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 
as
ym
m
et
ri
c 
in
te
ro
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
  
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
su
pp
lie
rs
 o
f 
on
e 
C
an
ad
ia
n 
re
ta
il 
co
m
pa
ny
 (
21
1,
 3
3.
0%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
ab
ou
t c
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
an
al
ys
is
, 
st
ra
te
gy
 f
or
m
ul
at
io
n,
 p
la
ns
 f
or
 s
al
es
 p
ro
m
ot
io
n,
 
an
al
ys
is
 o
f 
m
ar
ke
t t
re
nd
s,
 (
et
c.
) 
is
 r
eg
ar
de
d 
as
 a
n 
in
te
gr
al
 p
ar
t o
f 
jo
in
t-
de
ci
si
on
-m
ak
in
g.
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: p
ro
ce
ss
 s
pe
ci
fi
ci
ty
 
(+
),
 d
om
ai
n 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
it
y 
(+
),
 p
hy
si
ca
l-
as
se
t s
pe
ci
fi
ci
ty
 (
+
),
 
si
te
-s
pe
ci
fi
ci
ty
 (
n.
s.
),
 r
el
at
io
na
l 
fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
 (
+)
; N
o 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 
te
st
ed
. 
* 
Jo
in
t a
ct
io
n 
is
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 f
ro
m
 “
qu
as
i i
nt
eg
ra
tio
n”
 
an
d 
ha
s 
di
ff
er
en
t a
nt
ec
ed
e n
ts
; *
 S
up
pl
ie
r’
s 
do
m
ai
n 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
it
y 
(a
s 
a 
re
fi
ne
m
en
t o
f 
hu
m
an
-
ca
pi
ta
l a
ss
et
 s
pe
ci
fi
ci
ty
) 
an
d 
bu
si
ne
ss
 p
ro
ce
ss
 
sp
ec
if
ic
it
y 
le
ad
 to
 m
or
e 
jo
in
t d
ec
is
io
n-
m
ak
in
g.
 
K
ul
p,
 L
ee
, a
nd
 
O
fe
k 
(2
00
4)
, 
M
ng
tS
ci
 
T
o 
te
st
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
di
ff
er
en
t 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n-
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
an
d 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r's
 p
ro
fi
ta
bi
lit
y 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
ut
iv
es
 o
f 
U
S 
Fo
od
 
an
d 
C
on
su
m
er
-
Pa
ck
ag
ed
 g
oo
ds
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 r
es
po
ns
ib
le
 
fo
r 
ov
er
se
ei
ng
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 
w
ith
 r
et
ai
l p
ar
tn
er
s 
(5
4,
 
un
kn
ow
n 
re
sp
on
se
 
ra
te
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 c
al
le
d 
"i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
in
te
gr
at
io
n"
 a
nd
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
ex
te
ns
iv
en
es
s 
to
 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r's
 d
ea
lin
gs
 w
ith
 it
s 
re
ta
il 
pa
rt
ne
rs
 is
 la
rg
e.
 H
er
e,
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
on
 th
re
e 
co
nt
en
t d
om
ai
ns
: (
1)
 s
to
re
 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
le
ve
ls
, (
2)
 w
ar
eh
ou
se
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
le
ve
ls
, 
an
d 
(3
) 
co
ns
um
er
 n
ee
ds
 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s:
 f
re
qu
en
cy
 o
f 
re
ta
ile
r 
st
oc
ko
ut
s 
(-
),
 f
re
qu
en
cy
 o
f 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
st
oc
ko
ut
s 
(+
),
 r
el
at
iv
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 p
ri
ce
 (
+)
, 
pr
of
it 
m
ar
gi
ns
 (
+)
 
* 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
on
 s
to
re
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
is
 
po
si
tiv
el
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 p
ro
fi
t m
ar
gi
ns
; *
 
Sh
ar
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 r
et
ai
le
r 
w
ar
eh
ou
se
 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
le
ve
ls
 o
r 
co
ns
um
er
 n
ee
ds
 is
 n
ot
 
si
gn
if
ic
an
tl
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 a
ny
 o
f 
th
e 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 m
ea
su
re
s.
 *
 T
he
 r
es
ul
ts
 in
di
ca
te
 th
at
 
th
e 
m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 b
en
ef
its
 d
er
iv
ed
 r
el
at
e 
to
 
co
lla
bo
ra
tiv
e 
pr
ac
tic
es
 r
at
he
r 
th
an
 to
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g.
 
L
ag
es
, L
ag
es
, a
nd
 
L
ag
es
 (
20
05
),
 J
B
R
 
T
o 
em
pi
ri
ca
ll
y 
as
se
ss
 th
e 
qu
al
it
y 
of
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
in
 a
n 
ex
po
rt
 c
on
te
xt
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
U
K
 
fi
rm
s 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 o
ne
 
of
 th
ei
r 
ex
po
rt
 v
en
tu
re
s 
w
ith
 a
 im
po
rt
er
 (
11
1,
 
32
%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
di
m
en
si
on
s 
of
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
qu
al
it
y;
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
di
m
en
si
on
s 
ar
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
qu
al
it
y,
 lo
ng
-t
er
m
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n,
 a
nd
 s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
* 
N
o 
an
te
ce
de
nt
s 
te
st
ed
; *
 N
o 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 te
st
ed
; 
* 
B
ec
au
se
 th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
w
as
 to
 d
ev
el
op
 a
 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t f
or
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
qu
al
it
y 
of
 e
xp
or
t 
ve
nt
ur
es
, n
ei
th
er
 a
nt
ec
e d
en
ts
 n
or
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
w
er
e 
te
st
ed
; *
 th
e 
“a
m
ou
nt
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g”
 
is
 f
ou
nd
 to
 b
e 
po
si
tiv
el
y 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
th
re
e 
ot
he
r 
di
m
en
si
on
s 
of
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
qu
al
it
y.
  
Y
ilm
az
, S
ez
en
, a
nd
 
O
zd
em
ir
 (
20
05
),
 
IM
M
 
T
o 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
tr
us
t 
on
 r
el
at
io
na
l b
eh
av
io
rs
 in
 
ch
an
ne
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 
Su
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t T
ur
ki
sh
 
ne
w
-c
ar
 d
ea
le
rs
 
re
po
rt
in
g 
on
 a
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
(1
92
, 2
1%
) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ar
in
g 
is
 th
ou
gh
t o
f 
as
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
no
rm
s 
of
 r
el
at
io
na
l b
eh
av
i o
r.
 T
he
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t o
f 
“i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
” 
do
es
 n
ot
 g
au
ge
 th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
no
rm
 o
r 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 b
eh
av
io
r 
in
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p,
 r
at
he
r 
th
e 
be
ha
vi
or
 it
se
lf
 
* 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
ts
: t
ru
st
 (
+)
, d
ea
le
r 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 (
+)
, s
up
pl
ie
r 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 (
ns
),
 d
ea
le
r’
s 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p-
sp
ec
if
ic
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
(+
),
 s
up
pl
ie
r’
s 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p-
sp
ec
if
ic
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 (
ns
);
 N
o 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 
te
st
ed
 
* 
T
ru
st
 f
ac
ili
ta
te
s 
re
la
tio
na
l b
eh
av
io
rs
 in
 
sy
m
m
et
ri
c 
de
al
er
-s
up
pl
ie
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
ze
d 
by
 lo
w
 in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nc
e,
 w
he
re
a s
 in
 
hi
gh
ly
 in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nt
 d
ya
ds
 tr
us
t s
ee
m
s 
to
 b
e 
un
re
la
te
d 
to
 r
el
at
io
na
l b
eh
av
io
rs
; *
 T
he
 r
el
at
io
na
l 
be
ha
vi
or
-e
nh
an
ci
ng
 r
ol
e 
of
 tr
us
t b
ec
om
es
 m
or
e 
im
po
rt
an
t i
n 
m
or
e 
as
ym
m
et
ri
c 
ch
an
ne
l 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
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 St
ud
y,
 A
ut
ho
rs
 
(y
e a
r )
, J
o u
r n
a l
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 O
bj
ec
t i v
e 
Em
pi
ric
al
 B
as
is 
(s
a m
p l
e  
s iz
e ,
 r e
s p
o n
s e
 
r a
te
) 
Co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
in
g 
in
 
Ch
a n
n e
l R
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p  
An
te
ce
de
nt
s a
nd
 C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
(fo
u n
d  
r e
la
tio
n s
h i
p s
 a
r e
 b
e t
we
e n
 
b r
a c
k e
ts )
 
K
ey
 fi
nd
in
gs
 
C
o r
s t
e n
, a
n d
 
K
u m
a r
 (
2 0
0 5
),
 J
M
 
T
o  
e m
p i
ri
c a
ll
y  
a s
s e
s s
 if
 
a n
d  
u n
d e
r 
w
h i
c h
 
c o
n d
iti
o n
s ,
 s
u p
p l
ie
rs
 
b e
n e
fi
t f
ro
m
 c
o l
la
b o
ra
tiv
e  
E
C
R
 r
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p s
 w
ith
 
m
a j
o r
 r
e t
a i
le
rs
. 
S u
rv
e y
 a
m
o n
g  
s u
p p
lie
rs
 o
f 
o n
e  
U
K
 
re
ta
ile
r 
 r
e p
o r
tin
g  
o n
 
th
e i
r 
re
la
tio
n s
h i
p  
w
ith
 
th
e  
re
ta
ile
r 
(2
6 6
, 
3 4
.5
%
) 
S h
a r
in
g  
o f
 v
a r
io
u s
 in
fo
rm
a t
io
n  
is
 in
c l
u d
e d
 a
s  
p a
rt
 
o f
 th
e  
jo
in
t i
m
p l
e m
e n
ta
tio
n  
o f
 d
e m
a n
d -
s i
d e
 a
n d
 
s u
p p
ly
-s
id
e  
o f
 c
o l
la
b o
ra
ti
o n
 in
 E
C
R
-r
e l
a t
io
n s
h i
p s
. 
*  
A
n t
e c
e d
e n
ts
: t
ra
n s
a c
tio
n -
s p
e c
if
ic
 
in
v e
s t
m
e n
ts
 b
y  
s u
p p
lie
r 
(+
),
 c
ro
s s
-
fu
n c
tio
n a
l t
e a
m
s  
(+
),
 in
c e
n t
iv
e  
s y
s t
e m
s  
(+
);
 *
 C
o n
s e
q u
e n
c e
s :
 
e c
o n
o m
ic
 p
e r
fo
rm
a n
c e
 (
…
),
 
p e
rc
e i
v e
d  
e q
u i
ty
 (
…
),
 c
a p
a b
ili
ty
 
d e
v e
lo
p m
e n
t (
…
) 
*  
T
h e
 s
u p
p l
ie
r’
s  
a l
ig
n m
e n
t w
ith
 th
e  
re
ta
ile
r 
in
 
te
rm
s  
o f
 tr
a n
s a
c t
io
n -
s p
e c
if
ic
 in
v e
s t
m
e n
ts
, c
ro
s s
-
fu
n c
tio
n a
l t
e a
m
s ,
 a
n d
 in
c e
n t
iv
e  
s y
s t
e m
s  
e x
p l
a i
n  
th
e  
a d
o p
tio
n  
o f
 E
C
R
-p
ra
ct
ic
e s
; *
 E
C
R
 a
d o
p t
io
n  
 
b y
 s
u p
p l
ie
r 
le
a d
s  
to
 h
ig
h e
r 
s a
le
s  
p e
rf
o r
m
a n
c e
s ,
 y
e t
 
th
e  
s u
p p
lie
r 
e v
a l
u a
te
s  
th
e  
re
w
a r
d  
fr
o m
 it
s  
ef
fo
rt
s  
re
la
tiv
e l
y  
lo
w
e r
 th
a n
 th
e  
re
w
a r
d s
 th
e  
re
ta
ile
r 
re
tr
ie
ve
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
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APPENDIX IV QUESTIONNAIRE: SURVEY 
 
DOELSTELLING ONDERZOEK 
In gesprekken met inkooprelaties komen naast de gebruikelijke aspecten van inkoophoeveelheid, 
prijsonderhandelingen en leveringsvoorwaarden ook meestal de marktontwikkelingen aan de orde. Bekend is dat 
de openheid in het doorgeven van vertrouwelijke informatie over de markt niet bij alle inkooprelaties even groot 
is. Met dit onderzoek willen we te weten komen waaraan dit verschil in openheid ten grondslag ligt. Mede omdat 
de samenwerking in de keten sterk afhangt van de transparantie die er met elkaar gecreëerd wordt.  
 
Met marktinformatie bedoelen wij: 
1. de waargenomen consumentenvraag;  
2. de verklaringen voor schommelingen in de consumentenvraag;  
3. de voorgenomen marketinginspanningen; en 
4. de algemene strategie en marktverwachtingen. 
 
Richtlijnen om deze vragenlijst in te vullen 
 
We zouden graag willen dat u eerst de volgende instructies leest: 
1. Beantwoord alstublieft alle vragen. 
2. U wordt verzocht bij het beantwoorden van de vragen uitsluitend gebruik te maken van de 
gespecificeerde antwoordmogelijkheden (meerkeuzevragen). 
3. Beantwoord de vragen op basis van uw eigen beoordeling. U dient uw antwoorden te baseren op de 
werkelijke situatie. Dus niet op de situatie die u wenselijk acht. 
4. Bij veel van de vragen wordt van u verlangd dat u uw mening op een 7-punt schaal weergeeft.  
1 = sterk mee oneens 
2 = mee oneens 
3 = een beetje mee oneens 
4 = niet mee eens / niet mee oneens 
5 = een beetje mee eens 
6 = mee eens 
7 = sterk mee eens 
 
5. We zullen soms iets over uw bedrijf of organisatie vragen. Als u in een bedrijf werkt met meerdere 
divisies of business units, beantwoord de vragen voor de specifieke unit waarvoor u werkt. Daarom 
vanaf nu, zullen we in deze enquête met “uw bedrijf”  de divisie of unit waarvoor u werkt bedoelen. 
6. Alle vragen hebben betrekking op een specifieke situatie bij één van uw inkooprelaties. Onder een 
inkooprelatie wordt verstaan: een leverancier waarvan u producten afneemt, die voor de 
doorverkoop bestemd zijn. 
7. Onder een productcategorie wordt verstaan: een groep van producten uit het assortiment van uw 
winkel(formule), die in de ogen van de consument een logische eenheid vormt. Zoals de “televisies” 
in de electronicazaak of “dames-vrijetijdskleding” in de kledingzaak, of “frisdranken” in de supermarkt.  
8. De aanduiding retailer wordt hier in deze vragenlijst gebruikt in de ruime zin van het woord. Dat wil 
zeggen dat we hiermee alle soorten winkelbedrijven (winkelketens, vrijwilligfiliaalbedrijf, 
franchisegever, retail service organisatie, etc.) bedoelen. De “retailer” als tegenhanger en/of partner van 
de fabrikant. 
9. Vertrouwelijkheid gegarandeerd: Bij het uitvoeren van dit onderzoek houden wij ons aan de 
universitaire gedragscodes voor marktonderzoek. Dit betekent dat de resultaten vertrouwelijk worden 
behandeld en de anonimiteit van de respondenten blijft gewaarborgd.  
10. De vragenlijst bestaat uit 7 onderdelen: 
 
A. de uitwisseling van marktinformatie met de leverancier 
B. de verwachtingen omtrent meer openheid in het delen van marktinformatie 
C. hoe er met de leverancier samengewerkt wordt 
D. de leveranciersrelatie 
E. de prestaties van de leveranciersrelatie 
F. de consumenten- en inkoopmarktsituatie 
G. uw bedrijf 
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11. De totale enquête duurt ongeveer 50 minuten. Per vraag is slechts één antwoord mogelijk. Heeft u uw 
keuze gemaakt, dan vragen wij u het desbetreffende vakje duidelijk aan te kruisen. 
12. Zou u graag een kopie van de onderzoeksresultaten van ons ontvangen? 
 
 Ja 
 Nee 
 
Indien ja, stuur u dan uw visitekaartje mee of schrijf uw adres hieronder: 
 
Naam:  
Bedrijf:  
Adres:  
Postcode:  Plaats:  
E-mail:  
 
Retourneert u dit boekje met behulp van de ingesloten enveloppe (frankering onnodig) naar: 
 
drs. Willem Smit 
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
Vakgroep Marketing Management 
Kamer: FB-54 
Antwoordnummer 5240 
3000 VB  ROTTERDAM 
 
T.:  010 – 408.19.18 
E.:  wsmit@fbk.eur.nl 
 
BELANGRIJK:  DE KEUZE VAN DE LEVERANCIER  
 
De volgende vragen zullen betrekking hebben op één van uw inkooprelaties in één bepaalde productcategorie.  
Om een willekeurige keuze uit al uw inkooprelaties mogelijk te maken, vragen wij u om de volgende drie stappen 
te zetten. 
 
STAP 1 Noem vijf inkooprelaties, waarmee u het laatst contact heeft gehad?   
We hoeven niet persé de naam van de leverancier te weten. U kunt bijvoorbeeld ook volstaan met het invullen 
van de initialen van de leveranciers. N.B.: deze vraag betreft bestaande inkooprelaties. 
 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
 
STAP 2 Uit deze vijf inkooprelaties zal het nummer uit de envelop één leverancier selecteren. 
Open de hieronder aangeplakte envelop. Hierin vindt u een nummer. Dit nummer bepaalt de keuze van de 
leverancier. 
De nu volgende vragen in deze enquête zullen op de relatie van uw bedrijf met deze leverancier betrekking 
hebben. 
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HIER ZAT EEN ENVELOP GEPLAKT. 
 
INDIEN DAT NIET HET GEVAL IS, 
NEEM CONTACT OP MET: 
 
WILLEM SMIT 
Telefoonnummer: 010 – 408.19.18 
E-mail: wsmit@fbk.eur.nl 
 
 
 
 
STAP 3  Inleidende algemene vragen over deze leverancier en de productcategorie 
 
 De naam (of initialen) van de geselecteerde 
leverancier is: 
 
   
A. Voor welke productcategorie/artikelgroep levert 
deze leverancier hoofdzakelijk producten (noem 
er 1 specifiek): 
 
 
B.  Wat is het belang van deze productcategorie (A) voor de winkelformule van uw bedrijf? 
 
 
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 Deze productcategorie (A)… 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
… is in vergelijking tot andere productcategorie  
belangrijk        
 
… is in vergelijking tot andere productcategorie 
essentieel         
 
… heeft in vergelijking tot andere 
productcategorie een hoge prioriteit        
 
… is relatief tot andere productcategorie veel 
betekenend        
   
 
C. 
 
Hoeveel leveranciers binnen deze productcategorie (A) leveren 
producten aan u? 
 
   
D. We zijn geïnteresseerd in de concentratiegraad van de leveranciers in deze productcategorie. Wat 
is de het percentage van uw inkoopbudget binnen deze productcategorie dat bij de grootste vier 
leveranciers wordt besteed? 
  <10% van het inkoopbudget van deze productcategorie (A) wordt ingekocht bij de 4 grootste 
  11% - 30% van het inkoopbudget van deze productcategorie (A) wordt ingekocht bij de 4 
grootste 
  31% - 60% van het inkoopbudget van deze productcategorie (A) wordt ingekocht bij de 4 
grootste 
  61% of meer van het inkoopbudget van deze productcategorie (A) wordt ingekocht bij de 4 
grootste. 
 
E. 
 
Behoort de geselecteerde inkooprelatie tot de vier grootste leveranciers? 
 Ja 
 Nee 
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A De Uitwisseling van Marktinformatie tussen Uw Bedrijf en Deze Leverancier  
 
 
A1 De informatie die uw bedrijf aan deze leverancier geeft 
Omcirkelt u alstublieft hoeveel inzicht uw bedrijf aan deze leverancier geeft. 
 
Met betrekking tot de waargenomen consumentenvraag geven 
wij deze leverancier … inzicht in … 
G
ee
n 
(0
%
) 
Z
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r 
w
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g 
W
ei
ni
g 
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en
 d
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e 
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l 
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r 
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V
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le
di
g 
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00
%
) 
1. De verkoopcijfers van zijn eigen producten 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. De verkoopcijfers van zijn producten door de tijd heen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. De gerealiseerde verkoopprijs voor zijn producten 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. De gerealiseerde verkoopprijs voor zijn producten door de 
tijd heen 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Het voorraadniveau van zijn producten bij ons  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Het voorraadniveau van zijn producten bij ons door de tijd 
heen 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Met betrekking tot verklaringen voor de waargenomen 
consumentenvraag geven wij deze leverancier … inzicht in … 
G
ee
n 
(0
%
) 
Z
ee
r 
w
ei
ni
g 
W
ei
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g 
T
en
 d
el
e 
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l 
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r 
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V
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g 
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%
)  
1. de totale verkoopcijfers in de productcategorie / artikelgroep 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. zijn verkoopprestatie ten opzichte van zijn concurrenten 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.  de out-of-stock problematiek van zijn producten 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4.  de out-of-stock problematiek van de gehele productcategorie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.  de out-of-stock problematiek van zijn concurrenten 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. de effectiviteit van zijn promotionele acties in onze winkels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. de effectiviteit van promotionele acties binnen de gehele 
productcategorie 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. de effectiviteit van promotionele acties van zijn concurrenten 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. de geografische spreiding van zijn productverkopen per 
winkel 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 de geografische spreiding van de verkopen per winkel voor 
de gehele productcategorie 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 de geografische spreiding van de verkopen van zijn 
concurrenten per winkel 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 de promotionele ondersteuning door concurrerende 
leveranciers (tegemoetkoming in de kosten, 
leveringscondities, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 de klanten (groepen) die zijn producten kopen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 de klanten (groepen) die de producten binnen de categorie 
kopen 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 de klanten (groepen) die de producten van de concurrent 
kopen 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16 De rendementskengetallen voor de verkoop van zijn 
producten bij ons 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17 De rendementskengetallen voor de gehele productcategorie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18 De rendementskengetallen voor de verkoop van 
concurrerende producten bij ons 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Met betrekking tot voorgenomen marketinginspanningen voor de 
productcategorie geven wij deze leverancier … inzicht in … 
G
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 d
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1. De omzetdoelstellingen voor zijn producten 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. De omzetdoelstellingen voor de gehele productcategorie / 
artikelgroep 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. De omzetdoelstellingen voor zijn concurrenten 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Ons voorraadbeleid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Onze logistieke kostendoelstellingen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. De margemix van de productcategorie / artikelgroep 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. De voorgenomen wijzigingen in de merkenmix van ons 
assortiment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. De promotiekalender voor de komende periode 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. De geplande promotionele acties van zijn concurrenten bij 
ons 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 De strategie voor de gehele productcategorie / artikelgroep 
binnen onze winkelformule 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 De algemene strategie van onze winkelformule 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 De verwachte marktontwikkelingen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
A2 De informatie die deze leverancier aan uw bedrijf geeft 
We zijn geïnteresseerd in uw inschatting naar de mate waarin deze leverancier marktinformatie met uw bedrijf 
deelt. Omcirkelt u alstublieft hoeveel inzicht u denkt dat deze leverancier aan uw bedrijf geeft. 
 
Met betrekking tot de waargenomen 
consumentenvraag geeft  deze 
leverancier ons … inzicht in … 
G
ee
n 
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1. De totale verkoopcijfers van zijn producten in de gehele 
markt 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Zijn verkoopcijfers in de gehele markt door de tijd heen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. De levertijden van zijn producten 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. De hoeveelheid te produceren producten die voor de gehele 
markt beschikbaar is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.  De verkooppunten waar hij zijn producten vermarket 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Met betrekking tot verklaringen voor de waargenomen 
consumentenvraag  
geeft  deze leverancier  ons … inzicht in … 
 
G
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1. Onze verkoopprestaties ten opzichte van andere 
verkooppunten/retailers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. De interpretaties waarom andere verkooppunten/retailers 
beter scoren. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. De interpretaties waarom andere verkooppunten/retailers 
slechter scoren. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Zijn out-of-stock problematiek in het algeheel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Met betrekking tot verklaringen voor de waargenomen 
consumentenvraag  
geeft  deze leverancier  ons … inzicht in … 
 
G
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5.  Zijn out-of-stock problematiek bij onze concurrenten (bij 
andere retailers) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. De effectiviteit van zijn promotionele acties in het algemeen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. De effectiviteit van zijn promotionele acties bij onze 
concurrenten (bij andere retailers). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8.  De geografische spreiding van zijn productverkopen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9.  De verkoopprestatie van andere verkooppunten in ons 
verzorgingsgebied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 De verkoopprestatie van andere verkooppunten buiten ons 
verzorgingsgebied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 De kostenstructuur van zijn producten 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 De promotionele ondersteuning aan onze concurrenten (bij 
andere retailers) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 De resultaten van zijn consumentenonderzoeken (product 
tests, consumer evaluations) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 De consumentengroepen die zijn producten gebruiken 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 De rendementskengetallen van zijn producten 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16 De rendementskengetallen van zijn producten bij onze 
concurrenten (bij andere retailers) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Met betrekking tot voorgenomen marketinginspanningen 
voor de productcategorie geeft deze leverancier geeft ons 
… inzicht in … 
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1. Zijn omzetdoelstellingen voor zijn producten voor de 
komende periode 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Zijn omzetdoelstellingen voor zijn producten bij onze 
concurrenten 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Zijn voorraadbeleid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Zijn logistieke kostendoelstellingen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. De introducties van nieuwe producten (en/of modellen) voor 
de komende periode 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. De reclame strategie voor de komende periode 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7.  De consumentenpromoties voor de komende periode 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. De marketinginspanningen voor de verkoop binnen onze 
winkels 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. De marketinginspanningen voor de verkoop bij onze 
concurrenten 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 Zijn expansiestrategie (de klanten die hij de komende tijd 
gaat benaderen) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 De algemene strategie voor zijn producten 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 De verwachte marktontwikkelingen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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A3 Uw oordeel over de kwaliteit van de marktinformatie die deze leverancier aan uw bedrijf geeft. 
Kunt u aangeven in welke mate u het eens bent met de volgende stellingen aangaande de kwaliteit van de 
marktinformatie die deze leverancier aan uw bedrijf geeft.  
 
De marktinformatie die deze leverancier aan ons bedrijf geeft, is …  
 
  Sterk  
mee oneens 
 Sterk 
mee eens 
1. voldoende belangrijk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. voldoende op tijd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. voldoende accuraat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. voldoende in omvang 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. voldoende betrouwbaar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. voldoende nuttig 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. voldoende relevant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. voldoende waardevol 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. voldoende consistent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Voldoende objectief 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. voldoende verifieerbaar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12.  ook beschikbaar via andere bronnen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. voldoende uniek 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. voldoende bruikbaar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
A4 De mate waarin deze Leverancier bij de volgende beslissingen wordt betrokken 
Kunt u aangeven in hoeverre deze leverancier een bijdrage levert aan de volgende activiteiten t.b.v. de 
productcategorie: 
 
 Alleen door 
ons bedrijf  
Gezamenlijk 
met deze 
leverancier 
 (geen bijdrage=1)  
(zeer grote 
bijdrage=7) 
Het verzamelen van marktinformatie. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het verrichten van klantbehoeftenanalyses. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het evalueren van de kwaliteit van de leveringen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het evalueren van de gerealiseerde omzetten van de afgelopen 
periode. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het evalueren van de prestaties van de afgelopen periode. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het evalueren van de effectiviteit van de uitgevoerde promoties 
gedurende de afgelopen periode. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het formuleren van ons voorraadbeleid voor de 
productcategorie voor de komende periode. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het formuleren van onze omzetdoelen voor de productcategorie 
voor de komende periode. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het formuleren van welke rol de productcategorie voor onze 
winkelformule gaat spelen. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het ontwikkelen van een strategie voor de gehele 
productiecategorie. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het vaststellen op welke doelgroep(en) we ons gaan richten. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het bepalen van de merkenmix in ons assortiment voor de 
komende periode. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het bepalen van het promotieplan voor de komende periode. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het bepalen van de leveringsplanning voor de komende 
periode. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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A5 De exclusiviteit van marktinformatiedelen met deze leverancier 
Zou u kunnen aangeven in hoeverre de uitwisseling van marktinformatie met deze leverancier op exclusieve basis 
plaatsvindt? Wij vragen u aan te geven welke omschrijving het beste de werkelijke situatie  weergeeft. U doet dit 
door aan te geven in welke mate u het eens bent met de onderstaande stellingen.  
 
 sterk mee 
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Deze leverancier geeft ons op exclusieve basis 
marktinformatie 
       
Deze leverancier onthoudt zich ervan om dezelfde 
hoeveelheid marktinformatie aan onze concurrenten (andere 
retailers) te geven. 
       
Deze leverancier geeft zelden één retailer dezelfde 
hoeveelheid marktinformatie op exclusieve basis 
       
Deze leverancier heeft zo veel retailers/afnemers dat retailers 
niet exclusief dezelfde hoeveelheid marktinformatie 
ontvangen. 
       
 
Het aantal retailers dat van deze leverancier minstens evenveel marktinformatie krijgt, bedraagt: 
 
 0  3 a 5  21 a 50 
 1  6 a 10  51 a 100 
 2  11 a 20  Meer dan 100 
      
 
     
 sterk mee 
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ons bedrijf geeft alleen marktinformatie aan deze 
leverancier 
       
Ons bedrijf weerhoudt zich ervan om andere leveranciers 
binnen deze productcategorie ook dezelfde hoeveelheid 
marktinformatie te geven. 
       
Ons bedrijf geeft maar zelden aan slechts één leverancier 
dezelfde hoeveelheid marktinformatie. 
       
Ons bedrijf heeft zo veel leveranciers in deze product 
categorie dat wij deze leverancier niet exclusief dezelfde 
hoeveelheid marktinformatie geven. 
       
  
Het aantal leveranciers  van deze productcategorie, dat wij minstens evenveel marktinformatie verstrekken, 
bedraagt: 
 
 0  3 a 5  21 a 50 
 1  6 a 10  51 a 100 
 2  11 a 20  Meer dan 100 
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B De Voor- en Nadelen van het delen van Marktinformatie met deze leverancier 
We zijn geïnteresseerd in uw inschatting naar de voordelen en de nadelen van meer openheid in het 
delen van  marktinformatie met deze leverancier. Geeft u aan in welke mate u het met de volgende 
stellingen eens bent. 
 
B1    VOORDELEN sterk mee oneens  
sterk mee 
eens 
Als ons bedrijf heel open zijn marktinformatie met deze leverancier 
deelt, heeft dat tot gevolg dat … 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… onze activiteiten met deze leverancier beter afgestemd worden.         
… ons bedrijf samen met deze leverancier sneller op veranderingen in 
de marktvraag kan inspelen. 
       
… ons bedrijf samen met deze leverancier doelbewust de marktvraag 
kan "sturen". 
       
… ons bedrijf een betere relatie met deze leverancier krijgt.        
… ons bedrijf meer invloed bij deze leverancier krijgt.        
… deze leverancier meer afhankelijk van ons bedrijf wordt.        
… de relaties met andere leveranciers verbeterd worden.        
 
B2    NADELEN sterk mee oneens  
sterk mee 
eens 
Als ons bedrijf heel open zijn marktinformatie met deze leverancier 
deelt, heeft dat tot gevolg dat … 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
... deze leverancier onze marktinformatie gaat misbruiken.        
... deze leverancier onze marktinformatie naar onze concurrenten gaat 
lekken. 
       
… onze kennisvoorsprong ten opzichte van deze leverancier verloren 
gaat. 
       
… het onze onderhandelingspositie ten opzichte van deze leverancier 
aantast. 
       
… de relaties met andere leveranciers verslechteren.        
… ons bedrijf meer afhankelijk van die leverancier wordt.        
… ons bedrijf meer tijd en energie in deze leveranciersrelatie moet 
gaan steken. 
       
… ons bedrijf meer geld in deze leverancier moet gaan steken.        
 
B3    EVALUATIE sterk mee oneens  
sterk mee 
eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ons bedrijf heeft veel vertrouwen in de potentiële voordelen van 
marktinformatie delen met deze leverancier.  
       
Ons bedrijf heeft vanwege de potentiële nadelen weinig vertrouwen in 
het delen van marktinformatie met deze leverancier.  
       
Alle voordelen en nadelen afwegende staat ons bedrijf er heel positief 
tegenover om heel open zijn marktinformatie met deze leverancier te 
delen.  
       
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C Hoe er met de leverancier samengewerkt wordt 
De volgende vragen gaan over de manieren waarop uw bedrijf en deze leverancier samenwerken. Is er sprake van 
een formele overeenkomst? Wie van uw bedrijf heeft contact met wie bij de leverancier? En andersom? En wat is 
hun contactfrequentie met uw bedrijf? 
 
C1 Formalisering van afspraken met deze leverancier 
Wij vragen u aan te geven welke omschrijving het beste de werkelijke situatie weergeeft. U doet dit door aan te 
geven in welke mate u het eens bent met de onderstaande stellingen. 
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
Ons bedrijf en deze leverancier… 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… hebben een gespecificeerde en gedetailleerde overeenkomst met elkaar.        
… een formele overeenkomst die gedetailleerd elkaars verplichtingen 
uiteenzet. 
       
… hebben een contract dat ook specifieke boetes voor wanprestatie bevat.        
… bewaken onze relatie met geschreven contracten.        
… verwijzen vaak naar contracten om te beslissen bij meningsverschillen.        
… hebben nauwkeurige afspraken met elkaar over welke marktinformatie 
we uitwisselen. 
       
… hebben een duidelijke taakverdeling bij het gebruiken van de 
uitgewisselde marktinformatie 
       
… hebben heldere afspraken over de informatieroutines (standaarden, 
formats, etc.) voor elk van de betrokken partijen. 
       
 
 
C2 Communicatie en contact van uw bedrijf met deze leverancier 
De volgende vragen zijn bedoeld om de frequentie van communicatie tussen uw bedrijf en deze leverancier te 
meten. Wij vragen u aan te geven welke frequentie het beste de werkelijke situatie weergeeft. 
 
 
n.v.t= 
 
Niet van toepassing 
  
6 = Dagelijks of vaker 3 = Elk kwartaal 1 of 2 keer 
5 = Wekelijks 1 of 2 keer 2 = Jaarlijks 1 of 2 keer 
4 =  Maandelijks 1 of 2 keer 1 = Minder dan 1 keer per jaar tot nooit 
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Hoe vaak heeft ons bedrijf contact met...  n.v.t. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
... de verkoper van deze leverancier (accountmanager)        
... de marketing manager (commercieel directeur) van 
deze leverancier 
       
... de logistiek manager van deze leverancier        
... de service of ondersteuningspersoneel van deze 
leverancier (en verkoop-binnendienst) 
       
... de directie (het top-management) van deze 
leverancier 
       
... de medewerkers van de financiële administratie        
... andere medewerkers van deze leverancier        
 te weten:  
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Hoe vaak heeft deze leverancier contact met...  n.v.
t. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
... de inkoper van ons bedrijf         
... de marketing manager van ons bedrijf         
... de logistiek manager van ons bedrijf         
... de service of ondersteuningspersoneel van ons 
bedrijf (en inkoop-binnendienst) 
       
... de directie (het top-management) van ons 
bedrijf  
       
... onze medewerkers van de financiële 
administratie 
       
... andere medewerkers van ons bedrijf        
 te weten:  
         
 
C3 Ondersteuning van top-management 
De volgende vragen zijn bedoeld om te weten of samenwerking met deze leverancier vanuit het topmanagement 
ondersteund wordt. Wij vragen u aan te geven in welke mate u het eens bent met de volgende stellingen. 
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ons topmanagement…        
… voorziet ons van de noodzakelijke financiële 
middelen om de samenwerking met deze leverancier 
gestalte te geven. 
       
… geeft ons voldoende tijd om de samenwerking met 
deze leverancier gestalte te geven. 
       
… stelt ons een adequaat hoeveelheid personeel ter 
beschikking om de samenwerking met deze leverancier 
voldoende vorm te geven. 
       
Het topmanagement van deze leverancier…        
… voorziet onze contactpersoon van de noodzakelijke 
financiële middelen om de samenwerking met ons 
bedrijf gestalte te geven. 
       
… geeft onze contactpersoon voldoende tijd om de 
samenwerking met ons bedrijf gestalte te geven. 
       
… stelt onze contactpersoon een adequaat hoeveelheid 
personeel ter beschikking om de samenwerking met 
ons bedrijf voldoende vorm te geven. 
 
       
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C4 Beloningstructuur voor samenwerking 
De volgende vragen zijn bedoeld om te weten of samenwerking met deze leverancier vanuit de organisaties zelf 
(uw bedrijf én deze leverancier) aangemoedigd wordt door middel van een passende beloningsstructuur.  Wij 
vragen u naar beste kunnen aan te geven in welke mate u het eens bent met de volgende stellingen. 
 sterk mee  
oneens  
sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Onze contactpersoon bij deze leverancier…        
… ontvangt waardering van zijn eigen organisatie voor de manier 
waarop hij/zij met ons bedrijf als team samenwerkt. 
       
… wordt door zijn eigen organisatie beoordeeld hoe hij de relatie 
met ons bedrijf beheert. 
       
… wordt door zijn eigen organisatie hoofdzakelijk afgerekend op 
zijn individuele omzetten. 
       
Ons bedrijf …        
… geeft waardering voor de manier waarop wij met deze 
leverancier als team samenwerken. 
       
… beoordeelt ons op de manier wij de relatie met deze leverancier 
beheren. 
       
… rekent ons in hoofdzaak af op onze individuele omzetten.        
 
D Kenmerken van deze Leverancier 
 
D1 Type Leverancier 
 Geeft u aan wat van toepassing is.  
 
 1A. Deze leverancier is …  
 een A-merkleverancier  
 een A-merkleverancier, maar hij produceert tevens ons private label 
 een B- /C-merkleverancier en levert zijn eigen merken aan ons 
 een B- /C-merkleverancier, maar hij produceert tevens ons private label 
 een private-label producent 
 
1B. Deze leverancier heeft …  
 geen eigen winkels 
 eigen winkels, maar niet in ons verzorgingsgebied 
 eigen winkels in ons verzorgingsgebied 
 
1C. De contactpersoon voor ons bedrijf van deze leverancier heeft …  
 Zijn verkoopkantoor in Nederland 
 Zijn verkoopkantoor in een ander Europees land, te weten:   
 Zijn verkoopkantoor in de Verenigde Staten, Canada 
 Zijn verkoopkantoor in Azië 
 Zijn verkoopkantoor in Latijns-Amerika 
 Zijn verkoopkantoor in Afrika 
 
 
D2 De duur van de relatie met deze leverancier 
 
Hoeveel jaren doet uw bedrijf 
zaken met deze leverancier: 
    
Ja(a)r(en) en  
   
Maanden 
   het precieze aantal is niet bekend; zeker meer dan 20 jaar. 
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D3 Hoe gaat deze leverancier met marktinformatie om? 
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Deze leverancier doet veel eigen marktonderzoek.        
Deze leverancier is snel in het opsporen van veranderingen in 
consumentenvoorkeuren. 
       
Bij deze leverancier worden alle managementniveau’s regelmatig 
over marktontwikkelingen op de hoogte gesteld. 
       
Marktinformatie wordt door deze leverancier professioneel door 
de organisatie verspreid 
       
Deze leverancier weet marktontwikkelingen goed te interpreteren.        
Deze leverancier kan heel goed nieuwe inzichten in de markt 
omzetten in marketing inspanningen. 
       
Deze leverancier is heel goed in staat marktinformatie te 
commercialiseren. 
       
 
D4 De overeenstemming tussen doelen van deze leverancier met die van uw bedrijf  
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ons bedrijf en deze leverancier streven verenigbare doelen na.        
Beide bedrijven hebben dezelfde doelstellingen in deze relatie 
gemeenschappelijk. 
       
Deze leverancier en ons bedrijf steunen elkaar’s omzet en 
winstdoelstellingen. 
       
Onze doelstellingen verschillen aanzienlijk van de doelstellingen 
van deze leverancier.  
       
 
D5 Het vertrouwen van uw bedrijf in deze leverancier 
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
De beloften die deze leverancier doet zijn betrouwbaar.        
Deze leverancier is heel eerlijk in het zakendoen met ons bedrijf.        
Ons bedrijf vertrouwt deze leverancier.        
Wanneer er problemen zouden zijn, zou deze leverancier klaar 
staan en bereid zijn om ons bedrijf assistentie te verlenen. 
       
Deze leverancier houdt rekening met de belangen van ons bedrijf, 
als er iets verkeerd gaat. 
       
 
D6 De investeringen in de relatie met de leverancier 
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Als we stoppen zaken te doen met deze leverancier, gaat er veel 
kennis, die toegewijd aan deze relatie is, verloren. 
       
Als ons bedrijf of deze leverancier verkoos met een ander bedrijf 
zaken te doen, zouden we veel gemaakte investeringen in deze 
relatie verliezen. 
       
We hebben veel geïnvesteerd in het opbouwen van onze 
gezamenlijke activiteiten. 
       
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D7 De afhankelijkheidstructuur in de relatie tussen uw bedrijf en de leverancier 
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
In welke mate is de leverancier afhankelijk van uw bedrijf? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Als ons bedrijf stopt zaken te doen met deze leverancier, dan heeft 
deze leverancier een probleem om het verlies in omzet in ons 
verzorgingsgebied op te vangen. 
       
Deze leverancier is door en door afhankelijk van ons bedrijf.        
Het zal voor deze leverancier moeilijk zijn om ons bedrijf te 
vervangen. 
       
Deze leverancier heeft voor ons bedrijf in ons verzorgingsgebied 
geen goed alternatief. 
       
 
In welke mate is uw bedrijf afhankelijk van deze leverancier? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Als deze leverancier stopt zaken te doen met ons bedrijf, dan 
hebben we een probleem om het verlies in omzet in deze 
productcategorie op te vangen. 
       
Het zal voor ons bedrijf moeilijk zijn om deze leverancier te 
vervangen. 
       
Voor deze productcategorie is ons bedrijf door en door afhankelijk 
van deze leverancier. 
       
Ons bedrijf heeft voor deze leverancier in deze productcategorie 
geen goed alternatief. 
       
 
 
D8 De invloed van samenwerking met deze leverancier op onze verhoudingen met andere 
leveranciers 
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Als ons bedrijf (meer) gaat samenwerken met een deze 
leverancier, dan wordt het voor ons bedrijf moeilijker om samen 
te werken met concurrenten van deze leverancier. 
       
Een hechte samenwerking tussen ons bedrijf en deze leverancier 
zal de relatie tussen ons bedrijf en één van de concurrerende 
leveranciers verstoren. 
       
Samenwerking van ons bedrijf met deze leverancier is schadelijk 
voor de prestaties onze relatie met een andere concurrerende 
leverancier. 
       
        
        
Als ons bedrijf gaat samenwerken met deze leverancier, dan wordt 
het voor ons bedrijf makkelijker om samen te werken met 
concurrenten van  deze leverancier. 
       
Een hechte samenwerking tussen ons bedrijf en deze leverancier 
zal de relatie tussen ons bedrijf en één van de concurrerende 
leveranciers positief beïnvloeden. 
       
Samenwerking van ons bedrijf met deze leverancier is 
bevorderlijk voor de prestaties in onze relatie met een andere 
concurrerende leverancier. 
       
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E De prestaties van deze leveranciersrelatie 
We zijn geïnteresseerd in de prestaties van deze leverancier voor uw bedrijf. In hoeverre heeft uw bedrijf van 
deze leverancier geleerd? Wat zijn de uiteindelijke opbrengsten van het zakendoen met deze leverancier? Hoe 
tevreden bent u over deze leverancier? Bent u van plan in de toekomst nog zaken te doen met deze leverancier? 
Geeft u aan in welke mate u het met de volgende stellingen eens bent. 
 
E1 Gezamenlijk leren over de consumentenmarkt voor de productcategorie  
In de samenwerking met deze leverancier heeft uw bedrijf mogelijk meer ervaring opgedaan over de manieren 
waarop marktontwikkelingen voor deze productcategorie beter in de gaten kunnen worden gehouden.  
 
 
Sterk mee 
oneens  
Sterk mee 
eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Aangaande het bespeuren van de marktontwikkelingen in deze 
productcategorie zijn we samen met de leverancier goed in …  
       
het verzamelen van marktinformatie.        
het aftasten van de consumentenmarkt.        
het analyseren van het concurrerend productaanbod.        
het zoeken naar latente consumentenbehoeften.        
het experimenteren met nieuwe producten of 
consumentenpromoties. 
       
 
Aangaande het begrijpen  van de marktontwikkelingen in deze 
productcategorie zijn we samen met de leverancier goed in…  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
het ordenen van de verzamelde marktinformatie.        
het selecteren van marktinformatie op basis van relevantie.        
het verhelderen van de structuur van de markt.        
het aan het licht brengen van onze aannames over de markt.        
het verbreden van onze focus op deze markt.        
 
Aangaande het gebruiken van marktinformatie over deze 
productcategorie zijn we samen met de leverancier goed in…  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
het accuraat voorspellen van de marktvraag.        
het snel reageren op marktvraagveranderingen.        
het adequaat anticiperen op marktvraagveranderingen.        
het doeltreffend beïnvloeden van de marktvraag.        
 
Aangaande de informatieuitwisseling met deze leverancier  zijn 
we samen met de leverancier goed in.. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
het kritisch kijken naar de manieren waarop marktinformatie 
wordt verzameld. 
       
het kritisch kijken naar de verspreiding van deze marktinformatie.        
het kritisch kijken naar het systematisch analyseren van de 
uitkomsten onze samenwerking. 
       
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E2 Totale strategische opbrengsten 
Geeft u aan in welke mate u het eens bent met de volgende omschrijvingen. 
 
 Sterk mee 
oneens 
Sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Samen met deze leverancier hebben we veel gezamenlijke winsten 
gerealiseerd. 
       
Samen met deze leverancier hebben we onze gezamenlijke 
omzetten in de productcategorie vergroot. 
       
Met deze leverancier hebben we strategische voordelen ten 
opzichte van onze concurrenten gekregen. 
       
De relatie met deze leverancier heeft geresulteerd in een 
strategisch voordeel voor ons. 
       
De voordelen uit deze relatie stellen ons in staat om effectiever te 
concurreren op de consumentenmarkt. 
       
De voordelen uit deze relatie stellen ons in staat om effectiever te 
concurreren op de inkoopmarkt. 
       
Deze leveranciersrelatie heeft belangrijke strategische opbrengsten 
opgeleverd. 
       
 
E3 De prestatie van de leverancier in zijn totaliteit 
Hoe zou u de prestatie van deze leverancier vergelijken met zijn naaste concurrenten? En hoe zijn de prestaties 
van deze leverancier in vergelijking met drie jaar geleden? 
 
 Veel 
slechter 
Ongeveer 
hetzelfde 
Veel beter 
 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
De omzetgroei ten opzichte van zijn concurrerende leveranciers in 
deze productcategorie is… 
       
De groei in omzetaandeel ten opzichte van zijn concurrerende 
leveranciers in deze productcategorie is… 
       
De winstgevendheid ten opzichte van zijn concurrerende 
leveranciers in deze productcategorie is… 
       
 
 
 
Is significant 
afgenomen 
Hetzelfde 
gebleven 
Is 
significant 
toegenomen 
 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
In de afgelopen drie jaar zijn de verkopen van deze leverancier in 
deze productcategorie bij ons…  
       
In de afgelopen drie jaar is het omzetaandeel van deze leverancier 
in deze productcategorie bij ons… 
       
In de afgelopen drie jaar is de winstgevendheid van deze 
leverancier in deze productcategorie bij ons… 
       
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E4 Tevredenheid van uw bedrijf over de relatie met deze leverancier 
Geeft u aan in welke mate u het eens bent met de volgende omschrijvingen. 
 Sterk mee  
oneens 
 Sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
De relatie met deze leverancier heeft ons bedrijf een dominante en 
winstgevende marktpositie in deze productgroep opgeleverd.  
       
De relatie die ons bedrijf met deze leverancier heeft, is heel 
aantrekkelijk in termen van economische resultaten. 
       
Het marketingbeleid van deze leverancier helpt ons bedrijf om meer 
resultaat te boeken. 
       
Deze leverancier voorziet ons van een kwalitatief goede marketing en 
verkoop-ondersteuning. 
       
In de relatie met deze leverancier worden erg efficiënt activiteiten met 
ons bedrijf gecoördineerd. 
       
Ons bedrijf is zeer tevreden over de flexibiliteit waarmee we met deze 
leverancier op marktvraagveranderingen reageren.  
       
De relatie met deze leverancier is sterk “consumentenvraag-gedreven.”        
De manier van zaken doen met deze leverancier wordt gekenmerkt door 
wederzijds respect.  
       
Tegenover ons bedrijf is deze leverancier heel open over wat ons bedrijf 
zou moeten weten. 
       
De relatie tussen ons bedrijf en deze leverancier wordt gekenmerkt door 
vijandelijke emoties. 
       
Deze leverancier weigert ons om de redenen achter zijn beleid uit te 
leggen. 
       
 
E5 Het toekomstperspectief van uw bedrijf op de relatie met deze leverancier 
Geeft u aan in welke mate u het eens bent met de volgende omschrijvingen. 
 Sterk mee  
oneens 
 Sterk 
mee eens 
Bereidheid om te investeren in de relatie met de leverancier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Als de leverancier het zou vragen, dan is ons bedrijf bereid om meer te 
investeren in de relatie met deze leverancier. 
       
Ons bedrijf is bereid meer energie en geld te steken in het uitbouwen 
van de relatie met deze leverancier. 
       
In de toekomst zal ons bedrijf er aan werken om meer met deze 
leverancier samen te werken om de consument nog beter te bedienen. 
       
 
Toewijding aan de relatie met de leverancier        
Zelfs als ons bedrijf het zou kunnen, dan zou het niet stoppen zaken te 
doen met deze leverancier omdat ons bedrijf graag  met hem 
geassocieerd blijft. 
       
Ons bedrijf wil graag lid blijven uitmaken van het netwerk van deze 
leverancier, omdat het oprecht plezierig vindt met hen zaken te doen. 
       
De positieve houding van ons bedrijf ten opzichte van deze leverancier 
is een voorname reden waarom wij met hen blijven samenwerken. 
       
 
Continuïteitsverwachting         
Ons bedrijf verwacht de relatie met de leverancier nog lang te zullen 
voortzetten. 
       
Voortzetting van de relatie met deze leverancier is eigenlijk 
vanzelfsprekend. 
       
Het is waarschijnlijk dat onze bedrijf de komende twee jaar met deze 
leverancier zaken zal blijven doen. 
       
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F De Consumentenmarkt- en Inkoopmarktomgeving 
In dit onderdeel stellen we enkele vragen over de consumentenmarkt en de inkoopmarkt.  
Graag zouden we meer willen weten over de marktcondities van deze productcategorie. De vragen hebben 
betrekking op de marktturbulentie, groei, complexiteit en concurrentie.  
In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen? 
 
F1 Turbulentie en groei in de consumentenvraag  
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In deze productcategorie verandert de consumentenvraag voortdurend.        
Binnen deze productgroep reageren consumenten alsmaar anders op 
marketinginspanningen. 
       
In deze productcategorie veranderen consumentenvoorkeuren snel.        
Geheel onverwacht zijn het steeds weer andere consumenten die producten 
uit deze productgroep kopen. 
       
De afgelopen drie jaar is de groei van de consumentenvraag naar deze 
producten sterk toegenomen. 
       
Deze productcategorie kan omschreven worden als een "groei-markt"        
 
F2 Complexiteit in het distributiekanaal 
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
Het inkoopproces van deze product categorie… 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… is relatief complex.        
… wordt gekenmerkt door een relatief grote “time-lag” (tijdsvertraging) 
tussen het bestellen en het leveren ervan aan ons bedrijf. 
       
…  is traag in het kunnen reageren op marktvraagveranderingen vanwege de 
lengte van het distributiekanaal. 
       
… is relatief gecompliceerd.        
… is relatief technisch van aard.        
.. wordt gekenmerkt door een productiecapaciteit dat in het distributiekanaal 
beschikbaar is, en dat zich traag aan de consumentenvraag aanpast. 
       
 
F3 Intensiteit van concurrentie op de inkoopmarkt van deze productcategorie 
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Er zijn veel concurrenten van de leverancier op deze inkoopmarkt        
Tijdelijke handels-promoties (zoals prijskortingen) worden in deze 
inkoopmarkt vaak gebruikt. 
       
Op deze inkoopmarkt wordt voornamelijk op prijs geconcurreerd.        
Binnen deze productcategorie geldt dat wat de ene leverancier aanbiedt, kan 
de andere leverancier vrijwel direct evenaren. 
       
De concurrentie tussen de leveranciers binnen deze categorie is moordend        
In deze inkoopmarkt is er nagenoeg elke dag sprake van nieuwe 
concurrentiele acties. 
       
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F4 De gemeenschappelijke normen bij leveranciers over het delen van marktinformatie 
N.B. de volgende vragen gaan over de algemeen geldende norm bij alle leveranciers binnen deze 
productcategorie. 
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Bij de leveranciers van producten in deze productcategorie wordt in het 
algemeen verwacht dat elke vorm van marktinformatie dat retailers zou 
kunnen helpen, doorgegeven wordt. 
       
In deze inkoopmarkt is het gewoon dat retailbedrijven en leveranciers hun 
eigen vertrouwelijke marktinformatie met elkaar uitwisselen. 
       
In deze inkoopmarkt wordt verwacht dat leveranciers en retailers elkaar op de 
hoogte houden van zaken dat voor de andere partij van belang zou kunnen 
zijn. 
       
Leveranciers en winkelbedrijven informeren elkaar van tevoren van 
veranderingen. 
       
 
 
G Afrondende vragen over uw bedrijf 
In dit onderdeel worden u enkele algemene vragen over uw bedrijf en u gesteld.  
 
G1 Algemeen over uw bedrijf 
A. In welke detailhandelssector(en) is uw bedrijf hoofdzakelijk werkzaam? 
 Food  Personal Care  
Consumer 
electronics  Living 
 Supermarkten  Drogisterijen  Wit- en bruingoed  Doe-het-zelf 
 Slijterijen  Parfumerieën  Telecomwinkels  Verf- en behangz. 
   Juweliers  Computershops  Tuincentra 
 Fashion  Opticiens  Fotohandel  Huishoudelijke art. 
 Dameskledingzaken       
 Herenkledingzaken    Education&Entertainment 
 Dames-en heren    Videotheken  Speelgoedzaken 
 Baby- en kinder    Boekhandel  Kantoorboekhandel 
 Schoenenzaken    CD-zaken  Rijwielhandel 
 Algemene textiel    Dierenspeci.   
 Bodyfashion-zaken    Sportzaken  Warenhuizen 
 Textielsupermarkt       
     Anders, te weten:  
 
 
B. Uw bedrijf is hoofdzakelijk te typeren als: 
 
 Groot-winkelbedrijf met 1 winkelketen  Inkooporganisatie 
 Groot-winkelbedrijf met meerdere winkelketens  In- en verkooporganisatie  
 Franchisegevers-organisatie   
 Verkooporganisatie  Anders, te weten:  
     
 
C. Hoeveel werknemers heeft uw organisatie (inclusief de medewerkers van eventuele franchisenemers) 
 
 1-9  100 - 199  1.000 – 2.499  10.000 – 14.999 
 10-49  200-499  2.500 – 4.999  15.000 – 19.999 
 50 – 99  500-999  5.000 – 9.999  20.000 of meer  
 
D. De consumentenomzet van ons bedrijf van het afgelopen boekjaar is (ongeveer):   Euro’s 
E. Hoeveel winkels heeft uw bedrijf in Nederland (inclusief evt. franchisenemers?  Winkels 
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G2 Concurrentie tussen uw bedrijf en andere retailers 
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
De concurrentie in onze markt is moordend.        
Nagenoeg elke dag hoort men in onze markt van nieuwe concurrentiele 
acties  
       
De activiteiten in onze markt zijn bijzonder vijandig.        
In onze markt zijn veel promotie-campagnes        
In onze markt geldt dat wat de ene retailer aanbiedt, kan de andere retailer 
vrijwel direct evenaren. 
       
Onze concurrenten zijn relatief sterk.        
In onze markt wordt voornamelijk op prijs geconcurreerd.        
 
G3 Hoe gaat uw bedrijf met marktinformatie om? 
 sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ons bedrijf doet veel eigen marktonderzoek.        
Ons bedrijf is snel in het opsporen van veranderingen in 
consumentenvoorkeuren. 
       
Binnen ons bedrijf worden alle managementniveau’s regelmatig over 
marktontwikkelingen op de hoogte gesteld. 
       
Marktinformatie wordt door ons bedrijf professioneel door de organisatie 
heen verspreid 
       
Ons bedrijf kan heel goed nieuwe inzichten in de markt omzetten in 
marketinginspanningen. 
       
Ons bedrijf is heel goed in staat marktinformatie te commercialiseren.        
Ons bedrijf weet marktontwikkelingen goed te interpreteren.        
Ons bedrijf kan heel goed nieuwe inzichten in de markt omzetten in 
marketing inspanningen. 
       
 
G4 Samenwerkingsbereidheid van uw bedrijf 
 
Over het algemeen is de visie van ons bedrijf dat… 
sterk mee  
oneens 
 sterk 
mee eens 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… hechtere relaties met leveranciers een groot voordeel bieden in het 
zakendoen. 
       
… zich aansluiten bij en hecht samenwerken met een leverancier staat ons 
toe om effectiever te worden. 
       
… het is toepasselijk om informatie met leveranciers te delen als het nuttig 
is. 
       
… meestal leveranciers toevertrouwd kunnen worden dat zij zich aan hun 
verplichtingen houden. 
       
… leveranciers ons meestal niet zullen uitbuiten.        
… hoe minder een leverancier weet over wat we doen, hoe beter het voor 
ons is.  
       
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G5 Overig 
A. Wat is uw functie?  
  
B. Hoeveel jaar heeft u ervaring in een inkoopfunctie? 
  jaar en  maanden 
 
C. In hoeverre bent u persoonlijk betrokken bij de inkoop van uw bedrijf bij deze leverancier? 
 
Helemaal niet betrokken  
 
-3 
 
 
-2 
 
-1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 Heel betrokken 
 
D. In hoeverre heeft u er vertrouwen in dat u in staat was de vragen in deze enquête te beantwoorden?  
 
Helemaal niet met vertrouwen 
 
-3 
 
 
-2 
 
-1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
Met veel 
vertrouwen 
 
E. Vrouw/Man 
  Vrouw 
  Man 
 
 
Tenslotte 
Allereerst willen wij u hartelijk danken voor uw medewerking. Hieronder treft u ruimte aan voor eventuele op- en 
aanmerkingen op de vragenlijst. Wij verzoeken u zo vrij te zijn alle onduidelijkheden vragen, opmerkingen, 
kritiek, etc. hieronder te vermelden. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HARTELIJK BEDANKT VOOR HET DELEN VAN UW INFORMATIE! 
Desgewenst zullen wij u spoedig van de onderzoeksresultaten op de hoogte brengen. 
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APPENDIX VI.1 OPERATIONALIZATION AND DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY 
TESTS FOR CONSTRUCT MEASURES:  
MARKET CHANNEL ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
Operationalization 
All items are measured on seven-point “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” Likert scales unless otherwise mentioned. 
 
Consumer Demand Turbulence (TRBLNC) 
(3 items, α = 0.87) (adapted from: Jaworski and Kohli, 1993) 
 Purchase Complexity (CMPLX) 
(3 items, α = 0.81) (adapted from: Cannon and Homburg, 2001)  
1. In this product category, consumer demand keeps on 
changing over time. 
2. Every time consumers react differently to marketing efforts 
within this product category. 
3. In this product category consumer preferences change in a 
rapid pace.  
4. Very unexpectedly, different consumers buy products from 
this product category. (item deleted) 
 
 1. The buying process in this product category is relatively complex 
2. The buying process in this product category is relatively 
complicated 
3. The buying process in this product category is relatively technical 
Consumer Demand Growth (GRWTH) 
(2 items, α = 0.89) 
 Channel Inertia (INERTIA) 
(2 items, α = 0.84) 
1. During the past three years, growth in the consumer demand 
has been considerable. 
2. This product category can be called a "growth-market". 
 1. The buying process in this product category features a relatively 
long time-lag between ordering and delivery to our firm.  
2. The buying process in this product category is slow in its ability to 
react to consumer demand changes due to the length of the channel. 
3. The buying process in this product category is featured by a 
production capacity available in this channel and adjusts to 
consumer demand sluggishly. (item deleted) 
* item deleted from scale 
 
Discriminant Validity Tests 
Models 
 
χ2 df χ2/df χ2diff TLI CFI RMSEA 
No constraints between latent variables 39.26 30 1.31  0.98 0.99 0.043 
Constrained models with perfect correlation between:        
TRBLNC and GRWTH 148.47 31 4.79 109.21* 0.71 0.80 0.15 
TRBLNC and CMPLX 295.85 31 9.54 256.59* 0.52 0.67 0.23 
TRBLNC and INERTIA 135.26 31 4.36 96.00* 0.77 0.84 0.14 
CMPLX and GRWTH 152.07 31 4.91 112.81* 0.69 0.78 0.15 
GRWTH and INERTIA 154.84 31 4.99 115.58* 0.68 0.78 0.16 
CMPLX and INERTIA 108.30 31 3.49 69.04* 0.81 0.87 0.12 
*Critical value for Chi-square at a 5% level = 3.84 (1 df) 
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APPENDIX VI.2 OPERATIONALIZATION AND DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY 
TESTS FOR CONSTRUCT MEASURES:  
SUPPLIER NETWORK ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
Operationalization 
All items are measured on seven-point “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” Likert scales unless otherwise mentioned. 
 
Supplier Network Horizon 
(1 item) 
 Supplier Network Concentration 
(1 item) 
How many suppliers deliver goods to you in this product 
category? 
 What is the percentage in your buying budget for this product category 
spent at the four largest suppliers? (0 = less than 10%; 1 = 11 – 30% ; 2 
= 31 – 60; 3 = more than 60%). 
 
Competition Intensity among Suppliers 
(4 items, α = 0.82) (cf. Jaworksi and Kohli, 1993) 
 Competition among Retailers (RETCOMP) 
(4 items, α = 0.79) (cf. Jaworksi and Kohli, 1993) 
1. There are many competitors of this supplier in this p[urchase 
market. (item deleted) 
2. Temporary trade promotions (like discounts) are often used 
in this purchase market. (item deleted) 
3. In this purchase market, they mostly compete on price.  
4. Within this product category, anything that one competitor 
can offer, others can match readily. 
5. Competition between suppliers within this product category 
is cut throat. 
6. In this purchase market, one hears of a new competitive 
move almost every day. 
 
1. Competition in our marketplace is cutthroat. 
2. One hears of a new competitive move almost every day.  
3. The activities in our marketplace are particularly hostile. 
4. In our market there are many promotion-campaigns.* 
5. In our market, anything that one retailer offers, others can match 
readily. (item deleted) 
6. Our competitors are relatively strong. 
7. In our marketplace there is a lot of price competition. (item deleted) 
Information-Sharing Norms among Suppliers (NORMS) 
(2 items, α = 0.67) (adapted from John and Heide, 1994) 
Negative Connectedness (NEGNETW) 
(3 items, α = 0.87) 
1. In general suppliers of products in this product category 
expect that every market information that might help 
retailers, is passed on. (item deleted) 
2. In this purchasing market it is common that retail companies 
and suppliers exchange their own confidential market 
information. 
3. In this purchasing market, suppliers and retailers are 
expected to keep each other posted on matters that are 
important to them. 
4. Suppliers and retailers inform each other about changes in 
advance. (item deleted) 
 
1. If our firm is going to collaborate (more) with this supplier, than it 
will be more difficult for us to collaborate with competitors of this 
supplier. 
2. A closer cooperation between our firm and this supplier will disturb 
the relationship between our company and one of this supplier’s 
competitors. 
3. Working together to this supplier can be detrimental to the 
performances in the relationship with other competing companies. 
Positive Connectedness (POSNETW) 
(3 items, α = 0.89) 
 
1. If our firm is going to collaborate (more) with this supplier, 
than it will be easier for us to collaborate with competitors of 
this supplier. 
2. A closer cooperation between our firm and this supplier will 
facilitate the relationship between our company and one of 
this supplier’s competitors. 
3. Working together to this supplier can be beneficial to the 
performances in the relationship with other competing 
companies. 
 
 
Discriminant Validity Tests 
Models 
 
χ2 df χ2/df χ2diff TLI CFI RMSEA 
No constraints between latent variables 98.28 95 1.03  .99 .99 .014 
Constrained models with perfect 
correlation between: 
  
  
   
SUPCOMP and RETCOMP 276.89 96 2.88 178.61* .85 .88 .107 
SUPCOMP and NORMS 340.93 96 3.55 242.65* .74 .79 .13 
SUPCOMP and NEGNETW 334.93 96 3.49 236.65* .70 .76 .123 
SUPCOMP and POSNETW 343.02 96 3.57 244.74* .66 .73 .125 
RETCOMP and NORMS 342.39 96 3.57 244.11* .75 .80 .125 
RETCOMP and NEGNETW 342.29 96 3.57 244.01* .75 .80 .125 
RETCOMP and POSNETW **       
NORMS and NEGNETW 335.358 96 3.49 237.08* .69 .75 .123 
NORMS and POSNETW 332.13 96 3.46 233.85* .68 .75 .122 
NEGNETW and POSNETW 342.56 96 3.57 244.28* .66 .73 .125 
        
* Critical value for Chi-square at a 5% level = 3.841 (1 df) 
** Covariance matrix not positive definite 
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APPENDIX VI.3 OPERATIONALIZATION AND DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY 
TESTS FOR CONSTRUCT MEASURES:  
RELATIONSHIP CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
Operationalization 
All items are measured on seven-point “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” Likert scales unless otherwise mentioned. 
 
Trust in Supplier (TRUST)  
(4 items, α = 0.85) (cf. Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Jap, 1999) 
 Relationship-specific Investment  (RSI) 
(2 items, α = 0.67) (cf. Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Jap, 1999) 
1. The promises of this supplier are reliable.  
2. This supplier is very honest in dealing with our company.  
3. Our firm trusts this supplier.  
4. When problems arise, this supplier would go of its way to help 
our firm. (item deleted) 
5. This supplier takes our firm’s interests into account, when 
something goes wrong.  
 
1. If this relationship were to end, we would be wasting a lot of 
knowledge that's tailored to their relationship.  
2. If either company were to switch to a competitive retailer or 
supplier, we would lose a lot of the investments made in the 
present relationship.  
3. We have invested a great deal in building up our joint business. 
(item deleted) 
 
Contract Formalization (FORM) 
(5 items, α = 0.84; adapted from Jap and Ganesan,2000) 
Supplier Dependence on Retailer (SUPDPND) 
(3 items, α = 0.82) (cf. Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp,1995)  
Our firm  and this supplier … 
1. … have a een specified and detailed agreement with each other. 
2. … have a formal written agreement stating each others 
obligations in detail. 
3. … have a contract that also includes specific penalties for any 
default. 
4. … govern our relationship with written contracts. 
5. … often refer to contracts in order to make a decision about 
differences of opinion. 
 
To which extent is the supplier dependent on your firm?  
 
1. If our firm ceases to do business with this supplier, then this 
supplier will have a problem in replacing compensation for the 
loss in sales from our trade area. (item deleted) 
2. This supplier is through and through dependent on our firm. 
3. It would be difficult for this supplier to replace our firm.  
4. This supplier does not have a good alternative in our trade area.  
Retailer Dependence on Supplier (RETDPND) 
(3 items, α = 0.84) (cf. Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp,1995) 
 
To which extent is our firm dependent on this supplier? 
 
1. If this supplier ceases to do business with our firm, we will have 
a problem in replacing the loss in sales in this product category. 
2. It would be difficult for our firm to replace this supplier. 
3. Concerning this product category, our firm is through and 
through dependent on this supplier. (item deleted) 
4. In this product category, our firm does not have a good 
alternative for this supplier. 
 
 
Discriminant Validity Tests 
Models 
 
χ2 df χ2/df χ2diff TLI CFI RMSEA 
No constraints between latent variables 198.98 109 1.83  .91 .93 .070 
Constrained models with perfect correlation between:        
TRUST and TSI 229.92 110 2.09 30.94* .88 .90 .081 
TRUST and FORM 570.71 110 5.19 371.73* .61 .68 .158 
TRUST and SUPDPND **       
TRUST and RETDPND 407.80 110 3.71 208.82* .70 .76 .127 
RSI and FORM **       
RSI and SUPDPND 235.68 110 2.14 36.7* .87 .89 .082 
RSI and RETDPND 226.85 110 2.06 27.87* .85 .90 .080 
FORM and SUPDPND **       
FORM and RETDPND 408.36 110 3.71 209.38* .70 .76 .127 
SUPDPND and RETDPND 376.35 110 3.42 177.37* .74 .79 .121 
* Critical value for Chi-square at a 5% level = 3.841 
** Covariance matrix is not positive definite 
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APPENDIX VI.4 OPERATIONALIZATION AND DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY 
TESTS FOR CONSTRUCT MEASURES:  
SUPPLIER CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
Operationalization 
All items are measured on seven-point “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” Likert scales unless otherwise mentioned. 
 
Market Information Processing Capabilities Supplier 
(4 items) 
 Goal Congruency (GOALCNG) 
(3 items, α = 0.82) (adapted from Anderson and Weitz, 1989) 
 
Market Sensing Capabilities (α = 0.71)( SUPINFSS) 
1. This supplier performs a lot of market research on its own 
2. This supplier is fast in tracing changes in consumer 
preferences 
 
Market Information Dissemination Capabilities*  
3. At this supplier, all management levels are regularly updated 
about market developments. (item deleted) 
4. Market information is professionally disseminated by this 
supplier throughout its organization. (item deleted) 
 
Market Relating Capabilities (α = 0.85) (SUPINFRL) 
5. This supplier knows well how to interpret market 
developments.* 
6. This supplier is well capable of translating new market 
insights into marketing efforts. 
7. This supplier is very good at commercializing market 
information. 
 
 
1. Our firm and this supplier pursue compatible goals. 
2. Both companies have the same objectives in this relationship 
in common. 
3. This supplier and our firm support each others’ sales and 
profit targets. 
4. Our objectives differ significantly from those of this supplier 
(R)* 
 
 
Top Management Support Supplier (SUP_TOP) 
(3 items, α = 0.84) (adapted from Gruen and Shah, 2000) 
 Incentive Structure Supplier (SUP_INC) 
(2 items, α = 0.62) 
The top management of this supplier … 
… provides our contact persons with the necessary financial 
resources to give shape to the collaboration with our firm.  
… gives our contact person sufficient time to give shape to the 
collaboration with our firm. 
 … makes an adequate amount of personnel available to our 
contact person for the collaboration with our firm. 
 
 Our main contact person at this supplier … 
… receives appreciation from his/her own organization for the way 
in which he/she cooperates with our firm as a team. 
… is being evaluated by his/her own organization for the way he 
manages the relationship with our firm. 
… is mainly accountable for his/her own individual sales. (R) (item 
deleted) 
 
   
* item deleted from scale 
 
Discriminant Validity Tests 
Models 
 
χ2 df χ2/df χ2diff TLI CFI RMSEA 
No constraints between latent variables 79.68 44 1.81  .93 .95 .072 
Constrained models with perfect correlation 
between: 
       
SUPINFSS and SUPINFRL 84.18 45 1.87  4.50* .92 .95 .074 
SUPINFSS and GOALCNG 112.23 45 2.49 32.55* .85 .90 .098 
SUPINFSS and SUP_TOP 116.18 45 2.58  36.50* .84 .89 .100 
   SUPINFSS and SUP_INC 102.23 45 2.27  22.55* .88 .92 .091 
SUPINFRL and GOALCNG 148.39 45 3.30  68.71* .76 .84 .122 
SUPINFRL and SUP_TOP 154.86 45 3.44  75.18* .73 .81 .126 
SUPINFRL and SUP_INC 101.77 45 2.26  22.09* .88 .92 .090 
GOALCNG and SUP_TOP 226.61 45 5.04  146.93* .65 .76 .161 
GOALCNG and SUP_INC 101.74 45 2.26  22.06* .88 .92 .090 
    SUP_TOP and SUP_INC 90.89 45 2.02  11.21* .90 .93 .081 
* Critical value for Chi-square at a 5% level = 3.841  
** Covariance matrix is not positive definite 
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APPENDIX VI.5 OPERATIONALIZATION AND DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY 
TESTS FOR CONSTRUCT MEASURES:  
RETAILER CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
Operationalization 
All items are measured on seven-point “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” Likert scales unless otherwise mentioned. 
 
Market Information Processing Capabilities Retailer 
(4 items) (adapted from Jaworksi and Kohli, 1993) 
Firm’s predisposition to ally with Suppliers(RETPRO)  
(Relational Proclivity) (cf. Johnson and Sohi, 2001)  
(3 items, α = 0.76) 
Market Sensing Capabilities (α = 0.64) (RETINFSS) 
1. Our firm performs a lot of market research on its own 
2. Our firm is fast in tracing changes in consumer preferences 
 
Market Information Dissemination Capabilities 
3. At our firm, all management levels are regularly updated 
about market developments. (item deleted) 
4. Market information is professionally disseminated by our 
firm throughout our organization. (item deleted) 
 
Market Relating Capabilities (α = 0.92) (RETINFRL) 
5. Our firm knows well how to interpret market 
developments.* 
6. Our firm is well capable of translating new market insights 
into marketing efforts. 
7. Our firm is very good at commercializing market 
information. 
 
In general, in my firm the view is that… 
 
1. … closer partner-type relationship with suppliers offer major 
advantages in doing business 
2. … teaming up and working closely with suppliers allows us to be 
more effective. 
3. … it is appropriate to share proprietary information with our 
suppliers if it is useful to do so. 
4. ... most often, suppliers can be trusted to meet their obligations. 
(item deleted) 
5. … most of the time, suppliers will not take advantage of us. 
(item deleted) 
6. … the less any supplier knows about how we do things, the 
better off we are . (R) (item deleted) 
 
Top Management Support Retailer (own firm) (RET_TOP) 
(3 items, α = 0.78) 
Incentive Structure Retailer (own firm) (RET_INC) 
(2 items, α = 0.73) (borrowed from Gruen and Shah, 2000) 
Our top management … 
1. … provides us with the necessary financial resources to give 
shape to the collaboration with this supplier. 
2. … gives us sufficient time to give shape to the collaboration 
with this supplier. 
3. … makes an adequate amount of personnel available to us 
for the collaboration with this supplier. 
Our firm … 
1. … gives appreciation for the way in which we cooperate as a 
team with this supplier. 
2. … evaluates us for the way we manage the relationship with our 
firm. 
3. … holds us mainly accountable for our own individual sales. (R) 
(item deleted) 
 
* item deleted from scale 
 
Discriminant Validity Tests 
Models 
 
χ2 df χ2/df χ2diff TLI CFI RMSEA 
No constraints between latent variables 51.45 44 1.17  .98 .99 .032 
Constrained models with perfect correlation between:        
RETINFSS and RETINFRL 68.88 45 1.53 17.43* .95 .96 .057 
RETINFSS and RELPRO 83.93 45 1.87 83.93* .91 .94 .073 
RETINFSS and RET_TOP 79.89 45 1.78 79.89* .92 .94 .069 
RETINFSS and RET_INC 82.07 45 1.82 82.07* .91 .94 .071 
RETINFRL and RELPRO 194.19 45 4.32 194.19* .73 .81 .142 
RETINFRL and RET_TOP 173.62 45 3.86 173.62* .61 .74 .132 
RETINFRL and REL_INC 105.88 45 2.35 105.88* .86 .90 .091 
RETPRO and REL_TOP 195.84 45 4.35 195.84* .72 .81 .143 
RETPRO and REL_INC 110.28 45 2.45 110.28* .88 .92 .087 
RET_TOP and REL_INC 97.56 45 2.17 97.56* .88 .92 .084 
* Critical value for Chi-square at a 5% level = 3.841 (1 df) 
** Covariance matrix is not positive definite 
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APPENDIX VII.1 OPERATIONALIZATION AND DISCRIMINATION TESTS 
FOR CONSTRUCT MEASURES CONSEQUENCES:  
RELATIONSHIP PERFORMANCE AND QUALITY 
 
 
Operationalization 
All items are measured on seven-point “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” Likert scales unless otherwise mentioned. 
Economic Satisfaction (ECOSAT) 
(3 items; α = .76; adapted from Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000) 
 Willingness to invest in the relationship with the supplier (WILL) 
(α = .85; adapted from Kumar, et al.1995) 
1. If the supplier requested it, our firm would be willing to make 
further investment in the relationship with this supplier.  
2. We are willing to put more effort and investment in expanding the 
business dealings with this supplier. 
3. In the future our firm will work more with this supplier to serve the 
consumer better.* 
Affective Commitment to the relationship with this supplier (AFF) 
(α = .78; adapted from Kumar, et al.1995) 
1. The relationship with this supplier has provided our firm with a 
dominant and profitable market position in this product category. 
2. The relationship with this supplier is very attractive with respect 
to economic results. 
3. The marketing policy of this supplier helps our firm to get more 
results. 
4. This supplier provides our firm with marketing support of high 
quality.* 
5. In the relationship with this supplier, the activities with our firm 
are very efficiently coordinated.* 
6. Our firm is very satisfied with the flexibility by which we and this 
supplier react to market changes.* 
7. The relationship with this supplier is very “consumer demand 
driven”.* 
 
1. Even if our firm could, we would not drop the supplier because we 
like being associated with them.* 
2. Our firm wants to remain a member of the supplier's network, 
because we genuinely enjoy our relationship with them. 
3. The positive feelings of our firm towards the supplier are a major 
reason we continue working with them. 
Social Satisfaction (SOCSAT) 
(3 items; α = .71) (adapted from Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000) 
 Continuity Expectations (CONT) 
(α = .89; adapted from Kumar, et al.1995) 
1. The working relationship of our firm with this supplier is 
characterized by feelings of hostility.(R) 
2. Interactions between my firm and this supplier are 
characterized by mutual respect. 
3. This supplier is very open about things our firm ought 
know.(R) 
4. This supplier refuses to explain the reasons for its 
policies.(R)* 
 1. Our firm expects our relationship with the supplier to continue for a 
long time. 
2. Renewal of relationship with supplier is virtually automatic.* 
3. It is likely that our firm will still be doing business with this 
supplier in 2 years. 
 
Joint Profits (PROFIT) 
(2 items, α = .89; adapted from: Jap 1999 ) 
 Attainment of competitive channel advantage (CCA) 
(3 items, α = .88; adapted from: Jap, 1999)  
1. Together with this supplier we have achieved a high level of 
joint profits between us.  
2. Together with this supplier we have generated a lot of extra 
sales in this product category.  
 
 1. With this supplier we have gained strategic advantages over our 
competitors.  
2. The relationship with this supplier has resulted in strategic 
advantages for us. (R)* 
3. The benefits from this supplier relationship enabled us to compete 
more effectively in the consumer marketplace.  
4. The benefits from this supplier relationship enabled us to compete 
more effectively in the purchasing market.*  
5. This supplier relationship has resulted in strategically important 
outcomes.  
* item deleted from scale 
 
Discriminant Validity Tests 
Models 
 
χ2 df χ2/df χ2diff TLI CFI RMSEA 
No constraints between latent variables 141.16 98 1.44  .96 .97 .053 
Constrained models with perfect correlation 
between: 
       
PROFIT and CCA 234.87 99 2.37 93.71* .88 .91 .086 
PROFIT and ECOSAT 211.08 99 2.13 69.92* .89 .92 .084 
PROFIT and SOCSAT 217.24 99 2.19 76.08* .86 .90 .087 
PROFIT and WILL 216.75 99 2.19 75.59* .84 .89 .086 
PROFIT and AFF 200.35 99 2.02 59.19* .88 .92 .080 
PROFIT and CONT 240.51 99 2.43 99.35* .80 .86 .095 
CCA and ECOSAT 181.20 99 1.83 40.04* .92 .94 .072 
CCA and SOCSAT 200.52 99 2.03 59.36* .89 .92 .080 
CCA and WILL 212.48 99 2.15 71.32* .86 .90 .085 
CCA and AFF 199.33 99 2.01 58.17* .89 .92 .080 
CCA and CONT 241.48 99 2.44 100.32* .80 .86 .095 
ECOSAT and SOCSAT 212.69 99 2.15 71.53* .88 .91 .085 
ECOSAT and WILL 212.69 99 2.15 71.53* .87 .91 .085 
ECOSAT and AFF 202.77 99 2.05 61.61* .89 .92 .081 
SOCSAT and WILL 227.12 99 2.29 85.96* .85 .89 .090 
SOCSAT and AFF 194.87 99 1.97 53.71* .90 .93 .078 
SOCSAT and CONT 212.85 99 2.15 71.69* .88 .91 .085 
WILL and AFF 199.66 99 2.02 58.50* .89 .92 .080 
WILL and CONT 242.22 99 2.45 101.06* .80 .86 .095 
AFF and CONT 200.20 99 2.02 59.04* .90 .92 .080 
* Critical value for Chi-square at a 5% level = 3.841 (1 df) 
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APPENDIX VII.2 BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS  
  BTWEEN SHARED CONTENT,  
  SHARING MODE, AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
    
 
 
Joint 
Market Learning 
Relationship 
Quality 
Relationship 
Performance 
  Satisfaction Commitment  
        
 JD JI JU JR Eco. 
Sat. 
Soc. 
Sat. 
Will. Affect 
Com. 
Cont. 
Exp. 
Joint 
Profit 
CCA 
Joint  Market Learning            
Joint Detection of Market Development            
Joint Interpretation of Market Developments .85**           
Joint Utilization of Market Information .74** .73**          
Joint Reviewing Joint Market Learning Process .72** .81** .62**         
            
Relationship Quality            
Economic Satisfaction .59** .48** .53** .43**        
Social Satisfaction .52** .38** .32** .26** .42**       
Willingness to invest .29** .29** .14 .27** .34** .31**      
Affective Commitment .25* .26** .25* .23* .33** .40** .42**     
Continuity Expectancy .14 .13 .04 .01 .21* .38** .39** .48**    
            
Relationship Performance            
Joint Point .39** .23* .42** .18 .63** .20* .13 .22* .17   
Channel Competitive Adv. .54** .46** .47** .45** .77** .42** .36** .28** .24* .54**  
            
            
Degree of Shared Content            
By Retailer .42** .43** .29** .43** .38** .26** .06 .01 -.02 .25* .43** 
By Supplier .54** .48** .43** .52** .37** .35** .15 .14 .09 .23* .39** 
            
Sharing Mode            
Contact Frequency by Retailer .09 .02- .10 .01 .03 .06 .21* .17 .16 .13 .19 
Contact Frequency by Supplier .13 .06 .18 .12 .11 .06 .26** .15 .10 .13 .21* 
Higher Management from Retailer .28** .19 .29** .18 .21* .04 .14 .05 -.01 .23* .27** 
Higher Management from Supplier .06 .03 .15 .06 .24* .04 .24* .22* .21* .24* .21* 
Exclusivity given by Retailer .13 .15 .10 .19 .19 -.04 .05 .19 .10 .09 .18 
Exclusivity given by Supplier .24* .25* .26* .34** .28** .03 .08 .17 .11 .15 .28** 
Formalization Information Sharing .43** .45** .34** .54** .18 .17 .08 .09 -.02 .06 .25* 
 
Note: JD. = Joint Detection of Market Development; JI. = Joint Interpretation of Market Developments; JI. = Joint Utilization of Market Information; 
JR= Joint Reviewing of Joint Market Learning Process; Eco.Sat = Economic Satisfaction; Soc.Sat = Social Satisfaction; Will. = willingness to invest; 
Affect.Comm. = Affective Commitment; Cont.Exp. = Continuity Expectancy; CCA = Competitive Channel Advantages 
*p<.05; **p<.01; n= 99 (listwise deletion) 
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APPENDIX VIII.1 EXPERIMENT:  
MANIPULATION LEVEL OF TRUST 
 
Low Initial Trust 
 
High Initial Trust 
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APPENDIX VIII.2 EXPERIMENT:  
MANIPULATION LEVEL OF CONNECTEDNESS 
 
 
Low Connectedness 
 
High Conectedness 
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APPENDIX VIII.3 EXPERIMENT:  
MANIPULATION LEVEL OF  
INFORMATION SHARING ANNOUNCEMENT 
 
Announcement: No Information Sharing 
 
Announcement: Information Sharing 
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APPENDIX VIII.4 OPERATIONALIZATIONS OF CONSTRUCTS EXPERIMENT 
 
 
RELATIONSHIP QUALITY  MEASURES 
 
 
 
  
Economic Satisfaction (Adapted from Geyskens and Steenkamp, 
2000) 
 
 Calculative Commtiment (Adapted from Kumar, Steenkamp and Scheer, 
1995) 
SAT1 Its relationship with {SUPERMARKET S} has 
provided {YOUR COMPANY} with a dominant and 
profitable market position. 
 COM7 
 
If {SUPERMARKET S} requested it, {YOUR 
COMPANY} is willing to make further investment in 
supporting {SUPERMARKET S}'s coffee assortment. 
SAT2 {YOUR COMPANY}’s relationship with 
{SUPERMARKET S} is a very attractive one in 
economic terms. 
 COM8 {YOUR COMPANY} is willing to put more effort and 
investment in building their business with 
{SUPERMARKET S}. 
SAT3* {YOUR COMPANY} is very pleased with the high 
distribution coverage that SHOPHERE provides. 
 COM9 In the future {YOUR COMPANY} will work to link their 
firm with {SUPERMARKET S}'s in order to serve the 
consumer better. 
     
Cronbach’s alpha (t1, t2): 0.67 , 0.63 
Mean (t1, t2): 5.04 , 5.33 
Standard deviation (t1, t2): 1.48 ,  1.06 
Range (t1, t2): 1 to 7 , 2 to 7  
 Cronbach’s alpha (t1, t2): 0.84 , 0.84 
Mean (t1, t2): 3.85 , 1.64 
Standard deviation (t1, t2): 1.64 , 1.33 
Range (t1, t2): 1 to 7 , 1 to 7 
 
 
  
Social Satisfaction (Adapted from Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000) 
 
 Affective Commitment (Adapted from Kumar, Steenkamp and Scheer, 
1995) 
SAT4 Interaction between {SUPERMARKET S} and 
{YOUR COMPANY} are characterized by mutual 
respect. 
 COM1  
 
Even if {YOUR COMPANY} could, they would not drop 
{SUPERMARKET S} because they like being associated 
with them. 
SAT5 {SUPERMARKET S} is very open towards {YOUR 
COMPANY} about things that {YOUR COMPANY} 
ought to know. 
 COM2 {YOUR COMPANY} wants to remain a member of the 
{SUPERMARKET S}'s network, because they genuinely 
enjoy their relationship with them. 
SAT6 {YOUR COMPANY}'s relationship with 
{SUPERMARKET S} reflects a happy situation. 
 COM3 {YOUR COMPANY}'s positive feelings towards 
{SUPERMARKET S} are a major reason they continue 
working with them. 
The relationship between the two companies is very 
positive. 
 COM4* 
 
{YOUR COMPANY} expects their relationship with 
{SUPERMARKET S} to continue for a long time. 
{YOUR COMPANY} is very satisfied with 
{SUPERMARKET S}. 
 COM5* Renewal of the relationship with {SUPERMARKET S} is 
virtually automatic. 
In general, {YOUR COMPANY} is pretty happy with 
its dealing with {SUPERMARKET S}. 
 COM6* It is likely that {YOUR COMPANY} will continue doing 
business with {SUPERMARKET S} during the following 
2 years. 
Cronbach’s alpha (t1, t2): 0.96 , 0.97 
Mean (t1, t2): 3.55 , 4.18 
Standard deviation (t1, t2): 1.81 , 1.57 
Range (t1, t2): 1 to 7 , 1 to 7 
 Cronbach’s alpha (t1, t2): 0.84 , 0.84 
Mean (t1, t2): 3.85 , 4.35 
Standard deviation (t1, t2): 1.64 , 1.32 
Range (t1, t2): 1 to 7 , 1 to 7 
* These items were deleted from further analysis   
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APPENDIX VIII.5 MEASURES OF CONSTRUCTS EXPERIMENT 
  
 
MANIPULATION CHECKS 
 
 
 
  
Honesty as part of Trust (Adapted from Kumar, Steenkamp and 
Scheer, 1995) 
 Benevolence as part of Trust (Adapted from Kumar, Steenkamp and 
Scheer, 1995) 
HON1 Even when {SUPERMARKET S} gives {YOUR 
COMPANY} a rather unlikely explanation, 
{YOUR COMPANY} is confident that they are 
telling them the truth. 
 BEN1 Though circumstances change, {YOUR COMPANY} 
believes that {SUPERMARKET S} will be ready and 
willing to offer them assistance and support. 
HON2 {SUPERMARKET S} often provides {YOUR 
COMPANY} information, which later proves to 
be inaccurate ( r ) 
 BEN2 When making important decisions, {SUPERMARKET S} is 
concerned about {YOUR COMPANY}'s  welfare. 
HON3 {SUPERMARKET S} usually keeps the 
promises they make to {YOUR COMPANY}. 
 BEN3 When {YOUR COMPANY} shares their problems with 
{SUPERMARKET S}, they know that {SUPERMARKET 
S} will respond with understanding. 
HON4 Whenever {SUPERMARKET S} gives {YOUR 
COMPANY} advice on their business operations, 
we know they are sharing their best judgment. 
 BEN4 In the future {YOUR COMPANY} can count on 
{SUPERMARKET S} to consider how its decisions and 
actions will affect them. 
HON5 {YOUR COMPANY} can count on 
{SUPERMARKET S} to be sincere. 
 BEN5 When it comes to things, which are important to {YOUR 
COMPANY}, they can depend on the {SUPERMARKET 
S}'s support. 
Cronbach’s alpha (t1): 0.87 
Mean (t1): 4.22 
Standard deviation (t1): 1.60 
Range (t1): 2 to 7 
 Cronbach’s alpha (t1): 0.90 
Mean (t1): 3.48 
Standard deviation (t1): 1.36 
Range (t1): 1 to 7 
 
 
  
Conflict (Adapted from Kumar, Steenkamp and Scheer, 1995) 
 
 Connectedness (Adapted from Hakansson, Anderson and Johanson, 
1994) 
When {YOUR COMPANY} reflects on its 
relationship with {SUPERMARKET S}, {YOUR 
COMPANY} feels anger. 
 CNC1 If supermarket chain {SUPERMARKET S} starts 
cooperating with competitor {YOUR COMPETITOR}, 
{SUPERMARKET S} makes it difficult to work together 
with {YOUR COMPANY}. 
CNF2 When {YOUR COMPANY} reflects on its 
relationship with {SUPERMARKET S}, {YOUR 
COMPANY} feels frustration. 
 CNC2 Too close a relationship between {SUPERMARKET S} and 
{YOUR COMPETITOR} will destroy the balance between 
{YOUR COMPANY} and {SUPERMARKET S}. 
CNF3 When {YOUR COMPANY} reflects on its 
relationship with {SUPERMARKET S}, {YOUR 
COMPANY} feels resentment. 
 CNC3 Collaboration of {SUPERMARKET S} with {YOUR 
COMPETITOR} is harmful to {SUPERMARKET S}’s 
relationship with {YOUR COMPANY}. 
CNF4 When {YOUR COMPANY} reflects on its 
relationship with {SUPERMARKET S}, {YOUR 
COMPANY} feels hostility. 
 CNC4 Although {SUPERMARKET S}’s working together with 
{YOUR COMPETITOR} will likely provide some benefits to 
them, {YOUR COMPANY} may not be happy about this. 
CNF5 A high degree of conflict exists between the 
{SUPERMARKET S} and {YOUR COMPANY}.  
   
CNF6 {SUPERMARKET S} and {YOUR COMPANY} 
have major disagreements on key issues. 
   
Cronbach’s alpha (t1): 0.94 
Mean (t1): 3.64  
Standard deviation (t1): 1.61 
Range (t1): 1 to 7 
 Cronbach’s alpha (t1): 0.78 
Mean (t1): 5.1  
Standard deviation (t1): 1.12  
Range (t1): 2 to 7 
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
 
 
 
 
Na een ongekend snelle professionalisering waarin de slaapverwekkende gefragmenteerde 
kleingruttershandel zich ontpopte tot een hypercompetitieve, geconsolideerde en 
technologisch geavanceerde bedrijfstak staat er bij de retailbranche opnieuw een radicale 
ontwikkeling voor de deur. Deze keer belt de vernieuwing aan bij de achterdeur. Deze 
zogenaamde Back-End Revolution of Retailing wordt mogelijk gemaakt door de recente 
ontwikkelingen in informatie- en communicatietechnologie. Daar komt bij dat door een 
toenemende standaardisering in productcodering en een al wijdverspreide adoptie van 
Web-based communicatiemiddelen de mogelijkheden voor retailers zodanig zijn vergroot 
dat ze nu hun leveranciersrelaties (supply chain management) drastisch kunnen 
vernieuwen. Vernieuwing in de retailer-leverancier relaties is hoogst noodzakelijk want het 
is voor distributiekanalen nog steeds erg lastig om de juiste producten in de juiste 
hoeveelheden op het juiste moment op de juiste plek te krijgen. Dat wordt zeker moeilijker 
te bewerkstelligen als de consumentenvraag vaker onvoorspelbaar verandert. 
 
In de nieuwe manier van zaken doen met hun leveranciers kunnen retailers grofweg kiezen 
tussen twee strategieën. Ze besluiten ofwel om die nieuwe digitale mogelijkheden te 
gebruiken om hard tegen hun leveranciers te vechten, ofwel om met hen samen te werken. 
Een voorbeeld van de vechtstrategie is het organiseren van gemeenschappelijke 
electronische marktplaatsen met reversed auctions waardoor vooral de concurrentie tussen 
leveranciers verhevigd wordt en inkoopprijzen naar beneden worden gedreven. De andere 
strategie die de Back-End Revolutie biedt, is het aangaan van samenwerking met de 
leveranciers. Retailers zouden samen met hun handelspartijen meer kunnen streven naar 
het omvormen van de gezamenlijke aanbodketen tot een vraaggedreven kanaal, dat beter, 
sneller en tegen lagere kosten in consumentenbehoeften voorziet. Efficient Consumer 
Response (ECR), Quick-response (QR), Continuous Replenishment Planning (CRP), 
Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI), Collaborative Planning Forecasting and 
Replenishment (CPFR), Category Management (CM) en Collaborative Customer 
Relationship Management (CCRM); allemaal vormen van kanaalsamenwerkingen. 
Essentieel voor het slagen van zo’n kanaalpartnerschap is dat beide partijen, retailers èn 
leveranciers, elkaar op de hoogte houden van de laatste marktontwikkelingen. Het elkaar 
informeren over wat zij over de markt weten is het centrale onderwerp van dit proefschrift. 
Heel specifiek gaat dit proefschrift in op drie aan elkaar verwante onderzoeksvragen: 
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1. Wat zijn de eigenschappen van het delen van informatie in distributiekanalen? 
2. Wat zijn de antecedenten voor het delen van marktinformatie? 
3. Wat zijn de gevolgen van het delen van marktinformatie? 
 
Op basis van een rijke variëteit aan onderzoeksmethoden worden er antwoorden op deze 
drie vragen geformuleerd. De eerste onderzoeksmethode is literatuuronderzoek. Om er 
zeker van te zijn dat dit proefschrift iets nieuws aan de kennis over het delen van 
marktinformatie toevoegt, is het belangrijk om eerst te weten wat er al over bekend is. In 
Hoofdstuk 2 wordt aan de hand van ruim 120 verschillende studies de bestaande inzichten 
uit drie verschillende onderzoeksperspectieven geïnventariseerd. De drie 
onderzoeksperspectieven die in dat hoofdstuk de revue passeren zijn: supply chain 
optimalisatie benadering, de spel-theoretische benadering, en de gedragswetenschappelijke 
empirische benadering.  
 
De nieuwe inzichten, die in deze dissertatie gepresenteerd worden, zijn gebaseerd op data 
die op twee verschillende manieren verzameld zijn: een enquête en een experiment. De 
enquête is gehouden onder meer dan 170 professionele inkopers van Nederlandse 
retailorganisaties.  De deelnemers aan het experiment waren studenten met een grote 
interesse in marketing en processen binnen handelsrelaties. Hieronder wordt per 
onderzoeksvraag een overzicht gegeven van de belangrijkste bevindingen in het 
proefschrift: 
 
Wat zijn de eigenschappen van het delen van informatie in distributiekanalen? 
In de praktijk van distributiekanalen wordt het intensiever delen van marktinformatie 
aangeduid met diverse namen. Dat geeft al aan dat er een rijke verscheidenheid bestaat in 
de overeenkomsten op basis waarvan de retailer en leverancier elkaar inzicht geven in de 
eigen marktinformatie. Van het eenvoudig frequent en electronisch uitwisselen van bestel- 
en leveringsinformatie in EDI- en QR-arrangementen, tot het uitwisselen van strategische 
klanten- en concurrentie-informatie (CM en CCRM). Hiertussen zijn er allerlei vormen als 
het delen van logistieke informatie (VMI), vraagvoorspellingen, en sales promotie 
planning (CPFR). Niet alleen het type marktinformatie dat uitgewisseld wordt, maar ook 
de manier waarop informatie gedeeld wordt kan per bedrijf uiteenlopen. Partijen kunnen 
verschillen in de formalisatie van hun informatieuitwisseling, in de exclusiviteit ervan, in 
de contactfrequenctie en in de betrokkenheid van hoger management.  
 
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt op basis van de enquêteuitkomsten systematisch gekeken naar de 
verscheidene aspecten van marktinformatie-uitwisseling tussen retailer en leverancier. Een 
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belangrijke les is om de gedeelde informatie (Gedeelde Inhoud, Shared Content) te 
scheiden van de manier waarop marktinformatie gedeeld wordt (Deelwijze, Sharing 
Mode). Wat betreft de Gedeelde Inhoud, toont dit proefschrift empirisch bewijs dat hierin 
een hiërarchische (opeenvolgende) rangschikking van 5 niveau’s bestaat. Het nul-niveau is 
geen informatie uitwisselen; het hoogste is “vier” en betekent dat er inzicht gegeven wordt 
in strategische klanten-, concurrentie- en businessproces-informatie. We hebben ontdekt 
dat kanaalpartijen pas strategische marktinformatie doorgeven nadat ze elkaar inzicht 
hebben gegeven in hun meer operationele soorten van informatie. In onze steekproef geeft 
80% van de retailers en 64% van de leveranciers inzicht in enige marktinformatie (hoger 
dan niveau 0). Vierentwintig procent van de retailers geeft inzicht in het hoogste niveau, 
terwijl 16% van de leveranciers dat doen. Aangaande de Deelwijze, wordt er over het 
algemeen vrij frequent uitgewisseld, vindt het zelden exclusief plaats en in weinig gevallen 
wordt er uitvoerig geformaliseerd. Hoewel er een verband bestaat tussen Gedeelde Inhoud 
en Deelwijze laat dit proefschrift zien dat het niveau van de gedeelde informatie niet 
automatisch iets zegt over de manier waarop informatie uitgewisseld wordt. In de latere 
hoofdstukken wordt het belang van het onderscheid tussen Gedeelde Inhoud en Deelwijze 
onderstreept. 
 
Wat zijn de antecedenten voor het delen van marktinformatie? 
Oftewel: waarom delen sommige bedrijven wel marktinformatie met elkaar of anderen 
niet? Hoewel de voordelen van ketensamenwerking en het delen van informatie bij veel 
retailers en fabrikanten bekend en evident zijn, laten diverse beschrijvende onderzoeken 
zien dat het doorgeven van marktinformatie aan elkaar toch nog maar sporadisch 
plaatsvindt. De vraag waarom bepaalde bedrijven wel en andere geen informatie 
uitwisselen met hun kanaalpartijen is nog nooit grootschalig en in diverse retailbranches 
tegelijk onderzocht. Voor deze tweede onderzoeksvraag formuleert Hoofdstuk 3 een 
veelomvattend onderzoeksmodel dat gestoeld is op de sociale ruiltheorie. Die theorie stelt 
dat bedrijven een relatie met een ander voortzetten en uitbouwen wanneer de voordelen 
voor hen de nadelen overstijgen. Dat wil zeggen dat strategische marktinformatie pas 
wordt gedeeld wanneer de voordelen voor een retailer of leverancier groter zijn dan de 
nadelen. De hypothesen hierover worden in Hoofdstuk 6 op basis van de enquêteresultaten 
getoetst. De voornaamste conclusie is dat bedrijven [meer] strategische informatie delen in 
twee gevallen. Ten eerste delen zij informatie vanuit een positie van sterkte: als ze zelf 
capaciteiten hebben ontwikkeld om de marktinformatie goed te gebruiken. Ten tweede zijn 
ze geneigd intensiever informatie te delen binnen kanaalrelaties waarvan ook de andere 
partij sterk afhankelijk is.  Interessant  en misschien wel counter-intuïtief is dat deze studie 
laat zien dat het vertrouwen van de retailer in de leverancier geen aantoonbare 
stimulerende rol speelt. Eveneens verrassend is dat turbulentie in de consumentenvraag 
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retailers lijkt ontmoedigen om informatie te delen. Juist in tijden van een onzekere 
consumentenvraag is real-time marktinformatie waardevoller voor een betere prestatie van 
het gehele distributiekanaal.  
 
Wat zijn de gevolgen van het delen van marktinformatie?  
De derde onderzoeksvraag, die in deze dissertatie aan de orde wordt gesteld, is of het delen 
van marktinformatie leidt tot een betere prestatie van het distributiekanaal. Kan het delen 
van informatie daadwerkelijk bijdragen aan het succes van de omvorming van de 
aanbodketen tot een vraaggedreven kanaal? Leren informatiedelende bedrijven beter van 
de ontwikkelingen in de consumentenmarkt? Resulteert het uitwisselen van 
marktinformatie in hogere gezamenlijke winsten en het creëren van concurrentievoordelen 
in het kanaal? Draagt het bij aan het verbeteren van de relatiekwaliteit tussen retailer en 
leverancier? In de hoofdstukken 7 (enquête) en 8 (experiment) toetst dit proefschrift of het 
informatiedelen daadwerkelijk de gewenste positieve gevolgen heeft. Zowel de uitkomsten 
van enquête als die van het experiment bevestigen dat kanaalrelaties beter worden 
naarmate er meer informatie wordt gedeeld. Bovendien laat de enquête zien dat wanneer 
retailer en leverancier hogere niveaus van marktinformatie uitwisselen, zij beter van de 
markt leren, meer gezamenlijke winst genereren en extra concurrentievoordelen creëren. 
Dieper gaande analyses laten voorts zien, dat vooral in omstandigheden met een turbulente 
consumentenvraag de leer-effecten en concurrentievoordelen aanwezig en omvangrijk zijn. 
Dit demonstreert dat de retailers die hun eerste reactie om niet te delen in dergelijke 
omstandigheden negeren, daar uiteindelijk voor beloond worden met betere resultaten voor 
het kanaal.  
 
Direct relevant voor bedrijven is dat Hoofdstuk 9 op basis van de onderzoeksbevindingen 
duidelijke richtlijnen geeft die retailers en leveranciers kunnen hanteren om de condities 
voor en de effectiviteit van het delen van marktinformatie te verbeteren. 
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Market Information Sharing in Channel Relationships
Its Nature, Antecedents, and Consequences
Efficient Consumer Response, Quick-response, Continuous Replenishment
Planning, Vendor-Managed Inventory, Collaborative Planning Forecasting
and Replenishment – all are names for channel arrangements in which
retailers and suppliers actively work together in transforming the
supply chain into a demand-driven channel in order to fulfill
consumer wishes better, faster, and at lower costs. For collaborative
channel arrangements it is essential that retailers and suppliers
keep each other informed about the latest consumer market develop-
ments. This dissertation focuses on market information sharing practices
in retailer-supplier channel relationships. By investigating the under-
lying nature, it finds that it is important to separate sharing mode
from the shared content. The sharing mode in the information
sharing arrangement is the way in which information is communi-
cated between the retailer and the supplier. A key lesson is that the
content shared in a channel relationship follows a hierarchical struc-
ture, meaning that channel members share more confidential and
strategic information only after disclosing more operational and
tactical market information. The dissertation also exposes the circum-
stances in which channel firms are most inclined to share strategic
market information in a more collaborative manner. Furthermore, two
empirical studies with different methodologies demonstrate that
market information sharing leads to a better channel performance.
This dissertation not only provides an in-depth insight into market
information sharing practices, but also gives marketers precise guide-
lines to design effective market information sharing arrangements.
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founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by
ERIM is focussed on the management of the firm in its environment,
its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its business processes in their
interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From
a variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu-
nity is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront
of creating new business knowledge.
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